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'''Yablo's paradox''' is of type similar to the [[liar paradox]] published by [[Stephen Yablo]] in 1993. It distinguished of other paradoxes of this type in that it apparently does not have neither [[self-reference]]s (unlire the liar paradox itself), nor [[circular reference]]s (unlike, e.g., the [[card paradox]]). <ref>[http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/pwsr.pdf "Paradox Without Self-Reference"] - ''Analysis'', vol. 53 (1993), pp. 251–52</ref>
'''Yablo's paradox''' is of type similar to the [[liar paradox]] published by [[Stephen Yablo]] in 1993. It distinguished of other paradoxes of this type in that it apparently does not have neither [[self-reference]]s (unlike the liar paradox itself), nor [[circular reference]]s (unlike, e.g., the [[card paradox]]). <ref>[http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/pwsr.pdf "Paradox Without Self-Reference"] - ''Analysis'', vol. 53 (1993), pp. 251–52</ref>


The paradox arises from considering the following [[infinite set]] of sentences:
The paradox arises from considering the following [[infinite set]] of sentences:

Revision as of 07:29, 4 May 2010

Yablo's paradox is of type similar to the liar paradox published by Stephen Yablo in 1993. It distinguished of other paradoxes of this type in that it apparently does not have neither self-references (unlike the liar paradox itself), nor circular references (unlike, e.g., the card paradox). [1]

The paradox arises from considering the following infinite set of sentences:

  • (S1): for all k > 1, Sk is false
  • (S2): for all k > 2, Sk is false
  • (S3): for all k > 3, Sk is false
  • ...
  • ...

The set is paradoxical, because it is unsatisfiable (contradictory), but this unsatisfiability defies immediate intuition.

Moreover, none of the sentences refers to itself, but only to the subsequent sentences; this leads Yablo to claim that his paradox does not rely on self-reference.

References

  1. ^ "Paradox Without Self-Reference" - Analysis, vol. 53 (1993), pp. 251–52