National Reconciliation (Sudan)

Following the 1976 coup attempt, Gaafar Nimeiri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan. In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two leaders signed an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government.

Background

Main article: 1976 Sudanese coup attempt

In early 1972, Gaafar Nimeiry visited Saudi Arabia and engaged in dialogue with Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, the opposition leader, at the request of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The dialogue revolved around addressing past grievances and the political landscape. Nimeiry attributed past massacres to communists while Sharif criticized Nimeiry's regime. Offers and suggestions were exchanged, including Nimeiry proposing the Vice Presidency to Sharif, but no agreement was reached. Disappointed with the outcome, Sharif planned an attack on Khartoum with Libyan support.

Sadiq al-Mahdi joined the opposition and orchestrated a coup attempt in 1976, storming Khartoum with dissident forces led by Muhammad Nour Saad on 2 July. Their attempt to arrest Nimeiry was met with resistance, and the ensuing battle caused significant civilian casualties. Despite taking control initially, the rebel forces faced supply shortages and eventually succumbed to loyalist troops, ending the coup after a week. The aftermath involved searches, arrests, and executions of suspected plotters.

The reconciliation

Sadiq al-Mahdi sworn into the government after the 1977 National Reconciliation

Following the 1976 coup attempt, Gaafar Nimeiri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan. In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two leaders signed an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government.

Aftermath

As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi, who was sentenced to death in absentia. The Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) also admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's one-party system. Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood party an dean of law at the University of Khartoum who had been imprisoned and then exiled after the May Revolution, was also released and became Justice Minister and Attorney General in 1979. Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, a previous Finance Minister who led the National Unionist Party, stood against the President's peace proposal. However, he ultimately endorsed a reconciliation accord in London. While the leaders have made their way back, the 5,000 insurgence located in Libya and Ethiopia remain absent. The Government intends to dispatch delegates to visit the camps with the aim of convincing them to return. Additionally, efforts have been initiated to improve the previously tense relations with Addis Ababa and Tripoli.

However, relations between Khartoum and the South Sudan leadership worsened after the National Reconciliation due to the shift to Sharia law, and adopting Arabic as the country official language.

Sharia laws

By 1977, a committee was working to align Sudanese law with the sharia, and the Muslim Brotherhood was gaining influence in university student political groups. While legislative attempts to Islamize the law through the People's Assembly were met with resistance. In 1979, the ongoing disagreement between the Sudanese Brotherhood and the parent organization resurfaced. Al-Turabi declined allegiance to the international group, and a split occurred, with Sheikh Sadiq and his followers aligning with him. Pontiff Youssef Nour al-Daim took charge of the Sudanese Brotherhood since 1969, although it remained a minor faction with limited influence. Al-Turabi designated his wing the "Sudanese Islamic Movement."

In September 1983, President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced sharia law in Sudan, known as September laws, symbolically disposing of alcohol and implementing hudud punishments like public amputations. Al-Turabi supported this move, differing from Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's dissenting view. Al-Turabi and his allies within the regime also opposed self-rule in the south, a secular constitution, and non-Islamic cultural acceptance. One condition for national reconciliation was re-evaluating the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that granted the south self-governance, reflecting a failure to accommodate minority rights and leverage Islam's rejection of racism. The Islamic economy followed in early 1984, eliminating interest and instituting zakat. Nimeiri declared himself the imam of the Sudanese Umma in 1984.

Opposition to Nimeiri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition, later became prime minister, but his efforts to reform the sharia were limited by pressure from the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by his brother-in-law Hasan al-Turabi.

Nimeiri's attempt at implementing an "Islamic path" in Sudan from 1977 to 1985, ncluding aligning with religious factions, ultimately failed. His transition from nationalist leftist ideologies to strict Islam was detailed in his books "Al-Nahj al-Islami limadha?" and "Al-Nahj al-Islami kayfa?" The connection between Islamic revival and reconciling with opponents of the 1969 revolution coincided with the rise of militant Islam in other parts of the world. Nimeiri's association with the Abu Qurun Sufi order influenced his shift towards Islam, leading him to appoint followers of the order into significant roles. The process of legislating the "Islamic path" began in 1983, culminating in the enactment of various orders and acts to implement sharia law and other Islamic principles.

Nimeiri's establishment of the Islamic state in Sudan was outlined in his speech at a 1984 Islamic conference. He justified the implementation of the sharia due to a rising crime rate. He claimed a reduction of crime by over 40% within a year due to the new punishments. Nimeiri attributed Sudan's economic success to the zakat and taxation act, outlining its benefits for the poor and non-Muslims. His association with the Abu Qurun Sufi order and his self-proclaimed position as imam led to his belief that he alone could interpret laws in line with the sharia. However, his economic policies, including Islamic banking, led to severe economic issues. Nimeiri's collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ansar aimed to end sectarian divisions and implement the sharia. The Ansar, despite initial collaboration, criticized Nimeiri's implementation as un-Islamic and corrupt.

Nimeiri's Islamic phase resulted in renewed conflict in Southern Sudan in 1983, marking the end of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which had granted regional autonomy and recognized the diverse nature of Sudanese society. The agreement ensured equality regardless of race or religion and allowed for separate personal laws for non-Muslims. However, hostilities escalated due to oil discovery, dissolution of the Southern Regional Assembly, and decentralization efforts. Despite this, the Islamic laws implemented by Nimeiri exacerbated the situation. The political landscape shifted with Nimeiri's removal in 1985, leading to the emergence of numerous political parties. The National Islamic Front (NIF), Ansar, and Khatmiyya Sufi order (DUP) played crucial roles in Sudan's politics. Hasan al-Turabi and the NIF consistently supported the Islamic laws and resisted changes.

Another Islamic movement in Sudan was the Republican Brotherhood, founded by Mahmoud Muhammad Taha. This movement embraced the concept of Islam having two messages and abandoned numerous Islamic practices. It advocated for peaceful coexistence with Israel, gender equality, criticised Wahhabism, called for freedoms and refraining from implementing Islamic criminal punishments, and championed a federal social democratic government. Taha strongly opposed the ban on the Sudanese Communist Party and condemned the decision as a distortion of democracy, even though he wasn't a communist. He was sentenced to apostasy in 1968 and again in 1984, leading to his execution in January 1985 under the September laws, despite his strong opposition. This event significantly fuelled public and international discontent.

Southern Sudan

Main article: Second Sudanese Civil War

While legislative attempts to Islamize the law through the People's Assembly were met with resistance, the mutiny of southern forces in 1983 changed the political landscape. On 5 June 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the south's growing political power by re-dividing the Southern Region into the three old provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Al Istiwai, and Aali an Nil; he had suspended the Southern Regional Assembly almost two years earlier. The southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which emerged in mid-1983, unsuccessfully opposed this re-division and called for the creation of a new united Sudan.

Within a few months, in September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed the sharia as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. Nimeiri's decrees, which became known as the September Laws, were bitterly resented both by secularized Muslims and by the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the sharia and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. Meanwhile, the security situation in the south had deteriorated so much that by the end of 1983 it amounted to a resumption of the civil war.

Transition to democracy

The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the February 1978 People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratise Sudan's political system. However, the People's Assembly elections marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance personal rather than national interests.

The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing their own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.

The Libyan-Sudanese crisis

In 1980 and 1981, Sudan was deeply concerned about Libya's actions in Chad, which had historical and geopolitical implications. The relationship between Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Sudan's Nimeiri was characterised by suspicion, with a low point being the July 1976 attempted coup in Khartoum, which had Libyan involvement. Despite nearly succeeding, the coup plotters, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and Husayn al-Hindi, were sentenced to death in absentia. However, Sadiq later returned to Khartoum, and relations between Sudan and Libya improved briefly.

The situation in Chad, a country divided between a Muslim north and a Christian/animist south, added complexity. With Sudan's help, a ceasefire was achieved in February 1978, but it collapsed shortly after the Fezzan summit involving Chad, Niger, Libya, and Sudan. Libya's claim to the Aozou Strip, rich in uranium resources, remained unresolved. In December 1980, a Libyan "Islamic Legion" crossed into Chad and occupied its capital, Ndjamena. The situation worsened in early 1981, with plans for a Chado/Libyan union announced, raising concerns in Khartoum and Cairo.

Sudan supported Chadian rebels from its Darfur region, which created tensions. Libyan airstrikes on Darfur border villages led to increased U.S. support for Sudan. Although the threat of a large-scale Libyan invasion was low, Sudan remained vigilant due to its past close calls with Libyan-backed coup attempts. Sudan took precautionary measures, including detentions and military deployments. Efforts by some African states to defuse the situation were based on an OAU resolution affirming Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei's right to invite help for security, but Libya's role in Chad and the choice of Tripoli for the next OAU summit deepened concerns for Sudan and Egypt.

1985 protest and coup d'état

In early 1985, anti-government discontent resulted in a general strike in Khartoum. Demonstrators opposed rising food, gasoline, and transport costs. The general strike paralysed the country. Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the United States, was unable to suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations against his regime which lead to the 1985 coup d’état.

Political and economic discontent against Nimeiry grew over several years prior to 1985, according to Sudanese interviewed by The New York Times, who said that Nimeiry had "begun to alienate almost every sector of Sudanese society". Major complaints included the obligatory use of Islamic law throughout Sudan, which upset non-Muslims, especially in the southern part of Sudan, and price increases resulting from an economic austerity program implemented under pressure from the United States (US) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Price increases in late March 1985 were considered to be a major trigger factor for protests. Eight doctors', lawyers' and university lecturers' associations called for a protest on 3 April and a "general political strike until the abolition of the current regime". Massive demonstrations took place in Khartoum and around Sudan on 3 April. The general strike took place up to 6 April, when Nimeiry was deposed, with a high effectiveness in shutting down governance of Sudan. The use of massive civil disobedience that led to the coup d'état deposing Nimeiry from the presidency on 6 April is often referred to as the 1985 Revolution that followed the Sudanese October 1964 Revolution.

On 6 April 1985, while Nimeiry was on an official visit to the United States of America in the hope of gaining more financial aid from Washington, a bloodless military coup led by his defence minister Gen. Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab ousted him from power. At the subsequent elections the pro-Islamist leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi (who had attempted a coup against Nimeiry in 1976) became Prime Minister.

Opposition to Nimeiri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition, later became prime minister, but his efforts to reform the sharia were limited by pressure from the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by his brother-in-law Hasan al-Turabi.

The NIF's formation in 1985 aimed to assert Islam as the general source of law due to the Muslim majority, and it advocated a federal power-sharing system. The events culminated in a transition government, freezing the September Laws, and eventually in the elected coalition government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, dissatisfaction with his handling of the issue, his failure to engage with SPLM/SPLA, and moves to abrogate the September Laws led to his government's resignation in 1989. The subsequent coup, supported by the NIF, marked a turning point, further entrenching the Islamic agenda. This complex relationship between Islamization, power dynamics, and political manoeuvring underscored Sudan's trajectory and deep divisions between north and south, Arab and non-Arab communities, and Islamic and secular ideologies. The events of 1983 and their aftermath intensified fear and mistrust among various groups, shaping the course of Sudanese history.

The NIF's formation in 1985 aimed to assert Islam as the general source of law due to the Muslim majority, and it advocated a federal power-sharing system. The events culminated in a transition government, freezing the September Laws, and eventually in the elected coalition government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, dissatisfaction with his handling of the issue, his failure to engage with SPLM/SPLA, and moves to abrogate the September Laws led to his government's resignation in 1989. The subsequent coup, supported by the NIF, marked a turning point, further entrenching the Islamic agenda.