Countervalue: Difference between revisions
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The rationale behind countervalue targeting is that when two sides have both achieved [[assured destruction]] capability -- that is, that the nuclear arsenals of each side have the apparent ability to survive a wide range of counterforce attacks, and counterattack -- then, in an all-out nuclear war, the value of targeting the opponent's nuclear arsenal diminishes, and the value of targeting the opponent's cities and civilians increases. This line of reasoning, however, assumes that the opponent values its civilians over its military forces. |
The rationale behind countervalue targeting is that when two sides have both achieved [[assured destruction]] capability -- that is, that the nuclear arsenals of each side have the apparent ability to survive a wide range of counterforce attacks, and counterattack -- then, in an all-out nuclear war, the value of targeting the opponent's nuclear arsenal diminishes, and the value of targeting the opponent's cities and civilians increases. This line of reasoning, however, assumes that the opponent values its civilians over its military forces. |
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Some argue that countervalue targeting upholds [[nuclear deterrence]] because both sides are more likely to believe in each other's [[no first |
Some argue that countervalue targeting upholds [[nuclear deterrence]] because both sides are more likely to believe in each other's [[no first use]]. The line of reasoning is that if an aggressor strikes first with nuclear weapons against an opponent's countervalue targets, then, by definition, such an attack does not degrade the opponent's military capacity to retaliate. |
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Others, however, counter that countervalue targeting is neither moral nor credible because if an aggressor should strike first with nuclear weapons against only a limited number of a defender's counterforce military targets, the defender should not retaliate in this situation against the aggressor's civilian populace. |
Others, however, counter that countervalue targeting is neither moral nor credible because if an aggressor should strike first with nuclear weapons against only a limited number of a defender's counterforce military targets, the defender should not retaliate in this situation against the aggressor's civilian populace. |
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Revision as of 08:38, 7 November 2007
Countervalue refers to the targeting of an opponent's cities and civilian populations. In contrast, counterforce refers to the targeting of an opponent's military personnel, forces and facilities.
Theory
In nuclear warfare, enemy targets can be divided into two general types; counterforce military targets and countervalue civilian targets.
The rationale behind countervalue targeting is that when two sides have both achieved assured destruction capability -- that is, that the nuclear arsenals of each side have the apparent ability to survive a wide range of counterforce attacks, and counterattack -- then, in an all-out nuclear war, the value of targeting the opponent's nuclear arsenal diminishes, and the value of targeting the opponent's cities and civilians increases. This line of reasoning, however, assumes that the opponent values its civilians over its military forces.
Some argue that countervalue targeting upholds nuclear deterrence because both sides are more likely to believe in each other's no first use. The line of reasoning is that if an aggressor strikes first with nuclear weapons against an opponent's countervalue targets, then, by definition, such an attack does not degrade the opponent's military capacity to retaliate.
Others, however, counter that countervalue targeting is neither moral nor credible because if an aggressor should strike first with nuclear weapons against only a limited number of a defender's counterforce military targets, the defender should not retaliate in this situation against the aggressor's civilian populace.
World War II
Although the terminology had not yet been invented, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were countervalue operations. As these have -- so far -- been the only usages of nuclear weapons in the history of war, there is no real-world example of counterforce targeting.
International Law
The targeting of civilians in nuclear war is not specifically prohibited by any principle of international law. However, such a tactic prevents the maintenance of, for example, certain rights of civilians during times of hostility as enumerated in Part II of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and so the targeting of civilians for bombardment of any kind would be a violation of treaty for any group that has ratified this convention. The United States has ratified it, with a single reservation: The United States reserve the right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the provisions of Article 68, paragraph 2, without regard to whether the offences referred to therein are punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation begins. This reservation potentially provides a loophole whereby the use of nuclear weapons against a civilian population can be interpreted as a summary sentence of death for everyone affected, and is thus consistent with the sense in which the United States has accepted the Fourth Geneva Convention, though arguably it contradicts the intention of the Convention itself.
See also
References
- GlobalSecurity.org: Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence