Indo-Pakistani war of 1965

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan, also known as the Second Kashmir War, was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965. It is generally accepted that the war began following failed infiltration attempts by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. The fighting ended in a stalemate on September 23. Many details of this war, like those of most Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear and riddled with media biases.

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The War as depicted on the cover of TIME magazine dated September 12,1965.

The Rann of Kutch

Fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in an area known as the Rann of Kutch, a barren region between the Indian state of Gujarat and Pakistan, on March 20 and again in April 1965. In June the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan gaining only 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch of its original claim of 3500 sq miles. [1]

Pre-war

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan is said to have believed that the Indian army was unwilling or unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar. For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir - a state that Pakistan claims as "disputed", into the Indian union by way Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to declare President's Rule in the disputed state.

The war

On August 15 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Kashmir, marking an official beginning to the war. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to a tip the Indian forces received from Kashmiri civilians about Pakistani soldiers crossing the Line of Control (LoC) dressed as local Kashmiris.

Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.

These territorial gains and rapid Indian advances were met with a counterattack by Pakistan in the southern sector (Punjab) where Indian forces, having been caught unprepared, faced technically superior Pakistani tanks and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, calling in its air force to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab.

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6 (some officially claim this to be the beginning of the war).

On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian army within the range of Lahore International Airport, although temporarily. The United States requested for a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by PAF Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point.

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A map of Kashmir shows the 1949 ceasefire line, Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Sectors of active conflict during the 1965 war such as Chumb are also shown.

On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw.

Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Indian Punjab) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (Real Answer). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town) as Pakistan lost/abandoned nearly 100 tanks mostly Patton tanks.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of Indian territory, mostly in Chumb in the northern sector.

Naval war

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a bombardment of the coastal Indian temple town of Dwarka, under the name of Operation Dwarka which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. The Indian fleet from Mumbai sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment.

There was no retaliatory response from India. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land based conflict.

There were reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American supplied Pakistani submarines, but this was never confirmed.

Covert operations

There were a couple of covert operations launched by Pakistan Army to infiltrate Indian airbases and sabotage them. The SSG (Special Services Group) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory and according to the then Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, more than 180 commandos penetrated the enemy territory for this purpose. Indian sources however claim as many as 800-900 commandos were airdropped, though the figure is for the whole war. Given that most of the Indian targets (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur) were deep into enemy territory only 11-15 commandos made it back alive and the stealth operation proved ineffective. Of the remaining, 136 were taken prisoners, 22 were killed in encounters with the army, police or the civilians. The daring attempt proved to be a disaster with the Commander of the operations, Major Khalid Butt too being arrested.

Losses

India and Pakistan hold widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

	Indian claims	Pakistani claims
Aircraft Destroyed	35 IAF, 73 PAF	19 PAF, 104 IAF
Aerial Victories	13	30
Tanks Destroyed	128 Indian Army, 300-350 Pakistan Army	165 Pakistan Army, ?? Indian Army
Land area won	1,500 miles (2,400 km) of Pakistani territory*	2,000 miles (3,000 km) of Indian territory*

Statistics compiled from [2], [3] and [4]

* American sources claim India held 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 miles² (545 km²) of Indian territory.

There have been only a few neutral assessments of the damages of the war. According to Global Security Organization, "The losses were relatively heavy - on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan."

Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25 1966.

The battle remained largely inconclusive despite Pakistan suffering relatively more losses, and saw a six year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971.

Intelligence failures

Indian miscalculations

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained stalemate. The Indian army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss.

It was found later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other.The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military. [5]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion, and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary provided the Indian army with enough information for them to learn of "Operation Gibraltar" and the fact that the army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani army regulars.

The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir. "Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnur, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Gen. Ahktar Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command.

Many authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently viewed that Pakistan Army "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock". As a result most of the blame was heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war.

Consequences of the war

The war had created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Both India and Pakistan increased their defence spending and the Cold War politics had taken roots in the subcontinent. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering of India in the war, the Research and Analysis Wing was setup for external espionage and intelligence as a separate entity a few years later. India slowly started aligning with the Soviet Union both politically and militarily. This would be cemented formally years later before the Bangladesh Liberation War. It also showed that the numerically larger Indian Military - which was then undergoing massive changes in the armed forces - had been able to withstand an attack by a qualitative superior enemy. In light of the previous war against the Chinese, the performance in this war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India.

Pakistan's performance was hailed back home, especially the initial moves including Rann of Kutch and the defence of Sialkot. September 6 is celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan in commemoration of that defence. Pakistan Air Force was also seen with pride for its performance against its numerically bigger counterpart. However, the end game left a lot to desire as Pakistan had lost more ground than gained and more importantly did not achieve the goal of liberating Kashmir. Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning in Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal in Pakistan though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. The fighting also caused simmering resentment among East Pakistan whose security lay quite bare. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was apprehensive of this situation and the need for greater autonomy for the east led to another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

See also

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Kargil War

Sino-Indian War

A new book on the air war component of the 1965 war

Further reading

• India-Pakistan war, 1965 Hari Ram Gupta
• Die to live: A selection of short stories based on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war Muhammad Ismail Siddiqui.
• The war with Pakistan: A pictorial narration of the fifty days which rocked the sub-continent Dewan Berindranath
• First & Further reflections on the second Kashmir War (South Asia series) - 2 books by Louis Dupree.
• The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 P.V.S.Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publishers
• War Dispatches Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, Lancer International
• Indian Army after Independence Maj K C Praval, Lancer International
• Battle for Pakistan John Fricker, Ian Allan
• The Indo-Pakistan Conflict Russell Brines

Sources and external links

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United States Library of Congress Country Studies - India

Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan

Story of Pakistan

GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965

Pakistan Columnist AH Amin analyzes the war.

Grand Slam - A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin — very detailed roll of events and analysis

A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal — dispassionate analysis

The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On - From Rediff.com

Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan)

Pak Army's Kargil like disaster of 1965 - South Asia Tribune

1965 War From Pakistan's Prospective