Irk Valley Junction rail crash: Difference between revisions
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At [[Collyhurst]] just over a mile from [[Manchester Victoria station]] the electrified line to [[Bury]] passes through Irk Valley Junction, so called because it lies on a viaduct above the [[River Irk]]. At 07:40 |
At [[Collyhurst]] just over a mile from [[Manchester Victoria station]] the electrified line to [[Bury]] passes through Irk Valley Junction, so called because it lies on a viaduct above the [[River Irk]]. At 07:40 on the morning of 15 August 1953, the 07:20 [[LYR electric units|electric train]] from Bury collided with the 07:36 steam passenger train to [[Bacup]] hauled by [[LMS Class 4P 2-6-4T (1945)|Class 4P 2-6-4 tank engine]]. The leading electric coach struck and overturned the steam engine and smashed through the parapet wall. The front of the carriage fell {{convert|40|ft}} onto the bank of the river; the rear fell {{convert|70|ft}} into the shallow river itself. Nine passengers and the driver of the electric train were killed. The crash occurred on a Saturday; had it been a week day the casualties would likely have been far higher. |
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The investigation revealed that the causes of the accident were two-fold. Firstly the electric train passed the [[Railway semaphore signal#Stop signal|home signal]] at danger. Analysing the previous 110 runnings of the 07:20 train showed that the signal in question had not once been at danger; moreover the [[Railway semaphore signal#Distant signal|distant signal]] was at danger on 101 occasions. The driver appeared to have therefore missed the home signal as it was always clear in the past, and ignored the distant signal as it was normally at danger anyway and was normally cleared by the time he reached it. |
The investigation revealed that the causes of the accident were two-fold. Firstly the electric train passed the [[Railway semaphore signal#Stop signal|home signal]] at danger. Analysing the previous 110 runnings of the 07:20 train showed that the signal in question had not once been at danger; moreover the [[Railway semaphore signal#Distant signal|distant signal]] was at danger on 101 occasions. The driver appeared to have therefore missed the home signal as it was always clear in the past, and ignored the distant signal as it was normally at danger anyway and was normally cleared by the time he reached it. |
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The signalman was also at fault for not checking that the electric train had stopped before allowing the steam train through. The [[Absolute Block]] system was in place but was not being operated in accordance with the regulations. An analysis of the records revealed that the signal boxes in this area had frequently operated outside the guidelines |
The signalman was also at fault for not checking that the electric train had stopped before allowing the steam train through. The [[Absolute Block]] system was in place but was not being operated in accordance with the regulations. An analysis of the records revealed that the signal boxes in this area had frequently operated outside the guidelines, although up until the fateful morning without serious consequence. |
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==Sources== |
==Sources== |
Revision as of 14:19, 20 May 2010
Irk Valley Junction rail crash | |
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Details | |
Date | 15 August 1953 07:40 |
Location | Irk Valley Junction, Collyhurst near Manchester Victoria station |
Coordinates | 53°29′54″N 2°13′34″W / 53.49833°N 2.22611°W |
Line | Manchester to Bury line |
Cause | Signal passed at danger |
Statistics | |
Trains | 2 |
Deaths | 10 |
Injured | 58 (22 seriously) |
At Collyhurst just over a mile from Manchester Victoria station the electrified line to Bury passes through Irk Valley Junction, so called because it lies on a viaduct above the River Irk. At 07:40 on the morning of 15 August 1953, the 07:20 electric train from Bury collided with the 07:36 steam passenger train to Bacup hauled by Class 4P 2-6-4 tank engine. The leading electric coach struck and overturned the steam engine and smashed through the parapet wall. The front of the carriage fell 40 feet (12 m) onto the bank of the river; the rear fell 70 feet (21 m) into the shallow river itself. Nine passengers and the driver of the electric train were killed. The crash occurred on a Saturday; had it been a week day the casualties would likely have been far higher.
The investigation revealed that the causes of the accident were two-fold. Firstly the electric train passed the home signal at danger. Analysing the previous 110 runnings of the 07:20 train showed that the signal in question had not once been at danger; moreover the distant signal was at danger on 101 occasions. The driver appeared to have therefore missed the home signal as it was always clear in the past, and ignored the distant signal as it was normally at danger anyway and was normally cleared by the time he reached it.
The signalman was also at fault for not checking that the electric train had stopped before allowing the steam train through. The Absolute Block system was in place but was not being operated in accordance with the regulations. An analysis of the records revealed that the signal boxes in this area had frequently operated outside the guidelines, although up until the fateful morning without serious consequence.