Talk:Logical positivism

Section one (originally without title)

I don't have enough time now to look at this article and discussion properly right now, But sentences like, "positivism—which states that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge" puts a bug up my... anatomy.

(I don't think you have had enough time to read any of the subject matter of this article. You persist in promoting your own perversion of language and philosophy.

I was a serious student of philosophy, particularly empiricism, logical positivism, etc., and have actually read the books alluded in this article.

I have a strong objection to the first, introductory paragraph in the article - "Logical positivism (later and more accurately called logical empiricism) is a school of philosophy that combines empiricism, the idea that observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge of the world, with a version of rationalism, the idea that our knowledge includes a component that is not derived from observation."

Please provide references by Vienna Circle authors to support this paragraph.

Rationalism, in no way, was advanced in logical positivism. Willard Quine attacked the nature of reductionism as being non-confirmatory. All practitioners of LP espoused the ultimate priority of experential, sensory, verifiable observation against rational constructs or deduction. I will concede, and it is well documented, that the juncture of empiricism and rationalism was the concern and underlying reason of the meeting of the First Vienna Circle, but rationalism, per se, was rejected as metaphysical. A priori principles of rationalism were defeated by nearly every LP author. The only quasi-rationalist component of logical positivism is the religious belief in mathematical and logico-linguistic abstractions, which is my critical rejection of the philosophy. After all, what would you expect from mathematicians? Danarothrock (talk) 10:51, 9 July 2008 (UTC))

Could this be a oft repeated thoughtless poor translation of some well thought out Austrian language. One is into extremes when using the word "all" ( applying to something of such intensely central notions as "knowlege".... in a sense knowlege is Being... ) in a proposition. Authentic implys unauthentic but also something of the highest truth, rather than 'a' truth, simple truth, &etc . Truths often agree with proofs, but 'all that is' doesn't and/or don't ( agree that is ). There is much of the absurd in the grandioseness of such sweeping statements without a thorough dissection. It is easily read as a tautology ( isn't "sciencia" a word that kinda means "knowing"). And what is "authentic", don't all three words partake of the central concept of "truth". Is "scientific knowlege" "real" isn't the question, the question is is whether the statement is meant to be humble as "philosophy" is noted as being or such that attracts several kinds of venality while really saying nothing. In humble hands it makes for an interesting skelaton, but for those who take it as real it tends to become necromatic. Wblakesx 09:40, 30 September 2006 (UTC)wblakesx ( I'll place this on my watch list for later ) P.S. "To follow up on LMS's comments, it should be noted that Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications not just for logic and the philosophy of science but also for education, the arts, and politics. The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had for this movement are apparent in their manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle." Neurath, in particular, attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement in Germany, and with the socialist movement in politics (Neurath considered himself to be a Marxist). One of the most intriguing aspects of the history of logical positivism is how these broader aspects of the philosophy were generally lost during its reception into British and American philosophy." Jim F. ( an edit of the above ) "...Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications ....The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had ... attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement and with the socialist movement ",

this sounds like a proper domain, perhaps even wider and deeper. It should probably have no more than a minor role economics or politics or we might get an even more Hobbean old world.

Myth is a form of knowlege, parables may express authentic knowlege... but these are minor quibles. Feelings and desires are facts to a biologist and his cousins, they form parts of elaborate systems of survival and are subject ot rules and laws, in a given envirornment events are as entirely predictable as quatum physical science allows predidictability, nay More! , the broader the statement, the more predictable.... Much of the world is inaccessable even to speaking apes. What's that line from Hamlet... we haven't dreamt worlds and never will, truth is referential, if you don't have the reference, if you've buried it, you cannot see

But I'll have to come back later to see if I haven't gone Too terribly far off in my rant.

Cleanup

User:Knucmo2 has inserted a Cleanup tag. I don't know very well Wikipedia etiquette, but perhaps one can use the talk page to suggest improvements. I don’t see in talk anything from User:Knucmo2. So I ask: what’s the problem? [[Murzim 15:51, 25 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I think that you have made a worthy contribution to the article, and that it should be saved. I also think that the flow of the article could be improved. You have made the intellectual connections clear. However what precisely the logical positivist project is, and how the encyclopeadia is relevant should be retained at the opening of the article. I'll try and edit along these lines. Sholto Maud 02:54, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

The article now sounds better: it's well organized. Thanks. [[Murzim 08:15, 27 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Just Plain Wrong: Analytic/Synthetic

The definitions of analytic and synthetic statements given in this article are completely wrong. An analytic statement is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject; the famous example is "all bachelors are men." Simply through an analysis of the concept of "bachelor," we can deduce that, a bachelor being an unmarried man, man is contained in the subject, bachelor. Synthetic propositions amplify their subject through their predicate, and, depending on whether one accepts Kant or not, can be either a priori (Kant) or only a posteriori. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.243.39.242 (talk • contribs) .

Could you expand on your definition of synthetic statement. How does one 'amplify' a subject through a predicate? How are you using the term 'amplify' here? And how can one measure the degree of amplification? I think Strawson, and Quine had different definitions. Sholto Maud 11:31, 9 February 2006 (UTC)

There are different definitions about analytic and synthetic statements. The first definition was introduced by Kant. An analytic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is not contained in concept of the subject. According to Kant, analytic statements explicate the concept of the subject, while synthetic statements add a predicate to the concept of the subject. Kant conjugated this distinction with the distinction between a priori and a posteriori. A statement is a priori when its true does not depend from the experience, otherwise it is a posteriori. Kant recognized three kinds of statements: analytic a priori (e.g. every body occupies a space), synthetic a posteriori (e.g. every body is heavy), and synthetic a priori (e.g. 7+5=12). According to Kant, mathematical statements are synthetic a priori, and the theoretical principles of physics are synthetic a priori.
From the point of view of logical positivism, an analytic statement is one which is true (or false) by means of the meaning of the terms that occur in the statement; otherwise it is synthetic. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is the same as Kant. According to logical positivism, mathematical statements are analytic a priori; the principles of physics (and in general every scientific statement) are synthetic a posteriori. There are not synthetic a priori statements. Carnap in Philosophical Foundations of Physics distinguishes the following kinds of statements:
L-statements, which are true or false by the rule of logic alone: they are true or false by the meaning of the logical terms, such as OR, AND, IF, NOT, EVERY, EXISTS (e.g. rain or not rain). They are a priori.
A-statements, which are true or false by the meaning of the term, including not logical terms (e.g. all bachelors are men). They are a priori.
P-determined statements (P stands for Postulate, i.e. Axiom), which are implied by the axioms of the scientific theory (they are P-true) or whose negation is implied by the axioms (they are P-false). They are synthetic a posteriori.
Not determined statements, which are independent from the axioms. They can be factually true or false. They are synthetic a posteriori.
According to Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic is untenable.
Finally, I think that the distinction between analytic and synthetic in the article is oversimplified. [[Murzim 13:56, 15 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Thank you for your considered response. Perhaps you should consider ammending some of the article on this topic. I notice that you have not addressed the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject. Also, the statement "There are not synthetic a priori statements." is that an absolute statement of a staement of how logical positivists view the situation? I have read authors claiming that synthetic a priori statements are possible and necessary. Sholto Maud 21:05, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

"There are not synthetic a priori statements" is the basic philosophical principle of logical positivism. From the Vienna Circle Manifesto: "It is precisely in the rejection of the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori that the basic thesis of modern empiricism lies." (Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, 1929; English translation The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle, in Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.), The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle, New York: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 330). I cannot address the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject; however, the "amplification" of the subject is a notion introduced by Kant. [[Murzim 18:06, 16 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Old talk

(Because this talk page was becoming difficult to read, I made some minor edits: I moved unanswered questions and comments about remaining deficiencies in the article to the top, formatted conversations so as to make the conversation structure clear, and deleted one unattributed, off-topic comment.)

We need to rethink the scope of this article. Should it discuss the verifiability theory of meaning in depth? I think that it shouldn't, because there is already a page for a treatment of that subject. Should it discuss criteria of meaning in general? I think that it shouldn't, and that an article with that title would be useful as a place for much of the material that is here. What is difficult for me to understand, and what I think should be the subject matter of this article, is what logical positivism is.

Logical positivism is a theory holding that scientific rigor should be applied to philosophy. (from the first sentence) Is it the only such theory? Is there more than one way to understand its premises? What is the history of people's understandings of what logical positivism is? What is the origin of the term "positivism" - what does the word for nonnegative, nonzero numbers have to do with scientific rigor?

An important tenet of logical positivism is the verifiability criterion of meaning, which implies that matters of fact and relations of ideas are the only meaningful statements. (from the the third sentence) Is it the only tenet? And so forth - I ought to go to sleep.

Anyway, I think that this article should treat the meaning and usage of the term "logical positivism", and the history of the logical positivist movement, with links to relavent philosophy.

-- Jrn 05:33, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)

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This is a start, but logical positivism was an entire philosophical movement, not just a theory of cognitive significance. This--"only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless"--appears to be an attempt at formulating the verifiability theory of meaning, which was essential to the Vienna Circle's thinking, but does not exhaust what logical positivism was about. Maybe you could do some more research? The topic is eminently researchable--many books have been written about it. --LMS

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To follow up on LMS's comments, it should be noted that Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications not just for logic and the philosophy of science but also for education, the arts, and politics. The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had for this movement are apparent in their manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle." Neurath, in particular, attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement in Germany, and with the socialist movement in politics (Neurath considered himself to be a Marxist). One of the most intriguing aspects of the history of logical positivism is how these broader aspects of the philosophy were generally lost during its reception into British and American philosophy.

Jim F.

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This article needs either a discussion of "positivism" in general (starting from Comte) or a link to a separate article on positivism, SR

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Michael Polanyi seems to be another opponent of positivism. I'm studying his book. Anyone else interested in discussing Polanyi's rejection of positivism? <>< tbc

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Logical positivism asserts that only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless.

I copied the sentence above to use in the pseudo-science article. I received this feedback from another forum: "[You] tacitly imply that non-empirical statements are equivalent to metaphysical statements. The difficulty with the LP criterion confronts us long before we consider traditionally metaphysical questions. Most of mathematics and virtually all of the humanities are problematic. History is curiously problematic because of the the "repeatability" issue - an apparently apriori standard of what is accepted as "empirical". And finally since science itself embodies its own "scientific metaphysics", the criterion was self-defeating." --Chris

Positivism and Imparatives/Questions?

Questions and imparatives don't seem to meet the positivistic criterion for "meaningfulness". Would positivists thus say that something like "go to your room!" is "meaningless"? If so, does this imply we should stop issuing commands and asking questions? --Ryguasu 01:30, 19 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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I seem to remember that Richard_Swinburne says in The Coherence of Theism that "The toys in the cupboard come to life and dance when they are not being observed" is a meaningful statement which is at the same time impossible to falsify, under verifiability. Am I right, and if so, does this merit inclusion under Criticisms? (I'm new here, and still working this all out; your help is appreciated) --Shikasta 22:22, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

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From an earlier version of this page:

Logical positivism asserts that only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless.

Unfortunately, this fundamental tenet of logical positivism belongs to the family of statements that it asserts to be meaningless. As a result, the entire edifice of logical positivism vanishes in a puff of logic.

This insight appears not to have occurred to the logical positivist school of philosophers.

Although this may have been stated in an amusing way, and perhaps the language needs toning down, I assert that as:

1. The first sentence quoted is an accurate statement of the fundamental tenet of logical positivism
2. It is a metaphysical statement of the kind that it states are meaningless

the text quoted is a valid comment, (as well as being a bad joke).

Note that none of the above is an attack on Popper's valid (and related) idea of falsifiability which has no such problems

-- The Anome

As far as I remember logical positivist philosophy, this is "statement about language" or something like that,

and such statements fall into special category in logical positivism. For example all math falls into this category: it's not empirical, but positivists didn't reject it. --Taw

I have restored the observations quoted, but this time with language toned down, your comment merged, and an attempt at NPOV. Is this more acceptable?

-- The Anome

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Under this view, statements such as "God exists" or "Pegasus is a winged horse" are examples of meaningless, metaphysical nonsense that are neither true nor false, and thus should not be believed.

Isn't "Pegasus is a winged horse" true by definition? --Camembert

Analytic statements relying on a metaphysical term are also meaningless. I think a logical positivist would say that the statement "Pegasus is a winged horse" presupposes that "Pegasus exists" in some metaphysical sense and that the conjunct of these two statements is meaningless. Suppose we had these statements in the article instead: "Pegasus exists" and "God is an omnnipotent being". The later could also be said to be analytic, but you'd be hard pressed to get a LP to agree that the statement is meaningful. The current article doesn't explain it this way though.

Response by Jod:

(1)The logical positivists were well aware of Russell's theory of descriptions. "Pegasus is a winged horse" would be analyzed as "There is exactly one thing x such that x is a horse, x has wings, and x is called "Pegasus."" This would be false, not meaningless, because the existence and properties of horses is subject to empirical investigation.

(2) The claim that Popper's falsifiability criterion "supplanted" the positivist criterion, and is not subject to the same problems, is both highly conentious amd, at least in part, false. In a strictly logical sense Popper's criterion is just as bad as verifiability. Verifiability cannot account for positive universal or negative existential claims; falsifiability cannot account for positive existential or negative universal claims. Very few contemporary theorists of science think Popper's can simply be taken as a replacement; the consensus is more along the lines of "things are just more complicated than that." In the light of Quine's work, Kuhn's work, and others, it is importantto recognize that economy of theory and the "inertia" of one's present beliefs can itself dictate which observations are "worth" taking seriously.

The analytic-synthetic distinction

It seems to me that the statement regarding analytic statements in the first paragraph of the Introduction...

"...and analytic truth, statements which are true or false by definition, and so are also meaningful."

...misstates the LP position regarding analytic statements. The logical positivists viewed analytic statements to be true, but meaningless truths; empty of factual content. Analytic statements are empty similarly to how tautologies are empty. Mathematics fall under the class of analytic statements to the Logical Positivists as well. We can use synthetic claims to describe the world using mathematical language (e.g. "There are five apples on the table.") but mathematic proofs, etc. are analytic and therefore empty of meaning.

I hope I haven't overlooked something that has already been covered or a crucial statement in the article itself that would immediately clear up my concern. In any event, I thought I should mention it.

Grammatical Error?

"...not an axiomatic system that's unable prove its own consistency."

Unified Science

Do any of the contributors to this page know what the idea of unified science is? It is a topic that is in Enc. Brittanica but not Wikipedia, so it would be great if we could fill the hole. Pcb21| Pete 2 July 2005 22:53 (UTC)

I think the issue of unified science is that often known as "the unity of science". I've created a very cursory entry on that rather large topic in philosophy of science. philosofool 12 July 2005

Difference between logical and sociological postivism?

Aren't those articles talking about the same thing? See sociological positivism (aka positivism in social sciences)? Technical note: at present this article redirects to a section in positivism disambig. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 23:57, 8 September 2005 (UTC)

Malicious, accepted and mistaken nonsense

Did logical positivists, Popper, etc distinguish between false assertions made to mislead ("No, I don't have a knife behind my back.", "The Chinese sharpen their teeth.", "There is no global warming."), those that are made through accepted wisdom ("There are fairies in the forest.", "The moon is only half a mile up.", "There are WMDs in Iraq."), and those that are mistakes of cognition, perception and recollection ("My keys are on the table.", "Only a mile or so to go.", "George Bush has cut public expenditure.")? I include the political examples because they can be considered the result of a concerted effort to deceive, but the people I imagine making the assertions are not all lying. I bring this up a) because the article does not discuss modes of nonsense b) because the quote "Otto Neurath famously compared science to a boat which we must rebuild on the open sea." reminds me that I suspect that the main impediment to the development of science and its application outside of the scientific establishment is the utility to a relatively small class of the malicious propagation of fantasies.

Another aspect not discussed in this article is the psychological necessity of fantasy. Did they have anything to say about that? And did Jung, for instance, have anything to say about Logical Positivism? Mr. Jones 10:56, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

With respect, I don't think this is very relevant. Most readers will probably be able to imagine what the positivists would have thought about lying - false sentences can be meaningful, but in that case their verification conditions are not fulfilled. Thomas Ash 03:26, 1 December 2005 (GMT)

Karl Popper

"Although Karl Popper belonged to the Vienna Circle in his early days, he became the main critic of the neo-positivist approach." This contradicts claims that Popper was not part of the Circle, e.g. the Vienna Circle article. Could someone check this out, and clarify in a reply to this message? Thomas Ash 03:26, 1 December 2005 (GMT)

Thomas Kuhn

I certainly wouldn't class Kuhn as a logical positivist, although there are certainly those who might. However, in my opinion, and the opinion of many others, Kuhn is not a logical positivist, and to read his work in this way is to miss the point. He certainly is not a logical positivist in the sense of, for example, Schlick and Tarski (or Popper, if you read him as a logical positivist). For example, Popper's idealistic views about how scientists carry out their work is markedly different to Kuhn's more realistic view of how scientists actually carry out their work. Also, Kuhn's notion of rationality is far more realistic, as opposed to the logical positivist notion of rationality, which equates it with objectivity (something Kuhn suggests is impossible). I could go on, but my point I think is straight forward: Kuhn is not a logical positivist.

I do agree that Kuhn is not a logical positivist, but not really because he has a "more realistic view of how scientists actually carry out their work". There is a distinction between a philosophy of how science ought to be carried out (what the logical positivists were interested in) versus a sociological analysis of how it actually is carried out (which is what much of Kuhn's work investigates). --Delirium 04:54, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

• It is unclear what qualifies a thinker/writer as a logical positivist. Kuhn published his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science which was published by the Vienna circle also known as logical positivists. A fundamental presupposition of this publication was that science could be unified through some kind of absoulte dimensional system. If we assume that this system embodies an objectivist rationality, and is presupposed in any of the contributions to the Encyclopedia, then it seems tha Kuhn qualified as a logical empiricist. Sholto Maud 12:36, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

• Kuhn usually is not qualified as logical positivism. On the contrary, Kuhn's philosophy is generally contrapposed to that of logical positivism. Kuhn published his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science, but this is not a prove that Kuhn was a logical positivist (also Popper published his Logic of Scientific Discovery in Vienna Circle's series). I think that the reference of Kuhn as a logical positivist is misleading, and suggest to remove it from the article. [[Murzim 22:01, 14 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I'm not sure on what basis one would say that Kuhn usually is not qualified as logical positivist. In publishing his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science it is clear that this major work has a strong connection with the main intellectual project of logical positivism. What we need to clarify is this,

• was the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science the major project embodying the aims and ideals of logical positivism?
• was Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions considered an expression of these aims and ideals?

If so then Kuhn's paradimg qualifies as a logical empiricist. Sholto Maud 01:07, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Barone, Il neopositivismo logico, 1986 (a book of about 700 pages, the best Italian book on logical positivism) consider Kuhn as an opponent of logical positivism. Barone studied the philosophy of logical positivism from 1950s to 1980s.
Hempel, 'Scientitic Rationality', in Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle, and Critical Rationalism, 1979, pp. 291-301, distinguishes two different schools about the methodology of science: He said that one is derived from the works of logical positivists, and the other from the works of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. There is – said Hempel – a controversy between those different schools. Thus Hempel implicitly recognized that Kuhn cannot be ascribed to logical positivism. This distinction is present also in Hempel, 'Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives', in Rationality Today, 1979, pp. 46-58, in which Hempel describes a conflict between a school (he called Analytic) originated from Vienna Circle, Berlin Circle, and correlated philosophers (he cited Popper, Braithwaite and Nagel), and a school (he called Pragmatic) ascribed to Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hanson. The two schools differ about the conception of rationality and of methodology of science.
In Friedman's Reconsidering Logical Positivism, 1999, there is only one citation of Kuhn, in page 1 of the Introduction, in which Friedman remembers Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism.
About the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolution in the International Encyclopedia, one cannot consider every author as a logical positivist. For example, can one consider Russell, Dewey or Bloomfield as logical positivist?
Carnap was very enthusiastic about Kuhn's work, and he said that this "monograph will be a valuable contribution to the Encyclopedia" (Friedman, Dynamics of Reason, 1999, p. 42).
A good analysis of relations between Kuhn and logical positivism can be found in Gurol Irzik, 'Changing Conceptions of Rationality – From Logical Empiricism to Postpositivism' in Logical Empiricism, 2003, pp. 325-346. He said that this relation is very complicated and frequently presented in a more simplified way (Kuhn against Carnap), while in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science. However, Kuhn's philosophy can be ascribed to postpositivism (I'm now oversimplifying…).
In standard Encyclopedia, Kuhn is not considered a logical positivist. I’ve consulted:
Philosophielexikon (in German), 1983, 646 pages, where it is said that Kuhn expressed a strong critique against Logical Positivism's philosophy.
Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. IX, Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the 20th Century, 1996, 461 pages. In the article about Logical Positivism, pp. 193-213, Kuhn is never cited.
The Encyclopedia Britannica, in the article about Positivism, in which logical positivism in considered, never cited Kuhn as a logical positivism (I've consulted the on line version of Britannica).
Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, ten volumes, about 6200 pages, in the entry on Logical Positivism never cited Kuhn.
Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia (in Italian), six volumes, in the entry dedicated to "il neo-empirismo" (an Italian expression for logical positivism), pp. 382-423, never cited Kuhn.
Finally, Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics, ed. by Sahotra Sarkar, 1996, said that "the death [of logical positivism] was inflicted by Popper, […] or Kuhn". [[Murzim 12:13, 15 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Undeniable Fact: Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions (and philosophico-sociological paragidm of scientific inquiry) was first published the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science.

• A: Was the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science the major project embodying the aims and ideals of logical positivism? Yes/No.
• B: Was Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions considered an expression of the aims and ideals of the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science publication? Yes/No
• If A & B then ...

Sholto Maud 10:42, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I've cited the interpretation of Kuhn's philosophy presented in respectable encyclopedia and history of philosophy, written by respectable scholars. I've cited Hempel on Kuhn. Can you cite respectable sources that consider Kuhn a logical positivist? [[Murzim 17:50, 16 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I agree that Sholto Maud is moving into the realm of original research here. It is widely accepted that Kuhn is not a logical positivist; our job as encyclopedia writers is to report that, not to go back and dig up his original works and concoct our own interpretation. --Delirium 11:27, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

We seem to have problems.

• a) I have not disputed the accuracy of any of the citations given above.
• b) I do not consider my questions original research, I consider that I am stating historically accurate fact.
• c) neither user Delirium nor user Murzim have addressed questions A or B in their answers
• d) Murzim says that there are "two different schools about the methodology of science" but does not state what they are.
• e) Murzim does not state "Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism", which should be mentioned in the article.
• f) The fact that "in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science", does not clarify "the two different schools about the methodology of science".
• g) In the articles about Logical Positivism in Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopedia Britannica", and Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. IX, Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the 20th Century, 1996, 461 pages. pp. 193-213, Murzim says that Kuhn is never cited. Given 1. Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism, 2. that in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science, 3. that the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolution is in the International Encyclopedia, it is concluded that these books are missing some important information, which should also be mentioned in this article.
• h) Finally, Murzim says, " Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics, ed. by Sahotra Sarkar, 1996, said that "the death [of logical positivism] was inflicted by Popper, […] or Kuhn". " We must be careful with hasty pronouncements like this, which are sure to sell books. An important part of the project of logical positivism was the unification of science, and the internatinoal encyclopedia was published with this aim in mind, thus its title. A survery of contemporary scientific literature reveals that the project of the unification of science is still alive. So then this part of logical positivism/logical empiricism/emprical rationalism/rational physiology/field physiology - call it what you will - is not dead.

I agree with Delirium is right on one front, that if it is widely accepted that Kuhn is not a logical positivist, then our job as encyclopedia writers is to report such.

I'd like to ask, do any of the above citations reference the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and talk about why Kuhn chose to publish in that encyclopedia?

If it is pleases the court, I propose that we accept premise A (above) is true, and then propose a meeting point, such that we change the article to read, "many important philosophers such as, Woodger, Bohr, Dewey, Russell, Kuhn etc., contributed to the logical empricist project of the international encyclopedia of unified science." Sholto Maud 12:36, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

There is another problem with the list of logical positivists: Herbert Feigl (1902-88), Philipp Frank (1884-1966), Kurt Grelling (1886-1942), Hans Hahn (1879-1934), Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97), Victor Kraft (1880-1975), and Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) are not included (the lack of Hempel and Reichenbach is serious, because they were two of the most important members of logical positivism). On the contrary, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Niels Bohr usually (i.e. in respectable histories of philosophy) are not regarded as logical positivists. Dewey is an American pragmatist, Russell is … well, he’s Russell, he does not belong to a specific philosophical school, and Bohr can only be regarded as a sympathizer of logical positivism, not a member. However, I prefer now not to change anything in the list, because I hope we can find an agreement on this point. What do you think? [[Murzim 12:47, 17 March 2006 (UTC)]]

• Yes the lack of the mentioned authors should be addressed. To be comprehensive, the article should breifely document their association with log. pos., their take on log. pos. and what contribution they are generally known for. When one reads the works of many of the above mentioned philosophers, it often becomes apparent that classifications like 'pragmatist', 'analytic philosopher', 'rationalist', 'empiricist', are simplifications - often for the purposes of undergraduate university courses and philosophy dictionaries - and that these philosophers don't actually fit into neat, exclusive sets, as instanced by the Russell comment above. Sholto Maud 22:14, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps we can include in the article the list of all entries in the International Encyclopedia (see Vienna Circle). By the way, unified science was originally a project of Vienna Circle. As stated in the Preface of International Encyclopedia "The Encyclopedia was in origin the idea of Otto Neurath. It was meant as a manifestation of the unity of science movement". Here unity of science movement is not simply logical positivism, but it means a more general movement, which included philosophers and scientists from different schools. [[Murzim 13:10, 17 March 2006 (UTC)]]

• This is a positive suggestion. It is correct to say that "unity of science movement is not simply logical positivism", and that it is "a more general movement, which included philosophers and scientists from different schools." This kind of generalist attitude is an instance of the other kind of defintion of the word "synthesis" (mentioned above), which works to break down the traditional classification of philosphers into exclusive schools in which the language of one person's philosophic-psychology has no relation or communicative potential with the language of another person's philosophic-psychology. I support Murzim's proposal to include in the article the list of all entries in the International Encyclopedia, with the ammendment that the author's name of each Internatiaonal Encyclopedia for Un. Sci. article is included. If the Wiki article simply leaves this list and does not interpret it (so no OR or bias claim), it will leave the reader to make up their own mind about whether Kuhn, Russell, Dewey etc. should considered log. pos. and will be historically accurate. Sholto Maud 22:14, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Sholto Maud asked why Kuhn chosed to publish in the International Encyclopedia. I've found some information in Oliveira, J. C. P. (2002) 'Carnap, Kuhn and Revisionism: On the Publication of "Structure" in "Encyclopedia"'. Oliveira's thesis is that the editors of the International Encyclopedia have planned to publish an article about history of philosophy. As reported by Reisch in 'Planning Science: Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science'. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, vol.27, p.2, N 93, p. 153 – 176, Neurath had asked Italian mathematiciam and philosopher Enriques to write a book on the history of science. The project was frustrated by the war and the dead of Enriques in 1946. Later the work was offered to Bernard Cohen who apparently suggested Thomas Kuhn. Really, in the index of the International Encyclopedia, the books of Kuhn is under the section 3. History of Science, with Kuhn's The Copernican Revolution. However, Carnap found Kuhn's work very good (this is a documented fact). Problems arise with the interpretation of this fact. Kuhn belived that Carnap was simply polite; others think that Carnap found Kuhn's work close to logical positivist's philosophy; others think that Carnap did not recognized the defference between Kuhn and logical positivism, and considered Kuhn's work as a book about hystory of philosophy (at that time Kuhn was known for his history of Copernical revolution). Of course, the entire question is still open. [[Murzim 23:17, 23 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Fascinating. It is often stated that Kuhn opposed logical positivism, but rarely do there seem to be any citations to Kuhn's work to back up this claim. Again, this research might benefit the article with correct citations as per usual. Sholto Maud 02:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

Bohr & Kuhn

I think that some people here have been displaying a misunderstanding of how the International Encyclopedia worked. Its editors, especially Neurath and Carnap, did not require that all of its contributors subscribe to their program for Unified Science in its entirety. In fact a number of contributors to the Encyclopedia did not consider themselves to be logical positivists, nor were they considered as such by members of the Vienna Circle. This is true for such contributors as John Dewey, Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell, and Niels Bohr. One could make a case that these people did subscribe to philosophies that the logical positivists regarded as allied with their own (i.e. American pragmatism, analytic empiricism etc.) but that is different from calling these people logical positivists in their own right. I think the same applies to Kuhn. To the best of my knowledge, he never called himself a logical positivist, and I know of no commentator on his work who would regard him as having been a positivist. Nevertheless, that doesn't mean that someone like Rudolf Carnap might not have seen his work on the history of science as lending support in some way to the positivists' own project. And in fact that does seem to have been Carnap's take on Kuhn, who strongly supported the publication of The Structure of Scientifc Revolutions as a volume in the International Encyclopedia. --JimFarm 14:32, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

I think I might be included as one of those people JimFarm mentioned... It seems to me that we need to ask whether all the contributors to the encyclopedia of unified science endorsed the encyclopedia's mission to unify science. I belive that it is safe to assume that A) since the encyclopedia was one of the main outputs of the logical positivism circle, that the encyclopedia's mission was also one of the aims of logical positivism. But don't you think it seems odd that a writer would contribute to an encyclopedia of "unified science" and at the same time not endorse the mission of unifying science!? If one did not endorse the mission, why not publish elsewhere? With respects to Bohr, for what its worth...

"When the Unity of Science movement organized, Neils Bohr was listed as the first member of the Aadvisory Commitee."

"Bohr thought that his explanation of the unity proper to physics was one of his most basic, and certainly his most misunderstood, contributions to science." (p. 224)

• Edward MacKinnon (1980) Niels Bohr on the Unity of Science, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1980, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers, pp. 224-244. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281980%291980%3C224%3ANBOTUO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Again given A) then it seems safe to assume that Neils Bohr was an important figure in the logical positivist movement. Sholto Maud 09:52, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

List of Logical Positivists

I'm now modifying the list of logical positivists. I've listed the members of Vienna Circle. I'll list the members of Berlin Circle, and then non-German speaking philosophers (Ayer, Polish philosophers, Scandinavian philosophers: Ake Petzäll, Eino Kaila, and von Wright, Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen), and finally the contributors of International Encyclopedia. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 19:50, 18 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I've added Ayer, Polish philosophers, Scandinavian philosophers, Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen. The next step is the listing of contributors of Unified Science and International Encyclopedia, with the title of their books or articles. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 20:50, 19 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I've added Wittgenstein and the complete list of contributors to the three collections published by logical postivism, with the title of their articles or books. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 21:51, 19 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Murzim has done alot of work. :) If only there were some way of having this formally recognised in formal academic circles. Sholto Maud 00:50, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

A few years before his death Gödel wrote: 'I was a conceptual and mathematical realist since about 1925. I never held the view that mathematics is syntax of language'. His philososphical stance is more commonly described as platonist and of course Gödel's platonism has been known and commented upon. Including him in a list of 'philososphers associated with logical positivism' needs some qualification. At most he is historically or cirumstancially associated with logical positivism.al 17:36, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

I think that sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3 should not be in this article. It seems to me that, in an article about logical positivism, the focus should be on the content and history of the core beliefs and disputes of the logical positivists. The exhaustive lists of (sometimes, I think, rather obscure) publications, and also the biographical details about individual positivists, are worth having on Wikipedia, but belong in separate articles. Perhaps there should be a separate page or category or something that lists the publications of the logical positivists? It would be enough here, I think, to link to that page (and also, as in the "People" section, to the individual pages for the various positivists). If nobody objects, I will make those changes in a few days. (Iolasov 22:12, 24 July 2007 (UTC))

Unified science

Should we move the entire list of publications of the Encyclopeadi of Unified science to it's own separate page, or merge it with the pages on unified science, and make reference to the publication on the logical positivism page so as to cut the overall size down a bit? Sholto Maud 08:07, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Analystic/synthetic

Surely the analystic/synthetic distinction is standardly associated with Kant? In the introduction it makes it sound like the logical positivists were the first to think of it, and Hume is referenced in stead of Kant. Any thoughts? Cadr 13:09, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Misplaced Criticisms section

As it stands now, the "Criticisms" section is far below the lists of people associated with Logical Positivism. My concern is that when reading through the article sequentially a reader will get the impression that when these lists start the substantive part of the article is over and stop reading unless he/she is looking for such a list or a bibliography... and thus those readers will never even get to the Criticism section.

So I propose moving the Criticisms section just below the end of the "Unified Science" paragraph. Or, if the lists of people could be seperated from the bodies of the "Einheitswissenschaft", "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science", and "Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception" sub-sections then the Criticisms section would fit after those, but before the lists of people, as well. Thoughts? -- noosphere 22:47, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps "Criticism" can be put after "The assertions and origins of logical positivism". I agree that "Criticism" is now too below. [[Murzim 09:30, 16 May 2006 (UTC)]]

Logical positivism, metaphysics, religion and ethics

Sholto Maud asked clarifications about the statement that “Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that statements about metaphysics, religion and ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”. He asked some references. Here there are some references:

Rudolf Carnap, Pseudoproblems in philosophy (1928)
Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1932)
Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935), in particular the chapter “The Rejection of Metaphysics”
Alfred Julius Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (1936), in particular the chapter “A Critique of Ethics and Theology”
Moritz Schlick, What is the Aim of Ethics? (1930)
Charles Leslie Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms (1937)

Perhaps the assertion above can be more clearly formulated in these terms:

“Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that the assertions of metaphysics, religion and prescriptive ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”

[[Murzim 20:00, 16 June 2006 (UTC)]]

Thankyou again Murzim for your work. I would like to clarify the revised formulation if possible: a) does logical positivism asserts that expressions of feelings or desires are not "sound"; b) what is "soundness in this sense?; c) what is an example of "cognitive meaning" (there is no entry on this)?; and d) what is the philosophical consequence if something has no cognitive meaning: i.e. why were the logical positivists concerned to emphasise that feelings had no cognitive meaning? (Is this important for the unity of science?) Sholto Maud 10:11, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Unified Science

I'm thinking that the content of the texts referred to here might go better in separate articles each dedicated specifically to the publication. Any objections if I move the contents to separate articles? Sholto Maud 11:44, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

Quine

As far as I know the statement about Quine in the last paragraph is dubious, it need's to be explained and there should be a citiation. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.105.111.91 (talk)

Yes, and I've tagged it as such. Quine had criticisms of logical positivism of course, but it's quite inaccurate to say that one of his criticisms was that logical positivism tried to "provide truth conditions for science independent of its historical paradigm". I assume that this is a reference to Quine's confirmation holism, but unlike Kuhn, Quine didn't have a particular interest in the sociology of science or "historical paradigms", so it would be misleading at best to summarize his view on confirmation holism as a claim that science is (or ought to be) situated within historical paradigms. But in any case, this misses the bigger point of his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. --Delirium 09:09, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

I think that the reference is to Quine's criticism of analytic-synthetic and of reductionism in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and thus I've consequently updated the text. Murzim 19:59, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

Bolded names?

Why are many of the linked names near the middle of the article bolded as well? It is distracting. If it serves no purpose, either remove it, or give me the OK and I'll remove it. Thanks. --Steevven1 ^{(Talk) (Contribs) (Gallery)} 16:01, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

De Finetti

I think that the presence of De Finetti in the section dedicated to the influences of logical positivism on Italian philosophy is probably a misunderstanding. I cite from M.C. Galavotti, Kinds of Probabilism. "Reichenbach, Carnap and de Finetti represent divergent conceptions of probability, in many ways irreconcilable, despite the fact that all of these authors share an empiricist approach rooted in the work of authors like E. Mach and H. Poincaré . In addition to this common background, Reichenbach and Carnap share the logical empiricist matrix, while de Finetti embraces the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and W. James, though filtered through the work of the Italian thinkers M. Calderoni, G. Vailati and A. Aliotta. The main consequence of this philosophical choice is the different attitude taken towards rationality. Albeit based on different notions of probability, the theories of both Carnap and Reichenbach are sustained by a strong notion of rationality, while de Finetti perspective is deeply anti-rationalist. In addition, de Finetti subjectivism is inspired by what today we would call an anti-realist philosophy, whereas Reichenbach and Carnap seem rather oriented towards some form of realism, at least taken as methodological realism." I'll remove the reference to De Finetti, if there are not oppositions. Murzim 18:48, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

category: logical positivsm

I thought there used to be such a category, was it deleted? Is there any objection for creating one? Nadavvv 18:13, 2 July 2007 (UTC)

Editing Links

Does anyone mind if I delete the link to Cosma Rohilla Shalizi's essay 'Logical Positivism'? It is, IMHO, neither informative nor well-informed. I was particularly struck by his comment that there are no living verificationists. -- (Iolasov 01:39, 23 July 2007 (UTC))

Criticism

This version for the criticism section is easier to understand and, more importantly, it is more interesting to read than the current version. What do you think? A.Z. 01:18, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

npov concerning the death of logical positivism?

Recently the following sentence from the introduction was edited:

In the early 1930s, the Vienna Circle dispersed, mainly because of political upheaval and the untimely deaths of Hahn and Schlick, but logical positivism lived on.

The words "but logical positivism lived on" were removed. The reason given was NPOV.

I don't see any problems with NPOV. The disputed sentence neutrally reported a plain fact. Logical Positivism did in fact live on well past the 1930s. It exerted a major influence on American philosophy after WWII. Also, Carnap continued to advocate it until his death in the 1970's, and one of the most popular works of logical positivism, Language, Truth, and Logic, was published in the 1950s.Twerges (talk) 05:52, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

I was discussing this same problem with Jok2000 himself. He removed it because according to him, the metaphor, "lived" is misleading and it goes contrary to what the book cited suggests. But I think he does agree that logical positivism prolonged its influence well into 1960s. Stampit (talk) 19:18, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

lived is the wrong metaphor (or meaning, if you will), especially in the context of the sentence ending with "lived on". There is no "until" portion, so you know people like me who think logical positivism is cute, don't really mean to promote it, as it's flaws (or researched counter-opinions) did not allow it to "live on". Jok2000 (talk) 19:44, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Oh, I see. When I wrote the text, I only meant to disambiguate--the text claimed that "the movement" dispersed in the 1930s and I thought most readers would assume that "the movement" was referring to logical positivism. I only wanted to make clear that it was the vienna circle, not logical positivism, that dispersed at that time. It's certainly not my POV that logical positivism remains a viable doctrine.

We could add an "until" phrase to the text, like "logical positivism lived on until the 1960s".Twerges (talk) 04:01, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

I've changed the sentece: "In the early 1930s, the Vienna Circle dispersed, mainly because of political upheaval and the untimely deaths of Hahn and Schlick. The most prominent proponents of logical positivism emigrated to United Kingdom and United States, where they considerably influenced American philosophy. Until the 1950s, logical positivism was the leading school in the philosophy of science." It correctly describes that (1) logical positivists mainly emigrated to US (Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel); (2) they influenced American philosophy and (3) logical positivism was well alive at least until 1950s. Murzim (talk) 12:32, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, Murzim. That edit summarizes the information well.Twerges (talk) 19:59, 25 May 2008 (UTC)

---

Logical positivism as a method, paradigm, analytic approach, or school of thought (whatever you might prefer to call it), has not "died". It "lives" on but most new work takes the form of more logical, mathematical discussion within the literature of many fields. It is simply a matter that most of what can be said in broad terms the cover the sciences generally has been brought into particular specialties. When it appears in that form the term "logical positivism" might not be used, but the key ideas are essentially the same. I intend to modify this section to show that. Bracton (talk) 18:02, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

Sentence from "Karl Popper's Objections"

Is this claim true?

Although Popper's philosophy of science enjoyed great popularity for some years, if his criterion is construed as an answer to the question the positivists were asking, it turns out to fail in exactly parallel ways.

Not only is the claim unsourced, but it seems untrue.

I don't see how Popper's falsifiability criterion is liable to the same objections as positivism. Positivism failed because it defined all statements outside of empirical observation and tautology as meaningless, which would include their statements. But Popper does not claim that unscientific statements are meaningless, so he could easily claim that his statements are unscientific but true nevertheless, or at least useful. He could simply claim that he is discussing the philosophy of science which is not scientific itself but which is nevertheless true and important.

If the claim from the article is true, then it's not supported sufficiently.Twerges (talk) 23:48, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

A digression in scope that needs to be fixed.

Although the logical positivists held a wide range of beliefs on many matters, they were all interested in science and skeptical of theology and metaphysics. Early on, most logical positivists believed that all knowledge is based on logical inference from simple "protocol sentences" grounded in observable facts. Many logical positivists supported forms of materialism, metaphysical naturalism, and empiricism.

Is this article about logical positivism or about the logical positivists? There is a distinction to be made between the characteristics of a belief, and the characteristics of the people who hold a belief. The quoted paragraph is not written to say anything about logical positivism per se, but rather only about so-called logical positivists. This is fully outside the scope of the article, since it is supposed to be about a philosophical idea, and not a clique of people with their shibboleths. As a result of this shift in scope, the article is also riddled with weasel words like "most logical positivists" and "many logical positivists". Obviously it is irrelevant to the article what the ideologies of some (in this case fully imaginary) faction of the past did or did not profess to believe. Logical positivism as a thing-to-know is completely distinct from any "logical positivism movement" that might or might not have existed in the Marxist sense. --75.49.223.247 (talk) 03:31, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

I see your point, but it seems like you may be drawing too much of a distinction. Logical positivism was a school which was strongly associated with a group of people.

"There is a distinction to be made between the characteristics of a belief, and the characteristics of the people who hold a belief."

I see your point.

But the paragraph only lists their beliefs about logical positivism. It doesn't mention their beliefs about, say, politics or music. Obviously, the personalities of the positivists are irrelevant to the issue. But their beliefs about positivism are relevant to an article about it, since they defined it. Any further mention of those people would be too far afield, IMO.

"riddled with weasel words like 'most logical positivists' and 'many logical positivists'"

I don't think those are weasel words, because they're not intended to make a claim in an underhanded way. I think the author was trying to convey that logical positivism was not precisely defined in a way that all its adherents would accept.

"Obviously it is irrelevant to the article what the ideologies of some (in this case fully imaginary) faction""'

Is it an imaginary faction? How so? I'm almost certain that there were people who adhered to those beliefs; at least AJ Ayer and Rudolph Carnap would have accepted them.

...In short, I think it's relevant to the list the beliefs of positivists as the relate to positivism. Any other beliefs of theirs would not be relevant.

I do think, however, that some of those sections could be re-phrased. Perhaps there could be less emphasis on the positivists and more on the doctrine.Twerges (talk) 05:06, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Replaceable statement

The section Criticism and influences says:

The verifiability criterion of meaning did not seem verifiable; but neither was it simply a logical tautology, since it had implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements. This presented severe problems for the logical consistency of the theory.^{[citation needed]} [My emphasis of dubious statement]

As much as I know and have read by myself, there is no such logical inconsistency. The trouble is not illogics, it is a double standard, rejecting metaphysics while defining itself metaphysically. This might be perceived as a logical inconsistency, so I believe the statement is some kind of confusion of "inconsequency" with "inconsistency". I believe the sentence is badly formulated, instead of being an ad-hoc-statement out of the blue. Any ideas for a replacement? Maybe Popper or other contemporary critics had some on this theme? ... said: Rursus (bork²) 09:10, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

The Forlorn German Philosophy

I removed recent edits by Shiki2, including a section entitled "The Forlorn German Philosophy" and a reference in the "Declining Use" section to Logical Positivism being "forlorned by contemporary German philosophers." These additions were baffling, non-encyclopedic in tone, and apparently reflected a confused sense of the meaning and usage of the English word "forlorn." Thefellswooper (talk) 20:17, 30 July 2009 (UTC)