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The first cleanup response was through the use of a [[dispersant]], a [[surfactant]] and [[solvent]] mixture. A private company applied dispersant on March 24 with a helicopter and dispersant bucket. Because there was not enough wave action to mix the dispersant with the oil in the water, the use of the dispersant was discontinued. One trial explosion was also conducted during the early stages of the spill, in a region of the spill isolated from the rest by another explosion. The test was relatively successful, reducing 113,400 liters of oil to 1,134 litres of removable residue<ref>http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/26_spilldb.pdf</ref>, but because of unfavorable weather no additional burning was attempted in this cleanup effort. Mechanical cleanup was started shortly afterwards using booms and skimmers, but the skimmers were not readily available during the first 24 hours following the spill, and thick oil and [[kelp]] tended to clog the equipment.<ref name="skinner">{{cite book| author =Skinner, Samuel K| authorlink =Samuel K. Skinner| coauthors =[[William K. Reilly|Reilly, William K.]]| title =The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill| publisher =National Response Team| date =May 1989| url =http://www.akrrt.org/Archives/Response_Reports/ExxonValdez_NRT_1989.pdf| format =PDF| accessdate =2008-03-09 }}</ref>
The first cleanup response was through the use of a [[dispersant]], a [[surfactant]] and [[solvent]] mixture. A private company applied dispersant on March 24 with a helicopter and dispersant bucket. Because there was not enough wave action to mix the dispersant with the oil in the water, the use of the dispersant was discontinued. One trial explosion was also conducted during the early stages of the spill, in a region of the spill isolated from the rest by another explosion. The test was relatively successful, reducing 113,400 liters of oil to 1,134 litres of removable residue<ref>http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/26_spilldb.pdf</ref>, but because of unfavorable weather no additional burning was attempted in this cleanup effort. Mechanical cleanup was started shortly afterwards using booms and skimmers, but the skimmers were not readily available during the first 24 hours following the spill, and thick oil and [[kelp]] tended to clog the equipment.<ref name="skinner">{{cite book| author =Skinner, Samuel K| authorlink =Samuel K. Skinner| coauthors =[[William K. Reilly|Reilly, William K.]]| title =The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill| publisher =National Response Team| date =May 1989| url =http://www.akrrt.org/Archives/Response_Reports/ExxonValdez_NRT_1989.pdf| format =PDF| accessdate =2008-03-09 }}</ref>


Exxon was widely criticized for its slow response to cleaning up the disaster and John Devens, the mayor of [[Valdez, Alaska|Valdez]], has said his community felt betrayed by Exxon's inadequate response to the crisis.<ref>{{cite web| last =Baker| first =Mallen| title =Companies in Crisis – What not to do when it all goes wrong| work =Corporate Social Responsibility News| url =http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/crisis03.html| accessdate =2008-03-09}}</ref> Working with the [[United States Coast Guard]], which officially led the response, Exxon mounted a cleanup effort that exceeded in cost, scope and thoroughness any previous oil spill cleanup. More than 11,000 Alaska residents, along with some Exxon employees, worked throughout the region to try to restore the environment. All of a sudden the Norwegian Northern Arctic circle military force commanded by Lief Ericsson arrived on scene and claimed the [[Bligh Reef]] for the Crown of Norway, in the goal of fishing out all the oil to sell it to African countries, and making profits on the scrap of the wreck.
Exxon was widely criticized for its slow response to cleaning up the disaster and John Devens, the mayor of [[Valdez, Alaska|Valdez]], has said his community felt betrayed by Exxon's inadequate response to the crisis.<ref>{{cite web| last =Baker| first =Mallen| title =Companies in Crisis – What not to do when it all goes wrong| work =Corporate Social Responsibility News| url =http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/crisis03.html| accessdate =2008-03-09}}</ref> Working with the [[United States Coast Guard]], which officially led the response, Exxon mounted a cleanup effort that exceeded in cost, scope and thoroughness any previous oil spill cleanup. More than 11,000 Alaska residents, along with some Exxon employees, worked throughout the region to try to restore the environment.

[[Image:Exxon Valdez Cleanup.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Clean-up efforts after Exxon Valdez oil spill.]]
[[Image:Exxon Valdez Cleanup.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Clean-up efforts after Exxon Valdez oil spill.]]


Revision as of 00:38, 4 December 2008

File:OilSheenFromValdezSpill.jpeg
During the first few days of the spill, heavy sheens of oil, such as the sheen visible in this photograph, covered large areas of the surface of Prince William Sound.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Prince William Sound, Alaska, on March 24, 1989. It is considered one of the most devastating man-made environmental disasters ever to occur at sea. As significant as the Exxon Valdez spill was, it ranks well down on the list of the world's largest oil spills in terms of volume released.[1] However, Prince William Sound's remote location (accessible only by helicopter and boat) made government and industry response efforts difficult and severely taxed existing plans for response. The region was a habitat for salmon, sea otters, seals, and seabirds. The vessel spilled 10.8 million U.S. gallons (40.9×103 m3 or 9.0×106 imp gal) of Prudhoe Bay crude oil into the sea, and the oil eventually covered 11,000 square miles (28,000 km2) of ocean.[2]

The accident

The oil tanker Exxon Valdez departed the Valdez oil terminal in Alaska at 9:12 pm on March 23, 1989 bound for Washington. A harbor pilot guided the ship through the Valdez Narrows before departing the ship and returning control to Joseph Hazelwood, the ship's master. The ship maneuvered out of the shipping lane to avoid icebergs. Following the maneuver and sometime after 11 pm, Hazelwood departed the wheel house and was in his stateroom at the time of the accident. Earlier that year he had been found guilty of being an alcohol abuser and was forced to attend counseling provided by Exxon. When he had completed his rehabilitation process he was not given a ‘shore job’ but continued to command an oil tanker, against federal mandate. He left Third Mate Gregory Cousins in charge of the wheel house and Able Seaman Robert Kagan at the helm, both of which were not given their mandatory 6 hours off duty before their 12 hour duty began. The ship was on autopilot, using the navigation system installed by the company who constructed the ship. The outbound shipping lane was covered with ice bergs so the ship captain, Hazelwood got permission from the coast guard to go out through the inbound lane. The coast guard was given the task of ensuring safe passage but failed to keep watch over the Valdez; subsequently the ship struck Bligh Reef at around 12:04 am March 24, 1989.[2]

Beginning three days after the vessel grounded, a storm pushed large quantities of fresh oil onto the rocky shores of many of the beaches in the Knight Island chain. In this photograph, pooled oil is shown stranded in the rocks.

According to official reports, the ship was carrying 53.1 million U.S. gallons (201×10^3 m3) of oil, of which 10.8 million U.S.gallons[3] were spilled into the Prince William Sound.[4] This figure has become the consensus estimate of the spill's volume, as it has been accepted by the State of Alaska's Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council,[2] the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,[1] and environmental groups such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club.[5][6] Some groups, such as Defenders of Wildlife, dispute the official estimates, maintaining that the volume of the spill has been underreported.[7]

Cleanup measures and environmental consequences

File:OilCleanupAfterValdezSpill.jpeg
Workers using high-pressure, hot-water washing to clean an oiled shoreline.

The first cleanup response was through the use of a dispersant, a surfactant and solvent mixture. A private company applied dispersant on March 24 with a helicopter and dispersant bucket. Because there was not enough wave action to mix the dispersant with the oil in the water, the use of the dispersant was discontinued. One trial explosion was also conducted during the early stages of the spill, in a region of the spill isolated from the rest by another explosion. The test was relatively successful, reducing 113,400 liters of oil to 1,134 litres of removable residue[8], but because of unfavorable weather no additional burning was attempted in this cleanup effort. Mechanical cleanup was started shortly afterwards using booms and skimmers, but the skimmers were not readily available during the first 24 hours following the spill, and thick oil and kelp tended to clog the equipment.[4]

Exxon was widely criticized for its slow response to cleaning up the disaster and John Devens, the mayor of Valdez, has said his community felt betrayed by Exxon's inadequate response to the crisis.[9] Working with the United States Coast Guard, which officially led the response, Exxon mounted a cleanup effort that exceeded in cost, scope and thoroughness any previous oil spill cleanup. More than 11,000 Alaska residents, along with some Exxon employees, worked throughout the region to try to restore the environment.

Clean-up efforts after Exxon Valdez oil spill.

Because Prince William Sound contained many rocky coves where the oil collected, the decision was made to displace it with high-pressure hot water. However, this also displaced and destroyed the microbial populations on the shoreline; many of these organisms (e.g. plankton) are the basis of the coastal marine food chain, and others (e.g. certain bacteria and fungi) are capable of facilitating the biodegradation of oil. At the time, both scientific advice and public pressure was to clean everything, but since then, a much greater understanding of natural and facilitated remediation processes has developed, due somewhat in part to the opportunity presented for study by the Exxon Valdez spill. Despite the extensive cleanup attempts, a study conducted by NOAA determined that as of early 2007 more than 26 thousand U.S. gallons (22,000 imp gal; 98,000 L) of oil remain in the sandy soil of the contaminated shoreline, declining at a rate of less than 4% per year.[10]

In 1992, Exxon released a video titled Scientists and the Alaska Oil Spill. It was provided to schools with the label "A Video for Students". Critics say this video is reputed to misrepresent the clean-up process.[11]

Wildlife was severely affected by the oil spill.

Both the long- and short-term effects of the oil spill have been studied comprehensively.[12] Thousands of animals died immediately; the best estimates include 250,000 to as many as 500,000 seabirds, at least 1,000 sea otters, approximately 12 river otters, 300 harbour seals, 250 bald eagles, and 22 orcas, as well as the destruction of billions of salmon and herring eggs.[3][11] Due to a thorough cleanup, little visual evidence of the event remained in areas frequented by humans just 1 year later. However, the effects of the spill continue to be felt today. Overall reductions in population have been seen in various ocean animals, including stunted growth in pink salmon populations.[13] Sea otters and ducks also showed higher death rates in following years, partially because they ingested prey from contaminated soil and from ingestion of oil residues on hair due to grooming.[14]

Almost 20 years after the spill, a team of scientists at the University of North Carolina found that the effects are lasting far longer than expected.[13] The team estimates some shoreline habitats may take up to 30 years to recover.[3] Exxon Mobil denies any concerns over this, stating that they anticipated a remaining fraction that they assert will not cause any long-term ecological impacts, according to the conclusions of 350 peer-reviewed studies.[14] However, a study from scientists from NOAA concluded that this contamination can produce chronic low-level exposure, discourage subsistence where the contamination is heavy, and decrease the "wilderness character" of the area.[10]

Litigation

In 1994, in the case of Baker v. Exxon, an Anchorage jury awarded $287 million for actual damages and $5 billion for punitive damages. The punitive damages amount was equal to a single year's profit by Exxon at that time.

Exxon appealed the ruling, and the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the original judge, Russel Holland, to reduce the punitive damages. On December 6, 2002, the judge announced that he had reduced the damages to $4 billion, which he concluded was justified by the facts of the case and was not grossly excessive. Exxon appealed again and the case returned to court to be considered in light of a recent Supreme Court ruling in a similar case, which caused Judge Holland to increase the punitive damages to $4.5 billion, plus interest.

After more appeals, and oral arguments heard by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on January 27, 2006, the damages award was cut to $2.5 billion on December 22, 2006. The court cited recent Supreme Court rulings relative to limits on punitive damages.

Exxon appealed again. On May 23, 2007, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied ExxonMobil's request for a third hearing and let stand its ruling that Exxon owes $2.5 billion in punitive damages. Exxon then appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.[15] On February 27, 2008, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for 90 minutes. Justice Samuel Alito, who owns between $100,000 and $250,000 in Exxon stock, recused himself from the case.[16] In a decision issued June 25, 2008, Justice David Souter issued the judgment of the court, vacating the $2.5 billion award and remanding the case back to a lower court, finding that the damages were excessive with respect to maritime common law. Exxon's actions were deemed "worse than negligent but less than malicious."[17] The judgment limits punitive damages to the compensatory damages, which for this case were calculated as $507.5 million.[18] Some lawmakers, such as Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, have decried the ruling as "another in a line of cases where this Supreme Court has misconstrued congressional intent to benefit large corporations."[19]

Exxon's official position is that punitive damages greater than $25 million are not justified because the spill resulted from an accident, and because Exxon spent an estimated $2 billion cleaning up the spill and a further $1 billion to settle related civil and criminal charges. Attorneys for the plaintiffs contended that Exxon bore responsibility for the accident because the company "put a drunk in charge of a tanker in Prince William Sound."[20]

Exxon recovered a significant portion of clean-up and legal expenses through insurance claims associated with the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.[21][22] Also, in 1991, Exxon made a quiet, separate financial settlement of damages with a group of seafood producers known as the Seattle Seven for the disaster's effect on the Alaskan seafood industry. The agreement granted $63.75 million to the Seattle Seven, but stipulated that the seafood companies would have to repay almost all of any punitive damages awarded in other civil proceedings. The $5 billion in punitive damages was awarded later, and the Seattle Seven's share could have been as high as $750 million if the damages award had held. Other plaintiffs have objected to this secret arrangement,[23] and when it came to light, Judge Holland ruled that Exxon should have told the jury at the start that an agreement had already been made, so the jury would know exactly how much Exxon would have to pay.[24]

In October 2008, Exxon Mobil’s results got a boost of $1.62 billion in the most-recent quarter from the sale of a natural gas transportation business in Germany. It also took a special, after-tax charge of $170 million for a punitive damages award related to the oil spill.

The aftermath

The cause of the incident was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board, which identified the four following factors as contributing to the grounding of the vessel:

  • The third mate failed to properly maneuver the vessel, possibly due to fatigue and excessive workload.
  • The master failed to provide navigation watch, possibly due to impairment under the influence of alcohol.
  • Exxon Shipping Company failed to supervise the master and provide a rested and sufficient crew for the Exxon Valdez.
  • The United States Coast Guard failed to provide an effective vessel traffic system.[4]

The Board made a number of recommendations, such as changes to the work patterns of Exxon crew in order to address the causes of the accident.[4]

In response to the spill, the United States Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The legislation included a clause that prohibits any vessel that, after March 22, 1989, has caused an oil spill of more than one million U.S. gallons (3,800 m³) in any marine area, from operating in Prince William Sound.[25]

In April 1998, the company argued in a legal action against the Federal government that the ship should be allowed back into Alaskan waters. Exxon claimed OPA was effectively a bill of attainder, a regulation that was unfairly directed at Exxon alone.[26] In 2002, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Exxon. As of 2002, OPA had prevented 18 ships from entering Prince William Sound.[27]

OPA also set a schedule for the gradual phase in of a double hull design, providing an additional layer between the oil tanks and the ocean. While a double hull would likely not have prevented the Valdez disaster, a Coast Guard study estimated that it would have cut the amount of oil spilled by 60 percent.[28]

The Exxon Valdez supertanker was towed to San Diego, arriving on July 10. Repairs began on July 30. Approximately 1,600 short tons (1,500 t) of steel were removed and replaced. In June 1990 the tanker, renamed S/R Mediterranean, left harbor after $30 million of repairs.[27] It was still sailing as of August 2007. The vessel is currently owned by SeaRiver Maritime, a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil.

Other consequences

The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, representing approximately 40,000 workers nationwide, announced opposition to drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) until Congress enacted a comprehensive national energy policy. In the aftermath of the spill, Alaska governor Steve Cowper issued an executive order requiring two tugboats to escort every loaded tanker from Valdez out through Prince William Sound to Hinchinbrook Entrance. As the plan evolved in the 1990s, one of the two routine tugboats was replaced with a 210-foot (64 m) Escort Response Vehicle (ERV). The majority of tankers at Valdez are still single-hulled, but Congress has enacted legislation requiring all tankers to be double-hulled by 2015.

In 1991, following the collapse of the local marine population (particularly clams, herring, and seals) the Chugach Alaska Corporation, an Alaska Native Corporation, went bankrupt.[29]

According to several studies funded by the state of Alaska, the spill had both short- and long term economic effects. These included the loss of recreational sports fisheries, reduced tourism, and an estimate of what economists call "existence value," which is the value to the public of a pristine Prince William Sound.[30][31][32]

WikiScanner discovered changes made from within Exxon Mobil altering this article's descriptions of the oil spill and downplaying its severity.[33][34]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Oil Spill Case Histories 1967 – 1991, Report No. HMRAD 92-11 (PDF). Seattle: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. September 1992. p. 80. Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  2. ^ a b c "Frequently asked questions about the Spill". History of the Spill. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  3. ^ a b c Graham, Sarah (2003-12-19). "Environmental Effects of Exxon Valdez Spill Still Being Felt". Scientific American. Retrieved 2008-03-09. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  4. ^ a b c d Skinner, Samuel K (May 1989). The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (PDF). National Response Team. Retrieved 2008-03-09. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ "Exxon Valdez disaster – 15 years of lies". Greenpeace News. Greenpeace. 2004-03-24. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  6. ^ "16 Years After Exxon Valdez Tragedy, Arctic Refuge, America's Coasts Still At Risk" (Press release). Sierra Club. 2005-03-23. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  7. ^ "Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Fifteen Years Later" (Press release). Defenders of Wildlife. 2004-03-24. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  8. ^ http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/26_spilldb.pdf
  9. ^ Baker, Mallen. "Companies in Crisis – What not to do when it all goes wrong". Corporate Social Responsibility News. Retrieved 2008-03-09.
  10. ^ a b MacAskill, Ewan (2007-02-02). "18 years on, Exxon Valdez oil still pours into Alaskan waters". The Guardian. Retrieved 2008-03-09. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  11. ^ a b Fry, D. Michael (January–February 1993). "How's Exxon's "Video for Students" Deals in Distortions". The Textbook Letter. Retrieved 2008-03-10.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
  12. ^ SC Jewett, TA Dean, and M Hoberg (2001). "Scuba Techniques Used to Assess the Effects of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill". In: SC Jewett (ed). Cold Water Diving for Science. Proceedings of the American Academy of Underwater Sciences (21st Annual Scientific Diving Symposium). Retrieved 2008-06-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  13. ^ a b Williamson, David (2003-12-18). "Exxon Valdez oil spill effects lasting far longer than expected, scientists say". UNC/News. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Retrieved 2008-03-09. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  14. ^ a b "Exxon Valdez oil spill still a threat: study". abc.net.au. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2006-05-17. Retrieved 2008-03-09. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  15. ^ Staff writer (2007-10-29). "Supreme Court to review Exxon Valdez award". money.cnn.com. CNN. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  16. ^ Staff writer (2008-02-27). "High Court may lower Exxon Valdez damages". CNN.com. Associated Press. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  17. ^ Savage, David G. (2008-06-26). "Justices slash Exxon Valdez verdict". articles.latimes.com. Tribune Company. Retrieved 2008-06-26.
  18. ^ Exxon v. Baker, 554 U.S. (Supreme Court of the United States of America 2008-06-25).
  19. ^ http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200806/062508d.html
  20. ^ Egelko, Bob (2006-01-28). "Punitive damages appealed in Valdez spill". San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  21. ^ Bandurka, Andrew (2005-03-10). "Exxon Valdez – D. G. Syndicate 745 vs. Brandywine Reinsurance Company (UK) - Summary of the Court of Appeal Judgment". Holman Fenwick & Willan. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  22. ^ "Exxon Corporation 1993 Form 10-K". EDGAR. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 1994-03-11. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  23. ^ Erb, George (2000-11-03). "Exxon Valdez case still twisting through courts". Puget Sound Business Journal. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  24. ^ Exxon v. Baker, CV-89-00095-HRH (9th Cir. 2006).
  25. ^ "Oil Pollution Act of 1990 - Summary". Federal Wildlife and Related Laws Handbook. 1990-08-18. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  26. ^ Carrigan, Alison. "The bill of attainder clause: a new weapon to challenge the Oil Pollution Act of 1990". Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review (Fall 2000). Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  27. ^ a b "Exxon Valdez Is Barred From Alaska Sound". The New York Times. 2002-11-02. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  28. ^ Kizzia, Tom (1999-05-13). "Double-hull tankers face slow going". Anchorage Daily News. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  29. ^ Loshbaugh, Doug (2000). "School of Hard Knocks". Juneau Empire. Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  30. ^ Carson, Richard (1992-12-18). "A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Recreational Fishing Losses Related to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill" (PDF). Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Retrieved 2008-03-10. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  31. ^ "An Assessment of the Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on the Alaska Tourism Industry" (PDF). Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. August 1990. Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  32. ^ "Economic Impacts of Spilled Oil". Publications. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Retrieved 2008-03-10.
  33. ^ http://wikiscanner.virgil.gr/f.php?ip1=158.35.56.0-225.255&ip2=192.67.48.0-255&ip3=198.43.100.0-255&ip4=158.32.161.0-35.54.255&ip5=192.83.106.0-255
  34. ^ "Seeing Corporate Fingerprints in Wikipedia Edits". The New York Times. 2007-08-19. Retrieved 2008-06-26. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

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