Russo-Georgian War

2008 South Ossetia war
Part of Georgian–Ossetian conflict and Georgian–Abkhazian conflict
Location of Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the Russian part of North Caucasus
Date 7 August 2008 – 16 August 2008 Location Georgian Territory Result Russian/South Ossetian/Abkhazian victory Partial recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics. Explusion of ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia. Territorial changes Georgia loses control over parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia it previously held.
Belligerents
Russia South Ossetia Abkhazia	Georgia
Commanders and leaders
Dmitry Medvedev (commander-in-chief) Anatoly Khrulyov (58th Army) Vyacheslav Borisov (76th Airborne) Marat Kulakhmetov (peacekepers) Vasiliy Lunev Anatoliy Zaitsev	Mikheil Saakashvili (commander-in-chief) Davit Kezerashvili Mamuka Kurashvili (WIA)
Strength
Est. at least 15,000 regulars in Georgia (as of 13/08/08), not including support and rear troops (in Russia and on the sea) 3,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists; unknown number of volunteers unknown number of volunteers, potential of 45,000 according to the At least 23,000 total	Estimate: 12,000 troops including 75 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Up to 16,000 troops according to another source. Total military personnel is 37,000 as of 2007 Unknown number of Georgian Police deployed in the conflict zone
Casualties and losses
South Ossetia: $\approx$ 150 dead (including voluenteers) Confirmed by Russia: 48 killed, 157 wounded,2 missing Confirmed by Abkhazia: 1 killed, 2 wounded	Confirmed by Georgia: 153 soldiers killed, 17 missing, 42 captured and 1,964 wounded; 14 policemen killed and 22 missing
Civilian casualties: Georgia: Officials confirmed at least 228 Georgian civilians killed; authorities in Georgia initially classified 872 civilians as missing; One foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded. South Ossetia: Russia and South Ossetian officials initially claimed 1,492 South Ossetian civilians killed. These numbers were disputed by Human Rights Watch and Memorial. The Russian Procurator's office says it's investigating 365 deaths. Human Rights Watch believes Russian and South Ossetian figure of 300-400 civilians is a "useful starting point". Refugees:Georgia: At least 158,000 civilians displaced (including 56,000 from Gori, Georgia and 15,000 Georgians from South Ossetia per UNHCR). Estimate by Georgian Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs: at least 230,000. South Ossetia: Displaced from South Ossetia to Russia: Russian estimate, 30,000; HRW estimate, 24,000.

The 2008 South Ossetia War, also known as the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, was an armed conflict between Georgia on the one side, and Russia together with separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. It occurred in August 2008, and involved land, air and sea warfare.

A civil war fought in 1991–1992 left most of South Ossetia under the control of an unrecognized government backed by Russia. Other parts remained under the control of Georgia. This mirrored that situation in Abkhazia. Already increasing tensions escalated during the summer months of 2008.

On the evening of August 7, 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale ground- and air-based military attack on South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali. The events of August 7 remain a matter of debates and controversy. Russia responded by sending troops into South Ossetia and launching bombing raids farther into Georgia. On August 8, Russian naval forces blocked Georgia's coast and landed ground forces and paratroopers on Georgian coast. Russian and Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by Georgia, and entered western parts of Georgia's interior. After five days of heavy fighting, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian troops entered Georgia proper, occupying the cities of Poti and Gori among others.

Following mediation by EU chairman, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12, signed by Georgia and Russia on August 15 in Tbilisi and on August 16 in Moscow. On August 12, President Medvedev had already ordered a halt to Russian military operations in Georgia but fighting did not stop immediately. After the signing of the ceasefire Russia pulled most of its troops out of Georgia proper. However, Russia established "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and check points in Georgia's interior (Poti, Senaki).

On August 26, 2008 Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. International monitoring personnel was deployed in Georgia on October 1. Following international agreements, Russia completed its withdrawal from Georgia on October 8. Russian troops remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including areas under Georgian control before the war, under bilateral agreements with respective governments.

A number of incidents have occurred in both conflict zones since the war ended, and tensions between the belligerents remain high.

Naming

Commentators have applied various names to the 2008 South Ossetia war. Some of the names include:

• August War
• Five-Day War
• Georgia-Russia conflict
• Russian-Georgian War, Russia-Georgia War or Russo-Georgian War

Background

Main article: Background of the 2008 South Ossetia war

See also: Georgian-Ossetian conflict; South Ossetian independence referendum, 2006; and 2008 Georgia-Russia crisis

Ethnic map of the Caucasus from 1995: Ossetians live in North and South Ossetia, as well as in central Georgia.

Amidst rising ethnic tensions, a military conflict broke out in January 1991 when Georgia sent in troops to crush the separatist movement in South Ossetia. Estimates of deaths in this fighting exceed 2,000 people. During the war several atrocities occurred on both sides, including atrocities committed by Georgian troops in Tskhinvali. Approximately 100,000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, while 23,000 Georgians left South Ossetia. The war resulted in South Ossetia, which had a Georgian ethnic minority of around one fifth of the total population (70,000), breaking away from Georgia and gaining de facto independence. After a cease-fire in 1992, Tskhinvali was isolated from the Georgian territory around it and Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia under the JCC's mandate of demilitarization. The 1992 ceasefire also defined both a zone of conflict around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories. In May, 2008, there were about 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and about 1,000 in South Ossetia.

In late 1994, Georgia's Supreme Council ordered the disbanding of the South-Ossetian autonomous region (oblast). The government in Tbilisi established Georgian as the country's principal language, whereas the Ossetians' first two languages were Russian and Ossetian.

The conflict remained frozen until 2003 when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in the Rose Revolution which ousted president Eduard Shevardnadze. In the years that followed, Saakashvili's government pushed a program to strengthen failing state institutions, including security and military. In 2007, Georgia spend 6% of GDP on its military and had the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. Restoring South Ossetia and Abkhazia (a region with a similar movement) to Georgian control has been a goal of Saakashvili since he came to power.

In the 2006 South Ossetian independence referendum, 99% of those voting supported full independence, although ethnic Georgians living in the region did not participate. Georgia accused Russia of the annexation of its internationally recognised territory and installing a puppet government led by Eduard Kokoity and several officials who previously served in the Russian FSB and Army.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would "protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are". The proportion of Russians living in South Ossetia has always been low (in 1989, Ossetians accounted for around 60 percent, Georgians 20 percent, Armenians 10 percent and Russians 5 percent of the population), but about 7/8 of South Ossetians have been issued with Russian passports. Reuters describes the government as "dependent on Russia, [supplier of] two thirds of [its] annual budget", and reports that "Russia's state-controlled gas giant Gazprom is building new gas pipelines and infrastructure" worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply its cities with energy. In mid-April, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Prime Minister Putin had given instructions to the federal government whereby Moscow would pursue economic, diplomatic, and administrative relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as with the subjects of Russia.

While Russia has allied itself with the separatist regions, Georgia, on its part, has a close relationship with the United States, which has helped to train and arm the Georgian military. Although Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves on its own, it is an important transit route that supplies the West. The pipeline has been a key factor for the United States' support for Georgia, allowing the West to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil while bypassing Russia and Iran.

President Saakashvili has made Georgian NATO membership one of his main goals. NATO agreed in April 2008 that Georgia would become a member of the alliance at some unspecified date in the future. Russia has said it feels threatened by NATO's eastward expansion towards its borders. According to Prime Minister Putin, Russia opposes NATO expansion in principle.

Prelude to war

Situation in South Ossetia before the war.

See also: Timeline of the 2008 South Ossetia war

Military buildup

During 2008, both Georgia and Russia accused each other of preparing a war. In April, 2008, Russia said that Georgia was massing 1,500 soldiers and police in the upper Kodori Gorge area and planning to invade the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Russia said it was boosting its forces there and in the South Ossetia region as a response. Georgian Interior ministry spokesman Shota Utiashvili however said, that "there has been no increase in forces from the Georgian side, nothing at all. The Russian statement is simply not true."

In the same month, Russia deployed hundreds of paratroopers in Abkhazia, claiming they are the reinforcements of the peacekeeper force. Sergey Lavrov said, that his his country was not preparing for war but would "retaliate" against any attack. According to EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana, "even if the increase in peacekeepers is within limits, if we want to diminish the perception of tensions, I don't think it is a wise measure to increase now."

Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a Georgian unmanned spy plane flying over Abkhazia. Russia denied involvement, saying that the plane was shot down over Abkhazia by Abkhaz rebels.. Georgian interior ministry officials showed the BBC video footage, which Georgia said showed Russian troops deploying heavy military hardware in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. According to Georgia, "it proved the Russians were a fighting force, not just peacekeepers." Russia strongly denied the accusations. Both countries also accused each other of flying jets over South Ossetia, violating the ceasefire.

From July to early August, Georgia and Russia conducted two parallel military exercises, the joint US-Georgian Immediate Response 2008 and the Russian Caucasus Frontier 2008.

On August 5, Russian ambassador-at-large Yuri Popov reiterated the Russian claim that the country would intervene in the event of military conflict. Dmitry Medoyev declared from Moscow that volunteers were already arriving, primarily "from North Ossetia," in the Republic of South Ossetia to offer help in the event of Georgian aggression.

According to Moscow Defense Brief, an English-language defense magazine published by the independent research organization Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, "Over the course of several days in early August, the Georgians appear to have secretly concentrated a significant number of troops and equipment (the full 2th, 3th and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Artillery Brigade, the elements of the 1th Infantry Brigade, the separate Gori Tank Battalion – total the nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight artillery battalions – plus special forces and Ministry of the Internal Affairs troops – all in all, up to 16,000 men) in the Georgian enclaves in the South Ossetian conflict zone, under cover of providing support for the exchange of fire with Ossetian formations."

Pre-war clashes

During early August, frequent shelling and clashes in the South Ossetian conflict zone resulted in numerous deaths on both sides. Georgia and South Ossetia blamed each other for starting the violence.

On August 6, South Ossetia and Georgia failed to agree on the format of talks. South Ossetian side had proposed holding a JCC session with the participation of Georgian, South Ossetian, Russian and Russia’s North Ossetian negotiators in Tskhinvali scheduled for August 9. Tbilisi has consistently refused to participate in the quadripartite JCC talks.
According to the eyewitness account of a Nezavisimaya gazeta correspondent, Georgian military started sporadic heavy shelling of Tskhinvali on August 6. The eyewitness claims, weapons used by the Georgian military were mortars, artillery and sniper rifles. South Ossetian military officials speculated that the Georgian army was preparing for a full-scale attack on the city. Russian correspondents reported that the city was under artillery and mortar fire that continued all night long.

Active stage of the war

Events of August 7

See also: 2008 South Ossetia War § Responsibility for the war

Georgian officials claim that on August 7 at around 2 p.m. Ossetian artillery fire that had begun the night before resumed, targeting Georgian positions in the village of Avnevi in South Ossetia and continuing for several hours. Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze reported the killing of two Georgian peacekeepers. At 3 p.m., OSCE monitors on patrol saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and Grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori, just south of the South Ossetian border. At about 7 p.m., President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered a unilateral ceasefire after Georgian troops had occupied several important heights around Tshkinvali. According to the Georgian military, fighting intensified despite the declared ceasefire. South Ossetia denies any such night bombardment of Georgian forces or villages. An OSCE monitoring group in Tskhinvali also did not record outgoing artillery fire from the South Ossetian side before the start of Georgian bombardment, and NATO officials attest to minor skirmishes but nothing that amounted to a provocation, according to Der Spiegel. The Russian and Ossetian governments claim that Saakashvili's ceasefire was as an attempt to buy time while Georgian forces positioned themselves for a major attack. During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and vowed to restore Tbilisi's control by force over what he called the "criminal regime" in South Ossetia to "reinforce order". At 11:30 p.m. on August 7, Georgian forces began a major artillery assault on Tskhinvali. At 11:45 OSCE monitors report shells falling on Tskhinvali every 15–20 seconds. The Georgians used 27 rocket launchers, including 152-millimeter guns as well as cluster bombs. Three brigades began the nighttime assault. Georgia claims that it was responding to Russian troop movements, but this claim has not gained international support. According to Georgian intelligence and several Russian sources, parts of 58th Russian Army moved to South Ossetian territory through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. According to an article published in the New York Times on November 6, no conclusive evidence has been as yet presented by Georgia or its Western allies that Russia was invading the country before the Georgian attack or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary.

The Battle of Tskhinvali

Main article: Battle of Tskhinvali

Tskhinvali after the battle

Early in the morning of August 8, Georgia launched a military offensive, codenamed Operation Clear Field, to surround and capture Tskhinvali. At 12:15 a.m., General Marat M. Kulakhmetov, commander of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, reported to the OSCE monitors that his troops had come under fire and that they had casualties. According to a Russian military official, over 13 Russian Peacekeeping force soldiers stationed in Tskhinvali were killed and another 35 wounded. The heavy shelling, which included Georgian rockets being fired into South Ossetia left parts of the capital city in ruins. The news of the shelling was extensively covered by Russian media prior to the military reaction that followed, as Russia claimed to have responded in defense of South Ossetians against what they called "a genocide by Georgian forces." Russia claimed civilian casualties may amount up to 2,000 dead in Tskhinvali following the Georgian shelling. The extent of civilian casualties was later disputed in a number of sources, with Human Rights Watch report speaking of only 44 dead in Tskhinvali's city hospital, leveled with the BM-21 "Grad" multiple missile systems during the shelling of the city. The Tskhinvali hospital, HRW reports, was under constant shelling for 18 hours.

By 8 am. on August 8, Georgian infantry and tanks had entered Tskhinvali and engaged in a fierce battle with Ossetian forces and the Russian peacekeeping battalion stationed in the city. In the morning, Georgia announced that it had surrounded Tskhinvali and captured eight South Ossetian villages. According to Georgian officials, 1,500 Georgian ground troops had entered the centre of Tskhinvali by 10 a.m. on August 8, but were pushed back three hours later by Russian artillery and air attacks. According to a report in Der Spiegel, the attacking Georgian troops became bogged down and failed to advance further than Tskhinvali. The BBC has discovered evidence that Georgia may have committed war crimes during its attack and occupation of Tskhinvali, including possible deliberate targeting of civilians. The Human Rights Watch found some evidence of firing being directed into basements, locations which civilians frequently choose as a place of shelter.

According to Georgia, Russian military aircraft violated Georgian airspace around 10 a.m. on 8 August. Starting around 2 a.m., international press agencies began running reports of Russian tanks in the Roki tunnel. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit, the First Battalion of the 135th Regiment, was ordered at around dawn of August 8 to move through the Roki Tunnel and reinforce the Russian forces in Tshkinvali. According to him, the unit passed through the tunnel at 2:30 p.m. It reached Tshkinvali at the evening, meeting heavy resistance from Georgian troops. Georgia disputes the account, saying that it was in heavy combat with Russian forces near the tunnel long before dawn of 8 August.

During the evening of August 8, vicious fighting took place in the area of Tskhinvali and in South Ossetia. The fighting in South Ossetian towns and villages was done by the local militia and volunteers, while Russian troops concentrated on engaging larger Georgian army groups. Russia also undertook action to suppress the Georgian artillery and the Russian Air Force launched strikes on Georgia's logistical infrastructure. Russian special units reportedly prevented Georgian saboteurs from blowing up the Roki Tunnel, which could have hindered the sending of reinforcements to South Ossetia.

On the early afternoon of August 9 the Russian military stated that Georgian forces had been driven out of Tskhinvali and that the city had been "fully liberated."

Burned Georgian tank in Tskhinvali

According to Moscow Defense Brief, the passage of Russian forces through the narrow Roki Tunnel and along the mountain roads was slow and the Russians had difficulties in concentrating their troops, forcing them to bring their forces into battle battalion by battalion. Due to this, a fierce battle took place on August 9 in the region of Tskhinvali and the Georgians were able to mount several counterattacks, including some with tanks.

By the morning of August 10, the Georgians had captured almost the whole of Tskhinvali, forcing the Ossetian forces and Russian peacekeeping battalion to retreat to the northern reaches of the city. "However, on this very day the accumulation of Russian forces in the region finally bore fruit and the fighting in South Ossetia reached a turning point. Toward the evening of August 10, Tskhinvali was completely cleared of Georgian forces, which retreated to the south of the city. Georgian forces were also repelled from the key Prisi heights. The bulk of Georgia’s artillery was defeated. Meanwhile, Ossetian forces, with the support of Russian divisions, took Achabeti, Kekhvi, Kurta and Tamarasheni on the approach to Tskhinvali from the north. Georgian forces in several of Georgian enclaves were eliminated."

By August 10, the joint Russian and South Ossetian forces regained control over the city as the Georgian military withdrew. According to the Georgian Defence Minister, the Georgian military tried to push into Tskhinvali three times in all. During the last one, they got a very heavy counter attack which Georgian officials described as "something like hell." In total, the fighting in the Tskhinval area lasted for three days and nights, by the end of which Georgian artillery was either destroyed or had left its positions, from which it could shell the city and Georgian ground troops pulled out of the city.

The Georgian forces regrouped at Gori, and continued to shell Tskhinvali from a number of high points. However, by the end of August 11 South Ossetia was completely cleared of Georgian forces, and Russian units had moved into Georgia proper by the next morning.

Bombing and occupation of Gori

See also: Occupation of Gori

Pictures on display outside the Georgian parliament showing the destruction after Russian bombings in Gori

Gori is a major Georgian city close to the border with the de facto independent republic of South Ossetia, about 25 km from Tskhinvali. It was the staging area for the Georgian army during the fighting for the capital of South Ossetia and was bombed several times by the Russian Air Force.

Around 6 a.m. on August 9, Reuters reported that two Russian fighters had bombed a Georgian artillery position near Gori. A later attack hit the central district of the city, killing one Dutch journalist. An air-to-ground missile also hit the Gori hospital. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international rights group, accused Russia of deploying controversial and indiscriminately deadly cluster bombs on civilian areas of Georgia. According to HRW at least eight civilians were killed and dozens injured when a Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in the centre of Gori on August 12. According to the Russian military, three bombs hit an armament depot and the façade of one of the adjacent 5-storey apartment buildings suffered as a result exploding ammunition from the depot. The Georgian government reported that 60 civilians were killed when at least one bomb hit an apartment in Gori.

On the evening of August 10, large numbers of the civilian population began to flee the city. By the next day 56,000 people fled the district. The next day, at 5 p.m., the Georgian army started to abandon the city in disarray, without firing a shot, following their defeat at Tskhinvali. A Times reporter described the Georgian withdrawal as "sudden and dramatic", saying that the Gori residents watched in horror as their army abandoned their positions. According to Moscow Defense Brief, the retreat of the Georgian army from Gori soon grew into a panicked flight almost all the way to Tbilisi.

Around August 13 Russian ground forces entered Gori. On August 14, the Russian Ministry of Defence official Vyacheslav Borisov claimed that the city of Gori was controlled jointly by Georgian Police and Russian troops. He further said that Russian troops would start leaving Gori in two days. Russian troops said they were removing military hardware and ammunition from an arms depot outside Gori. Russian troops were also seen on the road from Gori to Tbilisi, but they turned off to the north, about an hour from Tbilisi, and encamped. Georgian troops occupied the road six miles (about 10 km) closer to Tbilisi.

The Russian forces denied access to some humanitarian aid missions seeking to assist civilians. The United Nations, which has described the humanitarian situation in Gori as "desperate," was able to deliver only limited food supplies to the city. On August 15, Russian troops allowed a number of humanitarian supplies into the city but continued their blockade of the strategically located city. In the August 17 report, HRW said the organization's researchers interviewed ethnic Georgians from the city of Gori and surrounding villages who described how armed South Ossetian militias attacked their cars and kidnapped civilians as people tried to flee in response to militia attacks on their homes following the Russian advance into the area. In phone interviews, people remaining in Gori region villages told HRW that they had witnessed looting and arson attacks by South Ossetian militias in their villages, but were afraid to leave after learning about militia attacks on those who fled. An officer in the Russian army said during the war: "We have to be honest. The Ossetians are marauding." But another Russian officer said: "we're not a police force, we're a military force. It's not our job to do police work." The Russian human rights group Memorial called the attacks by South Ossetian militia "pogroms".

The occupation lasted until August 22.

Abkhazian front

See also: Battle of the Kodori Valley

The Russian Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol on the evening of August 8 and established a de-facto sea blockade of the Georgian coast. On the evening of August 9, a Russian corvette called Mirazh probably sank one Georgian patrol cutter with two Malakhit (SS-N-9) anti-ship missiles in what amounted to the Russian Navy's first real sea battle since 1945, according to Moscow Defense Brief. The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed that a such naval skirmish in the Black Sea off Abkhazia had taken place. The Russians claimed that Georgian ships had violated the security zone of the Black Sea Fleet and therefore the action was in accordance with international law. Following the action, the remaining Georgian ships withdrew to a nearby harbor.

On August 9 2008 Russia opened a second front in Abkhazia, deploying up to 9,000 men from the 7th Novorossiysk and 76th Pskov Air Assault Aivisions, the elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division and two batallions of the Black Sea Fleet Marines. With their support, Abkhaz forces began to dislodge the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.

On August 10 Abkhazia declared a full military mobilization to drive out the 1,000 Georgian troops from their remaining stronghold in the Kodori Valley.

The next day, Russian paratroopers deployed in Abkhazia carried out raids deep inside Georgian territory to destroy military bases from where Georgia could send reinforcements to its troops sealed off in South Ossetia. Russian forces, meeting virtually no opposition, reached the military base near the town of Senaki outside Abkhazia on the 11th, leaving the base there destroyed. Russian aircraft also shot down two Georgian helicopters at the airbase at Senaki. Russian troops also drove through the port of Poti, and took up positions around it. On August 12, the Abkhazian authorities announced the beginning of military operations against Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge area. On the same day, Georgia said it was withdrawing its troops from the Kodori Gorge "as a gesture of goodwill". The battle between Georgian and Abkhazian forces lasted until August 13, when all of the remaining Georgian forces, including at least 1,500 civilians in the Kodori Valley, retreated from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Occupation of Poti

Main article: Occupation of Poti

On August 14, Russian troops entered Poti and sunk several Georgian naval vessels moored in the harbor, as well as removing or destroying military equipment. They also controlled the highway linking Poti to Tbilisi. Four days later, Russian forces in Poti took prisoner 22 Georgian troops who had approached the city. They were taken to a Georgian military base occupied by Russian troops at Senaki. From August 13 to 15, according to Moscow Defense Brief, "Russian paratroops raided Poti again and again, destroying almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took away a quantity of valuable military equipment."

Six-point peace plan

Territories controlled by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh

On August 10, most international observers began calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The European Union and the United States expressed a willingness to send a joint delegation to try and negotiate a ceasefire. Russia, however, ruled out peace talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing the use of force against South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On August 12, Russian President Medvedev said that he had ordered an end to military operations in Georgia, saying that "the operation has achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians has been restored. The aggressor was punished, suffering huge losses." Later on the same day, he met the President-in-Office of the European Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and approved a six-point peace plan. Late that night Georgian President Saakashvili agreed to the text. Sarkozy's plan originally had just the first four points. Russia added the fifth and sixth points. Georgia asked for the additions in parentheses, but Russia rejected them, and Sarkozy convinced Georgia to agree to the unchanged text. On August 14, South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity and Abkhazia President Sergei Bagapsh signed the peace plan as well.

1. No recourse to the use of force.
2. Definitive cessation of hostilities.
3. Free access to humanitarian aid (addition rejected: and to allow the return of refugees).
4. The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions.
5. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures. (addition rejected: six months)
6. An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security will take place. (addition rejected: based on the decisions of the UN and the OSCE).

After the cease fire had been signed, hostilities did not immediately stop. According to Moscow Defense Brief, active raids on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian weapons, and the 'demilitarization of the Georgian armed forces' continued. A reporter for the UK The Guardian was quoted on the 13th of August saying "the idea there is a ceasefire is ridiculous" while Russian troops and irregulars advanced. On August 14, efforts to institute joint patrols of Georgian and Russian police in Gori broke down due to apparent discord among personnel. Reuters stated on August 15, that Russian forces had pushed to 34 miles (55 km) from Tbilisi, the closest during the war; they stopped in Igoeti 41°59′22″N 44°25′04″E, an important crossroads. That day, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also traveled to Tbilisi, where Saakashvili signed the 6-point peace plan in her presence. Russian and Georgian forces exchanged prisoners of war on August 19. Georgia said it handed over 5 Russian servicemen, in exchange for 15 Georgians, including two civilians.

As of January, 2009, there are 200 EU ceasefire monitors operating in Georgia. The mandate of OSCE monitors expired on 1 January, and the organization began withdrawing its personnel from Georgia. According to Russia, the extension of the mandate in its current format was impossible because it would be illegal under the Russian law that recognises South Ossetia as an independent state.

Russian withdrawal

Despite numerous calls for a quick withdrawal from Georgia by western leaders, Russian troops occupied some parts of Georgia proper for about two months. In late August, some troops were withdrawn, however Russian troops and checkpoints remained near Gori and Poti, as well as in so called "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Withdrawal from the buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia was completed when control was handed over to a EU observer mission on 9 October. On 9 September, 2008, Russia officially announced that its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would "thenceforth be considered foreign troops stationed in independent states under bilateral agreements". Russia maintains 3,700 soldiers in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and is planning to open military bases in Java, Tskhinvali, and Gudauta in 2010. Russia is planning to spend $400 million on the bases.

A number of incidents have occurred in both border conflict zones since the war ended, and tensions between the belligerents remain high.

Casualties

More than 2,000 people were killed in the five-day long war. South Ossetian and Russian officials claimed that 1,492 South Ossetian civilians had died, while a surgeon in the Tskhinvali hospital said only 44 people were killed. Human rights watch says that estimates at 300-400 dead is a "useful starting point". South Ossetian military casualties, including various voluenteers, are estimated at 150. Russia confirmed its military casualties as being 48 killed, 157 wounded, and 2 missing. Abkhazia confirmed its military casualties as being 1 soldier killed and 2 soldiers wounded. Georgia confirmed the loss of 153 soldiers killed, 17 soldiers missing, 42 soldiers captured, and 1,964 wounded. The Georgian police, which also fought in the conflict, suffered the loss of 14 policemen killed and 22 policemen missing. Georgian officials initially claimed that 228 Georgian civilians had died, but later lowered the figure to 69. An additional 872 Georgian civilians are listed as missing. One Dutch journalist was killed in the conflict and another 3 foreign civilians were wounded.

Humanitarian impact

See also: Humanitarian impact of the 2008 South Ossetia war and Humanitarian response to the 2008 South Ossetia war

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), all parties committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, resulting in many civilian deaths and injuries. Georgian forces used indiscriminate force during their attack on South Ossetia, directing tanks and machine gun fire at buildings in Tskhinvali, including at apartment buildings where civilians sheltered. South Ossetian forces had fired on Georgian forces from at least some of these buildings. The Georgian military used Grad multiple rocket launchers, an indiscriminate weapon, to destroy targets situated in civilian areas. The Russian military has also used indiscriminate force in attacks in South Ossetia and in the Gori district, and has apparently targeted convoys of civilians attempting to flee the conflict zones. Armed criminal gangs and Ossetian militia have committed looting, arson attacks, rape and abductions, terrorizing the civilian population, forcing them to flee their homes and preventing displaced people from returning home.

HRW further reports that both Georgians and Russians used cluster bombs of the types M85S and RBK 250, resulting in civilian casualties. Georgia admits using cluster bombs against Russian troops and the Roki tunnel but is accused of also hitting civilians fleeing from the battle zone. Russia denies the use of cluster bombs, but is accused of having used them in its attacks against Gori and Ruisi. The organisation called the conflict a disaster for civilians. HRW also called for international organisations to send fact-finding missions to establish the facts, report on human rights, and urged the authorities to account for any crimes.

On September 8, Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, issued a report titled "Human Rights in Areas Affected by the South Ossetia Conflict" stating that during the conflict "a very large number of people had been victimised. More than half of the population in South Ossetia fled, the overwhelming majority of them after the Georgian artillery and tank attack on Tskhinvali and the assaults on Georgian villages by South Ossetian militia and criminal gangs." The report also states that the main Tskhinvali hospital had been hit by rockets, that some "residential areas in the city" of Tskhinvali were "completely destroyed" and "the main building of the Russian peace keeping force as well as the base’s medical dispensary had been hit by heavy artillery." Furthermore, the villages with ethnic Georgian majority between Tskhinvali and Java "have been destroyed, reportedly by South Ossetian militia and criminal gangs."

In November 2008, Amnesty International released a 69 page report citing both Georgia and Russia of serious international law violations on the conduct of war.

Infrastructure damage

1993 map showing the defense industries of Georgia at the time: Tbilaviamsheni, an aircraft assembly plant in Tbilisi which was bombed during the war, and component plants in other cities.

On August 12 local authorities stated that approximately 70% of Tskhinvali's buildings, both municipal and private, have suffered damage during Georgian offensive. According to later statements made by Russian and Ossetian sources, about 20% of the Tskhinvali's buildings have suffered various damage, including an estimate of 700, or 10% of city's buildings of "beyond repair".

Georgia claimed Russia had bombed airfields and economic infrastructure, including the Black Sea port of Poti. Between eight and eleven Russian jets reportedly hit container tanks and a shipbuilding plant at the port.

From August 19 onwards the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) released a series of detailed satellite maps of the regions affected by the war via its Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). All damage is assessed from satellite images (with a resolution of up to 60 cm), however it is not independently validated on the ground. For Tskhinvali, UNOSAT reports 230 (5.5% of the total) of buildings either destroyed or severly damaged. In the villages to the north of Tskhinvali (controlled by Georgia previous to the war) between 5.4% and 51.9% of the total buildings was affected. Human Rights Watch (HRW) used the images to support the claim that widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages by Ossetian militia had occurred inside South Ossetia. With regard to the city of Poti, UNOSAT provided imagery that witnesses a total of 6 Georgian naval vessels either "partially or completely submerged". "No other damage to physical infrastructure or vessel-related oil spills" were detected.

Interfax.ru reported that retreating Georgian forces mined civilian infrastructure in South Ossetia, including some private house basements civilians used to hide in during the Georgian offensive.

On August 10 Reuters reported that "a Reuters witness and the Georgian interior ministry" claimed an attack on the civilian Tbilisi International Airport. Later, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili admitted that the attack had not taken place, stating, "There was no attack on the airport in Tbilisi. It was a factory that produces combat airplanes" (most likely referring to Tbliaviamsheni, a military avionics plant near Tbilisi).

Many countries and institutions promised reconstruction aid for the affected regions.

Responsibility for the war and motives

The combatants' positions

Georgia's position is that the country acted in self-defence. Around 11:30 p.m. on August 7 the Georgian government claims to have received intelligence information that 150 Russian army vehicles had entered Georgian territory through the Roki Tunnel. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Mikheil Saakashvili said "we wanted to stop the Russian troops before they could reach Georgian villages. When our tanks moved toward Tskhinvali, the Russians bombed the city. They were the ones -- not us -- who reduced Tskhinvali to rubble."

Russia says it acted to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia, and its own peacekeepers stationed there. The Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia suffered casualties during the initial Georgian artillery barrage on Tskhinvali and were besieged by Georgian troops for two days until a Russian unit broke through to their camp and started evacuating the wounded at 5 a.m. on 9 August. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit was ordered to move through the Roki Tunnel at around dawn of 8 August. Defending Russia's decision to launch attacks on Georgia proper, Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov has said that Russia had no choice but to target the military infrastructure being used to sustain the Georgian offensive.

Georgian intelligence and journalistic evaluation

Georgia has released intercepted telephone calls purporting to show that part of a Russian armoured regiment crossed into the separatist enclave of South Ossetia nearly a full day before Georgia’s attack on the capital, Tskhinvali, late on Aug. 7; Russian military played down the significance of the intercepted conversations, saying the troop movements to the enclave before the war erupted were part of the normal rotation and replenishment of longstanding peacekeeping forces there. In a September 16 article, the New York Times described the intercepted calls as "credible if not conclusive"

In a later article published on November 6, the New York Times said that "neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary" and that the phone intercepts published by Georgia did not show the Russian column’s size, composition or mission, and that "there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment."

OSCE monitors

A former senior OSCE official, Ryan Grist, who was in charge of unarmed monitors in South Ossetia at war's start and in mid of August 2008 forced to resign by OSCE , told the BBC in November 2008 that he had been warning of Georgia's military activity before its move into the South Ossetia region, saying there was a "severe escalation" and that this "would give the Russian Federation any excuse it needed in terms of trying to support its own troops." According to Grist, it was Georgia that launched the first military strikes against Tskhinvali. "It was clear to me that the [Georgian] attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” he said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.”

Grist's views were echoed and confirmed by Stephen Young, who was another senior OSCE official in Georgia at the time. According to him, there had been little or no shelling of Georgian villages on the night Saakashvili’s troops began their onslaught on Tskhinvali. Young added, that if there had been shelling of Georgian villages that evening as Georgia has claimed, the OSCE monitors at the scene would have heard it. According to him, the monitors only heard occasional small arms fire. According New York Times the accounts are neither fully conclusive nor broad enough to settle the many lingering disputes over blame in a war.

The monitors' ground reports were subject of briefings in August (by Grist) and October 2008 (by Young) for diplomats in Tblisi. These briefings were confirmed by three Western diplomats and a Russian, and were not disputed by the OSCE's mission in Tbilisi.The OSCE itself, while refusing to discuss its internal findings, stood by the accuracy of its work but urged caution in interpreting it too broadly. Monitoring activities in certain areas at certain times couldn't be taken in isolation to provide a comprehensive account. Later Ambassador Terhi Hakala of Finland, head of the OSCE mission to Georgia called what three monitors heard just from villages nearest them on August 7 "a bit irrelevant." She added, "We're very limited in what we can monitor".

Ryan Grist's objectivity was later questioned by Georgia and some Western diplomats in Tbilisi. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, he admitted that he went AWOL across Russian lines on his own fact-finding mission. Grist remains scathing about Georgian actions before and during the war. But he said, that some of his comments have been overinterpreted. "I have never said there was no provocation by the South Ossetians. What I have said is that the response from the Georgian authorities was absolutely disproportionate." The Georgian secret service believes Mr Grist is a Russian spy.

NATO officials

NATO officials interviewed by Der Spiegel believed that the Georgians had started the conflict. The officials treated the exchanges of fire in the preceding days as minor events and didn't see them as a justification for Georgian war preparations. The NATO experts however did not question the Georgian claim that the Russians had provoked them by sending their troops through the Roki Tunnel. But their evaluation of the facts was dominated by skepticism that these were the true reasons for Saakashvili's actions.

Other statements

On August 11, 2008, a US Defense official said that there was no obvious buildup of Russian forces along the border that signaled an intention to invade. "Once it did happen they were able to get the forces quickly and it was just a matter of taking the roads in. So it's not as though they were building up forces on the border, waiting," the official said.

On August 14, Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, observer of Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta and regular contributor to U.S. based think-tank Jamestown Foundation speculated in a Novaya Gazeta article that "Russia's invasion of Georgia had been planned in advance, with the final political decision to complete the preparations and start war in August apparently having been made back in April."

On August 16, Andrei Illarionov, V. Putin's ex-advisor in economics topics, argues that Russia was the country to prepare and start the war. However, his speech wasn't shown by Russian television. Referring to a major ground exercise Russia held in July, just north of Georgia’s border, Dale Herspring (an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University) described Russia's intervention as being "exactly what they executed in Georgia just a few weeks later... a complete dress rehearsal".

On September 8, Dana Rohrabacher (a senior Republican member of the United States House of Representatives) Foreign Affairs Committee, argued at a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, according to The Daily Telegraph, that "the Georgians had initiated the recent military confrontation in the on-going Russian-South Ossetian conflict", citing unidentified U.S. intelligence sources. Further, Telegraph reported that "Mr. Rohrabacher insisted that Georgia was to blame", citing him: "The Georgians broke the truce, not the Russians, and no amount of talk of provocation and all this other stuff can alter that fact." Telegraph stated: ""His comments got little attention in the United States but have been played prominently on state-run Russian television bulletins and other media."

On September 14, Irakli Okruashvili, Georgian defence minister from 2004 to 2006, reported in an interview to Reuters that in 2004–2006 he and Saakashvili worked together on military plans to invade South Ossetia and Abkhazia, adding "Abkhazia was our strategic priority, but we drew up military plans in 2005 for taking both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well".

On September 20, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking at an event organised by the German Marshall Fund in Washington, "acknowledged that Georgia had fired the first shots in the breakaway region of South Ossetia". This view was echoed by five former American Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger, James Baker, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, and Colin Powell, at a forum on presidential policy.

On November 17, Moscow Times reported that on August 7, state-owned Rossia television showed Sergei Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, speaking at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council. He is reported to have said: "I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area." The newspaper does not specify if Bagapsh was talking of a paramilitary battalion or a unit of the Russian army.

On November 25, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Georgia's former ambassador to Russia, has given a testimony to a parliamentary commission in which he said that Georgian authorities were responsible for starting the conflict. According to Kitsmarishvili, Georgian officials told him in April, 2008 that they planned to start a war in Abkhazia and that they had received a green light from the United States government to do so. He said that the Georgian government later decided to start the war in South Ossetia and continue into Abkhazia. According to him, "Russia was ready for the war, but the Georgian leadership started the military action first."

On November 29, Badri Bitsadze, former head of Georgia's Border Police, has accused the Georgian leadership of starting the war. According to him, the Georgian leadership decided to launch the war in South Ossetia "because Saakashvili was sure he would have won it." He also said that "there was no green light from any foreign country" to start the war. Mr. Bitsadze also claimed the decision to start the war was taken by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and his "inner circle" of influential politicians, including Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili; Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili, Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria; Secretary of the National Security Council Alexandre Lomaia and Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava.

Reactions to the conflict

International reaction

Main article: International reaction to the 2008 South Ossetia war

See also: Protests regarding 2008 South Ossetia war and Controversy over Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence

In response to the war, Russia faced strong criticism from the US, the United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states. George W. Bush warned Russia: "Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century." lolZ! In contrast, Italy was more supportive of Russia, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini stating "We cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin's position". France and Germany took an intermediate position, refraining from naming a culprit while calling for an end of hostilities.

Also in response to the war, Viktor Yushchenko, the president of Ukraine, said he intended to negotiate increasing the rent on the Russian naval base at Sevastopol in the Crimea. On the other hand, the Abkhazian government said it would invite Russia to establish a naval base in the port of Sukhumi. According to Russia, any re-negotiation of the use of the Ukraine naval base would break a 1997 agreement, under which Russia leases the base for $98 million a year until 2017. A controversy arose over how Ukraine should respond to the Ossetia war, which contributed to the 2008 Ukrainian political crisis.

Although many Western leaders initially showed solidarity to Georgia, the findings of possible war crimes committed by Georgia in South Ossetia later raised concerns among Georgia's supporters in the West. British Foreign Minister David Miliband, after being informed of the Human Rights Watch and BBC findings of possible war crimes committed by Georgia, apparently hardened his language towards Georgia, calling its actions "reckless". But he also added that "the Russian response was reckless and wrong".

Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Main article: International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence

On August 25, 2008, the Federal Assembly of Russia unanimously voted to urge President Medvedev to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. On 26 August 2008, Medvedev agreed, signing a decree officially recognising the two entities, and in a televised address to the Russian people expressed his opinion that recognising the independence of the two republics "represents the only possibility to save human lives." Georgia rejected this move outright as an annexation of its territory. Nicaragua recognised the republics on 5 September 2008. In January, 2009, Belarus said it would make a decision on recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 2 April.

The unilateral recognition by Russia was met by condemnation from NATO, the OSCE Chairman, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, Foreign Ministers of the G7, and the government of Ukraine due to alleged violation of Georgia's territorial integrity, and United Nations Security Council resolutions. Russian policy of recognition was supported by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation although no members of the SCO have followed suit with recognition of the two republics.

Judicial reaction

On August 12, 2008, Georgia instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Russia for violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The case (Georgia v. Russian Federation) was accepted by the court on August 15. The first public hearings has started at the Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the Court on September 8, 2008.

The Court held three days of hearings in September and issued its Order two weeks ago, requiring both Parties to "do all in their power to ensure the security of persons, the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence, and the protection of property of displaced persons and of refugees. The Parties are also called upon to facilitate humanitarian assistance."

South Ossetians have sent over 300 lawsuits to the International Criminal Court in The Hague seeking to bring Georgian authorities to justice for genocide. Russian prosecutors are also gathering evidence to support the allegations of genocide committed by Georgians against the South Ossetians but have not given a detailed statement on the legal grounds for the accusation.

Media reaction

Main article: Information war during the 2008 South Ossetian war

Independent media coverage and access to information were limited as the conflict continued to unfold. Cyber-warfare fueled claims of distributed denial of service, censorship, propaganda, and disinformation from all sides, and restricted access for journalists made it difficult to verify the allegations. Blogs sprang up on the Internet where individuals and professionals alike reported on events from different locations and different points of view as they happened in real time. An international debate continued about access to accurate and reliable information.

Cyberattacks

During the war, Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian, and Azerbaijani websites were attacked by hackers, causing a breakdown of local servers. Estonia responded to the Georgian need for web hosting by sending information security specialists from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and by hosting the web site for the Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Office of the President of Poland provided Internet access for the government of Georgia to disseminate information.

Censorship in Georgia

The Georgian government cut access to Russian TV stations and websites, limiting news coverage in Georgia. Temur Yakobashvili, the minister for reintegration, publicly claimed responsibility for blocking access to the TV station.

NATO reaction in the Black Sea

NATO increased its naval presence in the Black Sea significantly, with ships docking in Georgian ports, and according to the US navy, delivering humanitarian aid. NATO stressed that the increased presence in the Black Sea was not related to the current tensions and that the vessels were conducting routine visits and carrying out pre-planned naval exercises. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev denied the claim and alleged delivery of military suport. Russian General Anatoly Nogovitsyn warned that NATO had already exhausted the number of vessels allowed in the Black Sea, under the 1936 Montreux convention, and warned Western nations against sending more ships.

According to political analyst Vladimir Socor, the United States maintained an uninterrupted naval presence in the Black Sea, which is constrained by the Montreux Convention's limitations on naval tonnage and the duration of naval visits, and rotated its ships in the Black Sea at intervals consistent with that convention.

Combatants

See also: Military of Georgia, Military of Russia, Military of South Ossetia, and Military of Abkhazia

Georgia

As of August 8, 2008, Georgia had 82 T-72 Main Battle Tanks, 139 Armoured Personnel Carriers (BMP and BTR variants), 7 Combat aircraft (Su-25 ground attack) and 95 Heavy artillery pieces (including Grad BM-21 122 mm multiple rocket launchers), according to Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments. Georgia had recently also been acquiring some western-made weaponry, including the UH-1 Iroquois helicopters and M4 Carbine rifles from the United States, 152mm SpGH DANA self-propelled guns and RM-70 Multiple rocket launchers from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Turkish Otokar Cobra armoured vehicles, and German Heckler & Koch G36 and Israeli IMI Tavor TAR-21 rifles. According to a US military trainer, the Americans had trained Georgian soldiers with M-4 rifles, but when the fighting started, the Georgians went back to Soviet AK-47s, the only weapon they trusted. They had serious firing problems because they seemed unable to fire in single shot. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, "the Georgian armed forces have GRADLAR 160 multiple launch rocket systems and MK4 LAR 160 type (with M85 bomblets) rockets with a range of 45 kilometers". Ukraine had supplied Georgia with weapons, reportedly including Tor and Buk AA missile systems, Armoured Personnel Carriers and small arms. Israeli companies supplied UAVs, night-vision equipment, anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition and electronic systems as well as advanced tactical training. According to HRW, the Israeli-made M85 cluster bombs used by the Georgian military had a high rate of submunitions that failed to explode on impact as designed.

U.S analysts mention that the air defense was "one of the few effective elements of the country's military" and credit the SA-11 Buk-1M with shooting down a Tupolev-22M and contributing to the losses of the 3 Su-25s. A view mirrored by Russia's deputy chief of General Staff, Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who said the Tor and Buk missile systems were responsible for the downings of 4 Russian aircraft in the war, and independant Russian analysis. SPYDER air-defense systems were also spotted.

Georgia has said that its principal vulnerabilities, which proved decisive, were its comparative weakness to Russian air power and its inability to communicate effectively in combat. Konstantin Makienko of CAST saw a low efficiency of Georgian air raids due to inadequate pilot training. According to Batu Kutelia, Georgia's first deputy defense minister, in the future Georgia will need a very sophisticated, multi-layered air-defense system to defend all its airspace. However, Western military officers who have experience working with Georgian military forces suggest that Georgia's military shortfalls were serious and too difficult to change merely by upgrading equipment. According to an article published in the New York Times on 3 September, "Georgia's Army fled ahead of the Russian Army's advance, turning its back and leaving Georgian civilians in an enemy's path. Its planes did not fly after the first few hours of contact. Its navy was sunk in the harbor, and its patrol boats were hauled away by Russian trucks on trailers." Georgia's logistical preparations were poor and its units interfered with each other in the field. According to their American trainers, the Georgian soldiers don´t lack "warrior spirit", but weren´t ready for combat. It has also been pointed out, that neither Saakashvili, nor his Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili had any military experience, but they still commanded troops in battle.

Georgian order of battle

The Georgian army consisted of 4 regular infantry brigades, plus a fifth brigade in the process of formation. One artillery brigade was stationed at Gori and Khoni and a tank battalion was also stationed at Gori. In South Ossetia, Georgia reportedly committed several infantry battalions (part of the 4th infantry brigade) supported by T-72 tanks and artillery.

The 1st infantry brigade, being the only one trained to a NATO level, served in Iraq at the start of the war. 2–3 days into the war, it was airlifted to Georgia by the U.S. Air Force, too late to take part in the Battle of Tskhinvali.

Military instructors and alleged use of foreign mercenaries

At the outbreak of the war 127 U.S. military trainers including 35 civilian contractors were present in Georgia. Additionally, 1,650 personnel, including troops from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, had participated in the military exercise "Immediate Response 2008" which ended only days earlier. Several of these soldiers were still in the country. EUCOM stated that neither participated in the conflict. According to South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity, quoted by pravda.ru, "many mercenaries from Ukraine and the Baltic states" participated in the fighting on the Georgian side. The Konovalyuk Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament released a disputed list of Ukrainian military specialists, thought to had been present in Georgia during the onset of the war. Aleksandr Bastrykin, head of the Russian Prosecutor-General's investigative committee, reiterated these claims: "It was a fairly small number of people. They mainly fulfilled support roles" - specifically mentioning a female sniper from Latvia, a reappearance of the mythical so-called "White Tights", female Baltic snipers supposedly active during the Chechen Wars. The allegations were neither substantiated, nor responded by Baltic states.

Russia

The New York Times reported that Russia’s military went into battle with aging equipment, including scores of tanks designed in the 1960s, and armoured vehicles that broke down in large numbers along Georgia’s roads. In contrast, the Washington Times writes that the war showed "how supposedly obsolete weapons can still play a potent and even decisive role in modern war" and added that Russia didn't rely exclusively on old T-72s; state-of-the-art T-90 main battle tanks were also identified in action. According a "military source in Moscow", who was interviewed by Reuters, Russian troops using similar weapons to the Georgians "surpassed them in every possible way".

According to U.S. analysts Russia's forces in the conflict included 150 T-62 and T-72 tanks and 100 pieces of artillery. At least some T-80 and modern T-90 main battle tanks were sighted in the war. Old T-72s had been upgraded with reactive armour. Su-25, Su-27 and Su-24 strike aircraft were used to establish air superiority. Russia reportedly fired 15 OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missiles in the conflict during 8 August–11. A few new Iskander (SS-26) short-range theater ballistic missiles were also launched. During bombings, Russia used RBK air-dropped cluster bombs with AO-2.5 RTM submunitions.

An editorial in RIA Novosti claimed that forces deployed by the Russian army lacked unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which hurt their intelligence efforts and forced Russia to send a Tupolev Tu-22M3 long-range bomber on a reconnaissance mission. The same editorial stated that Russian Su-25 fighter jets still lacked radar sights, computers for calculating ground-target coordinates and long-range air-to-surface missiles that could be launched outside enemy air-defense areas. Independant Russian analyst Konstantin Makienko pointed out the poor performance of the Russian airforce: "It is totally unbelievable that the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority almost to the end of the five-day war, despite the fact that the enemy had no fighter aviation." According to Jane's Information Group, Russia also used BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry vehicles, BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers and MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicles. According to Russian General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the General Staff, no new arms were tested during the war.

A Reuters analyst described Russia's army in light of the conflict as "strong but flawed." According to him, the war showed that Russia's armed forces have emerged from years of neglect as a formidable fighting force, but revealed important deficiencies. The weaknesses, especially in missiles and air capability, leave Russia still lagging behind the image of a world-class military power it projects to the rest of the world. In contrast to the weak conscript soldiers used in Chechnya, Russia's force in Georgia was made up entirely of professional soldiers, according to commanders. Reuters reporters on the ground in Georgia saw disciplined, well-equipped troops. Ruslan Pukhov, director of Russia's Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technology, has pointed out that "the victory over the Georgian army ... should become for Russia not a cause for euphoria and excessive joy, but serve to speed up military transformations in Russia."

Russian-South-Ossetian and Russian-Abkhazian order of battle

The Russian order of battle involved significant elements of the Russian 58th Army. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 58th Army is one of Russia’s premiere combat formations and boasts more than twice the number of troops, five times the number of tanks, ten times the number of armoured personnel carriers and twelve times the number of combat aircraft as the entire Georgian Armed Forces

South Ossetian Sector

• 600 peacekeepers from 135th Motorised Rifle Regiment of 58th Army
• Two battalions of 135th Motorised Rifle Regiment
• 503rd and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division
• 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division
• Units of Airborne Troops (VDV)
  • 104th and 234th Paratroop Regiments of the 76th Airborne Division (Pskov)
  • Units of 98th Guards Airborne Division (Ivanovo)
• Units of GRU (direct or operational subordination)
  • Spetsnaz of 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV (Moscow)
  • 10th Spetsnaz Brigade
  • 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade
  • One company of Special Battalion Vostok of 42nd Motor Rifle Division (Chechnya)
  • One company of Special Battalion Zapad of 42nd Motor Rifle Division (Chechnya)
• Military of South Ossetia - est. 2,500 men before the war.

Abkhazian Sector

• 9000 men from
  • 7th Novorossiysk Air Assault Division
  • 76th Pskov Air Assault Divisions
  • elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division
  • two battalions of Black Sea Fleet marines
• Units of 131st Separate Motor-Rifle Brigade (formerly used for peacekeeping)
• Unnamed units of VDV
• Army (land and air forces) of Abkhazia
• Naval Task Force consisting of following units from the Black Sea Fleet
  • Slava Class Cruiser RFS Moskva
  • Kashin Class (Upgraded) Destroyer Smetlivy (Template:Lang-ru)
  • Alligator Class Landing Ships Saratov.
  • Ropucha-I Class Landing Ships Caesar Kunikov and Yamal.
  • Grisha-V Anti-Submarine Corvettes Kasimov, Povorino and Suzdalets.
  • Nanuchka-III Class Corvette Mirazh.
  • Bora Class Missile Boat Samum
  • Moma Class Surveillance ship Ekvator.
  • Natya Class Minesweepers Zhukov and Turbinist.
  • Small Landing Ship Koida
  • Sorum Class Fleet Tug MB-31.

Air support

• Fighter, attack, bomber and reconnaissance aircrafts of 4th Air Army (acting over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia proper)
• Unnamed transport aviation units used for air-lift of units of 76th and 98th Airborne Divisions, Spetsnaz of 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment to South Ossetia and unnamed units of VDV to Abkhazia

Equipment losses and cost

In the aftermath of war Reuters cited some Stratfor analysts that believed who "Russia has largely destroyed Georgia's war-fighting capability". During its retreat from South Ossetia the Georgian army left behind much of its military equipment. Large parts of its tank forces, artillery and relatively modern anti-aircraft defense units were either destroyed or captured. Almost the entire Georgian navy was sunk in their harbor, Poti, after Russian forces occupied the city. Russia confirmed the loss of 3 Su-25 strike aircraft and 1 Tu-22M3 supersonic bomber. Russia estimates, that 3 Georgian Su-25 strike aircraft and 2 L-29 jet trainers were destroyed in the war. According to Moscow Defense Brief, overall losses of Russian Air Force in the war amounted to seven aircraft: one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer frontal bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane, and four Su-25 attack planes.

According to a rough estimate by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, based on figures from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the five days of war cost Russia $508.7 million. This includes the cost of the losses of the four Russian aircraft which is thought to have been $101.7 million. According to the estimate, the bulk of Russian spending in South Ossetia went on fuel. The newspaper added, that in comparison the United States spends $10 billion per month on the war in Iraq.

See also

• Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia
• Georgia Train and Equip Program

External links

Abkhazia

• Template:Ab icon Template:En icon Template:Ru icon Template:Tr icon Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia

Georgia

• Template:En icon Template:Ka icon Template:Ru icon Georgia Update - service of the Government of Georgia offering updates on recent developments

Russia

• Template:En icon On the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia @ President of Russia
• Template:Ru icon On the situation around South Ossetia @ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

South Ossetia

• Template:En icon Template:Ru icon State Committee of Information and Press of the Republic of South Ossetia

International

• Template:En icon United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
• Template:En icon OSCE Mission to Georgia

Media

• Template:En icon War in Georgia. International Crisis Group’s multimedia presentation