Yablo's paradox: Difference between revisions
Content deleted Content added
No edit summary |
→The paradox: Changing to strict inequalities. Without them, the sentences are obviously self-referential |
||
| Line 6: | Line 6: | ||
The paradox arises from considering the following infinite set of sentences: |
The paradox arises from considering the following infinite set of sentences: |
||
* (S1): for all k > |
* (S1): for all k > 1, Sk is false |
||
* (S2): for all k > |
* (S2): for all k > 2, Sk is false |
||
* (S3): for all k > |
* (S3): for all k > 3, Sk is false |
||
* ... |
* ... |
||
* ... |
* ... |
||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
Moreover, none of the sentences refers to itself, but only to the subsequent sentences; and this leads Yablo to claim that his liar-like paradox does not rely on self-reference. |
Moreover, none of the sentences refers to itself, but only to the subsequent sentences; and this leads Yablo to claim that his liar-like paradox does not rely on self-reference. |
||
==External links== |
==External links== |
||
Revision as of 16:48, 23 January 2010
Yablo's paradox is a liar-like paradox without any apparent self-reference published by Stephen Yablo in 1993.
The paradox
The paradox arises from considering the following infinite set of sentences:
- (S1): for all k > 1, Sk is false
- (S2): for all k > 2, Sk is false
- (S3): for all k > 3, Sk is false
- ...
- ...
The set is paradoxical, because it is unsatisfiable (contradictory), but this unsatisfiability defies immediate intuition.
Moreover, none of the sentences refers to itself, but only to the subsequent sentences; and this leads Yablo to claim that his liar-like paradox does not rely on self-reference.
External links
- "Paradox Without Self-Reference" - Analysis, vol. 53 (1993), pp. 251–52