Sino-African relations

People's Republic of China-Africa
File:Africa China Locator.png

Chinese involvement in Africa began in ancient times, and has continued to the present in the exploration of, trade with, and settlement of Chinese people in Africa. This includes the ongoing move by the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) to secure highly needed natural resources through Sino-African trade and diplomatic rapprochement. This is mainly done by diplomatic and economic moves. However, it is also done by military support, such as providing African countries with needed weapons.

The quest for natural resources in Africa mainly targets key countries that are rich in natural resources (mainly oil, minerals, timber, and cotton), such as Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa. Many African countries are viewed as fast-growing markets, and, as such, it is profitable to export cheap Chinese goods, followed by more expensive services and products.

Large scale structural projects, accompanied by advantageous loans, are often proposed to resource rich African countries. Infrastructural constructions, such as roads and railroads, dams, and ports and airports, are commonly funded by China.

In this diplomatic and economic rush, Taiwan, the United States, France and the UK are the main opponents of China. France and the UK were previously major commercial partners, but China recently became the 2nd largest trading partner in Africa, after the United States.

Currently, China is working to expand its influence in the region, while working to isolate Taiwan and to replace colonial countries such France, the UK and the United States. China continues to work to broaden its presence on diplomatic, cultural, and commercial fronts, while working to secure its gains and stabilize the region for long term gains.

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Africa

People's Republic of China

Under Deng Xiaoping, the People's Republic of China began pursuing market socialism, which means the ongoing acceptance of capitalist notions as the main principles for the PRC's socioeconomic development. Beginning in 1980, the PRC started a policy of rapid modernization, lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants out of poverty, while developing its economy into an industrial based one. As of 2008, the PRC has the third largest nominal GDP (after the United States and Japan) at about $4.8 trillion, and the second largest by PPP (after the United States), at $8.5 trillion. The PRC has a noticeable growing lack of raw materials such as oil, wood, copper, and aluminum, all of which are needed to support its production of manufactured goods.

Republic of China (Taiwan)

The RoC, as of 2009, has the 26th largest economy nominally, and 19th largest by PPP. In the 1970s and 1980s, the RoC commonly had double digit economic growth, leading to rapid industrialization. As 2009, it still had a 5.7% growth, eith a nominal GPD of $400 billion and $730 billion by PPP, about 10% of the PRC's GPD. As such, Taiwan, while less important than the PRC in the quest for natural ressources, remains an important partner in African trade.

Africa

Africa, has a population of roughly 922 million and a surface of 30,221,532 km². Industrialization started marginally in the late 20th century in the colonies of the European nations, namely Portugal, Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The wars for independences saw a disastrous division of Africa, which remains a key cause of the frequent wars that have shaken Africa in recent years. Africa, being a major source of raw materials, saw the colonial powers vie for influence among the newly independent nations, and former colonial powers established special relations with their former colonies, often by offering economic aid and alliances for access to the vast resources of their former colonies.

The presence of diamonds, gold, silver, uranium, cobalt) and large oil reserves has brought Africa onto the forefront of economic development, with the many of the world's nations having economic relations with the majority of Africa's resource rich nations.

As of 2008, the GDP of Africa is about $1.2 trillion.

The Chinese diaspora and private projects

Ancient times and coolies

In ancient times, trade and installation of Chinese descends have occur. Silk is mentioned in the late Roman Republic by the time of Julius Caesar's life (~50BC), and trustful traces of Chinese activity back as far as the Tang Dynasty: Chinese porcelains have been found in the coasts of North Africa, Egypt, Chinese coins were found in Kenya, Zanzibar, and Somalia was describe in the 9th century. Song made maritime trade with West Africa (now Tanzania, Zimbawe), providing their production also deeper into African lands, while Yuans's Zhu Siben (1273-1333) made the 1st know Chinese travel to the Atlantic Ocean. Ming Dynasty's admiral Zheng He and his amazing float stay the most famous of later explorers. Chinese internal issues reduced such large expeditions, but trade continued for the following centuries.

Jean Ping, 2008, example of Sino-African descendants. His father came from France in 1930 and became a successful businessman in Gabon.

A new step appeared in the Contemporary era. European colonization of Africa and 1807 British and 1793 and 1848 French slavery bans caused major workforce shortages in Europe's colonies. Accordingly, Europeans looked for way to fit this gaps with low-cost workers from major human hearths, namely: India and China. Since 1880, dozens of thousand Chinese 'Coolies' have been promise better lives, and were eventually sent across oceans to work into African, American, or Australian mines (copper, gold, silver), railroads, plantations. Chinese Coolies (together with Indian ones), participated to the Senegalese and Congo railroads construction, as well as in South African gold mines. Specific exploitations, such copper mines, etc, also lead to the presence of Chinese populations into locked countries, such Zambia, while other marginal specific destinies lead some Chinese all across Africa, which thus married to local women and have there some descendants. Jean Ping (b. 1942), the minister of Foreign Affairs of Gabon, and who presided the UN Assembly, was thus born in Gabon from an African mother and a Chinese father, in a country were almost no Chinese were present. By that time, trade was the action of westerners, Africa was an European colony, China was in the turmoil of foreign aggressions or civil wars, and Sino-African trade was almost nonexistent.

Post civil war (1949+)

Other Chinese people fled China after the 1949 Communist victory, some eventually landing in Africa. By the 1950s, noticeable Chinese communities were present in South Africa (100,000), Madagascar, and Maurice. Very small Chinese communities were also present in tropical Africa, some times about 3.000 nationals, most of time just as some dozens of Chinese by country, bring there by specific isolate destinies, married to local women and have here some descendants. They will became the corner stone of the post-1980 growing exchanges between China and Africa, but are by that time simply living agricultural lives, or trying to raise in African societies, likely without contact with China.

Opening and WTO's China

With Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the 1980s have switched toward a "mutual benefice readjustment", international commerce being encouraged. China have first looked for foreign investments, working to expand their export-focus industry. Chinese goods came to progressively flood the world market in the 1990s, and Africa was not forgiven. In this period, the Chinese diaspora in Africa played an active role. An example is the success story of the Ye clan, in Congo (Brazzaville), which can be find back to Jean Ping's and Coolies.

Chinese diaspora

Country	Chineses
Angola	30.000
South Africa	200.000
Sudan	20-50.000
Congo-Brazzaville	7.000
Equatorial Guinea	8.000
Gabon	6.000
Nigeria	50.000
Algeria	20.000
Morocco	/
Chad	hundreds
Egypt	thousands
Ethiopia	5-7.000
RDC	10.000
Zambia	40.000
Zimbabwe	10.000
Mozambique	1.500
Niger	1.000
Cameroon	7.000
Gabon	6.000
Total	+500.000

Jean ping's Chinese father went to France in the 1920s, leaving wife and children at Wenzhou, China, and when eventually successful in Gabon, he married there with a local woman of noble family, with who he had Jean Ping (b.1942), who quickly raise in the post independence Gabon. In 1987, as Gabonese minister of the Foreign affairs, he go together with the presidential team to the newly open and now quickly growing China. There, he contact a Wenzhou's lost cousin, M. Xu, who is a little wood exploiter in China, and propose to him to come to Gabon, to develop wood industry in Gabon, under his protection. The project is successful, exploiting Gabonese tropical forest trunks, going then toward Zhangjiang's port, near Shanghai, where Chinese industries are able to change it into valuable furnitures.

Since the end of the 1980s, M. Xu ease himself the way to other Chinese relatives to come to expand its business. In 2000, one relative come in neighbouring country, Congo Brazaville, were Chinese here are almost only those in the PRC's embassy, and with which she ties friendship. In contact with a Wenzhou based relative, she import containers of Chinese made low-cost goods, some helps in the Chinese embassy allow her to don't get these containers lock by Congo port's officers, she open some little shops, sell the Chinese goods, buy and later sell some discotheques, buy and redynamize a factory and so on. The friend in the Chinese embassy return in Beijing, and from there, manage Visa issues to help other members of the Ye clan go to Congo. When a Congolese wood concession is proposed to be sell, M. Xu, from Gabon and backed by his close relations with Henri Djombo, minister of Congolese forest, help to get the bids: Sicofor is create.

The raise of China on the world marker led the Chinese diaspora in Africa to reactivate their contacts with homeland relatives, in order to satisfy African low-price consumers goods thirst. Nowadays, private Chinese businessmen in Africa are calling skilled industrial engineers and technicians, such mechanics, electricians, furniture maker, etc. in order to build up the African industrial web from the ground, and develop their business and profit. Statistics of Chinese presence in Africa are difficult to obtain, both Chinese and African offices staying discrete on this issue.

In this stage, both African resources goes toward China, and later western markets, and Chinese technicians and low-cost goods come to African markets. This story is relevant of how the Chinese diaspora in Africa, as well as embassies' workers out of duty reactive their contacts and have been the key of private Sino-African commerce. The 1995's official Go Global declaration and the 2001 Chinese entry into the WTO just eased the way of such private Chinese businessmen to explore, import, and export more in these Sino-African possibilities.

History of Sino-African relations

First embassies

Ancient Sino-African official contacts were not widespread. Like the 97 Gan Ying who stopped his path in Persia, most recorded embassies stopped before reaching Europe or Africa. The Yuan Dynasty sent ambassadors to Madagascar, while ambassador Zhu Siben (1273-1333) had Africa's western coasts, drawing a more precise map of African triangle shape, but later the Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He went to Africa with a far larger embassy, taking back African leaders as well as African animals such lions, rhinoceros, ostriches, giraffes, and many others, to the great joy of the court.

But after Emperor Yongle of Ming (1360-1424) died, and Zheng He's own death (1424), and following the resurgence of Confucianism, which opposed such external expensive and frivolous adventures, in the Chinese Imperial court, such expensive foreign policies were abandoned, while the costly to maintain the fleet was destroyed. Confucian officials preferred agriculture and authority over innovation, exploration, and trade. According to their opinion, Ming China had nothing to learn from overseas barbarians (animals include), at such expensive price.

However, nowadays Chinese version is that the European Age of Discovery mercantilism put aggressively an end to Sino-African relations. This visions easing to enforce the rhetoric of the blood brother relation of China and Africa, and the claimed "winner winner" ongoing evolution.

1949-1980: Ideological period

Dates of independence of African countries

Since the 1949 communist victory, and with the decolonization process becoming more visible, newly established PRC made its best to support independence movements.

This era is specific by its rhetoric Sino-African friendship, both sharing the same 'victim background', and the same accomplished or on going fight for freedom and dignity, freedom, peace, and prosperity. A more skeptical view see that PRC was fighting against Taiwan and the United States to be worldly acknowledge as the "true China". This diplomatic battle was to fight in UN assembly, were all newly independent country will likely sit on Chinese side. At the 1955 Bandung conference, PRC was interested to lead this 'third world'. Zhou Enlai made an long African tour in 1963-1964, to strengthen Sino-African friendship. Hundreds Chinese medics were sent to Africa, and infrastructural projects were planed. The ex-diplomat and now professor in Foreign relation in Beijing, M. Xinghua talk of this era as the "golden age" of Sino-African relations.

More than this African strategy, the growing Sino-Soviet split of the 1950s and 1960s allowed PRC to get US support, and to come back on the international scene in 1971 : China (Taiwan)'s seat on the Security Council was expelled by General Assembly Resolution 2758, and replaced in all UN organs with the People's Republic of China government.

Switch to PRC recognition: 1949/1950s (dark red), 1960s (red), 1970s (orange), 1980s (beige) and 1990s/2000s (yellow). Countries not recognized by or not recognizing the PRC are in grey. The PRC itself is in black.

Indeed, with the 1960s USSR-Chinese ideological opposition, China started a specific diplomacy, some times supporting capitalist factions against USSR backed ones, like in Angola (UNITA) and South Africa (Apartheid). Nevertheless, the amazing 1860km long Tanzam railroad, on which 50.000 Chinese workers have work, is completed in 1976, illustrating the golden age of Sino-Chinese relations, and a growing number to African countries switched their recognition from ROC (Taiwan) to PRC. 1976 is also the death of Zhou Enlai, and the death of Mao Zedong, ending the "ideological golden age," and leaving the power to the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping.

On his side, Philip Snow qualify this 1949-1980 period as a period of "continual attempt to sustain a rhetorical unity which has sometimes disguised the pursuit of profoundly different goals".

1980-present: Pragmatism for mutual benefit

Common rhetorical ideological diplomacy was drastically friezed by Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism, while China itself was slowly awakening from its endless, decades old hibernation. China, both boasted by 1980s internal reforms, Taiwanese and foreign investments, and own work force action started its amazing growth. Quickly, in the 1980s, China turn once more toward Africa, now looking at it more as both a the granary of need or key resources and a brother low-exigences market.

According to R. Marchal, 1989, and 1995 were two key dates in Sino-African relations.
First, 1989's Tian'anmen crisis, and the following reactions of westerner country, condemning firmly Chinese government, taking economic sanctions in one hand, and of African diplomacies who kept silent on this embarrassing issue for their own harsh management of their respective African country, shown China that an Sino-African oligarchies pact was for both sides possible. Even more important, this alliance was more and more need. Chinese growing industry made China clearly resources-hungry. After what, on the world scene, human rights issues was suddenly, clearly, and conveniently for western powers, raising in the post-Cold War diplomatic scene, to the full benefit of western powers, and isolating more and more the rogues/pariah states.

走 Zǒu	出 chū	去. qū.

In 1995, an simple sentence will change the game. Jiang Zemin, pursuing the reform and now confident in Chinese own forces announced to Chinese economic leaders : Go out (走出去 Zǒu chūqū), encouraging Chinese businessmen to conquest world markets In late 1990s, Chinese bids were heavily supported by Chinese government, local embassies, and the government owned Eximbank providing need finances at low rates. This allowed Chinese enterprises to win many bids.

PRC officials qualifying the period as "sane adjustment" and "sane development of economic and commercial Sino-African relations". As classic weapons on the diplomatic scene, Chinese and African diplomacies continue to use imagery of the past 'ideological period' : the common past of victims in the hands of 19th century westerners ; the common fight for autonomy and independence against westerners. To what they now add the common fight toward progress in an unfair western-lead economic world. But fact is that, in Africa, strongly government-backed Chinese companies are more likely successful than isolated western companies.

International relations analyst Parag Khanna states that by cutting massive trade and investment deals with Latin America and Africa, China has established its presence as a superpower along with the European Union and the United States. China's rise is demonstrated by its ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product. He believes that China's consultative style has allowed it to develop political and economic ties with many countries including those viewed as rogue states by western diplomacies.

African resources, Chinese supports

Oil, for a Chinese energy security

Main article: China's energy security

China's oil if not enough

PRC China, thanks to soviet technology transfers until July 1960 and personal reserves such the Daqing oil field became oil sufficient in 1963. Chinese ideology and US-led embargo isolated Chinese oil industry from 1950 to 1970, preventing them to evolve into a powerful world companies. Chinese export peaked in 1985, with 30 Mt. But rapid post-reforms internal increase oil demand lead China to came into oil deficit, becoming net oil importer in 1993, and net crude importer in 1996, a trend which is continuing quickly. Indeed, Chinese reserves, such in the Tarim basin, are proved both difficult to extract, implying specific technologies, but also difficult to transport toward Chinese coast provinces, were are Chinese centres energy demand. Pipeline construction, associated cost, as well as and downstream facilities lag behind upstream demand progress.

China access on international oil markets have satisfied immediate thirst. But today, and despite its large coal based energy system, China is a key part of the vicious cycle which had lead to oil price increase worldwide, to the disadvantage of all industrialized and oil importing countries, including China itself. In 2006, China imported 47% of its total oil consumption (145 Mt of crude oil). Thus, Chinese companies such Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC, are looking for African oil.

African oil

Africa have produce about 10.7 Mbpd in 2005, which make a little more than the world leader, Russia, African production thus account for 12% only of the 84 Mbpd world production, with about one half being produce in north Africa, which have preferential trade with Europe. That's not amazing, but the chance for foreign powers is that this oil is almost not used in Africa, and China is now getting a part of it, by buying it or by other compensative deals, such constructions-for-oil. As of 2007 －thanks to good diplomatic relations and recent dynamism－ Africa provide 30% of China oil needs, with Sudanese's oil account for 10 of these 30 points.

As of 2007, world rank of major sub-Sahara oil producer were 13th for Nigeria (2,352,000bpd), 16th for Angola (1,910,000bpd), 31st for Sudan (466,100bpd), making together most of the sub-Sahara oil. Guinea (33rd), Democratic Republic of Congo (38th), and the Chad (45th) also have notable oil out put.

China Oil import share, 2003

Country	Share
M: S. Arab.	15.6%
M: Iran	15%
M: Oman	11.3%
Af: Angola	9%
Af: Sudan	7.7%
Af: Yemen	5.2%
E: Russie	4.5%
As: Indonesia	4%
As: Malaisia	2.3%
Af: Eq. Guinea	2.2%
Af: Congo	1.5%
Af: Gabon	1.2%
Af: Cameroon	1.1%
Af: Algérie	0.75%
Af: Nigeria	0.6%
Af: Egypt	0.3%
Others	17.75%
Af: Africa ; As: Asia ; M: Middle East.

Major projects

Chinese companies are new comers, and so recently increased their active worldwide. Specifically in Africa, notable cases are :

• Sudan: 1997, CNPC's Great Wall Drilling Company sign to buy 40% stake in the $1.7billion 'Greater Nile Petroleom Operating Company', contract renewed and expanded in 2000 ;; CNPC own most ot a field in south Darfour ; own 41% of a field in Melut Bassin, expected to produce 300,000 bpd in 2006 ; Sinopec : erecting a pipeline ; building a tanker terminal in Port-Sudan; 60% of Sudan's oil out put to China ; since the 90's, China have invest US$ 15 billions, mainly in its oil infrastructures ;
• Nigeria: 1998, CNPC buy two oil block (Niger delta); CNPC, July 2005, four blocks, together with other companies, in exchange of hydropower plant in Mambila, 1.000MW capacity, and taking controling stake in 1.100.000 bpd in Kaduna refinery; ; CNOOC has paid $2.7bn for a rich oil block ;
• Angola: proposal for a $5 billion loan for oil relate and structural constructions for post-war rebuilding, to be repaid in oil ; Sinopec have 50% of Angola BP-operate Greater plutonio project ;
• Gabon: Feb. 2004, signed a technical evaluation deal with Gabonese oil ministry for 3 onshore fields ;

Similar or greater projects are taking place in Middle East and Latin America, one Sino-Iranian deal having an estimate value of US$ 70 billions.

Chinese oil imports

	1990	2000	2004
Mdl East	39.4%	53.5%	45.4%
Africa	0%	23%	28.7%
Asia pacific	60.6%	15.1%	11.5%
other	0%	7.2%	14.3%
Sources: CQE, p12-15; CES, p49.

Chinese progress

China is actually working to establish a long-term energy security. This by investment in oil and gas fields abroad, and by diversifying its providers. The rapid expansion of the overseas activities of China's oil companies has been driven by the needs of both government and its National Oil Companies (NOC), formerly working into an uncommon very close partnership, to acquire overseas production of oil and gas. Accordingly, they had together gain access to projects of strategic importance (Sudan, Nigeria) in the 90's, leaving less important opportunities to companies alone.

World oil reserves: Middle East 56% ; Africa 9%. For its security, China can't rely on Middle East only, and is thus interested by African oil.

But Chinese actions is not always successful: the 2006's agreement in Rwanda proved unproductive, while Guinean oil imply technologies not familiar to Chinese companies. The conquest also stay limited: all together, Chinese oil companies produce 257.000bd in Africa in 2005 -one third of the leader ExxonMobil alone-, and control just 2% of African oil reserves.

Moreover, this new arrival on the oil diplomacy scene is perturbing for old players. China have been attacked for its increasingly close relationship with rogue states, such Sudan, and Angola, know know for their human rights abuses, political censorship, and widespread corruptions. China's world image have suffer of following critics, leading her to move to a more softy approach, hesitating now to go to in-crisis areas, such the Niger Delta. But as a consumer country and newcomer, China does not really have much of a choice in choosing its source of supply.

Natural resources from Africa for Chinese industries

Main article: Mineral industry of Africa

As previously state, Africa is the 2nd biggest continent, with 30 millions Km² of lands, which imply quantity of resources, together with a low humn density and an feable starting manufacturing sector. Some key facts are to notice about both African resources, and African recent productions.

Africa's resources/production － key facts

Africa mineral reserves ranks 1st or 2nd for bauxite, cobalt, diamonds, phosphate rocks, platinum-group metals (PGM), vermiculite, and zirconium. Many other minerals are also present in quantity. The 2005's share of world production from African soil is such following : Bauxite 9%; Aluminum 5%; Chromite 44%; Cobalt 57%; Copper 5%; Gold 21%; Iron ore 4%; Steel 2%; Lead (Pb) 3%; Manganese ore 39%; Zinc 2%; Cement 4%; natural Diamond 46%; Graphite 2%; Phosphate rock 31%; Coal 5%; Mineral fuels (including coal) & Petroleum 13%; Uranium 16%; Platinum/Palladium: 62%.

As of 2005, strategic minerals and keys producers

Diamonds: 46% of the world, share as: Botswana 35%; Congo (Kinshasa) 34%; South Africa 17%; Angola, 8%. Gold: 21% of the world, share as: South Africa 56%; Ghana, 13%; Tanzania, 10%; and Mali, 8%. Platinum/Palladium: 62% of the world, South Africa 97%/96%. Cobalt: 57% of the world, share as: DR Congo 83%, Zambia 14%. Uranium: 16% of the world, share as: Namibia 46%; Niger 44%; South Africa less than 10%. Bauxite (for Aluminum): 9% of the world, share as: Guinea 95%; Gana 5%. Aluminum: 5% of the world, share as: South Africa 48%; Mozambique 32%; Egypt 14%. Steel: 2% of the world, share as: South Africa 54%; Egypt 32%; Libya 7%; Algeria 6%. Copper (mine/refined): 5%/? of the world, shared as : Zambia 65%/77%; South Africa 15%/19% ; Congo (Kinshasa) 13%/0%; Egypt 0%/3%. Coal: 5% of the world, share as: South Africa 99%.

Many African countries are highly and dangerously dependent of such exports. Mineral fuels (coal, petroleum) account for more than 90% of the export earnings for: Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Nigeria. Various Minerals account for 80% for Botswana (led by, in order of value, diamond, copper, nickel, soda ash, and gold), Congo (Brazzaville) (petroleum), Congo (Kinshasa) (diamond, petroleum, cobalt, and copper), Gabon (petroleum and manganese), Guinea (bauxite, alumina, gold, and diamond), Sierra Leone (diamond), and Sudan (petroleum and gold). Minerals and mineral fuels accounted for more than 50% of the export earnings of Mali (gold), Mauritania (iron ore), Mozambique (aluminum), Namibia (diamond, uranium, gold, and zinc), and Zambia (copper and cobalt).

The Mineral industry's export make an important part of the African gross. Ongoing mining project of more than 1 billion US$ are taking place in : South Africa (PGM 69%;gold:31%), Guinea (bauxite & aliminum), Madagascar (nickel), Mozambique (coal), Congo (Kinshasa) and Zambia (cobalt & copper), Nigeria and Sudan (crude petroleum), Senegal (iron), etc.

"Curse of natural resources" hypothesis

In the recent decades, studies and researchers have enlighten an link between natural resource abundance (particularly minerals) of a country, resources having an adverse consequences for economic growth, often link to poor growth performance, as well as poor governmental policies and institutions (corruption, weak governance, rent-seeking, plunder). This seems especially true for 'point source' minerals such mine, oil fields, which produce high value to few people, in opposition to agricultural diffuse development, implying large quantities of workers, forcing share of benefice

“In recent decades the resource-abundant developing countries have underperformed when compared with the resource-deficient developing countries...Moreover, the mineral-driven resource-abundant countries have been among the weakest performers”.

Evidence have been provide that "an inverse statistical relationship between natural resource based exports (agriculture, minerals and fuels) and growth rates during the period 1970-1990. Almost without exception, the resource-abundant countries have stagnated in economic growth since the early 1970s, inspiring the term ‘curse of natural resources’. Empirical studies have shown that this curse is a reasonably solid fact” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, pp. 828, 837)

For a better management of African resources

The notion of a “curse” is misleading, actually, countries do have choice, development of natural resources sector is shaped by a host of government policies. Wright & Czelusta note 6 relevant policy issues: (1) the infrastructure of public knowledge (e.g., geological surveys); (2) engineering education; (3) systems of exploration concessions and property rights for mineral resources; (4) export and import controls; (5) supporting infrastructure (such as transportation); (6) targeted taxes or royalties. Chinese investments provide a large help on the 5th point (infrastructure), other points are largely in African elites' hands, to develop this points, Africa may string technology, knowhow, and knowledge transfers to their foreign partners.

African export to China

In 2005, exported African oil went at 35% to the EU, 32% to the USA, 10% to China, while 1% of African gas goes to Asia. North African preferentially exporting its oil to western countries : EU 64%; US 18%; all others 18%. 60% of African wood goes to China, where it is manufactured, and then sell across the world.

Infrastructure

For years, business in Africa was hampered by poor transport links between countries and regions.. Chinese-African association is managing to end this unproductive situation. Several large scale projects may be enlighten :

• Nigeria: railway Lagos-Kano, US$ 8.3 billions, needing 11.000 Chineses ; Mambilla plateau 2.600 MW hydro-electric central ;
• Angola and Zambia: the vital Benguela railway line built with British and linking Zambia's and RDC's copper mines to Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito, was to be rebuilt by Chinese company CIF. China being the World larger copper consumer ;
• Guinea: in 2006, a free of charge industrial 'packtage' of : one mine, one dam, one hydroelectric central, one railway, and one refinery is proposed to the Guinea bauxite/aluminum industry by China fund by the EximBank, who will get repaid by alumina at preferential price.
• Algeria: a 1.000 km freeway is build by Chinese workers ;
• Tanzania and Zambia: decades ago, the 1860 km long Tanzam is achieved in 1976, with 47 bridges and 18 tunnel made by 50.000 Chinese workers.
• Sudan: pipeline oilfields->Port Sudan completed within 2 years, contrary to western project which take years just to get started ;
• Congo: barrage d'Imboulou ;

The recent Sino-Angolan association is illustrative.
When petroleum rich post 27 years long civil war Angola called for investment and rebuilding, China advanced a $5 billion loan to be repaid in oil, sent Chinese technicians, fixing a large part of the electrical system, and leading a part of the building reconstruction. In the short term Angola will benefit from Chinese-built roads, hospitals, schools, hotels, football stadiums, shopping centers and telecommunications projects. These agreement may eventually look costly, having mortgaged future oil production of a valuable, non-renewable resource to pay for reconstruction work, but Angola need this infrastructural buildings immediately, and that's what China is providing where no one else is willing to do so. Thus, Angola has become China's leading energy supplier but it. China also plan to establish five special economic zones in Africa, zones where "the Chinese government will create the enabling environment into which Chinese companies can follow".

As summary, we can first notice that China provide infrastructural funds and work force in exchange of immediate preferential relations/prices and share in African resources. As secondary effect, this infrastructures allow Africa to increase its production and exports, improve the life and increase the needs of millions of Africans, who will become as many millions potential buyers of Chinese goods.

Arms and military

Arms selling

According to Dr. Wilson, arms selling have probably been the least significant factor relative to other instruments of China's state craft. It is the case that Chinese arms show up across the continent from Liberia to Somalia. These seem to be mostly small arms sales to middle men arms dealers who in turn sell to Africans, both governments and rebels (lots in Liberia, for example). The available evidence suggests these are not major (especially relative to the U.S. which supplies about 50% of the world’s weapons) and hence the direct leverage of the Peoples Liberation Army or the civilian ministries is probably modest in African conflicts.

On an other side, it have been enlighten that the Chinese arms supply power of killing is underestimate, both because part of these weapons may come to Africa by uncounted undirect ways or arms-for-raw materials exchanges, and because some conveniently refer to values involves to say that Chinese sellings are low. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute note that Chinese 2000-20004 unpublished arm export seems about US$ 1.4 billion, while US export run about 25.9 billions. Indeed, Chinese arms are basically low cost ones, sold in large quatities for relatively low costs. That's by example the cases for machettes, or low prices attack gun Type 56, a AK-47 like Chinese version, or QLZ87 grenade launcher. All this have a far lower value that one single attack jet or helicopter sells by the USA, but it stay clear that several thousands machettes or attack guns may kill far more peoples.

That's what happened in 1994's Rwanda genocide, with large quantities of "Made in China"'s machettes. Some, thus, noticed that those 'light weapons', when supplied in such large quantity, may become a kind of 'mass destruction weapon'. In Liberia, from 2001 to 2003 and against UN weapon embargo, Chinese weapons were buy by Van Kouwenhoven, from Netherlands, to supply Charles Taylor's army, in exchange of woods. Mugabe, in Zimbawe, bought weapons for US$ 240 millions, while Sudan received some civil helicopers and planes, later militarized on place.

Chinese PLA is allow to export weapons in the 80's, and thus create several exporting enterprise, the most famous being Norinco, Xingxing, Poly Group, selling weapons to notable rogue states such Sudan, Zimbawe, while Chinese weapons were used in Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda (grand lakes), Chad, Liberia. To stay fair, it stay important to keep in my the relative effect of China compare to other powers. An illustrative example is gave by a 2005 UN arms destruction operation in Congo, which reported that 17% of them were Chinese made, while thus 83% come from other manufacturers.

Military support

Chinese military presence in Africa did increase since 1990, 1990 being the turn point where China agreed to join UN peace keepers action. Thus, its military presence in Africa raised from nothing to some few teams of peace keepers. In January 2005, 598 Chinese peace keepers were sent to Liberia. Some others were sent into Sahara occidental and Sierra Leone, within the Operation MINURSO, but also in Ivory Coast, DRC This stay symbolic on purpose : China don't want appear as a new colonialist power interfering in internal issues. China also have specific military alliances with 6 African states, in wich 4 are major oil suppliers : Sudan, Algérie, Nigeria, Egypt.

Some specific support are enlightened by westerners. The FUC Chad rebelion, based in Sudan and aiming to overthrow the pro-Taiwan dictator Deby, seems to have received Chinese diplomatic support as well as light weapons and Sudanese oil. Sudan being pro-Chinese, Chad being pro-taiwan, and since 2003, an oil producer, China had interest to replace Deby by a pro-China leader. The 2006 rebelion failed after the French air force intervention, but Deby then switched his friendship to Beijing, the field defeat thus ending into a Chinese strategic victory.

On the strategic and political side, China's influence stay very limited, especially when compare to western powers such France, whom involvement in the 2004 Ivory Coast's conflict, and 2006 Chad's conflict had heavy military consenquences. Nor can China compete effectively in its military training and educational programs with the ex-colonial powers, given the latter’s continuing ties via their military academies like Sandhurst in the UK and Saint Cyr in France.

Sino-African trade and African market

Chinese trade with...
(in US$ billions)

Year	World	Africa	%
2002	620.8	12	1.9%
2003	851.2	18.48	2,17%
2005	1422	39	2,74%
2006	1760.6	55	3,12%
2007	2173.8	?	?%
2010	?	100?	?
Source: CEC, p15 ; LCA, p29

China trade in the world, an overview

China world trade have been growing fast the last decades. As of 1990, it was 116.8 billions US$, in 2000: 474.3 b.; in 2002: 620.8 b.; in 2003, 851.2 b.; in 2005: 1422 b.; in 2006: 1760.6 b.; and in 2007: 2173.8 b. The size and importance of Africa for China is, actually, currently really low. From 2002 to 2006, Africa have raise to share 3,12% of China trade, far after EU, USA, Japan : by 2007, EU made 356.2b. or 16.4%, USA 302.1b. or 13.9%, Japan 236.0b., 10.9% of the China US$ 2173.8 billions trade.

China in Africa

Thus, Africa is just a dwarf for China, with about 3% of its trade in 2007, while China is African main promise, being its 2nd trade partner as of 2008, and expected to have overtaken the US, France, and UK as Africa's biggest trading partner by 2010. Thanks to the decades old Chinese diaspora, economic dynamism of PRC embassies, China's low cost manufacturing industry, as well as experienced and "efficient export engine combined with an exchange rate held deliberately low", Sino-African trade raise US$ 55 billions in 2006.

Sino-African trade 2003

Country	Af->China	China->Af.	Total
South Africa	2.02	1.84	3.86
Angola	0.14	2.2	2.34
Sudan	0.47	1.44	1.91
Nigeria	1.78	0.07	1.85
Egypt	0.93	0.15	1.08
Congo-Brazzaville	0.06	0.81	0.87
Morocco	0.69	0.16	0.85
Algeria	0.64	0.09	0.73
Benin	0.47	0.07	0.54
Others	2,93	1,52	4,45
Total	10.13	8.35	18.48

Africa to China, and then the world

China growing thirst for raw materials lead first African states owned enterprises to sell raw materials to China, such wood and minerals, such is the case for Gabonese forests. Later only China, by the end of the 90's, became interested in African oil. China's oil purchases have raise up oil prices, boosting government revenues of oil exporters like Angola, Gabon or Nigeria, while hurting all other oil importer African countries. But China's raw materials purchases have increase raw materials prices such copper, timber, nickel, which help many other countries.

With time and African law adapting to China thirst, laws were enforce to force local transformation of raw materials. This lead to a new kind of manufactures in Africa, manage by Chinese, having African workers, and later exporting to Chineses, Europeans, Americans and Japaneses customers. African elites now force increase of the share of raw materials transformed on place, in order to both add value to its exports, and to provide (manufacturing) job to local Africans.

China to Africa

Typically, the Chinese diaspora first reactivated its familial links in order to import to Africa low price daily goods such cups, forks, umbrella, etc. sold in Chinese's owned little shops. Indeed, African society have a screaming need of goods, cheap one, in large quantities. China manufacturing industry is there really complementary of African markets, being all over producing, for low cost, often cheaper that what African starting manufactures can do, and for better quality. Cheap Chinese clothes, and cheap Chinese cars' half the price of western ones allow African customers to suddenly raise up their purchase power.

In Africa, China may sell its own low cost low quality overproduction, which out put is also a key point for China own social stability. In Africa, Chinese diaspora is famous to use Chinese-built, Chinese-run store, and selling Chinese goods. China takes raw materials, but not its manufactured products, while cheap Chinese imports flood the local marketplace, killing off local industry. Noticeable case is the Chinese tsunami on African textile industry, hurting it badly, while textile industry is most of time the first manufacture industry of in development countries. This case is not easy to solve. Consumers send large praises to Chinese textiles, often the first clothes they can afford to buy new. While local manufactures are badly attacked, raising opposition and concern over associated lost of local jobs.

Africa as a growing market

Africa is also seen by Chinese businessmen as a 900 million potential customers fast-growing market, and most important of all and in opposition of Western markets, African societies are far to market saturation. While Africa growth from 2000 to 2005 have been at an average of +4.7%/year, this going almost twice more to petroleum exporters (2005:+7.4%; 06:+6.7% ; 07:+9.1%), than to common petroleum importers countries (2005:+4.5%; 06:+4.8%; 07:+4.5%).

Underlying strategies

Struggle against Taiwan

Background

Taiwan is diplomatically the main rival of PRC. Following the Chinese civil war, both the Jiang Jieshi's Republic of China in Taiwan, and Mao Zedong's People's Republic of China in mainland claimed to be the legitimate representative 'China' on the world diplomatic scene. By that time, USSR supported the PRC, while the United States backed ROC, which thus had the Chinese UN security council's seat and the associate hight visibility and veto power. In 1971, after a complex struggle, the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s led the United States to offer the UN security council seat to PRC, thus excluding ROC-Taiwan from the diplomatic scene.

Mainy country followed the US move, ending recognition of ROC as legitimate China's representative, and switching their recognition to the increasingly legitimate PRC. The strengthening economy of Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s allowed Taiwan to keep some stronghold across the world, which relay and supported ROC's diplomatic claims into the UN. As China reformed, and grow wealthier, Taiwan was only able to keep some few small supporters, many for Pacific islands, Latin America, and Africa.

Taiwan (ROC) in Africa

Last 4 African supports Burkina Faso* (1994) Gambia* (1995) São Tomé and Príncipe* (1997) Eswatini* (1968)

Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC, worldwide.

In Africa

ROC-Taiwan do its best to be look as a legitimate country and one world actor, making large and costly effort to keep its some last diplomatic allies in Africa. PRC on its side, strengthened by its growing economic power do its best to isolate Taiwan from its last allies. In the 1990s, the political power-play between Taiwan and China often spurred investment's in Africa, with number of big projects. Nowadays, the balance of power to 'buy' African friendship seems clearly at the advantage of PRC. Taiwan investments in Africa are about US$ 500 millions a year, while the Chinese Eximbank alone is talking about 20 billions on 3 years.

Several Senegal projects were funded by Taiwan in May 2005, for a 5 years plan and US$ 120 millions. But soon after the bank transfer was done, Senegal move to support PRC, and a 'development based on free market and fair bids'. Abdoulaye Wade, Président of Senegal also wrote to ROC president : "Between countries, there is not friendship, just interests." The last oil producer allied to Taiwan was the Chad. But in April 2006, a PRC-Sudan backed rebellion went close to overthrow the pro-Taiwan Idriss Deby, the rebellion was eventually cut by the French aviation. Deby first looked for a Taiwanese large loans to upgrade its military strength. Taiwan being unable to provide the US$ 2 billions requested, he switch to PRC recognition, thus weakening the rebellion by taking out its main support, and strengthening himself by Chinese support. Year after year, PRC seize the last Taiwanese strongholds and secure the diplomatic disappearance of Taiwan in Africa, either by interesting loans, investments, or military pressure.

The Beijing consensus

Westerners and Chinese have different approach of the African resources market, need development, and ways to support it. The western approach is summarized under the Washington Consensus to which human right have been more or less include, while Chinese approach is summarized under the Beijing Consensus. Beijing's approach can be enlighten in some key points:

Non-interference

PRC offers trade with no strings attached, the rule of the Beijing consensus is simple: "If you are an African country and you have a raw material that China wants, then China will do business with you, no matter what the West thinks of your government or your human rights record." China have its own internal issues, and don't want see other comments on them, spread on the diplomatic scene a new spirit where countries respect Chinese privacy is in its immediate interest.

Two countries in particular stand out as examples of where Beijing has intimate dealings, but where standards of good governance (by any criterion) are clearly not meet: Angola and Sudan.

Structural development

Throughout Africa, Chinese companies are occupied in building hospitals, dams, government offices and stadiums and refurbishing facilities abandoned by western companies. Indeed, China's deals focus on build or rebuild key infrastructures in Africa. The target is clear : improve African productivity. China newly developed working force can provide large numbers of the need engineers, technicians, and specialized workers at low cost, a thing that Western countries can't do according to their own workers' cost. This provide China a key structural comparative advantage over westerners. This structurals project, moreover, are actually directly paid by share in Africa's oil.

Friendship and Respect

China is easily noticing that mutual respect a basis of its foreign relations, and so, that China respect the private, internal choice that may make Africans. This long friendship and strong claim respect thus explain the non-interference policy. More sceptically, several others reasons may explain this respect. First, Chinese culture strongly encourage to respect both your leaders, and your followers, underlining that respect ease relationships and access to success. Second, China coming in Africa first focus on its own needs, and, exactly like others country did for long, does not matter of other things. Last, the Chinese culture see each individual as responsible of its own fate, success or fall. Thus, African life improvement is not under its responsibility, even if, as human being, they hope the structural hand they currently provide will help Africa to wake up, and to both produce more and live better.

Chinese model of development

China also enlighten its own personal development history, first focusing on economic evolution, then planing social, civil evolution. "Democracy first" is not a universal model, and African countries may follow an other path: the Chinese one. Infrastructures first, then reforms and economic raise, after what civil and social reforms may come.

Map of percept corruption, 2007. A key point of Chinese adaptation to Africa is also their pragmatic approach face to local corruption.

Corruption-friendly

Like westerners did and still do, close ties with local African elite is also a key factor in Chinese businessmen raise. This ties allow them to be ready went the best opportunities come, especially when one administration replace an other. Then, the new leaders "quickly launch a maximum of new projects [with state's money] to get personal commissions immediately, all this is decide in a short time, and we are ready". In Angola, a country deeply weakened by years of wars, and now worldwide famous for its institutional corruption, China has propose low-cost loans (1.5%), to be paid back in oil.

One big advantage for the Angolan elites is that unlike international institutions, China does not insist on transparent accounting to try and ensure good governance.

This situation clearly put some trouble on the long-term. As noted a South African newspaper: ‘China’s no-strings-attached buy-in to major oil producers, such as Angola, will undermine efforts by Western governments to pressure them to open their oil books to public scrutiny.’

Simply more competitive

On the overall, Wade analysis seems relevant: "Contract which take 5 years to be sign with the World Bank take 3 months with Chinese authorities ; China who have fought its own battles to modernize has a much greater sense of the development need of Africa, and is more adapted to African business than westerners do." China is simply closer from African history, needs, usages and costs, and so more competitive than expensive, bureaucratic westerners.

China EximBank and other Chinese banks

The Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) is a government policy bank under the direct leadership of the State Council, acting in China and overseas as well. For its oversea actions, the EximBank have hundreds offices across the world, the three key overseas representative offices being in Paris, St. Petersburg, and Johannesburg (South Africa, for Africa). It is a major force in Chinese foreign trade and economy system, which aim to dynamize import-export initiatives. The China Eximbank propose to overseas Chinese enterprises and allies complete set of financial products (low rate loans, agreements, association to skilled Chinese building companies) to build or rebuild local infrastructures, equipments, offshore stations, which are in both the scope of Chinese and Africa's interest. The EximBank can provide loans for roads, railroads, electric and telecommunication systems, pipelines, hospital and various facilities. It is the sole lending bank for Chinese Government Concessional Loan entrusted by the Chinese Government. The bank officially aim to promoting the development of Chinese export-oriented economy, which de facto means to help provide China need raw materials, and ease selling of Chinese goods. Thus, the EximBank help to invest and develop underdeveloped African countries allowing them to both produce and export more raw materials to Chinese industries, and to allow African societies to expand their own good markets. In 2006, the EximBank alone pledged $20billions in development fund for 2007-2010, more than all western fundings. China is more competitive, less bureaucratic, and more adapted to African business.

Several other Chinese bank also provide African's governments and enterprises specific similar agreements. By example, a Chinese bank provide loans to develop the wood industry leader, in exchange to large part in this African enterprises stockshare, and leadership in its management.

Chinese embassies' economic action

In the economic progress of China in Africa, the Chinese diaspora and production is actively assisted by PRC embassadies. Michel and Beuret note that PRC embassies and local Chinese businessmen have frequent meetings and actively provide mutual assistances and informations. For Africans requesting PRC Visa for China, the embassy may request the local businessmen further information about this man, his wealth mainly. When confirmed wealthy, the African businessmen or rich consumer get quickly his Visa agreement. On the other side, Chinese government do "help by all possible means, providing informations, juridic councils, free of charge loans, and when we will go back to China, will sell us lands for cheaper price, for all the services provided to the Chinese nation in Africa." PRC embassies are full-time actors of Chinese economic progress in Africa, using widely the numerous and well organized pioneers Chinese businessmen of the diaspora. Chinese government, well informed (by the diaspora) about the local situation, is himself backed by thousands skilled China's locate engineers and workers ready to leave China, as well as by experienced banks (i.e. EximBank) and large US$ reserves (2008: 1,400 billions). The Chinese government is then ready to agree or not for large scale investments and projects, and if agreed, to lead them to their completion.

China and Africa, for an African eco-development ?

African organizations

Effort have been made toward stronger economic integration in Africa. In 2002, the African Union was formally launched to accelerate socio-economic integration and promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. The NEPAD, or New Partnership for Africa's Development was also create by pro-democracy African states, headed by South Africa. Ian Taylor, expert of Sino-African relations presenting it such as "NEPAD has succeeded in placing the question of Africa’s development on the international table and claims to be a political and economic program aimed at promoting democracy, stability, good governance, human rights and economic development on the continent. Despite its faults, NEPAD is at least Africa-owned and has a certain degree of buy-in." China relation to such economic move is complex, Taylor ending his presentation by "China’s oil diplomacy [is] threatens to reintroduce practices [such corruption, human rights abuses] that NEPAD (and the African Union for that matter) are ostensibly seeking to move away from —even though China protests that it fully supports NEPAD"

Sino-African Forum

A China lead Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have been create, where China and African partners meet up every 3 years, both to strengthen friendship, to sign contract, and to make important announcements. The forum de facto also help African leaders to get more legitimacy in their own country.

Chinese interest

Taylor also note that China blind support to African elites in resources abundant country may worsen the 'resource curses', by encouraging elites to control resources and torpedo other economic sectors. A such scenario may be in the short term interest of Beijing, who often want to keep importing low cost pure raw materials from abaord, and manufacture them in China.

Chinese society and resources shortage hypothesis

Key reasons of China interest on Africa is to found in China itself. Chinese economy, industry, energy and society have a special shape. Chinese economy and industry are turn toward export markets. These industries and associated works and investment provide the Chinese society the recent two digit yearly economic growth, job chances, life standard improvement, but dramatically rely on coal (70%) and oil (25%) energies (for 2003), as well as raw materials. Notable is the frequent electric shortages. An US Congress hearing noticed that Energy shortage have already lead to rationate electric supply, slowing down manufacturing sector and so overall economic growth. On other raw materials side, China simply does not have enough natural resources of its own to meet its growing industrial need.

Within the China economic success story, western scholars enlighten that China quest of wealth have one more lead coastal provinces to quickly enrich, while inner provinces or rural areas stay relatively poor, an inequity which thus lead to intern social tensions and instability. Recent economic growth helped to stabilize the hot Chinese society : in time of economic growth, individuals look simply for personal life improvement. Millions of poor farmers and workers work hard and silently in hope of a better lives tomorrow, they want to buy TVs, computers, cellphones, cars, fridges. To keep them happy and stable, China have to stay largely supplied in raw materials - oil, copper, zinc, cobalt - from abroad. Without these electricity and raw materails, without this economic growth, hundreds thousands hungry workers will let explode their rage, while millions Chinese will surely become grouchy and start to ask massive reforms, which may themselves threath current elites. As mirror consequences, China social stability and elites fate are closely relate to China economic growth, and so on energy and raw materials supply.

Also, driven by this politico-economic desire to obtain sources of raw materials and energy for China’s continuing economic growth and open up new export markets, the natural solution offer to Chinese political and economic elites is Africa, the lost continent that all western powers gave up, with enough rogue states exclude by the international community to let PRC make its market for respectable prices. China is actively looking for African resources of every kind: oil, cobalt, copper, bauxite, uranium, aluminium, manganese, iron ore etc. African resources feed China's industry hungry for minerals and electricity, fuels its economic boom, it thus keeps this country's consumers happy and quiet.

For the Communist Party, enough supply of minerals mean social stability. Like other power, China need to supply its industry in raw materials, and its citizen in goods to keep them happy. Out of energy and raw materials shortage, analysts also notice that long term factors threatening China growth questions over its innovation capability, corruption and inefficiency, and environmental risks.

Limits

Human limits: racism and private concurrences

Living and working together

In Congo-Brazzaville, Chinese enterprises are said to be 30% cheaper than western ones, which allow them to win the bids. But African workers complain of their worsening conditions of work : Chinese enterprises hire them on a day-to-day basis, with lower wage than gave by westerners, give low pay, are rude, may be insulting, or even racist, together with strict daily objectives. African businessmen have long complained of Chinese raise in local business, especially in Senegal. Some Angolans had complained that along with the shiploads of machinery and cement, China also imports many of its own nationals to work on these reconstruction projects, which do not generate employment for locals, nor allow close working relations and know-how transmission.

In a wood factory of Congo, Chineses work 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, maintaining machineries on Sundays, illustrating their own high involvement. A such high activity is also expected from Africans workers, creating tensions. We have typically two kinds of Chinese business organigrams :

• Enterprise exploiting African resources: boss, managers, and technicians are Chinese, workers are African, customers are Europeans, Americans and Japaneses.
• Enterprise exploiting African market: bossed and managers are Chinese, sellers are Chinese, customers are African.

Both situations create social tensions, economic concurrences with local enteprises, lower job positions for African, non-ethnic mix in each job level fuels inter-humans tensions.

African private fishers complain of Chinese industrial fishery, coming as close as 1 nautical miles of the coast, taking out most fishes, dragging villagers' fishing webs for whom fishery is the main income source. Western pro-Forest NGO complain of Chinese specific disdain for environment.

In Angola like often in all Africa, Chinese workers live separately from native African, especially around large scale work lead by Chinese enterprises, where specific 'China camp' are specially-built. There are clear barriers of language and culture between Chinese workers, which often lead on the field their African co-workers. Chinese qualifies Africans of "lazy, very lazy, waiting to be hungry to look for food.", while in some others Chinese people's comments on Africans seems clearly contemptuous.

Excessive corruption ?

Some major projects also get stopped, such as in Angola, where 2/3 of the massive US$4 billions CIF fund disappeared, it stay unclear who stolen who. Following this, a major Chinese-backed oil refinery was canceled buy Angolan officials, with unclear reasons, while Sino-Angolan relations get deeply troubled. China may be rudely learning how risky it is to send money to Africa.

African Industry under Chinese fire ?

The hotter issue is probably the concurrence of Chinese goods on local light manufacturing sectors, which are suffering from growing imports from China in many African nations, while the dominant and oligarchs-backed extractive industries are largely benefiting from Chinese capital investment. Chinese imports allow poors consumers to buy their first refrigerator, T-shirt, suitcases, microwave ovens are sold for low prices, but they also hurt nascent industries in countries trying to step up from reliance on commodities. Chinese textile imports seems to have causes 80% of Nigerian factories to shut down, resulting in 250.000 workers laid off. In Zambian, trade minister M. Patel complains : "we [Zambian industries] are simply not competitive in the way we produce goods". In a post Cold War WTO's Africa with wide open doors, national consumer goods manufacturers never recovered from the first wave of Chinese products.
De facto, China is already expert in middle quality level productions, with low labor costs and high productivity, where more basic African factories cannot compete, neither in productivity neither in quality.

In some cases, anger against working conditions, disdain, Chinese's goods concurrence, and over presence of Chinese lead to violence or even Anti-Chinese riots, like what happened in Zambian copper mines.

Neocolonialism (?) and african's counter strikes

African's are aware of the past mistake and western exploitation of Africa, resulting in low benefits for Africa. Some voice already raise up against this neocolonialism. Critics goes both to coward Western reactions which preach liberalism and WTO, and the human right but continue to protect some of their industries (cotton, agricultures) and does so few for fair development of Africa, and to China's growing presence and Chinese goods flood into African markets.

Africans leaders such Wade noticed clearly clearly the first need of Africa: build infrastructures. This need link necessarily Africa and China. He also warmly thanks Chinese dynamism and efficiency. After what, with westerners-relate experiences and the current world dynamic and growing demand for world raw materials, African states are starting to set up some counter strikes, some more favorable legislations encouraging local, long term, development. Examples are:

• Congo-Brazzaville: law now request that 85% of trunks from local tropical forest to be transformed in the country, even if control stay difficult according the spaces and quantities involved; this idea is also encouraged in other countries ;
• Nigeria: some protective laws came into force in 2003 against foreign/Chinese low-cost goods, some time encouraged by local Chinese diaspora which now aim to develop local industry ;
• Senegal: Leaders have negotiated an open-door policy from PRC, which have then provided thousands of visas to Senegalese businessmen, who are now installed in West China and import themselves Chinese goods to Senegal; a Chinese company cannot be awarded an infrastructure-relate contract unless it has partnered with a local company, thus encouraging technology and know-how transfers to African workers ;

In the current world growth, African leaders are still looking to first build up infrastructure, but are increasingly aware and now looking to strengthen their country's own industry and economy. In this, they have to look at China's hand and thirst cautiously.

Conclusion: Westernization of China

History

Sino-African relations date back to the first millennium, under the form of economic exchanges, ancient Chinese potteries having been found in north and east Africa. Private trade have then continue, slowly increasing, and some few official missions were sent in the 13th and 15th centuries. After the western colonial control over Africa together with the Chinese turmoil century (1830-1949), Sino-African relations were 'restored' as a 'blood brother' relation, pro-independence, pro-third world, and mainly ideological (communism). Later key dates are the 1976 death of Mao Zedong, the Deng Xiaoping lead Chinese reforms, the 1989 Tian'anmen repression, the 2001 China WTO entry, as well as the key fact of China own manufacturing growth and raw materials thirst. All these encouraged China (PRC) and the decisive few Chinese diaspora members in Africa to increase Sino-Africa exchanges, this time both in quest of personal and mutual benefice. More than a restoration of an old friendship, that's actually the almost empty record which helped a lot to start in good terms.

China's underlying strategies

As predictable, China interest and support for Africa is not for free. Both side claim a new South-South win-win alliance. It seems, as now, that China effectively got its need raw materials (minerals, woods, etc.) and energic supply (oil) dramatically need to sustain its own boiling industrial and economic growth, which themselves guarantees manufacturing goods supply both on Chinese market and export oriented business. Thus keeping jobless rate low, life standards and home equipment improving, and eventually, social stability and politico-economic elites security. Africa is not, for sure, the key supplier of raw materials, but it does, for sure, make a difference : about 8% of the just-enough Chinese electricity is produce using African oil, while rare African minerals such cobalt are vital for electronic industry. China also isolate years after years Taiwan, its diplomatic archi-rival, while an important deeper point is that Chinese oil companies are getting in rogue or semi-rogue states a valuable experience, to prepare later larger bids on the far more competitive world market. China industry also recently found in Africa an interesting low-exigence and under-equipped market where to export its low cost goods.
African leaders are softly confirmed in their places, getting legitimate in their authoritative rules, as well as legitimate by the on going economic last restart, both link to China new arrival and by recent raw material prices raising. In a such strong place, they work together with Chinese to provide Africa key structural infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, but also hydro electric dams and refineries), which are a first key tools to reverse the 'curse of natural resources' into an efficient exploitation and transformation/manufacturing in Africa itself.

Key to China's success

Chinese diaspora, were then support and follow by Chinese embassies, continuously enlighten the 'Blood Brother' relation of China and Africa as both victims of Western imperialism for decades, and later by raising Chinese companies. The Blood brother rhetoric helped to set up from the start a good image. China need of raw materials and still in need of international recognition walked carefully and humblely toward Africa. It resulted into what is called the Beijing consensus. The Beijing consensus, or China's soft policy, being a strict respect of Africa sovereignty and internal issues, as well as interesting loans, assistance for reform and infrastructures, without political strings such democracy, transparency, human rights respects, attached. Actually, to the Western Washington consensus proposing a western like development : democracy, transparency thus efficiency, liberalism and free concurrence, China add the almost opposite proposal of a China like development : enlighten authoritarianism, economic development first, elites/richs friendly evolution. Adaptation and speed (non bureaucracy) of Chinese assistances, loans, and projects proposals have also been praised, while Chinese goods, projects, and workers low cost and courage are clearly complementary and more adapted to African markets and its larges needs.

Chinese model and African choices

More than this present facts, nowadays China is also help by its own bright future. African countries signing with China today are signing with a futur world superpower. In Africa, this Chinese alliance provide amazing intellectual consequences. It provide economic hope, legitimate elites' hold on power, show African elites an example of success story which they may take as their own future. Harry Broadman notice that if Chinese investments in key sectors such as infrastructures, telecoms, manufactures, foods, textiles de facto transform radically the African continent, the main part is that it change African minds: with key infrastructures, Africa have future. With the recent ~5% growth a year and economic improvement, more Africans students are returning to Africa after studies abroad, in Western countries or China as well, in order to get rich at home.
Moreover, China 'non interference' and model of enlighten authoritarianism also give African leaders much more freedom and thus responsibilities, together with much more voluntary to work for immediate development. Voices come in Africa to notice that with China, Africa have a second chance to joint the international game, and should not repeated errors done with westerners. Facing China, African elites face a successful third world country, and have no more excuses.

Play Chinese against Westerners

Even more, the coming of a such new actor in Africa lead Westerners to review their own strategies, and to analyze Chinese action in Africa. These changes may provide Africa better investments (faster, more realist), while some western strategical think tank are now providing strategic analysis which may be helpful strategical advices on how African elites may react to get more from Chinese investments. Such do Chris Alden's "Leveraging the Dragon: Towards 'An Africa That Can Say No'". Indeed, it's clearly in the interest of Africa to play one side against the other, and to carefully avoid Chinese-Westerners alliances, already encouraged by some western scholars, and which may work together to decrease raw materials prices. Legal solutions are in the hands of local African elites, who may, or not, decide to enforce them. Even if democracy, transparency are no more the sole model, development is, for sure, what Africans want from their leaders.

Gallery

• 
  Map of African countries by population density
• 
  Colonial Africa, blue for former French colonies, pink for former british colonies.
• 
  Official languages (foreigns): Blue for French, Pink for English, Green for Arabic; Red for Portuguese.
• 
  Political division of Africa
• 
  Satelit view of Africa, displaying vegetal occupations
• 
  2008 IFM GDP nominal per capita
• 
  Overview of the index of perception of corruption, 2007. (Where the highest perception of corruption is colored red, and lowest is colored green.)

References

• Erikson & Chen. China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America. p. 21. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)
• World Energy Outlook 2008 Edition's executive summary. International Energy Agency & OECD. 2009. pp. 37–49. ISBN 978-92-64-04560-6. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)
• Pr. Marafa, L. M. (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Geography and Resource Management) (2007, Nov. 15th). Africa’s Business and Development Relationship with China: Seeking Moral and Capital Values of the Last Economic Frontier. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 2007 African Economic UN Conference. p. 28. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Peter Brooks (2007, Feb. 9). Into Africa: China’s Grab for influence and oil. The Heritage Foundation. p. 5. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help); Unknown parameter |serie= ignored (|series= suggested) (help)
• Cindy Hurst (political-military research analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office) (2007, Jan.). China’s Global Quest for Energy. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS.org). {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• Ian Taylor (School of International Relations, University of St Andrews,Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa) (2007). Unpacking China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa (PDF). Center on China’s Transnational Relations, Working Paper No. 19, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. p. 34.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• India–China energy perspectives. Energy Security Insights, Vol 2, Issue 2. The Energy and Resources Institute (teriin.org), New Delhi, India. 2007, Aug. p. 28. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |publisher= and |title= (help); Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)
• Dr. Cyril Widdershoven (2004, Nov. 15). Chinese Quest for Crude Increases Focus on Africa. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS.org). {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• China Energy Data, Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal (html). Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy. 2006, Aug. p. 17. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• Fueling the Dragon’s Flame: How China's Energy Demands Affect its Relationships in the Middle East. US Congress, Presented to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2006, Sept.14. p. 37. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help); Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)

Sources

• LCA : Serge Michel, Michel Beuret, Paolo Woods (2008). La Chinafrique: Pékin à la conquête du continent noir. Grasset & Fasquelle. p. 348. ISBN 2246736218, 9782246736219. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

>LCAtv : Drapeau Rouge sur le Continent Noir (Red Flag on Black Africa). France5.fr / A7 Média. 2008. {{cite AV media}}: External link in |title= (help); Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help), 52min. ; LCApdf : quotes

• FTT : Africa-China trade.pdf (html). Special report. Financial times. 2008, Jan. 24. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• COD : Ian Taylor (2006). China’s oil diplomacy in Africa. International Affairs 82: 5. Blackwell/The Royal Institute of International Affairs. pp. 937–959. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)
• COR : Cindy Hurst (political-military research analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office) (2006). China's Oil Rush in Africa. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS.org). {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)
• MIA : ""The Mineral Industries of Africa"". 2005 Minerals Yearbook. U.S. Geological Survey, PD license (U.S. government source, public domain). 2007, Aug. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |chapter= (help); Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help); Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)
• CAM: James Reynolds, Hangzhou (2007, Jul.). China in Africa: Developing ties > Minerals. BBC news (news.bbc.co.uk). {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• CEC : Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Cornell University ILR School (2008, Mar. 11 (yearly update)). China’s Economic Conditions (Official page and abstract). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. p. 32. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• MRE: Gavin Wright & Jesse Czelusta (2004 Feb. (2003, Nov 13-15)). Mineral Resources and Economic Development (PDF). Originally Prepared for the Conference on Sector Reform in Latin America, Stanford University, Center for International Development. p. 40. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
• CQE : Ingolf Kiesow (2004, Nov). China's Quest for Energy:Impact upon Foreign and Security Policy. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agengy. p. 61. ISSN 1650-1942. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)
• CES : Zha Daojiong (查道炯) (2005, Nov.). China’s Energy Security and Its International Relations. Vol. 3, No. 3. The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. pp. 39–54. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); External link in |title= (help)

See also

• Sino-African relations
• Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
• Foreign relations of PRC
• Foreign relations of ROC
• Economy of China
• Economy of Africa
• Mineral industry of Africa