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== Work ==
== Work ==
=== The being of essence ===
=== Being of essence ===
Henry argued that not only do individual creatures have a being corresponding to their [[essence]] - the being of essence or ''esse essentiae'', they also have a 'somethingness' (''aliquitas''). The being created by [[God]] is not the being of actual [[existence]], but the being of essence, also called ''esse latissimum'' (being in the widest sense), or ''esse communissimum'', the most general form of being. The determination of essence respecting its being made actual is a delimitation, or specification, of that being. thus, ''esse essentiae'' comes first, then comes ''esse aliquid per essentiam'', being a ''something'' through essence, finally the whole essence thus made up is put into actuality.
Henry argued that not only do individual creatures have a being corresponding to their [[essence]] - the being of essence or ''esse essentiae'', they also have a 'somethingness' (''aliquitas''). The being created by [[God]] is not the being of actual [[existence]], but the being of essence, also called ''esse latissimum'' (being in the widest sense), or ''esse communissimum'', the most general form of being. The determination of essence respecting its being made actual is a delimitation, or specification, of that being. thus, ''esse essentiae'' comes first, then comes ''esse aliquid per essentiam'', being a ''something'' through essence, finally the whole essence thus made up is put into actuality.


=== The intentional distinction ===
=== Intentional distinction ===


An intentional distinction is where the very same thing is expressed by different concepts in different ways (''Quodl''. V, q. 12). Unlike a purely logical distinction, an intentional distinction always implies a sort of composition, although it is minor with regard to that implied by a distinction in reality.
An intentional distinction is where the very same thing is expressed by different concepts in different ways (''Quodl''. V, q. 12). Unlike a purely logical distinction, an intentional distinction always implies a sort of composition, although it is minor with regard to that implied by a distinction in reality.

Revision as of 10:39, 12 April 2009

Henry of Ghent (c. 1217 – 1293), scholastic philosopher, known as Doctor Solemnis (the Solemn Doctor), also known as Henricus de Gandavo, was born in the district of Mude, near Ghent, and died at Tournai (or Paris). Between the death of Thomas Aquinas in 1274 and the arrival of Duns Scotus in the early 14th century he was the leading Augustinian.

Life

Henry is supposed to have belonged to an Italian family named Bonicolli, in Flemish Goethals, but the question of his name has been much discussed (see authorities below). He studied at Ghent and then at Cologne under Albertus Magnus. After obtaining the degree of doctor he returned to Ghent, and is said to have been the first to lecture there publicly on philosophy and theology.

Attracted to Paris by the fame of the university, he took part in the many disputes between the orders and the secular priests, on the side of the latter. Following the publication of the papal bull Ad fructus uberes by Pope Martin IV in 1281, Henry supported the secular clergy against the Mendicant Orders over the question of the 'reiteration of confession' (the obligation to confess to their parish priest, at least once a year, sins already confessed to a friar). Henry was engaged in this violent controversy for the rest of his life.

Work

Being of essence

Henry argued that not only do individual creatures have a being corresponding to their essence - the being of essence or esse essentiae, they also have a 'somethingness' (aliquitas). The being created by God is not the being of actual existence, but the being of essence, also called esse latissimum (being in the widest sense), or esse communissimum, the most general form of being. The determination of essence respecting its being made actual is a delimitation, or specification, of that being. thus, esse essentiae comes first, then comes esse aliquid per essentiam, being a something through essence, finally the whole essence thus made up is put into actuality.

Intentional distinction

An intentional distinction is where the very same thing is expressed by different concepts in different ways (Quodl. V, q. 12). Unlike a purely logical distinction, an intentional distinction always implies a sort of composition, although it is minor with regard to that implied by a distinction in reality.

For example rational and animal, as they are found in man, is not a distinction of reason, since one is not a definition of the other. Nor is a real distinction, otherwise the conjunction of 'animal' and 'rational' in some particular person would be purely accidental (per accidens). Therefore there must be some intermediate distinction, which Henry defines as 'intentional'. This principle was later developed by Scotus into the formal distinction.

Illumination

Henry's doctrines are infused by a strong Platonism. He distinguished between knowledge of actual objects and the divine inspiration by which we cognize the being and existence of God. The first throws no light upon the second. Individuals are constituted not by the material element but by their independent existence, i.e. ultimately by the fact that they are created as separate entities. Universals must be distinguished according as they have reference to our minds or to the divine mind. In the divine intelligence exist exemplars or types of the genera and species of natural objects.

On this subject Henry is far from clear; but he defends Plato against the current Aristotelian criticism, and endeavours to show that the two views are in harmony. In psychology, his view of the intimate union of soul and body is remarkable. The body he regards as forming part of the substance of the soul, which through this union is more perfect and complete.

Writings

  • Quodlibeta Theologica (Paris, 1518; Venice, 1608 and 1613)
  • Summa theologiae (Paris, 1520; Ferrara, 1646)
  • De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis (Cologne, 1580)

References

  • Public Domain This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domainChisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  • Gracia, J.E. & Noone, T., A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Blackwell 2003.
  • Henry of Ghent's Summa of Ordinary Questions. Article One: On the possibility of knowing Translation with an introduction and notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. South Bend, St. Augustine Press, 2008. ISBN 1-58731-359-6.
  • Henry of Ghent's "Summa": The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21-24). Translation by Jos Decorte (†) and Roland J. Teske, S.J. Latin Text, Introduction, and Notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. (Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 5). Louvain/Paris: Peeters, 2005. ISBN 978-90-429-1590-9.
  • Henry of Ghent's "Summa": The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity (Articles 25-30). Latin Text, Introduction, Translation, and Notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. (Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 6). Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 2006. ISBN 978-90-429-1811-5.