Jump to content

Agreed Framework: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
replaced dead cite with live cite (which states the opposite of the original cite, so the body text was changed accordingly
Both sides reports of Oct 2002 meeting
Line 26: Line 26:
Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. Construction of both reactors is well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by [[2003]], but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late [[2002]].
Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. Construction of both reactors is well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by [[2003]], but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late [[2002]].


In [[October]] [[2002]], a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of [[United States Department of State|State]] [[James A. Kelly]] visted North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program [http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm]. At that point, the North Koreans admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program. [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html]. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.
In [[October]] [[2002]], a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of [[United States Department of State|State]] [[James A. Kelly]] visted North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a [[uranium enrichment]] program [http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm]. Both parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/nukes/nukes.html]. The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded denying North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time [http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm] [http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/012104hecker.pdf]. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.


KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.
KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.
Line 43: Line 43:
==External links==
==External links==
*[http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/af.html Text of the Agreed Framework] between the US and N. Korea - October 21, 1994
*[http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/af.html Text of the Agreed Framework] between the US and N. Korea - October 21, 1994
*[http://210.145.168.243/pk/011th_issue/971001genevaagreemet.htm 1994 Agreed Framework Between DPRK and the U.S. (adopted on Oct. 21 in Geneva)] - People's Korea
*[http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/011th_issue/971001genevaagreemet.htm 1994 Agreed Framework Between DPRK and the U.S. (adopted on Oct. 21 in Geneva)] - People's Korea
*[http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] - KEDO, 1995
*[http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/SupplyAgreement.pdf Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] - KEDO, 1995
*[http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/chapters%20(pdf)/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf Ch 14: North Korea] from ''Deadly Arsenals'', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)
*[http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/chapters%20(pdf)/Pages%20from%2014-NoKorea.pdf Ch 14: North Korea] from ''Deadly Arsenals'', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)
Line 49: Line 49:
*[http://www.nautilus.org/fora/index.html The Nautilus Institute] - Indepth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997
*[http://www.nautilus.org/fora/index.html The Nautilus Institute] - Indepth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997
*[http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/northkoreacrisis.htm North Korea's Nuclear Breach] - ''Carnegie Endowment for International Peace''
*[http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/northkoreacrisis.htm North Korea's Nuclear Breach] - ''Carnegie Endowment for International Peace''
*[http://210.145.168.243/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm J. Kelly Failed to Produce ‘Evidence’ in Pyongyang] - O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003
*[http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/188th_issue/2003013001.htm J. Kelly Failed to Produce ‘Evidence’ in Pyongyang] - O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003
*[http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm Dealing With North Korea’s Nuclear Programs] - James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004
*[http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm Dealing With North Korea’s Nuclear Programs] - James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004
*[http://www.abb.com/global/abbzh/abbzh251.nsf!OpenDatabase&db=/global/abbzh/abbzh250.nsf&v=553E&e=&url=/global/seitp/seitp202.nsf/0/C1256C290031524B4125686C00433604!OpenDocument ABB to deliver systems, equipment to North Korean nuclear plants] - [[Asea Brown Boveri|ABB]] News Release, January 20, 2000
*[http://www.abb.com/global/abbzh/abbzh251.nsf!OpenDatabase&db=/global/abbzh/abbzh250.nsf&v=553E&e=&url=/global/seitp/seitp202.nsf/0/C1256C290031524B4125686C00433604!OpenDocument ABB to deliver systems, equipment to North Korean nuclear plants] - [[Asea Brown Boveri|ABB]] News Release, January 20, 2000

Revision as of 17:19, 25 October 2005

The Agreed Framework was signed on October 21, 1994 between North Korea (DPRK) and the United States. The agreement largely broke-down by 2003. The main provisions of the agreement were:

  • DPRK's graphite-moderated nuclear power plants, which could easily produce weapons grade plutonium, would be replaced with light water reactor (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.
  • Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down, until completion of the first LWR power unit.
  • The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
  • The U.S. would provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
  • The DPRK would take steps to implement the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Declaration.
  • The DPRK would remain a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  • IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.
  • Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK.
  • Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The pact is neither a treaty subject to Senate approval nor a contract, but more of a memorandum of understanding between the two countries. It was signed in the wake of North Korea's abandonment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a military buildup by the United States near the country.

A satellite photo of East Asia at night in 2000 illustrates the limited electric power generating capacity of North Korea in contrast to that of the neighboring countries.

Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, abandoning the construction of two new nuclear power plants, and placing of spent fuel which could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a nuclear weapon under IAEA controls. In exchange two light water reactors would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of $4 billion, primarily supplied by Japan and South Korea. In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO, is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for carrying out the 1994 U.S.-North Korea nuclear pact.

It is reported that President Clinton's officials only agreed to the plan because they thought the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed [1]. North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK [2].

There were increasing disagreement between North Korea and U.S. on the scope and implementation of the treaty. When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between U.S. and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the U.S. kept up its end of the bargain. U.S. has repeatedly stated that further implementation would be stalled as long as suspicions remained that the North Korean nuclear weapons research program continued covertly.

Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. Construction of both reactors is well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002.

In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visted North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program [3]. Both parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program [4]. The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded denying North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time [5] [6]. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.

KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the U.S. Congress would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.

In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers’ facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.

On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence" [7]. As yet, there is no evidence that North Korea has a working nuclear weapon, as there is no evidence that they have performed a successful nuclear test explosion.

Discussions are taking place through the Six-party talks about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on September 19, 2005. The accord makes no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework. [8].

See also