Eric Maskin: Difference between revisions
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'''Eric Stark Maskin''' (born [[December 12]], [[1950]]) is an American economist and co-winner of the 2007 [[Nobel Prize in Economics]] "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." |
'''Eric Stark Maskin''' (born [[December 12]], [[1950]]) is an American economist and co-winner of the 2007 [[Nobel Prize in Economics]] "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory." |
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He is the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the [[Institute for Advanced Study]]. He attended [[Harvard University]] where he received his A.B. and Ph.D. After he doctorate from Harvard University, Eric went to the [[University of Cambridge]] in 1976 where he was employed as a research fellow at [[Jesus College, Cambridge|Jesus College]]. In 1977, he received an honorary M.A. from the University. He went to [[MIT]] in 1980 as an assistant professor and remained there for several years with a brief interlude at [[Churchill College]] of the University of Cambridge between 1980-82. |
He is the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the [[Institute for Advanced Study]]. He attended [[Harvard University]] where he received his A.B. and Ph.D. After he earned his doctorate from Harvard University, Eric went to the [[University of Cambridge]] in 1976 where he was employed as a research fellow at [[Jesus College, Cambridge|Jesus College]]. In 1977, he received an honorary M.A. from the University. He went to [[MIT]] in 1980 as an assistant professor and remained there for several years with a brief interlude at [[Churchill College]] of the University of Cambridge between 1980-82. |
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He has worked in diverse areas of [[economic theory]], such as [[game theory]], the economics of incentives, and contract theory. He is particularly well known for his papers on [[mechanism design]]/[[implementation theory]] and [[dynamic games]]. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality and studying coalition formation. He is a Fellow of the ''[[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]]'', ''[[Econometric Society]]'', and the ''European Economic Association'', and a Corresponding Fellow of the ''[[British Academy]]''. He was president of the ''[[Econometric Society]]'' in 2003. |
He has worked in diverse areas of [[economic theory]], such as [[game theory]], the economics of incentives, and contract theory. He is particularly well known for his papers on [[mechanism design]]/[[implementation theory]] and [[dynamic games]]. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality and studying coalition formation. He is a Fellow of the ''[[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]]'', ''[[Econometric Society]]'', and the ''European Economic Association'', and a Corresponding Fellow of the ''[[British Academy]]''. He was president of the ''[[Econometric Society]]'' in 2003. |
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Revision as of 12:18, 15 October 2007
Eric Maskin | |
|---|---|
| Born | December 12, 1950 |
| Nationality |  American |
| Alma mater | Harvard University |
| Awards | Nobel Prize in Economics (2007) |
| Scientific career | |
| Fields | Economics |
| Institutions | the Institute for Advanced Study |
Eric Stark Maskin (born December 12, 1950) is an American economist and co-winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory."
He is the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study. He attended Harvard University where he received his A.B. and Ph.D. After he earned his doctorate from Harvard University, Eric went to the University of Cambridge in 1976 where he was employed as a research fellow at Jesus College. In 1977, he received an honorary M.A. from the University. He went to MIT in 1980 as an assistant professor and remained there for several years with a brief interlude at Churchill College of the University of Cambridge between 1980-82.
He has worked in diverse areas of economic theory, such as game theory, the economics of incentives, and contract theory. He is particularly well known for his papers on mechanism design/implementation theory and dynamic games. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality and studying coalition formation. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, and the European Economic Association, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was president of the Econometric Society in 2003.
References
Webpage from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science
