Talk:Battle of Lechfeld

Numbers

These numbers of soldiers are vastly exagerated. There were no more than 3500-4000 men in Otto's army and 6-8000 Magyars. (The whole Hungarian Tribal Feredation was unable to field 50 000 men, and this campaign was only a simple financial enterprise of some chief.)

Combatants

I changed "Holy Roman Empire" to "East Francia", as the HRE did not exist in that form yet. Otto was crowned Emperor in 962, a decade after this battle. At the time of the battle, the region that became the HRE was known as the Kingdom of East Francia or the Kingdom of the Germans. -Alex, 74.133.188.197 03:26, 10 September 2006 (UTC)

Sources

What sources is this article using for the numbers and the casulties? For example The Seventy Great Battles of All Time (edited by Jeremy Black) gives the Hungarian strength at circa 25 000. --88.114.235.214 18:31, 21 September 2007 (UTC)

There are 2 versions to this Battle of Lechfeld

Let us pause for a moment and consider these facts. Almost all western historians, writing about the Magyar Conquerors, label them as "barbarian hordes" who conquered the Carpathian Basin in A.D.896, yet these "barbarians" carried washing utensils with them and also had the foresight to carry enough food, in dehydrated form, to last the entire campaign. Almost one thousand years later in 1812, when Napoleon attacked Russia, Kutuzov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, destroyed all food supplies in the path of Napoleon so that the Napoleonic army was weakened by starvation. This was sufficient for the defeat of the French army, one of the most advanced armies of that era. In the tenth century the Magyars were prepared for the worst circumstances, by carrying sufficient quantities of dried food with them.

Another advantage the Magyars had over their western counterparts was the bow that they used as a weapon. It was a composite bow, similar to that of the Scythians, made of dried, animal sinews, which allowed them to take accurate aim at several hundred meters distance. When they attacked an army they could shoot seven or eight-hundred meters, whereas the western bows, made of flexible wood were unable to shoot half the distance.[7]

Writing about Bulcsu's campaign, Victor Padányi states that the Magyar army rode through the allied German territories and attacked three Frankish states. Then, "Konrad the Red welcomed Bulcsu and the Magyars in Worms with a fine celebration and showered them with gifts, after which he led them to the other possessions of Bruno, the territories of Köln and Maastricht." [8]

Today, historians still call the military campaigns of the Magyars against Otto and the German States "robbery campaigns". How could these campaigns be "robbery campaigns" when the German princes themselves, including Otto's son and his brother, his relatives and vassals requested the aid of the Magyars and even led them to the territories they planned to attack? The purpose of the Magyar campaigns was to repossess the Avar treasures and weaken the enemy. Therefore, the accusation that the Magyars committed devastation purely for the sake of robbery and looting is unjust. Their campaigns were strategically planned and the devastation and looting were a result of planned attacks.

Viktor Padányi continues with a description of Bulcsu's campaign of A.D.954, which covered a large territory in a relatively short period of time. After the Magyars had defeated the army defending Maastricht, they rode into Brabant (presently Belgium) and attacked Cambrai. Bulcsu's younger brother fell during the attack on the castle. Bulcsu wanted to set fire to the city to avenge his brother's death but he spared it on the pleas of the magistrates. The Magyars then rode through the northern part of France and towards the south where they destroyed Burgundy, another of Otto's possessions. They crossed the French Riviera into Italy, where they attacked and conquered Friault, Verona and Aquileia and then returned to their own land. This part of the campaign, which covered over five thousand kilometers, took approximately two months.

Victor Padányi suggests that modern military leaders examine the leadership, military maneuvers and preparedness of this campaign. "The whole campaign took seven months, approximately two hundred and fifty nights, five hundred meals per soldier, five hundred feedings and enough water for 120,000 horses. They crossed five large rivers, the Enns, the Rhine, the Rhone and twice the river Po, not to mention the many smaller streams."[9]

Padányi writes that Bulcsu's campaign had a shocking effect in Europe. All across Europe, in all the churches people prayed: "Lord, deliver us from the arrows of the Magyars" (De sagittis Hungarorum, libera nos, Domine). The campaign had the opposite effect than that expected by the rebellious princes. Instead of turning against Otto, the populace turned against the princes, who were then forced to render their loyalty to Otto. Prince Ludolf, Otto's son, barefoot and weeping, went to ask mercy of his father, who pardoned him but confiscated the principality of the Schwabenland. Konrad the Red also hastened to return his loyalty to his father-in-law. Only Arnulf of Bavaria resisted with a last desperate effort, but eventually Otto and Heinrich were victorious. They immediately began a bloody revenge. They executed many aristocrats and ecclesiastics. Arnulf fell defending Regensburg and all those who could flee, took refuge among the Magyars. The refugees desperately asked for another Magyar intervention. Heinrich's rule, after the victory of Regensburg was unbearable.

That was definitely a good opportunity for another campaign, if the Magyars wanted to break up the power of Otto and Heinrich. Bulcsu knew that well, but the circumstances were not favorable, for two reasons. One was that he could no longer rely on any help from inside the German states, as he had in the campaign of the previous year, although the Bavarian fugitives assured him that the populace of Bavaria would give him their support. The second reason was that the prospect of another campaign was not widely accepted among the Magyars. Each "nation" was autonomous and, before a campaign could be launched, the leaders had to come to a unanimous decision. It was sometimes possible to convince the leaders to act together but they could not be ordered to do so. The "nations" were not all convinced of the German danger, not even Taksony, who was the Kagan, the leader of the confederacy. The soldiers, who had returned from the previous campaign, wanted to enjoy the benefits of the booty they had just brought home. The army recruiters (zoltans) were unsuccessful in arousing interest in another campaign.

In April, A.D. 955, only two divisions of the two borderline tribes undertook the campaign but even they were lacking the motivation to fight. They had to leave behind a stronger force than previously to guard the borders from the hostile neighboring states. Scouts who were sent to reconnoiter the situation returned with unfavorable reports. The Magyars spent two months in uncertainty at the German borderline, during which time many soldiers deserted. At the beginning of June, Bulcsu sent an envoy to sound out Otto. In return, Otto sent only a very small present to Bulcsu, an action that revealed his attitude. To effect a victory on the scale of that of the previous year, the Magyars should have had not eight or ten thousand men but rather forty or fifty thousand. Finally, in July, Bulcsu, Lehel and Botond decided to launch the campaign. The timing was disastrous. By that time of the year, armies were usually returning from abroad. During the previous three months, the heavy German militia had been able to position itself and upset the strategy of the Magyar army whose speed normally never gave the enemy a chance to take up its position.

Heinrich was in possession of the castle of Regensburg, which had been rebuilt. The Magyar army, which broke into Bavaria, also committed the mistake of spending two weeks in a futile attack on this castle. They left a few thousand men there to lay siege to the castle and rode with a weakened army towards Füssen, where Otto was waiting with all his forces. The aid that the Bavarian fugitives had promised never materialized. The seventeen-year old Prince Arnold of Bavaria, whose father, Arnulf, had died in battle, joined the Magyars at Regensburg with only one hundred and twenty Bavarian soldiers. Finally, about seven or eight thousand men rode into battle in the Field of Lech (Lechfeld, A.D. 955) between Füssen and Augsburg. The light Magyar cavalry was surrounded by a wall of shields and suffered a tragic fate. The actions of the indignant Germans were brutal and beyond words. The leaders of the Magyar army, which was in a hopeless situation, tried to negotiate but the Germans would not negotiate unless the Magyars laid down their arms. After approximately five thousand Magyar soldiers had set down their weapons in a pile, instead of negotiating as promised, the Germans attacked the disarmed Magyar soldiers and butchered them. Bulcsu and Lehel were hanged on the spires of the Augsburg cathedral.

András Zakar and Endre K. Grandpierre explain what caused the sudden fall of the Magyars at the beginning of the tenth century.[10] German history teaches that the Battle of Lechfeld in A.D. 955 was the final victory of the West over the Magyars, that after the battle the Magyars were forced to turn to a peaceful life and that they begged to receive the Christian religion. German historians write that the Germans forgave the Hungarian atrocities and sent Christian missionaries to convert the Magyars to the only true religion. They insist that, after the Battle of Lechfeld, the Magyars had no power to retaliate. This version has been taught throughout the world.

This is not true. The Magyar retaliation after the Battle of Lechfeld was three times as devastating as their defeat at Lechfeld. In their warring campaigns, the Magyars always deployed three separate armies. Two were always on the offensive and the third was the defending army. Historians, writing about the Battle of Lechfeld, for some reason do not mention the third Magyar army. They only mention the armies of Bulcsu and Lehel, yet Anonymus, in two complete chapters, clearly describes the role of the third army under the leadership of Botond.[11] Botond fulfilled his duty with great success. It is true that he was unable to intervene in time to save his comrades but afterwards he took a severe revenge. Anonymus states: "The remaining Magyar warriors, when they saw their comrades fall into a difficult situation because of the cunning of their enemies, bravely and heroically stayed at their posts. They did not abandon each other but did all in their power to help those who were in trouble. Like injured lions, they ran shouting between the weapons and they put down the enemy with horrifying killings. Although, the armies of Bulcsu and Lehel were defeated, the Magyars of Botond ran down those who had defeated Bulcsu and Lehel and killed them all in a horrifying manner." "The larger part of the German army, which was headed toward the river Rhine, was followed by Botond's army. When the Magyar army caught up with them on the plains, the Germans closed ranks like a swarm of bees because the Magyars, with their arrows would not allow them either to retreat or to advance. The Germans, frightened to death, surrendered to the Magyars. When the Magyars captured them, they decapitated them all. They killed them in revenge for their comrades who were killed by the Germans. The German soldiers and the standard-bearers numbered eight thousand.[12] That was not enough. Under the leadership of Botond, they devastated the German states. The Hungarian chronicler, Simon Kézai, states "... they crossed the river Danube at Ulm and when they reached the Monastery at Fulda, they took enormous treasures and destroyed the entire Schwabenland. At the city of Worms, they crossed the river Rhine. There they met two armies, the armies of the Prince of Lotharingia and the Prince of the Schwabs. After defeating and routing these armies, the Magyars entered the land of France and made enormous destruction among the Christians and the monks. From here, they went to the river Rhone as far as Raguza. They destroyed two cities, Susa and Turin and opened the route to Italy. When they came to the flatlands of Lotharingia, they crossed them on horseback at a fast speed and took large booty with them. After this, they returned home."[13] The Magyars still could not overcome the loss of the battle of Lechfeld. It was not that losing a battle caused them great distress, but the reason that they were so upset was that Lehel and Bulcsu were hanged. This was not a fitting execution for courageous soldiers. "Prince Zolta and his men were extremely upset by the dishonorable execution of Lehel and Bulcsu and the other Magyar soldiers and they became real enemies of the Germans. Prince Zolta and his knights, because of the offence caused by the enemy, wanted to take revenge and they did not make a secret of the methods they wanted to use in revenge."[14] The Hungarian Prince Zolta organized a second revenge after the Hungarian defeat at Lechfeld. "Prince Zolta, fired with anger and supported financially by some Germans who asked his help and because he was so upset by the death of Lehel and Bulcsu, sent a huge army against King Otto. He named Botond the captain of one army, Szabolcs as captain of the second army and Orkony as captain of the third."[15] This is another example of the Magyar custom of always sending three armies to a campaign.

It is obvious that the Magyars were still a formidable enemy after their defeat at Lechfeld but shortly after that their power began to decline. If it was not the Lechfeld defeat that caused their decline, what caused them to lose their power? Unfortunately there are no written documents to give us this information. If there were a secret conspiracy in the West to annihilate the Magyars, there would obviously be no record of it, so we would look for it in vain. If there had been any mention made of it by Magyar historians, it would have been erased by the Church, the fanatical advocators of the Finno-Ugric theory or the followers of the Hapsburg absolutism. Because the Magyars have no written history of this time period, and because the chronicles of Anonymus and Kézai were disregarded by Western historians, the Hungarian historians simply accepted the record of the Germans that stated that the power of the Magyars was broken after the defeat at Lechfeld. Later Hungarian historians also disregarded these two sources because the actions of Botond belied their account of the peaceful Christianization of Hungary. Shortly after his second successful campaign, the apparently healthy Botond mysteriously lost all his strength and suddenly died. Hungarian history makes little mention of him.

Otto I was well aware of the military strength of the Magyars, even after their defeat at the Battle of Lechfeld. The Germans suffered their greatest losses in the battles that followed and Otto came to realize that it was not possible to subdue the Magyars by military means. Therefore he decided to use the weapon of diplomacy with which the Magyars were inexperienced. The given word was of as much value as an oath to the Magyars as it was among the Huns. Wess Roberts writes of the Huns: "Their guilelessness and naive faith in human goodness frequently caused them to fall prey to the intricacies of more skilled practitioners of diplomacy."[16] The Magyars inherited this same characteristic. The Germans, however, lacked this sensitivity and were more practiced in cunning and diplomacy.

During the Middle Ages, the Church was a political power Because the Germans were unable to make Hungary a vassal by military means, they decided they would first convert the Magyars (who even today are still called "pagan") to Western Christianity and then they would be able to overpower them politically. This is why the missionaries to Hungary were almost all Germans. The Germans did not expect much resistance from the Magyars because they knew that Bulcsu himself had been a Christian of the Eastern rite. Luitprandt, Bishop of Cremona, in 910 had written that the people of Magyarország were obviously Christian. [17]

Professor Badiny, in his paper "The Godly Conquerors" shows that the Magyars were Christians of the Eastern rite and asks why they are still called "pagans". He explains that, until the decision of the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church in 1962, anyone who was not Roman Catholic was a pagan and a heretic. "Only with the decision of this Council were the Christians of other sects acknowledged to be God-fearing Christians... Therefore, the expression "pagan" referring to the Magyars at the time of István I, simply meant "non-Roman-Catholic".[18]

Otto was undoubtedly a better diplomat than military leader, which is why he did not attack the Magyars in their homeland after the Battle of Lechfeld. It was obvious to him what would have resulted from such an attack. Instead of another attack against the Magyars, he attempted to gain more power and prestige for himself. His aim was, with the blessing of Rome, to crown himself Holy Roman Emperor by Divine Right, just as Charlemagne had done. He would gain political dominance over all the Christian nations of Europe. With this coronation, both the Pope and Otto were expecting to gain political power and prestige. The Pope especially was hoping to gain more power to strengthen his influence because at that time he was hardly more important than any other bishop. Only the Cluny Monastery gave greater prestige to the Papacy. In spite of all this, the coronation of the Emperor took a long time to materialize. It did not take place until A.D.962, after the settlement of a dispute between Otto and the Pope. Otto had taken it upon himself to defend the Vatican but, in return he demanded political sovereignty over Rome. Otto and the Pope could not come to an agreement. To settle the dispute between them they asked the Magyar Kagan, Taksony, the strongest leader at that time, to be mediator. Their request was brought to Taksony by the monks Salectus and Genzanini Zacheus. Egyed Rudnay, a Hungarian historian, discovered this information in the writings of Sackur, a Church historian.[19]

It is obvious from this request that both Otto and the Pope acknowledged the Magyars as the strongest power in Europe. Kagan Taksony decided in favor of the Pope and hoped that in return the Church would support him. Taksony's heir, Géza, also favored the Papacy. Because of the alliance between the Magyars and the Papacy, the Magyars ceased their attacks on Germany. One of the weaknesses of the Magyars was that they had a strong belief in the power of the given word. It was an ancient Scythian-Hun-Magyar custom to trust the verbal promise more than the written document. The Magyars could not even imagine that a promise could be broken. When Kagan Taksony was asked to become mediator between Otto and the Pope, he believed that friendship and peace would ensue.

At that time when the German "friendship" was so warm, Taksony was a young man, 38 years old, too young for the Germans to wait for his natural death. Here again, Hungarian history is vague. All references merely state that, although Taksony had been in good health, he died suddenly. His son, Géza, who was 14 or 16 years old, took over the leadership. Otto found the time ripe to overcome the Magyars.

It is natural and desirable to build peace and friendship with a former enemy. This is the final goal for every war but was this really the German goal? The Germans' feelings towards the Magyars, after the many German losses, were obviously very hostile. But the Germans were also convinced that they could not retaliate against the Magyars with weapons, therefore they camouflaged their goal and put it into a religious context. They began their "friendly" approach to the Magyars when a child was the Magyar Kagan and a group of advisors was ruling the country in his place.

In August of A.D.972, Otto I visited the Benedictine Abbey at Einsiedel where he gave a charter to certain selected monks. He selected Brother Wolfgang who was the most suited to his purpose to be a missionary to Hungary. Historians recorded that Wolfgang's journey was unsuccessful because, soon after his return to Germany, Emperor Otto sent another missionary to Hungary. Wolfgang was supposedly recalled by Bishop Pilgrim. Endre Grandpierre says that it is unimaginable that a bishop would have the power to recall an envoy sent by the Emperor himself. Grandpierre contradicts those historians who say that Wolfgang's mission was unsuccessful and he comes to the conclusion that, because of the fact that immediately after Wolfgang's recall another envoy was sent to Hungary, the mission of Wolfgang must have been very successful. Wolfgang was the one who established the continuous diplomatic exchange between Germany and Hungary. If Wolfgang had not been successful, the Emperor would not have appointed this simple monk to be Bishop of Regensburg on his return to Germany. That fact in itself showed a certain tendentiousness. It was at Augsburg that Bulcsu and Lehel were hanged after the Magyar defeat at Lechfeld and this city was to the Germans symbolic of the defeat of the Magyars, so the appointment of Wolfgang as Bishop of Regensburg was also symbolic. Emperor Otto I. in A.D. 976 gave another large land donation to Wolfgang to reward him for his efforts to suppress the Magyars. He was entrusted with the upbringing of the German princess, Giesel des Trau (Pledge of loyalty), known as Gizella, who became the wife of King István I. There is no doubt that Wolfgang was very successful in the Hungarian court because his success ensured the acceptance of a second envoy, Bishop Bruno.

The German goal was well camouflaged by the peace and the missionary activities. Endre Grandpierre suggests that a secret international conspiracy attacked the Hungarian power. This international conspiracy had such power and worked so methodically that in a short time it crushed the unsuspecting great power of the Magyars. There are no records of the coup, written by Magyar historians, and the names of the participants are not known. They were probably the advisors of the young Kagan Géza, the twelve aristocrats who represented Hungary at the Assembly at Quedlinburg in A.D.973, who accepted bribes from Bruno. The Germans did not approach with their friendship when Zsolt or Taksony were the rulers. Why not? Because under the strong Kagans it was not possible to prepare a coup. It was easy for the advisors to persuade a young inexperienced child Kagan to accept the new religion.

The German and Magyar contacts, for a long period of time, had consisted of the exchange of swords and arrows. Any other connections such as diplomatic connections were nonexistant. After the death of Kagan Taksony, when young Géza became Kagan, suddenly everything changed.

Bishop Bruno showered the Magyar aristocracy with gifts from Otto. The advantage of using gifts to bind the receiver was already used successfully in ancient times. They first gave small unimportant gifts and later more valuable gifts. The receiver was obliged first to make small and later larger concessions. According to György Győrffy, some of the gifts which the Magyars received came from the Emperor's own treasury. Others came from the treasury of the Archbishop of Mainz and others from the Abbey of Sankt Gallen.

Gold can open many gates. In the past, gold has opened the gates of Babylon, Thebes, Carthage, Rome, Buda and even Tihuanaco. Gold can raise someone to power or can destroy empires. J. Bratianu, Minister of Rumania, boasted to the French diplomats that he purchased Transylvania for ten million gold pieces. He used the gold to bribe people to obtain Transylvania from the Magyars.[20] Gold can buy empires. Bishop Bruno's large carriages, packed with treasures, were escorted by armed guards on the road to Esztergom. On the way, Bruno had to go to Passau to see Bishop Pilgrim. Bishop Pilgrim was the organizer of the entire anti-Magyar movement. He gave Bishop Bruno the letter which Otto the Great had written to him. This is the only document, which has survived.

Emperor Otto was indubitably a great German ruler who did great deeds for the Germans. He very skillfully camouflaged his conquest of Hungary by spreading Christianity. He was the first to introduce the politics of the "Drang nach Osten". His greatest desire was to eradicate the Magyars. The following is the text of the letter written by Otto the Great to Bishop Pilgrim of Passau:

"Otto, Emperor by the Grace of God, to Pilgrim, Reverend Bishop of the Church of Passau. We send our regards and our grace. We send Bishop Bruno and we commend him to your most attentive care. Give him whatever he needs, support him with your men, with horses and anything else he might need for his journey. Treat him with the greatest honor and lead him carefully to the border of the Magyars with the shortest route possible because we exhorted him to influence the Magyar King as soon as possible to act in our cause. Take good care of our envoy, Bruno, so that he may cautiously accomplish his goal. If our plan is successful, it will be extremely beneficial to you and yours." [21]

In spite of its simplicity, this letter reveals many secret thoughts and plans. Between the lines, I see a secret plan to conquer Hungary. The view of historians which is constantly echoed, that the Magyars of their own will desired Christianity and asked the Germans and the Bohemians to send missionaries, cannot be the truth. If the Magyars really wanted Christianity, they had the opportunity to adopt it in the Carpathian Basin because the majority of the Avars survived the campaigns of Charlemagne and they were already Christians of the Western rite. Why would they have approached the hostile Germans and the Bohemians when they already had Christians in the country? It is also a fact that the Magyars fought for a full century against those changes, which were imposed on them when they adopted Western Christianity. Moreover, even after they had adopted Western Christianity, with a chain of rebellions some of them demonstrated that they did not want to abandon the ancient faith. Tonozuba and his wife were buried alive because they would not give up their ancient religion. According to Grandpierre and other historians, not all the people who came with the Árpád Magyars were Christian. Some of them practiced the religion of the Sun-God, which was the most ancient form of worship. They did not worship the Sun but revered it as the representation of God. Some historians call this religion the ancient Christianity. Luitprand called the Árpád Magyars "Christians." The ancient religion is probably the remains of the Manicheistic religion, which is a religion that follows Jesus but does not recognize the Old Testament. The different religious views among the Árpád Magyars indicate that the Magyar people practiced religious tolerance.

comprhensive view is on this website, lets be fair and look at all views not biased idealogical chronicals

http://www.magtudin.org/Homeland%202.htm this —Preceding unsigned comment added by Hotpaprika (talk • contribs) 09:14, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

Pretty much all of that was debunked long ago. The rest is nationalistic wishful thinking.

removed URL in sources

I removed the following URL from the sources on the main page - it points to a password-protected section about Widukind's account

Widukind

(Florian Marquardt) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.147.59.12 (talk) 09:49, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Horses

I am skeptical about this line:

"The Magyars rode faster horses than the more heavily encumbered German knights and had a speed advantage in a normal situation."

My understanding is that while the Magyars had greater strategic mobility due to their extra horses and self-sufficiency, and greater long term endurance, the European warhorses were bred for strength and speed, while the steppe ponies were not. In a short sprint or charge the knights are faster I think. AThousandYoung (talk) 22:49, 31 May 2009 (UTC)