Greco-Persian Wars: Difference between revisions
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A force of 10,000 Athenians and Spartans led by Euenetus and [[Themistocles]] was dispatched to the [[vale of Tempe]] between Thessaly and Macedon after a call by Thessalian cities that disliked the Alevades. It arrived there traveling by ship to [[Phthiotis]] and from there by land. There they blocked the pass, but were joined by few Thessalian horsemen. [[Alexander I of Macedon]] warned the allied force that Xerxes intended to pass through another pass, so they left the way they came. This happened at the time Xerxes was still at Abydos.<ref>Herodotus VII,173</ref> All of Thessaly then defected to the Persians, as did many cities north of Thermopylae when they saw that help was not to come. It took Xerxes 13 days to travel from Therme to Thermopylae. |
A force of 10,000 Athenians and Spartans led by Euenetus and [[Themistocles]] was dispatched to the [[vale of Tempe]] between Thessaly and Macedon after a call by Thessalian cities that disliked the Alevades. It arrived there traveling by ship to [[Phthiotis]] and from there by land. There they blocked the pass, but were joined by few Thessalian horsemen. [[Alexander I of Macedon]] warned the allied force that Xerxes intended to pass through another pass, so they left the way they came. This happened at the time Xerxes was still at Abydos.<ref>Herodotus VII,173</ref> All of Thessaly then defected to the Persians, as did many cities north of Thermopylae when they saw that help was not to come. It took Xerxes 13 days to travel from Therme to Thermopylae. |
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At Thermopylae, a force was assembled led by King [[Leonidas I|Leonidas]] of Sparta who was only accompanied by the [[300 Spartans]], literally horsemen though they fought on foot and served as the royal bodyguard.<ref>Dionysius Halicarnassus,Roman Antiquities II,13</ref> |
At Thermopylae, a force was assembled led by King [[Leonidas I|Leonidas]] of Sparta who was only accompanied by the [[300 Spartans]], literally horsemen though they fought on foot and served as the royal bodyguard.<ref>Dionysius Halicarnassus,Roman Antiquities II,13</ref> |
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:''His general Artapanus, with 10,000 men, fought an engagement with Leonidas, the Spartan general, at Thermopylae; the Persian host was cut to pieces, while only two or three of the Spartans were slain. The king then ordered an attack with 20,000, but these were defeated, and although flogged to the battle, were routed again. The next day he ordered an attack with 50,000, but without success, and accordingly ceased operations'' (Persica 27,Edited by Roger Pearse) |
:''His general Artapanus, with 10,000 men, fought an engagement with Leonidas, the Spartan general, at Thermopylae; the Persian host was cut to pieces, while only two or three of the Spartans were slain. The king then ordered an attack with 20,000, but these were defeated, and although flogged to the battle, were routed again. The next day he ordered an attack with 50,000, but without success, and accordingly ceased operations'' (Persica 27,Edited by Roger Pearse) |
Revision as of 00:07, 1 April 2008
- "Persian Wars" redirects here. For other Persian wars, see Roman-Persian Wars, Arab-Persian Wars, Persian Gulf Wars, and Military history of Iran.
The Greco-Persian Wars | |||||||
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Map of the Persian offensive phase of the Greco-Persian Wars | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Greek city states led by Athens and Sparta (not including Epirus, Lokris, Achaea and Argos) | Persian Empire and allies (including Thessaly, Boeotia, Thebes, Macedon, and Phoenicia) | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Miltiades, Themistocles, Eurybiades, Leonidas I †, Pausanias, Kimon †, Pericles |
Darius I, Mardonius †, Datis †, Artaphernes, Xerxes I, Artabazus, Megabyzus |
The Greco-Persian Wars were a series of conflicts between several Greek city-states and the Persian Empire that started in 499 BC and lasted until 448 BC. The expression "Persian Wars" usually refers to both Persian invasions of the Greek mainland in 490 BC and in 480-479 BC;[2] in both cases, the allied Greeks successfully repelled the invasions. Not all Greeks fought against the Persians; some were neutral and others allied with Persia, especially as its massive armies approached.
Origins of the conflict
The Greeks, the Lydians, and the Persians
The Lydians of Western Asia Minor were the first nations to conquer the Asiatic Greeks. Alyattes II first made war on Miletus which ended with a treaty of alliance between Miletus and Lydia,[3] which meant that Miletus would have internal autonomy but follow Lydia in foreign affairs. Thus they sent an army to aid him in his war against the Medes. During a battle between the Lydians and the Medes a total solar eclipse took place, believed to be that of May 28 585 BC, which had been predicted by Thales the Milesian.The battle was suspended out of alarm, peace was signed that was strengthened by a royal marriage, and the river Halys was set up as the frontier between the Lydians and the Medes.[4] Croesus succeeded his father in 560 BC and made war on the other Greek city states of Asia Minor. He conquered them and forced them to pay tribute but did not extend his realm to the islands of the Aegean.[5]
Cyrus the Great rebelled against the Medes in 554 BC/553 BC[6] and after four years conquered the Medes and founded the Persian Empire. Croesus saw this as an opportunity to extend his realm and asked the oracle of Delphi whether he should make war. The Oracle replied with one of its more famous answers, that if Croesus was to cross the river Halys he would destroy a great empire.[7] Croesus did not realise the ambiguity of the statement and marched to war but was defeated and his capital fell to Cyrus.[8] The Greek city-states then sent messenger to Cyrus asking to have the same terms as under Croesus but, with the exception of Miletus, Cyrus refused, saying they should have asked while the outcome of the war was undecided, as had Miletus.[9] Cyrus then conquered Assyria[10] before he died. His successor Cambyses II
- regarded the Ionians and Aiolians; and he proceeded to march an army against Egypt, taking with him as helpers not only the other nations of which he was the ruler, but also those of the Hellenes over whom he had power besides (Herodotus II,1 translated by G. C. Macaulay)
Persian satraps of Asia Minor installed tyrants in most of the Ionian cities and forced Greeks to pay taxes. The campaign against Egypt in 525 BC was successful when the Cypriot cities,[11] Polycrates of Samos[12] (both of whom had a fleet) and the leader of the Greek mercenaries of Egypt Phanes of Halicarnassus came to his side.[13] This conquest increased discontent with the Persians due to a reduction in trade because Phoenicians, who had willingly joined the Persian empire earlier[14] took part of the market. Furthermore the fall of the Greek colony Sybaris in Southern Italy in 510 BC closed the western markets for the Ionian city-states.[15] In the mean time Darius the Great, Cambyses' successor conquered Libya and part of India, thus creating a massive empire.
Ionian Revolt
The Ionian Revolts were triggered by the actions of Aristagoras, the tyrant of the Ionian city of Miletus at the end of the 6th century BC and the beginning of the 5th century BC. They constituted the first major conflict between Greece and Persia. Most of the Greek cities occupied by the Persians in Asia Minor and Cyprus rose up against their Persian rulers. The war lasted from 499 BC to 493 BC. The Ionians had early success with the sack of Sardis but the ensuing Persian counterattack by both the army and navy was too strong and the Ionians were decisively defeated at the Battle of Lade off the coast of Miletus in 494 BC.
Darius' Invasions
By 493 BC, the last holdouts of the rebellion were subjugated by the Persian fleet, containing ships from Egypt and Phoenicia.The revolt was used as an opportunity by Darius the Great to extend the empire's border to the islands of the East Aegean and the Propontis, many of which had not been under the Persians before.[16] While the Ionian city of Miletus was sacked, its temples stripped and population resettled,[17] the other Ionian city-states found the Persians surprisingly conciliatory in the wake of the rebellion. Darius took direct control of the resettlement of the region through his son-in-law Mardonius. The flat-tribute system was replaced with a progressive tax based on the land-holdings of each city, democracies were established in some, if not all, of the Ionian city-states, prisoners were reintegrated into their home cities, and Darius actively encouraged the Persian nobility of the area to participate in Greek religious practices, especially those dealing with Apollo.[18] Records from the period indicate that the Persian and Greek nobility began to intermarry, and the children of Persian nobles were given Greek instead of Persian names. Darius' conciliatory policies were used as a type of propaganda campaign against the mainland Greeks, so that in 491 BC, when Darius sent heralds throughout Greece demanding submission (earth and water), initially most city-states accepted the offer, Athens and Sparta being the most prominent exceptions.[19]
Mardonius' Campaign
In the spring of 492 BC, an expeditionary force commanded by Darius' son-in-law Mardonius was assembled in Cilicia. The objective was to subdue as many as they could of the Hellenic cities. Mardonius sent his army to the Hellespont while he took the fleet up the Aegean coast to Ionia. There he removed the tyrants and established popular governments in the Ionian cities.[20]
From thence Mardonius continued on to the Hellespont and when his army and fleet had been assembled crossed the Hellespont into Thrace and Macedon, (both of which had been previously part of the Persian Empire before the Ionian revolt), subjugating all the people on his path. Thrace, which surrendered without defending themselves, was reorganized as a satrapy, and Macedonia was reduced from an ally to a client state.
The Vrygians, a local Thracian tribe, offered the strongest resistance, even managing in a daring night raid to wound Mardonius, but were eventually subjugated.[21]
Meanwhile the fleet conquered Thassos and reached Acanthus (in the isthmus of the Athos peninsula) but while attempting to round the peninsula was nearly destroyed in a storm off Mt. Athos. 300 ships and 20,000 men were lost. Mardonius thus ordered the remnants of his troop to return to the Asian side of the Aegean.[22]
Datis and Artaphernes' Campaign
Destruction of Eretria
In 490 BC Datis and Artaphernes gathered another Persian expeditionary force in Cilicia with the intention to go to Attica and Eretria (the only sizable city on the island of Euboea) to punish them for their assistance to the Ionians.
The Persian force sailed from Cilicia to Rhodes, where a Lindian Temple Chronicle[23] records that Datis besieged the city of Lindos, but was unsuccessful. The fleet then moved north along the Ionian coast to Samos and thence to Naxos, where the inhabitants fled to the mountains, spread across the Cyclades, and submitted to the Great King, and then to Eretria. Eretria was besieged and surrendered after only six days; the city was razed, and temples and shrines were looted.[24]
Battle of Marathon
On the advice of Hippias, son of the former tyrant of Athens Peisistratus, the Persian army landed in Attica near Marathon.[25] Modern sources estimate they were between 20,000 and 60,000 strong.
Pheidippides, a professional messenger, was sent by the Athenians to Sparta for aid but the Spartans were prevented from leaving the city, either because of a religious festival (the Karneia[26]) or because of a helot revolt mentioned by Plato.[27] Thus the only ally the Athenians had in the Battle of Marathon were the Plataeans, with whom Athens had formed an alliance since the late sixth century BC.[28]
Miltiades, the Greek commander, marched his army of about 20,000 to Marathon to meet the invading force. After a period of about five days, the delay of which was probably beneficial to the Greeks as they had access to better supplies while the Persians supplies were being depleted as time went by, Miltiades ordered his forces to attack at a run. The rapid advance prevented the Persian archers taking position and loosing their arrows from afar. Miltiades knew that in hand to hand combat the Greek hoplite was superior. In spite of the rapid advance, the centre of the Greek formation maintained formation. When the Persian centre counterattacked, the Greeks retreated in order. The Greek wings then closed in. They were able to defeat their opposites and join force behind the Persian centre, encircling it. A great slaughter followed.[29] 6400 dead Persian bodies were counted on the battlefield and buried against only 192 Athenian[30] and 420 Plataean dead.[31]
Legend has it that a runner named Pheidippides, after the battle, was sent as a messenger from Marathon to Athens to tell them the Athenians had been victorious. He cried "Νενικήκαμεν!" (We have been victorious!), then collapsed and died on the spot. This legend was the inspiration for the modern day Olympic event, the marathon.
After the battle the Persian commanders had been given a signal of a raised shield and, hoping to catch Athens undefended, sailed with their fleet around Cape Sounion and tried to land at Phaleron. Athenian leaders had also seen the signal and, after leaving two tribes to guard the battlefield quickly moved the remaining forces into Athens. When the Persian came to Phaleron they found the Athenian army waiting for them. After this, the Persian fleet picked up the Eretrian prisoners and sailed back to Asia in defeat.[32]
The Significance of Marathon
The effects of the battle of Marathon were dramatic for both sides of the conflict. The Athenians had proven their ability to fight and win against the Persian forces, which was indeed no small feat if Herodotus's words are to be accepted. As Cornelius Nepos said:
Than this battle there has hitherto been none more glorious; for never did so small a band overthrow so numerous a host (Miltiades chapter IV, Translated by the Rev. John Selby Watson, MA)
The Greeks saw that they had the option to stand and fight, and soon after Marathon a number of city-states renounced their submission to Persia and joined with the Athenians and Spartans.
Perhaps more important was the impact Marathon had upon the Persians. Marathon was the first defeat of regular Persian infantry forces since before the reign of Cyrus, over two generations before. While the Ionian rebellion, the Persian inadequacy at sea, and the burning of Sardis all constituted a threat to Persian holdings in the region, Marathon signaled a threat to the whole of the Western part of the empire. While the Persians had been unable to beat the Ionians at sea, the conflict had been settled by the superior Persian ground forces. Now, with the defeat of the regular Persian infantry, the Persians had found themselves bested on land and sea by the relatively small city-state of Athens.
Events of the next ten years
Persian Empire
After the defeat at Marathon Darius ordered all the cities of his vast empire to provide warriors, ships, horses, and provisions to raise a great army for a second invasion but before he was ready to attack (in 486 BC) an insurrection broke out in Egypt, forcing a delay. In the next year Darius died after a reign of thirty-six years. His only failure in his life was that he could not capture Greece. His son and successor, Xerxes I was at first preoccupied with squashing the revolt in Egypt and a later one in Babylon before he could turn his attention westward to the European side of the Aegean. It wasn't until 480 BC that the expedition was ready to proceed. Like his fathers, his only failure was that he could not capture Greece.
The Persians had the sympathy of a number of Greek city-states,[33] including Argos, which had pledged to defect when the Persians reached their borders.[34] The Alevades family that ruled Larissa in Thessaly saw the invasion as an opportunity to extend their power.[35] Thebes was willing to pass to the Persian side when Xerxes' army reached their borders, and did so immediately following Thermopylae, though Herodotus hints that at Thermopylae it was already well known that Thebes had capitulated.
Greek City States
Meanwhile Alexander I of Macedon, who had supported the Greeks during the Ionian revolt, had been forced to submit to Persia after the Mardonius' Campaign. He was sympathetic to the Hellenic side, however, and sent valuable information to the Greeks regarding Xerxes plans and movements.
Leonidas I assumed the throne of Sparta about 488 BC, succeeding his brother.
In Athens the hero of Marathon, Miltiades, convinced the Athenians to campaign in the Cyclades Islands in order to secure their frontier.[36] His expedition failed and he was sorely wounded. His failure prompted an outcry on his return to Athens, enabling his political rivals to exploit his fall from grace. Charged with treason, he was sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to a fine.[37] He died of his wound before his sentence was carried out and was buried with honor.
A new political leadership formed in Athens with Themistocles leading the democratic party and Aristides the aristocratic party. Ostracism was first exercised in 488 BC[38] leading to the exile of politicians who advocated submission to Persia.
During this time Athens was at war with Aegina.The ability of the Aeginian fleet to land unopposed at will in Attica and conduct raids led to public discontent. Themistocles convinced his fellow citizens to use the profits from the Lavrion silver mines to construct a fleet.[39][40] Alarm came to Greece after the Persian preparations had advanced to the construction of the bridges at Hellespontus and the channel at Athos.
In autumn of 481 BC Sparta, in co-operation with Athens, called a congress in the temple of Poseidon on the isthmus of Corinth. Every Greek city-state that had not then fallen to the Persians was called except Massalia and her colonies, and Cyrene. General reconciliation was preached. Athens and Aegina were publicly reconciled. Messengers were sent to the cities that had not sent emissaries.[41] The colonies of Sicily and Southern Italy were called, but reportedly refused unless the Syracusan king, Gelon, was given command, a right the Spartans refused to part with.[42] Additionally, Diodorus reports that the Persians and Carthaginians had signed a treaty to co-ordinate invasions, keeping the sizeable Sicilian and Italian reinforcements in check.[43] The only help received was one ship from Crotone, which fought in the battle of Salamis. Argos[44] and Crete[45] refused to send emissaries, and the oracle of Delphi did not take part. It continued, as it had since the beginning of the century, to issue oracles that the flood of the Persian Army would drown Greece. Corcyra promised assistance, but then rescinded the offer. They sent a fleet off the Peloponnese that simply monitored the situation.[46] For the most part, the alliance was made up of the Peloponnesian city-states, Euboea island and Attica.
Xerxes' Invasion
Preparation of the Persian Forces
Immediately following the return of Datis' expedition, Darius began preparations for a second, full-scale invasion of Greece. On the fourth year after the battle Babylonia and Egypt both revolted against Persian rule, delaying the preparations.[47] In 486 BC, Darius died, leaving the empire and the war against the Greeks to his son and successor, Xerxes I.[48] In 480 BC, after roughly four years of preparation, Xerxes mounted a massive expedition against Greece. Herodotus gives the names of 46 nations from which troops were drafted. The campaign was delayed one year because of another revolt in Egypt and Babylonia.[49] The Persian army was gathered in Asia Minor in the summer and autumn of 481 BC. The army of the Eastern satrapies was gathered in Kritala of Cappadocia and was led by Xerxes to Sardis where it passed the winter.[50] Early in spring it moved to Abydos where it was joined with the army of the western satrapies.[51]
Size of the Persian Forces
The numbers regarding the land and sea force Xerxes mustered for the invasion against Greece have been a subject of endless dispute. Modern scholars tend to reject the figures of 2.5 million given by Herodotus and other ancient sources as a result of miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. The topic has been hotly debated but the general consensus revolves around the figure of 200,000.[52] Some place the upper limit at 250,000 total land forces. Others place even these numbers as too high.
The size of the Persian fleet is also disputed. According to Herodotus the Persian fleet numbered 1,207 triremes and 3,000 ships with 50 oars. penteconter (Greek πεντηκοντήρ) Many modern scholars concur with this number
See below under the heading "Discussion on size of forces"
Persian advance to Therme
Two bridges were constructed across the Hellespont made of Egyptian and Phoenician ships but they were destroyed by storm. Thus two new bridges were constructed, one of 314 triremes, the other of 360. The army took seven days and nights to cross to the European side. One of the bridges was used by foot soldiers and the other by cavalry. Five major food depots had been set up along the path: at Lefki Akti on the Thracian side of the Hellespont, at Tyrozis on lake Bistonis, at Doriskos at the Evros river estuary where the Asian army was linked up with the Balkan allies, at Eion on the Strymon river and at Therme, modern-day Thessaloniki. There, food had been sent from Asia for several years in preparation for the campaign. Animals had been bought and fattened, while the local populations had been ordered for several months to grind the grains into flour.[53]
The Persian army took 3 1/2 months to travel unopposed from the Hellespont to Therme, a journey of about 600 kilometres or 360 miles. It paused at Doriskos where it was joined by the fleet. Xerxes reorganized the troops into tactical units replacing the national formations used earlier for the march.[54] A canal was dug over the isthmus of the Athos peninsula large enough to fit through two ships at a time, by which the fleet avoided the perilous journey around Cape Athos.[55]
From there, the Persian fleet traveled down the coast, capturing a few Greek ships that were sent to monitor its movements.[56] It fell into a storm off Mt. Pelion, between Casthanaia and Cape Sepias, which caused the loss of one third of the fleet.[57] This was seen as divine retribution by the Greeks, reportedly lifting the morale of the allied force.
Battered from the storm, the Persian fleet rested at Aphetes.[58] and rejoined the army at Therme.[59]
In later Greek literature the raising of a massive army and fleet, the construction of the bridges over the Hellespont and the digging of the channel in Athos was seen as a sign of hubris, of great arrogance that was to be punished by the gods.[60]
From Therme to Megara
A force of 10,000 Athenians and Spartans led by Euenetus and Themistocles was dispatched to the vale of Tempe between Thessaly and Macedon after a call by Thessalian cities that disliked the Alevades. It arrived there traveling by ship to Phthiotis and from there by land. There they blocked the pass, but were joined by few Thessalian horsemen. Alexander I of Macedon warned the allied force that Xerxes intended to pass through another pass, so they left the way they came. This happened at the time Xerxes was still at Abydos.[61] All of Thessaly then defected to the Persians, as did many cities north of Thermopylae when they saw that help was not to come. It took Xerxes 13 days to travel from Therme to Thermopylae.
At Thermopylae, a force was assembled led by King Leonidas of Sparta who was only accompanied by the 300 Spartans, literally horsemen though they fought on foot and served as the royal bodyguard.[62]
- His general Artapanus, with 10,000 men, fought an engagement with Leonidas, the Spartan general, at Thermopylae; the Persian host was cut to pieces, while only two or three of the Spartans were slain. The king then ordered an attack with 20,000, but these were defeated, and although flogged to the battle, were routed again. The next day he ordered an attack with 50,000, but without success, and accordingly ceased operations (Persica 27,Edited by Roger Pearse)
On the third day, a local deformed man named Ephialtes betrayed the existence of a mountain path that led behind Greek positions. Leonidas and the 300 Spartans, as well as Demophilus and his contingent of 700 Thespians, proved their bravery by staying back to allow the rest of the army to escape.[63]
In the meantime a Greek naval force of 271 triremes attacked the Persian fleet off Artemisium,[64] with a fleet of 75 triremes guarding against a Persian encirclement at Chalkis. The Persians had indeed sent out a strong contingent to encircle the Greek fleet, but it fell in a storm off Euboea and was damaged.[65] Herodotus makes a direct parallel between the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, even placing them on the same day. While not a "fight to the death" as Thermopylae had become, Herodotus records that roughly half of the Athenian fleet had been destroyed or damaged beyond repair, in addition to other losses to the allied fleet overall,[66] while at the same time the small Greek fleet had done immense damage to the larger, bulkier Persian fleet, which, as would be seen again at Salamis, became trapped in the narrow strait and unable to manoeuvre. Furthermore fifteen Persian ships had been captured when they sailed in error to the Greek lines earlier.[67] When news of the withdrawal from Thermopylae arrived, the Greek fleet secretly abandoned its position.
Soon afterwards Athens was evacuated, and the Greek fleet withdrew to Salamis to aid in the transfer of the population of Attica to the island.[68] The Peloponnesians proposed a defensive line at the Isthmus of Corinth, relying on the ground forces and using the fleet to keep the Isthmus supplied.[69] Themistocles instead forced a confrontation with the Persian fleet at the Battle of Salamis and routed the Persian fleet, forcing it to withdraw to the Ionian coast. According to a story related by Herodotus, before the battle, Xerxes had set up a throne on Mt. Aegaleo, so he could watch his great victory over the smaller Greek fleet. However, once again the narrow gulf provided little room for his heavy triremes to maneuver, allowing the lighter Greek ships to flank and destroy them.
After Salamis, Xerxes at first attempted to build a causeway across the channel to attack the Athenian evacuees on Salamis according to Herodotus. Strabo, who had access to works by other authors disagrees. He places the construction before the naval battle. Describing the coast between Eleusis and Piraeus notes:
- and to the passage to Salamis, about two stadia wide, across which Xerxes attempted to build a mole but was forestalled by the naval battle and the flight of the Persians (Geography,9.1.13, translated by H.L. Jones)
Ctesias[70] also places this attempt before the battle. In any case this project was soon abandoned. The Greek cities of Halkidiki rebelled against the Persians. Xerxes, fearing being trapped in Greece, halted his armies advance, withdrew with his family, retainers, the remaining fleet, and a large part of his army to Sardis. Artabazus who was following Xerxes besieged Potidaia and Olynthus.[71] The siege lasted five months, at the end of which he rejoined Mardonius. Mardonius with a handful of junior officers and the rest of the army had accompanied Xerxes until Thessaly. Then he returned south, wintering in Attica and Boeotia.[72]
End of the Campaign
The following spring (479), Mardonius twice offered Athens through Alexander I of Macedon a separate peace, but was rebuffed. The Peloponnesians decided to send their army out in Boeotia to take advantage of the situation, before Athenians could change their mind.[73] Cavalry harassment of the Greek forces eventually led to the Battle of Plataea. The Greeks were warned on eve of the attack by Alexander of Macedon.[74] The Spartans and the Tegeans attacked the main body of the Persians while most of their Greek allies feigned cowardice and abandoned the battle, the notable exception being the Thebans who were attacking Athenians.[75] Mardonius was killed, and his army routed. The remnants of the Persian army left Greece, but the largest part of them did not make it to Asia, being ambushed by the forces of Alexander of Macedon in the estuary of the Strymon river.[76]
Reportedly, on the same day as the battle of Plataea a 110 ship Greek fleet commanded by the Spartan king Leotychides routed a repaired and refitted 300 ship Persian fleet guarded by 60,000 troops in the Battle of Mycale.[77] Then they advanced towards the Hellespont intending to break the bridges. They found the bridges destroyed. The Spartans left after that. When Ionians had asked for more assistance, the Spartans suggested that they migrate to the cities in the Greek peninsula that supported the Persians.[78] The Athenians under Xanthippus continued the campaign and besieged Sestus. The Athenians continued the siege alone until the city fell a few months later.[79] This is where Herodotus ends his book.
The Greek Counterattack
The Unification of Macedonia
Alexander of Macedon, encouraged by the Greek success at Plataea and his victory over the Persians in the Strymon river, expanded his realm to include the other Greek tribes living east of Mount Pindus. He conquered the land east until the banks of the Strymon river, conquering several non-Greek tribes living there.[80] He founded three cities to expand Greek influence into his newly conquered land, and managed to expand his realm east of the Strymon river, gaining part of Mount Paggaion and its famous gold mines. Thus he created the largest individual Greek state in terms of area, population, and income. However, despite its potential, the kingdom of Macedon retained a splintered and feudal style of government, with the king holding little central authority and subservient to the combined force of the aristocracy. Only in the 4th century BC, when the city-states in its south were in general decline, would Phillip II of Macedon, a king with great political genius, firmly unite the Macedonian aristocracy into a strong, centralized monarchy and expand the kingdom beyond these borders and raise it to prominence.
The Last Joint Operation in Byzantium
Encouraged by Xerxes' failures, the Greeks of Asia Minor and the Cyclades revolted again. In 478 BC, a fleet composed of 20 Peloponnesian ships, 30 Athenian ships under Aristides, and other allied forces, with the general command given to Pausanias, sailed to Cyprus. There they succeeded in liberating the Greek cities, but did not succeed in their sieges against the Phoenician cities. Thus Cyprus remained a base of the Persian fleet. The Greek fleet then sailed to Byzantium.[81] Control of the Hellespont and Bosporus was of vital importance to Athens, since throughout the classical age Athens produced only 40% of the food required to feed her population, the rest being imported from the Greek colonies of the Black Sea.
The city of Byzantium fell after a siege. Many Persians including nobility fell prisoner to the Greek forces. Pausanias, who was of the royal house of Agis, was greatly impressed by the new way of life he witnessed it and adopted it. He started wearing Persian dress and offering Persian-style banquets. He also mistreated the Ionian delegates. His Persian-style behaviour scandalised both the Ionians and the Peloponnesians and Pausanias was recalled to Sparta. There he faced charges that he was plotting with the Persian king to become tyrant of Greece, that he was in secret communication with him and that he had asked his daughter as his wife. He was acquitted of those charges, found guilty only of mistreating individuals in their private affairs and sentenced not to lead another campaign outside Sparta.[82] Being impatient he took a warship from Hermion and travelled back to Byzantium. No longer welcome there, he crossed the Propontis to the Troas region where he stayed for some time.[83] What he did there is completely unknown. He was recalled to Sparta by special envoy where he was to be brought against charges that he was again plotting with the King of Kings and that he was planning a helot revolution. On his way back, while he was inside the Spartan state limits, he saw the ephoroi, the elected council of five that ruled Sparta, approaching and one of them signalled to him that he was doomed. He took refuge in a nearby temple, where he died of starvation several days later. Some modern historians,[84] based on that he was never condemned and that had he been in league with the Persians he would have sought refuge there and not return, claim this was all a fabrication by his political enemies in Sparta.
In the meantime, in 477 BC the Spartans had sent Dorkis as general in Byzantium with a small force. The Ionians, with the memories of Pausanias' mistreatment of them fresh, asked them to leave. Relieved, the Spartans who no longer wished to continue fighting the Persians withdrew.[85] Athens gladly filled the vacuum, forming the First Athenian Alliance, better known as the Delian League.
Formation of the Delian League
Aristides, as leader of the Athenians, had made a very good impression on the Ionians with his character. Also, since Athenians were also Ionians, they were more trusted than the Dorian Spartans. A congress was called in the holy island of Delos where the alliance was formed. The members were given a choice of either offering armed forces or paying a tax on the joint treasury. Most cities chose the tax.[86] Aristides spent the rest of his life occupied in the affairs of the alliance, dying (according to Plutarch) a few years later in Pontus determining what the tax of new members was to be.[87]
Themistocles was marginalised politically when the leadership of the aristocratic party passed from Aristides to Kimon, son of Miltiades. Themistocles was later exiled and eventually charged of conspiring with Pausanias against Greece. After a long journey he eventually presented himself to the Persians and, following an old Persian tradition of giving sanctuary to prominent Greek politicians, he was given three cities in Asia Minor to rule. He died there a few years later.[88]
Campaigns in the Aegean and Pamphylia
Cimon, in 476 BC, began a campaign against Eion, which still had a Persian guard. The city fell after he diverted the flow of the Strymon river and the walls collapsed. The campaign continued towards Doriskos, however the city refused to capitulate. With Persians out of Heion, many Greek colonies of the Thracian coast joined the Delian League. Doriskos apparently fell at a later date, though precisely when is not recorded. Finally, in 465 BC, with four triremes Kimon removed the last Persians from the Thracian peninsula; thus ended Persian presence in Europe. In the intervening years, Kimon had forced Karystos in Euboea to join the league, conquered Skyros and sent Athenian colonists there, and suppressed Naxos's desertion in 468 BC.[89]
In 468 BC Kimon had gathered a force of 200 improved Athenian triremes in Knidos and 100 allied triremes with 5,000 Athenian hoplites and campaigned in Phaselis in Pamphylia. With mediation from Chios (a League member), Phasilis joined the league. The Persian forces that had been gathered at the mouth of the Eurymedon river were defeated and the cities of Ionia officially joined the alliance.[90]
In 465 BC Athens founded the colony of Amphipolis in the Strymon river. Thassos, a member of the League, saw her interests in the mines of Mt. Paggaion threatened and defected from the League. She called to Sparta for assistance but was denied, as Sparta was facing the largest helot revolution in its history (see the Messenian Wars).[91] An aftermath of the war was that Kimon was ostracised and the relations between Athens and Sparta turned into hostility. After a three year siege, Thassos was recaptured and forced back into the League. The siege of Thassos marks the transformation of the Delian league from an alliance into, in the words of Thucydides, a hegemony.[92]
Athens Fights in the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece
Ever since the battle of Eurymedon in 466 BC Athens was engaged in operations against the Persian forces in Cyprus. In 462 BC Egypt rose again against Persia. Their king Inaros asked in 460 BC Athens for assistance which was gladly rendered because Athens wished to colonise Egypt. The Persians had gathered a force of 400,000 (according to Ctesias and Diodorus)[93] to suppress the revolution. A force of 200 Athenian triremes that was campaigning in Cyprus was immediately ordered for assistance.[94] A battle took place on Papremis in the west bank of the Nile river.[95] According to Diodorus who is our only source about Athenian engagement in this battle, the Athenian phalanx again defeated the numerically superior but individually inferior Persian archer. The Egyptians and Libyans that were previously retreating on the rest of the front followed the breach in the Persian ranks the Athenians caused and won the battle. The Persian army retreated to Memphis.[96] A sea battle took place near there, where 40 Athenian under Charitimedes and 15 Samian ships (of the 200 that had arrived) sunk 30 and captured 20 Persian ships, according to Ctesias.
In the mean time Athens was engaged in war in the Greek peninsula. While the helot revolution was in its final stages and Kimon in Athens, Argos rose against Sparta. The small force that was sent to quell this was defeated by a joint Athenian and Argos force in Oenoe in 460 BC. The war was generalised, and the allies of Plataea found themselves 19 years later at each other's throat. Several battles followed, the most important of which was in Tanagra.[97] Using the insecurity of the Aegean as a pretext Athens moved the joint Treasury and the seat of the alliance to Athens in 454 BC/453 BC. The war in Greece was halted in 453 BC when Kimon was recalled from exile and negotiated a five year peace with the Spartans.[98]
Athens Defeated in Egypt but Victorious in Cyprus
Between 459 BC and 456 BC the Egyptians and their Athenian allies were still engaged in the siege of the Persian force in Memphis. A large part of the Athenian fleet had been recalled to the Aegean to help with operations there. The Persians organised another force that, according to Ctesias, numbered 200,000 soldiers and 300 ships, though according to Diodorus had over 300,000 infantry and cavalry. It was led by Megabyzus. A new battle took place near Memphis. Charitimedes was killed, king Inaros escaped to the naval base that had been set up in Prosoptis island on the Nile Delta. There, assisted by 6,000 Athenians and their fleet he was besieged for 18 months. The Persian generals did not dare land. They drained the land between the river bank and the island and surprised the Egyptians. The Egyptians quickly surrendered except king Inaros. The Athenians were left alone.[99] Megabyzus negotiated with the Athenians their surrender and were allowed through Cyrene to return to their home. A number of them though was kept prisoner according to Ctesias. A fleet that was being sent to relieve the force at Prosoptis unaware they had surrendered was defeated by the Persians near Cape Mendesium. The result of this loss was that Cyprus fell again to the Persians.[100] Athenians and their allies lost some 20,000 men in this campaign if Isocrates' numbers are accepted.[101] However these dead were very well remembered and Plato puts them along the dead of Euremedon and Cyprus.
Kimon after his recall and the five year peace was sent in Cyprus and Cilicia to fight the Persians. The Persians had helped several cities in Ionia that had tried to defect from the league.[102] With Kimon in Cyprus was sent a force of 200 triremes.[103] They were facing a force of 300 Persian ships in Cyprus led by Artabazus and 300,000 soldiers in Cilicia led by Megabyzus. Kimon conquered Marion, but was unsuccessful in his siege of a Persian stronghold at Kition in Cyprus. He sent 60 ships to Egypt. During that siege of Kition he died of a wound or disease.[104] On his deathbed he ordered his army to lift the siege and retreat towards Salamis. His death was kept a secret from the Athenian army and their allies, until 30 days later the Athenians defeated both at land and sea the Persians. According to Thucydides both battles took place in Salamis.[105] According to Diodorus though the land battle took place in Cilicia where the defeated fleet had fled.[106] Thus Kimon, even after his death, defeated the Persians.
The Peace of Callias
After this battle both enemies were exhausted. None of the sides were in full control of the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean. The king of Persia sent emissaries to Athens. Pericles responded favourably and, in the autumn of 449 BC according to Diodorus, sent Callias son of Ipponicus in Susa to negotiate. The exact nature of the agreement that became known as the peace of Callias remains unclear (formal treaty or non-aggression pact). According to Diodorus it was an "important treaty", Thucydides doesn't even mention it. The terms, according to Diodorus were:[107]
- All Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous
- Persian satraps were not to reach closer than three days walk from the sea
- No Persian warship was to be in the area between Phaselis in Pamphylia and the Bosporus
- If the Great king and his generals were to comply the Athenians were not to campaign against Artaxerxes
After the peace was agreed Athenians recalled the 60 triremes from Egypt and their forces from Cyprus (apparently this was part of the agreement though it is not mentioned) and ceased operations in this front. The situation in Greece though had flared up and war continued there until the Thirty Year Peace of 445 BC. Afterwards Greece entered in what is called the Greek Golden Age, a time of security and development.
Later Conflicts
The Persians and Greeks continued to meddle in each others' affairs. The Persians entered the Peloponnesian War in 411 BC forming a mutual-defence pact with Sparta and combining their naval resources against Athens (see Tissaphernes) in exchange for sole Persian control of Ionia. In 404 BC when Cyrus the Younger attempted to seize the Persian throne, he recruited 13,000 Greek mercenaries from all over the Greek world of which Sparta sent 700-800, believing they were following the terms of the treaty and unaware of the army's true purpose. After the failure of Cyrus, Persia tried to regain control of the Ionian city-states. The Ionians refused to capitulate and called upon Sparta for assistance, which she provided. Athens sided with the Persians, setting off the Corinthian War (see Artaxerxes II). Sparta was eventually forced to abandon Ionia and Persian authority was restored with the peace of Antalcidas. No other Greek force challenged Persia for nearly 60 years until Phillip II of Macedon, who, in 338 BC formed an alliance called οι Ελληνες (the Greeks), modelled after the alliance of 481 BC, and set in motion an invasion of the western part of Asia Minor. He was murdered before he could carry out his plan. His son, Alexander III of Macedon, known as Alexander the Great, set out in 334 BC with 38,000 soldiers. Within three years his army had conquered the Persian Empire and brought the Achaemenid dynasty to an end, bringing Greek culture up to the banks of the Indus river.
Historical Sources
What is known of this conflict today comes almost exclusively from the Greek sources. Herodotus of Halicarnassus after his exile from his home town, in the middle of the 5th century BC travelled all over the Mediterranean and beyond, from Scythia to Egypt collecting information over the Persian Wars and other events that he complied in his book Ιστοριης Απόδειξη (known in English as The Histories). He begins with Croesus's conquest of Ionia[108] and ends with the fall of Sestus in 479 BC.[109] He is believed to repeat what was told to him by his hosts and sponsors without subjecting it to critical control, thus giving us at times the truth, at times exaggerations and at times political propaganda. However ancient writers consider his work much better in quality than that of any of his predecessors which is why Cicero called him father of history.[110]
Thucydides the Athenian intended to compile a work from where Herodotus ends until the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. His collection of books is entitled Ξυγγραφη (known in English as The Peloponnesian War). It is believed that he died before completing his work, as he gives a full account only of the first twenty years of the Peloponnesian War. There is little information on what happened before. The events that interest us here are recounted in Book I paragraphs 89 to 118.
Among later writers Ephorus wrote in the 4th century BC a universal history which includes the events of these wars. Diodorus Siculus wrote in the 1st century AD a book of history since the beginning of time that also includes the history of this war. The closest thing to a Persian source in Greek literature is Ctesias of Cnedus who was Artaxerxes Mnemon's personal physician wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources in the 4th century BC. In his work he also mocks Herodotus and claims that his information is accurate since he heard from the Persians. Unfortunately the works of these last writers have not survived complete. Since fragments of them are given in the Myriobiblon which was compiled by Photius that later became Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in the 9th century AD, in the book Eklogai by the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitos (913-919 AD) and the Suda dictionary 10th century AD it is believed that they were lost with the destruction of the imperial library of the Holy Palace of Constantinople by the crusaders of the Fourth Crusade in 1204.
Thus historians are forced to supplement Herodotus' and Thucydides' information with works of later writers intended for other uses like 2nd century AD Plutarch's biographies and the tour guide of southern Greece compiled at the same time by the geographer and traveller Pausanias, who is not to be confused with the Spartan general of the same name mentioned later. Some Roman historians in their works give account of this conflict. Justinus who information, as are in Cornelius Nepos's Biographies.
Discussion on size of forces
Persian
Herodotus gives the following numbers of the invasion forces:
Fleet crew: | 517,610 |
Infantry:[111] | 1,700,000 |
Cavalry:[112] | 80,000 |
Arabs and Libyans:[113] | 20,000 |
Greek allies: | 324,000 |
Total: | 2,641,610 |
Herodotus doubles this number to account for support troops and thus he reports that the whole troop numbered 5,283,220 men in Greece,[114] an estimate that has been rejected by modern historians. Other ancient sources contradict Heroditus. The poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million. Ctesias of Cnedus who was Artaxerxes Mnemon's personal physician wrote a history of Persia that unfortunately has not survived, gave 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in Doriskos.
Modern scholars tend to reject the figures given in ancient texts as a result of miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. Their estimations are based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route.The topic has been hotly debated but the general consensus revolves around the figure of 200,000.[52] Some place the upper limit at 250,000 total land forces. The main reason most often given for these values is the supply of water; Sir Frederick Maurice,[115] a British general in World War I, was among the first to argue that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due to lack of water. Many other modern scholars estimate that the land forces participating in the battle cannot have exceeded 100,000 soldiers. The logistics of fielding and supporting more than 100,000 soldiers in battle in ancient times has a low probability.[116][117][118][119] In comparison, they have pointed out that the largest Roman army ever fielded in ancient times was over 200,000 at the Battle of Philippi.[120] Since the 20th century, there has been a substantial agreement among many scholars that the fighting force that King Xerxes brought across the Hellespont for the invasion of Greece numbered between 50,000 and 100,000 combatants.[121][122]
Scholars who estimate numbers no larger than 100,000 include Hans Delbrueck, who estimated that the army of Xerxes included 55,000 fighting men at most,[123] which Eduard Meyer[124] and Beloch agreed with. Delbrueck later reduced his maximum estimate to 25,000, claiming that the Persian fighting forces may have been as small as 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers.[125] Robert von Fischer estimated a maximum fighting force of 40,000 in the Persian army.[126] Robert Cohen, estimated the fighting force of the Persian army at over 40,000.[127] John A. Scott estimates the fighting force of the Persian army to be between 50,000 and 100,000 combatants.[122] Beloch estimated the Persian fighting forces to be 60,000, which W. W. Tarn agreed with.[128] De Sanctis set the maximum size of the Persian fighting forces at 100,000 men at most. Ernst Obst agreed but set the maximum size of the combatants at 90,000.[129] Eduard Meyer estimated the maximum figure for the Persian forces at Doriskos to be 100,000 combatants.[124] Ulrich Wilcken[130] and Helmut Berve[131] estimate Xerxes' fighting force at 100,000. Jerry Bentley, Herbert Ziegler and Heather Streets also estimate Xerxes' land troops at 100,000.[132]
Another school contends that ancient sources do give somewhat realistic numbers. According to the texts the Greeks at the end of the battle of Plataea mustered 110,000 (Herodotus) or 100,000 (Pompeius) troops: 38,700 hoplites and 71,300 or 61,300 peltasts respectively, the difference probably being 10,000 helots. In that battle, according to Herodotus, they faced 300,000 Persians and 50,000 Greek allies. This gives a 3-to-1 ratio for the two armies, which proponents of the school consider a realistic proportion.
Furthermore, Munro[133] and Macan[134] note Herodotus giving the names of six major commanders and 29 μυρίαρχοι (muriarxoi)—leaders of the baivabaram, the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000-strong.[135] As troops were lost through attrition, the Persians preferred to dissolve crippled baivabarams to replenish the ranks of others.[136] It is therefore likely that the units were at full strength.
According to that view lack of water is not the determining force. The available surface water in Greece today satisfies the needs of a much larger population than the number Xerxes' troops, though the majority of that water is used for irrigation.
Nicholas Hammond suggests the Persian army numbered about 242,000 for the expedition. The metrologist Livio Catullo Stecchini (who was a controversial figure) argues that the size of the Persian fighting forces were 700,000 infantry and cavalry.[137] Dr. Manousos Kampouris argues that Herodotus' 1,700,000 for the infantry plus 80,000 cavalry (including support) is very realistic for various reasons including the size of the area from which the army was drafted (from modern-day Libya to Pakistan), the lack of security against spies, the ratios of land troops to fleet troops, of infantry to cavalry and Persian troops to Greek troops.[138] On the other hand Christos Romas believes that the Persian troops accompanying Xerxes were a little over 400,000.[139]
The size of the Persian fleet is also disputed. According to Herodotus, the Persian fleet numbered 1,207 triremes and 3,000 pentekontoroi, ships with 50 rowers. He gives a detailed descripti
Phoenicians and Syrians from Palestine: | 300 |
Egyptians: | 200 |
Cypriots: | 150 |
Cilicians: | 100 |
Pamphylians: | 30 |
Lycians: | 50 |
Dorians of Asia Minor: | 30 |
Carians: | 70 |
Ionians: | 100 |
Cycladian Islanders: | 17 |
Aeolians: | 60 |
Hellespontians (except Abydos): | 30 |
From Pontus: | 100 |
Total | 1,237 |
Herodotus also claims that this was the number at Salamis, despite the losses earlier in storms off Sepias and Euboea, and at the battle off Artemisium. Herodotus claims that the losses where replenished with reinforcements, though he only records 120 triremes from the Greeks of Thrace and an unspecified number of ships from the Greek islands. Aeschylus who fought at Salamis also claims that he faced there 1,207 warships, of which 1,000 were triremes and 207 fast ships. Lysias,[140] also claims there were 1,200 at Doriskos. The 1,207 trireme number (for the outset only) is also given by Ephorus while his teacher Isocrates[141] claims there were 1300 at Doriskos and 1,200[142] at Salamis. Ctesias gives another number, 1,000 ships, (in a fragment given in Photius's book) while Plato, speaking in general terms[143] refers of 1,000 ships and more. Ephorus claims there were also 800 cavalry-carrying ships and 3,000 triantakontorous, ships rowed by thirty rowers. Diodorus[144] concurs there were 1,200 ships at Doriskos but gives fleet numbers as such:
Phoenicians: | 300 |
Egyptians: | 200 |
Cypriots: | 150 |
Cilicians: | 80 |
Pamphylians: | 40 |
Lycians: | 40 |
Dorians of Asia Minor: | 40 |
Carians: | 80 |
Ionians: | 100 |
Cycladian Islanders: | 50 |
Aeolians: | 40 |
Hellespontians and Pontians: | 80 |
Total | 1,200 |
These numbers are close but not exactly what Herodotus claims and this have been interpreted as a confirmation of the 1,200 number. Among modern scholars Köster[145] Olmstead, and Green have accepted this number. Commodore Simpsas[146] interprets the 207 fast ship comment as that only these 207 were fully manned and the rest were not. Christos Romas[147] believes that there were 1,200 ships gathered in Doriskos but the reinforcements that later came did not cover the losses from the storms and battles. Other recent works on the Persian Wars (Peter Green's recent revision,[148] works by A.R. Burn,[149] and Pierre Briant's recent work)[150] reject this accounting, 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in the Iliad than an actual accounting, and generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean.
Grecian
Thermopylae
The Greek army at Thermopylae included the following forces:[151]
Spartans: | 300 |
Mantineans: | 500 |
Tegeans: | 500 |
Arcadian Orchomenos: | 120 |
Other Arcadians: | 1,000 |
Corinthians: | 400 |
Floians: | 200 |
Mycenaeans: | 80 |
Thespians: | 700 |
Thebans: | 400 |
Phocians and Opuntan Locrians: | 1,000 |
Total forces: | 5,200 |
Diodorus Siculus[152] mentions 1,000 other Lacedemonian troops sent along with the royal bodyguard, while more auxiliary troops were probably sent from other Greek cities. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total Greek troops, and Pausanias 11,200.[153] Modern historians, which usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer between 4,000 and 7,000. According to Ctesias:
Sparta: | 10,000 |
Athens: | 8,000 |
Plataea: | 600 |
Megara: | 3,000 |
Corinth: | 5,000 |
Tegea: | 1,500 |
Potidaea: | 300 |
Arcadian Orchomenus: | 600 |
Sicyon: | 3,000 |
Epidaurus: | 800 |
Troezen: | 1,000 |
Leprea: | 200 |
Mycene and Tiryns: | 400 |
Floia: | 1,000 |
Hermion: | 300 |
Eretria and Styra: | 600 |
Chalkis: | 400 |
Ambrakia: | 500 |
Lefkas and Anactorium: | 800 |
Cephalonia: | 200 |
Aegina: | 500 |
Total | 38,700 |
Plataea
According to Herodotus, the Greek city-states at Plataea fielded an army of hoplites listed in the table to the right. Also 71,300 light troops were sent. Of these 35,000 were helots of Sparta, 1,800 were Thespians and the other 34,500 are simply said to be from the other cities, about one per hoplite. [154]
This is a very large number for a Greek army. The Byzantine Empire rarely fielded armies larger than 100,000 while the modern Greek state raised an army of this size in the Greek-Turkish War of 1897 and the First Balkan War in 1912. Unlike the last two mentioned conflicts when only soldiers from 7 or 8 years were drafted what was fielded in Plataea was probably every able bodied man between the ages of 20 and 50 that owned weapons.
Among modern scholars others have accepted these numbers and have used them as a population census of Greece at the time,[155] others have claimed the light troop numbers bloated especially since they imply 7 helots for every Spartiat and others have claimed there were no light troops in Plataea, only hoplites, the light troops being nothing more than support troops.
Greek fleet
Herodotus claims there were 378 ships on the Greek fleet and gives the following numbers:[156]
Athens: | 180 |
Corinth: | 40 |
Aegina: | 30 |
Chalcis: | 20 |
Megara: | 20 |
Sparta: | 16 |
Sicyon: | 15 |
Epidaurus: | 10 |
Eretria: | 7 |
Ambracia: | 7 |
Troizen: | 5 |
Naxos: | 4 |
Leucas: | 3 |
Ermioni: | 3 |
Styra: | 2 |
Cythnus: | 2 |
Ceos: | 2 |
Melos: | 2 |
Siphnus: | 1 |
Seriphus: | 1 |
Croton: | 1 |
Total | 371 |
As can be seen his numbers add only to 371. It has been argued that the 12 missing ships were from Aegina guarding there against invasion. To those forces two more have to be added that defected from the Persians to the Greeks, one before Artemisium and one before Salamis. According to Aeschylus the Greek fleet numbered 310 triremes, while Ctesias claims there the Athenian fleet numbered only 110 triremes and not 180 as Herodotus claims.
See also
Notes
- ^ Herodotus book VII,89-95
- ^ The Timetables of History by Bernard Grun. New Third Revised Edition. ISBN 067174271X
- ^ Herodotus I,22
- ^ Herodotus I,74
- ^ Herodotus I,26-27
- ^ Herodotus I,127
- ^ Herodotus I,53
- ^ Herodotus I,84
- ^ Herodotus I,141
- ^ Herodotus I,178
- ^ Herodotus III,17
- ^ Herodotus III,45
- ^ Herodotus III,4
- ^ Herodotus III,17
- ^ Herodotus VI,21
- ^ Herodotus VI 31-33
- ^ Herodotus VI 20-22
- ^ Herodotus VI 42-45
- ^ Herodotus VI,49
- ^ Herodotus VI,43,44
- ^ Herodotus VI 45
- ^ Herodotus VI,44
- ^ Lind. Chron. D 1-59 in C. Higbie (2003)
- ^ Herodotus VI,95-101
- ^ Herodotus VI,102
- ^ Herodotus VI,105
- ^ Laws III 6923 D, 698 E
- ^ Herodotus VI,108
- ^ Herodotus VI,114
- ^ Herodotus VI,117
- ^ "Dr. J's Illustrated Persian Wars".
{{cite web}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|1=
(help) - ^ Herodotus VI,115-116
- ^ Herodotus VII,138
- ^ Herodotus VII,149-152
- ^ Herodotus VII,6
- ^ Herodotus VI,132
- ^ Cornelius Nepos, Miltiades VII
- ^ Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 22.4
- ^ Plutarch, Themistocles 4
- ^ Cornelius Nepos, Themistocles II
- ^ Herodotus VII,145
- ^ Herodotus VII,158
- ^ Diodorus 11.1.4
- ^ Herodotus VII,149
- ^ Herodotus VII,169
- ^ Herodotus VII,168
- ^ Herodotus VII,1
- ^ Herodotus VII,5
- ^ Herodotus VII,7
- ^ Herodotus VII,26
- ^ Herodotus VII,37
- ^ a b de Souza, Philip (2003). The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC. Osprey Publishing. pp. page 41. ISBN 1-84176-358-6.
{{cite book}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - ^ Herodotus VII,25
- ^ Herodotus VII,100
- ^ Herodotus VII,122
- ^ Herodotus VII,181
- ^ Herodotus Vii,188
- ^ Herodotus VII,193
- ^ Herodotus VII,124
- ^ See for example Lysias, Funeral oration 27-29 or Gregory Nazianzen, Logoi,43
- ^ Herodotus VII,173
- ^ Dionysius Halicarnassus,Roman Antiquities II,13
- ^ Herodotus VII,222
- ^ Herodotus VII,2
- ^ Herodotus VIII,8
- ^ Herodotus VIII,18
- ^ Herodotus VII,162
- ^ Herodotus VIII,40
- ^ Herodotus VIII,49
- ^ Persica, 26
- ^ Herodotus VIII,128
- ^ Herodotus VIII,129
- ^ Herodotus IX,10
- ^ Herodotus IX,44
- ^ Herodotus IX,61
- ^ Demosthenes, Against Aristocrates, 200
- ^ Herodotus IX,90
- ^ Herodotus IX,106
- ^ Herodotus IX,120
- ^ Thucydides 2,99
- ^ Thucydides 1.94
- ^ Thucydides 1.95
- ^ Thucydides I,128
- ^ Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους = History of the Greek nation volume Γ1, Athens 1972
- ^ Thucydides 1.95
- ^ Thucydides 1.96
- ^ Plutarch Aristeides 26
- ^ Plutarch Themistocles 32
- ^ Thucydides I.98
- ^ Plutarch, Kimon 12
- ^ Thucydides I,100
- ^ Thucydides 101
- ^ Diodorus 11.75
- ^ Thucydides I.104
- ^ Herodotus III,12
- ^ Diodorus 11.74
- ^ Thucydides I.108
- ^ Plutarch Kimon 18
- ^ Thucydides I,109
- ^ Thucydides I.110
- ^ Isocrates, On the Peace,85
- ^ Thucydides I.115
- ^ Plutarch Kimon 18
- ^ Plutarch Kimon 19
- ^ Thucydides I.112
- ^ Diodorus 12.3
- ^ Diodorus 12.4
- ^ Herodotus I,6
- ^ Herodotus IX,121
- ^ De legibus I,5
- ^ Herodotus VII,60
- ^ Herodotus VII,87
- ^ Herodotus VII,184
- ^ Herodotus VII,186
- ^ Maurice, F (1930). "The size of the army of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C.". Journal of Hellenic Studies. 50: 115–128. doi:10.2307/626811.
{{cite journal}}
: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|month=
(help) - ^ Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
- ^ Warry, J. (1998). Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.
- ^ Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
- ^ Green, Peter (1990). Alexander to Actium; The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age. Berkeley/Los Angeles.
- ^ Nick Welman. Army. Fontys University.
- ^ Stecchini, Livio C. "The Persian Wars". Professor Livio C. Stecchini. www.iranchamber.com. Retrieved 2007-12-25.
- ^ a b John A. Scott (June 1915). "Thoughts on the Reliability of Classical Writers, with Especial Reference to the Size of the Army of Xerxes", The Classical Journal 10 (9), p. 396-403.
- ^ H. Delbrueck (1887). Die Perserkriege und die Burgunderkriege, p. 164. Berlin.
- ^ a b Geschichte des Alterthums, Vol. III, p. 377 (1901). Stuttgart.
- ^ Hans Delbrueck (1920). Geschichte der Kriegskunst Vol. I, p. 106. Berlin.
- ^ R. von Fischer, "Das Zahlenproblem in Perserkriege 480-479 v. Chr." Klio, N. F., vol. VII, pp. 289ff.
- ^ R. Cohen, La Grece et l'hellenization du monde antique (Paris, 1934), p. 164.
- ^ W. W. Tarn (1908). "The Fleet of Xerxes", The Journal of Hellenic Studies 28, p. 208.
- ^ Ernst Obst (1914). Der Feldzug des Xerxes. Leipzig.
- ^ Griechische Geschichte, ninth ed. (Munich, 1962), p. 140.
- ^ Griechische Geschichte, vol. I (1951), p. 253.
- ^ Jerry Bentley, Herbert Ziegler and Heather Streets (2006). Traditions & Encounters: A Brief Global History, Volume II. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0073207039.
- ^ J.A.R. Munro, Cambridge ancient history vol IV 1929
- ^ The 7th,8th and 9th book of Herodotus, 1908 (reprinted New York 1971)
- ^ Papademetriou Konstantinos, Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, Issue 22 September–October 2005, Periscopio editions Athens; Nicholas Sekunda, Simon Chew, The Persian Army (560–330 BC), Elite series, Osprey 1992, Oxford. For an online article see also here.
- ^ Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens
- ^ "The size of the Persian Army".
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(help) - ^ Η στρατηγική διάσταση των Μηδικών Πολέμων (The strategic dimension of the Persian Wars), Πόλεμος και Ιστορία (War and History) Magazine no.34, October 2000
- ^ Οι δυνάμεις των Ελλήνων και των Περσών (The forces of the Greeks and the Persians), E Istorika no.164, 19/10/2002
- ^ Funeral oration,27
- ^ VII,49
- ^ IV, 93
- ^ Plato Laws, III 699 B
- ^ Library 12.7-8
- ^ Köster, A.J. Studien zur Geschichte des Antikes Seewesens. Klio Belheft 32 (1934)
- ^ Commodore Marios Simpasa HN, Το ναυτικό στην ιστορία των Ελλήνων (The navy in the history of the Greeks), Hellenic Navy General Staff 1982
- ^ Οι δυνάμεις των Ελλήνων και των Περσών (The forces of the Greeks and the Persians), E Istorika no.164 19/10/2002
- ^ Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1996
- ^ Burn, A.R., "Persia and the Greeks" in The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenid Periods, Ilya Gershevitch, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1985.
- ^ Briant, Pierre, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Peter Daniels, trans. Indiana: Eisenbrauns. 2002
- ^ Herodotus VII, 202
- ^ book XI,5
- ^ Pausanias 10,20,2
- ^ Herodotus IX,28
- ^ Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek nation)vol. B
- ^ Herodotus VIII,42-48
Further reading
- Herodotus, Ιστορίης Απόδειξη (The Histories)
- Thucydides, Ξυγκραφη (The Peloponnesian War or History of the Peloponnesian War)
- Xenophon, Κυρου Ανάβασις (Anabasis)
- Plutarch, Βίοι Παράλληλοι (Parallel lives), Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles
- Diodorus Siculus, Ιστορικη Βιβλιοθήκη (Library)
- Cornelius Nepos, Biographies, Miltiades, Themistocles
- Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volumes Β (1971) and Γ1 (1972),Ekdotiki Athinon, Athens
- Bengston, Hermann, ed., The Greeks and the Persians: From the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries. New York: Delacorte Press. 1965
- Briant, Pierre, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Peter Daniels, trans. Indiana: Eisenbrauns. 2002
- Burn, A.R., "Persia and the Greeks" in The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenid Periods, Ilya Gershevitch, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1985.
- Cook, J.M., The Persian Empire. New York: Shocken Books. 1983.
- Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1996
- Hignett, C., Xerxes' Invasion of Greece. Oxford: The Calrendon Press. 1963.
- Olmstead, A.T., History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948.
- Pomeroy, Sarah B., Stanley Burstein, Walter Donlan, and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Ancient Greece: A Political, Social, and Cultural History'. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999.
- Brown Reference ltd, Atlas of World History Sandcastle books Ltd. 2006.
- Gore Vidal, Creation (novel), a sardonic view of the wars from a fictional Persian's perspective.