Theological fatalism: Difference between revisions
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#REDIRECT [[Argument from free will]] {{R from merge}} |
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{{Mergeto | Argument from free will | Talk:Argument from free will#Merge proposal |date=April 2009 }} |
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'''Theological fatalism''' is the view that all our actions are pre-determined because of God's forknowledge of them, and that therefore we have no free will<ref name=stanford>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/ Foreknowledge and Free Will]</ref><ref name=iep>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/foreknow.htm Foreknowledge and Free Will]</ref>. A related attempt to demonstrate a logical contradiction between an [[omniscience|omniscient]] God and [[free will]] is discussed in the [[Argument from free will]]. |
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The [[argument]] is roughly stated as follows: |
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# God is omniscient. |
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# Since God is omniscient, God has infallible foreknowledge. |
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# If God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X, then you must invariably engage in event X. |
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# You must invariably engage in event X. |
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Therefore, [[free-will]] is not possible since you have no alternative except to engage in event X. In the event that you do not fulfill event X, then God is not omniscient. Alternatively, if you engage in event X, then you don't have free-will on account of the inability to choose another alternative. |
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However, the premises contain some logical flaws and circular logic. First, premise 4 does not logically follow from the earlier premises, since no premise states that God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X. Premise 3 states what will occur if that were true, but no premise actually asserts that knowledge. |
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Secondly, premise 3 assumes what is trying to be proven. In an argument trying to prove that foreknowledge of X logically leads to having to do X, premise 3 simply states this outright. If you accept premise 3, then technically you don’t even need the other premises, because premise 3 states the conclusion that it is attempting to prove. Thus, the argument is a case of circular logic, and is therefore invalid. |
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Premise 3 also commits the modal fallacy of assigning necessity to the action “engage in event X,” when the necessity actually applies to, “If God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X, then you will engage in event X.” In other words, “It is necessarily true that (A => B)” is not equivalent to “A => It is necessarily true that (B)”. Therefore, Premise 3 only states that it is true that “you will engage in event X,” which makes Premise 4 false. |
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==Opposing argument== |
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An opposing argument can state: |
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# God is omniscient |
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# Since God is omniscient, he is also infallible. |
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# If God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X, then you will freely choose this based on your free will, not obligation or lack of choice in event X. |
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# You still have free will to engage in event X; God merely knows your choice before you make it. You are not obliged to make choice 'X' anymore than choice 'A'. If you were going to change your mind, God would have seen that also, so you still have full free will in all matters. Also, you will still make the same choices [with free will] even if God chose to not see the future. Seeing the future or not does not alter your free will. |
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With passive foreknowledge, if it were kept hidden, it would not invalidate free will in any logical or rational way. The individual choosing event X, would be making the exact same choices regardless of whether God knew the choices beforehand or not. God knowing or not knowing the future [passively] would not alter the free will of individuals at all. |
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==Notes and References== |
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<references/> |
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==See also== |
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* [[Fatalism]] |
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* [[Newcomb's paradox]] |
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* [[Theological determinism]] |
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* [[Compatibilism]] |
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* [[Calvinism]] |
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* [[Predestination]] |
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[[Category:Theology]] |
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[[Category:Determinism]] |
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[[es:Fatalismo teológico]] |
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Revision as of 09:33, 29 April 2009
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