User:CheshireKatz/Notes: Difference between revisions

Majoritarian/Proselytizing Problem of the Categorical Imperative: "Non-Christians should be persecuted as heretics." "Religious law should be enforced." "My wife takes pleasure in whipping me, so I should submit to whippings."

Positivism

John Austin's Legal Positivism

Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon

H.L.A. Hart's Rule of Recognition and Practice Theory of Social Rules

In Convention: A Philosophical Study, David Kellogg Lewis's described conventions (as explained by Andrei Marmor):

Standard instances of conventions are not agreements, rather they are practical (pragmatic) solutions to recurrent coordination problems.

A typical coordination problem arises, according to Lewis, when:

Several agents have a particular structure of preferences with respect to their mutual modes of conduct, namely that between several alternatives of conduct open to them in a given set of circumstances, each and every agent has a stronger preference to act as the other agents will, than his own preference for acting upon any one of the particular alternatives.
Most coordination problems are easily solved by simple agreements between the agents to act upon one, arbitrary chosen alternative, thus securing uniformity of action among them.
However, when a particular coordination problem is recurrent, and agreement is difficult to obtain, (mostly because of the large number of agents involved), a social rule is very likely to emerge, and this rule is a convention.
— Coleman, Hart's Postscript (p. 200)

Interpretivism

Ronald Dworkin's Legal Interpretivism

Miscellaneous

Calvinball

Elder Wisdom Circle

Richard Rorty

"From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." - Karl Marx

Open Theism & Rabbi Harold Kushner

Wiki Cheatsheet

@@ Line 53: / Line 53: @@
 [[H.L.A._Hart|H.L.A. Hart's]] [[Rule of Recognition]] and [[Practice Theory of Social Rules]]
-[[David Kellogg Lewis|David Kellogg Lewis's]] description of how [[convention (norm)|convention]]s arise from [[Convention: A Philosophical Study]] (explained by [[Andrei Marmor]]):
+In [[Convention: A Philosophical Study]], [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Kellogg Lewis's]] described [[convention (norm)|convention]]s (as explained by [[Andrei Marmor]]):
 {{cquote2|Standard instances of conventions are not agreements, rather they are practical (pragmatic) solutions to recurrent coordination problems. }}
 A typical coordination problem arises, according to Lewis, when:
-{{cquote2|Several agents have a particular structure of preferences with respect to their mutual modes of conduct, namely that between several alternatives of conduct open to them in a given set of circumstances, each and every agent has a stronger preference to act as the other agents will, than his own preference for acting upon any one of the particular alternatives.
+{{cquote2|Several agents have a particular structure of preferences with respect to their mutual modes of conduct, namely that between several alternatives of conduct open to them '''in a given set of circumstances, each and every agent has a stronger preference to act as the other agents will, than his own preference for acting upon any one of the particular alternatives.'''
 Most coordination problems are easily solved by simple agreements between the agents to act upon one, arbitrary chosen alternative, thus securing uniformity of action among them.
 However, when a particular coordination problem is recurrent, and agreement is difficult to obtain, (mostly because of the large number of agents involved), a social rule is very likely to emerge, and this rule is a convention.|Coleman|<u>Hart's Postscript</u> (p. 200)}}