Battle of Borodino

"Borodino" redirects here. For other uses, see Borodino (disambiguation).

Battle of Borodino
Part of French invasion of Russia (1812)
File:Napoleon-borodino.jpg Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights, by Vasily Vereshchagin (1897)
Date September 7, 1812 Location Borodino, Russia Result French Victory
Belligerents
First French Empire	Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Napoleon I	Mikhail Kutuzov
Strength
82,400 infantry 26,700 cavalry 14,900 artillery troops with 587 guns	72,000 infantry 17,300 cavalry 14,500 artillery troops with 637 guns
Casualties and losses
~28,500 - 50,000 killed or wounded	~35,000 - 58,000 killed or wounded ~1,000 captured 20 guns lost.

Template:Campaignbox Napoleon's invasion of Russia The Battle of Borodino (Template:Lang-ru Borodinskaja bitva, Template:Lang-fr) (September 7, 1812, or August 26 in the Julian calendar then used in Russia), was the largest and bloodiest single-day battle of the Napoleonic Wars, involving more than a quarter of a million soldiers and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties.

It was fought by the French Grande Armée under Napoleon I and the Imperial Russian army of General Mikhail Kutusov near the village of Borodino, west from the town of Mozhaysk. The battle ended with frustrated tactical results, although the French captured the main positions on the battlefield. Strategic considerations and the poor condition of the army forced the Russians to withdraw. The clash at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign as it was the last offensive battle fought by Napoleon in Russia.

Background

File:Kutuzovborodino.jpg

Kutuzov at Borodino

The French Grande Armée had begun the invasion of Russia in June, 1812. Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in defence of the motherland. The Russian forces — previously massing on the Polish frontier — fell back before the invaders in the face of the speedy French advance (see main article on the invasion). Count Michael Barclay de Tolly was commander-in-chief of the Russian army. His attempts at forming a defensive line were thwarted time and again by the fast moving French line, but Barclay's constant retreat was nevertheless perceived as an unwillingness to fight, and he was removed. The new Russian commander, Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, although much more fierce in his rhetoric, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometers of Moscow. Kutuzov picked an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino and from September 3 strengthened it with earthworks, notably the Rayevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open arrow-shaped 'Bagration fleches' to the left.

Opposing forces

The Russian forces present at Borodino were 180 infantry battalions, 164 cavalry squadrons, 20 Cossack regiments, and 55 artillery batteries with 637 artillery pieces; in total the Russians had 103,800 troops. There were 7,000 Cossacks as well as 10,000 Russian militiamen in the area who did not take part in the battle. After the battle, militia units were broken up to provide reinforcements for third lines of depleted regular battalions. Of the 637 Russian artillery pieces, 300 were held in reserve; many of these guns were never committed to battle.

The French forces present at Borodino were 214 battalions of infantry, 317 squadrons of cavalry and 587 artillery pieces, for a total of 124,000 troops. However, the French Imperial Guard, which consisted of 30 infantry battalions, 27 cavalry squadrons and 109 artillery pieces, 18,500 troops in total was never committed to battle.

Battle

Battle of Borodino

Battle of Borodino, Peter von Hess, 1843

Napoleon's conduct during the battle suggests that his tactical decisions were marred by his efforts He was also suffering from a fever at the time, which may explain his uncharacteristic detachment from the battle as well as his unusually simplistic battle plan.

Napoleon ordered a frontal assault straight at the Russians. It is believed he was seeking a decisive encounter that would destroy the Russian army in one day. The initial French attack was successful if costly; the King of Naples, Joachim Murat, directed a joint cavalry and infantry attack that by early afternoon had broken through the Russian line and seized the Rayevski Redoubt, lost it and retaken it. The cavalry assault on the Russian redoubt was not made by the French army, but led by Major Friedrich Wilhelm Carl Luffleholtz von Colberg, in command of the Saxon Heavy Cavalry, and by Oberstleutnant Christian Günther von Selmitz, leading the Zastrow Cuirassiers.

But the Russians committed their reserves and the battle ground down into a bloody attritional mess. Even with the Russians nearly at breaking point, Napoleon would not commit to sending in the French Imperial Guard, fearing a battle possible the next day. A Russian counter-attack was broken by artillery; and as night fell, both sides disengaged. At night, after discussing with his officers, Kutuzov decided not to resume battle the next day and retreat, allowing the French to take Moscow. He had doubts that the Russian army could withstand another day of battle, and thought it was more important to preserve its strength rather than try to save Moscow at all cost. In retrospect, it was a wise decision.

Statistical discussion

Casualty estimates vary dramatically. The French are said to have suffered 28,000 dead and wounded including 48 generals, according to historian Adam Zamoyski. Others put the figure as high as 50,000 (Stephen Pope). The Russians lost between 38,500 - 58,000 (45,000 is the generally accepted number). Some believe that combined casualties were as high as 125,000, but this is unlikely. The lowest casualty estimates (28,000 French and 38,500 Russians) together give a combined total of 66,500. The casualty figures, except for the lowest estimates, are high enough to make the Battle of Borodino the bloodiest engagement in modern human history, although such a statement is hardly uncontroversial. Though other modern battles may have ended with a higher number of casualties (the Somme, Battle of Stalingrad), none seems to have surpassed Borodino in only a single day. Controversial casualty figures of ancient times make accurate comparison with them problematical. Consideration of casualties on a per-day basis is further complicated by the fact that casualty figures for Borodino are quoted over the three day period, from the 5 to 7 September (24 to 26 August old style), over which action took place, with the major action taking place on the last day.

Around 8,500 casualties were sustained each hour of the conflict— the equivalent of a full-strength company wiped out every minute. In some divisions casualties exceeded 80% of the strength prior to the battle.

File:Borodino4.jpg

Modern reenactment of the battle.

Adam Zamoyski, in his in-depth account of the Russian campaign, estimates that 1,400,000 rounds were discharged by the French infantry and a further 60,000 to 91,000 by the artillery. This averages as 2,300 rounds of musketry per minute from the French.

Aftermath

The Russian retreat opened the way for the French to seize Moscow on September 14 1812.

The battle was famously described by Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow to mark the 150th anniversary of the event.

There exists the tradition to replay the battle at the same place on August 26. At the battlefield today the 'Bagration fleches' are still preserved; there is also a modest monument to the French soldiers fallen in the battle, and also remnants of the trenches from the 7 day battle fought at the same battlefield in 1941 between the Soviet and the German armies (which took fewer human lives than the one of 1812).

File:Raevsky battery.jpg

Raevsky Battery at Borodino, details of Roubaud's panoramic painting.

References

• Chandler, David. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars (Wordsworth editions Ltd., 1999).
• Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 0-02-523660-1
• Markham, David. Napoleon for Dummies (Wiley Pub Inc., 2005).
• Riehn, Richard K. Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005.
• Smith, D. The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book. Greenhill Books, 1998.
• "История военного искусства", М., Воениздат, 1966. "History of military art", 1966. - Russian source

Monuments

• File:Borodino1.jpg
• File:Borodino2.jpg
• File:Borodino5.jpg
• File:Borodino3.jpg
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External links

• A very detailed description of the battle
• BORODINO: maps, diagrams, illustrations
• The Battle of Borodino, situation at 12.30 p.m.: Classic battlefield panorama by Franz A. Roubaud (1912) with explanations
• The Virtual Battle of Borodino

55°30.51′N 35°49.27′E