Rescue of the Danish Jews

The rescue of the Danish Jews occurred during Denmark's occupation by Nazi Germany during World War II. When German authorities in Denmark ordered the Jews' deportation to Germany in October 1943, many Danes and Swedes took part in a collective effort to evacuate the roughly 8,000 Jews of Denmark by sea to nearby Sweden. The rescue allowed the vast majority of Denmark's Jewish population to avoid capture by the Nazis and is considered to be one of the largest actions of collective resistance to repression in the countries occupied by Nazi Germany. As a result of the rescue, most of Denmark's Jewish population survived the Holocaust.

The "model protectorate"

Denmark, along with Norway, was invaded by German armed forces on April 9, 1940. Realizing that armed resistance would be futile and faced with the threat of aerial bombing of Copenhagen, the Danish government surrendered after a few skirmishes on the morning of the invasion.

At the time of invasion, the German government stated that its armed occupation of Denmark was an "act of protection" and that Germany did not intend to disturb the political independence of Denmark.^[1] Because the Danish government promised "loyal cooperation" with the Germans, the occupation of Denmark was thus relatively mild at first. German propaganda even referred to Denmark as the "model protectorate".^[2] King Christian X retained his throne, and Denmark's Parliament, government, and the courts continued to function. Even radio and the press censorship was administered by the Danish government rather than by the occupying German civil and military authorities.

During the early years of the occupation, Danish officials repeatedly insisted to the German occupation authorities that there was no "Jewish problem" in Denmark. The Germans recognized that discussion of the Jewish question in Denmark was a possibly explosive issue which had the potential to destroy the "model" relationship between Denmark and Germany and, in turn, cause political and economic consequences for Germany. As a result, when officials in Berlin recommended instituting anti-Jewish measures in Denmark, even ideologically committed Nazis such as Reich Commissioner Werner Best followed a strategy of avoiding and deferring discussion of Denmark's Jews.

In late 1941, upon the visit of Danish Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius to Berlin, German authorities there (including Hermann Göring) insisted that Denmark could not avoid its "Jewish problem". A Danish anti-Semitic newspaper used these statements as an opportunity for a slanderous attack on Denmark's Jews; shortly thereafter, arsonists attempted to start a fire at Copenhagen's synagogue. The Danish courts handed down stiff fines and jail time to the editors and would-be arsonist, and the Danish government took further administrative action. The Danish government's punishment of anti-Semitic crimes during occupation by Germany were interpreted by the German authorities in Denmark as signaling the Danish view toward any future measures taken against Denmark's Jews by the occupiers.

In mid-1943, Danes saw the German defeats in the Battle of Stalingrad and North Africa as an indication that having to live under German rule was no longer the certainty it had been in 1940. At the same time, Danish resistance movement was becoming more vocal in their underground press and with their increased sabotage activities. During the summer, several nationwide strikes led to armed confrontations between Danes and German troops. In the wake of increased resistance activities and riots, the German occupation authorities presented the Danish government with an ultimatum prescribing a ban on strikes, a curfew, and punishing sabotage with the death penalty. Deeming these terms as unacceptable and as a violation of Danish sovereignty, a state of emergency was declared and the Danish government resigned on August 28. The result was direct administration of Denmark by German authority; the "model protectorate" had come to an end — and with it, the protection the Danish government had provided for the country's Jews.

The deportation order and rescue

Without the recalcitrant Danish government to impede them, Denmark's German occupiers began planning the deportation of the 8,000 or so Jews in Denmark to Nazi concentration camps. On 28 September, 1943, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, a German diplomat, leaked word of the plans for the operation against Denmark's Jews to Hans Hedtoft, chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party, who in turn contacted the Danish Resistance Movement and the Jewish community. At the Rosh Hashanah services on 29 September, Danish Jews were warned of the German action and advised to go into hiding.

The improvisational nature of the early phases of the rescue was particularly notable. When Danish civil servants at several levels in different ministries learnt of the German plan to round up all Danish Jews, they independently pursued various measures to find the Jews and hide them. Some simply phoned friends and asked them to go through telephone books and warn those with Jewish-sounding names to go into hiding. Most Jews hid for several days or weeks before being smuggled to Sweden, which offered asylum to Danish Jews who reached Sweden.

The Jews were smuggled out of Denmark by transporting them by sea over the Øresund from Zealand to Sweden, a passage of approximately 10 miles. Some were transported in large fishing boats of up to 20 tons, but others were carried to freedom in rowboats or kayaks. Some refugees were smuggled inside freight cars on the regular ferries between Denmark and Sweden, this route being suited for the very young or old who were too weak to endure a rough sea passage. The underground had broken into empty freight cars sealed by the Germans after inspection, helped refugees onto the cars, and then resealed the cars with German seals to forestall further inspection.

Some of the fisherman assisting in the rescue charged money to transport Jews to Sweden, while others took payments only from those who could afford passage. Some profiteers took advantage of the confusion and fear during the early days of the escape, but as time passed, the Danish underground movement ousted them and took an active role in organizing the rescue and providing financing, mostly from wealthy Danes who donated large sums of money for the rescue.

During the first days of the rescue action, Jews swarmed into the many fishing harbors on the Danish coast for rescue, but as the Gestapo became suspicious of activity around harbors, subsequent rescues had to take place from isolated points along the coast. While waiting their turn, the Jews took refuge in the woods and in cottages away from the coast, out of sight of the Gestapo.

Some of the refugees never made it to Sweden; some were captured by the Gestapo en route to their point of embarcation, some were lost at sea when vessels of poor seaworthiness capsized, and some were intercepted at sea by German patrol boats. However, the Danish harbor police and civil police generally cooperated with the rescue operations. During the early part of the rescue operation, the Gestapo was undermanned. The German army and navy were called in to reinforce the Gestapo in its effort to prevent the transports, but by and large proved to be uninterested in the operation.

Only around 450 Danish Jews (some 7% of Denmark's Jewish population) were captured by the Germans, and most were sent to the Theresienstadt concentration camp in occupied Czechoslovakia. After these Jews' deportation, the Danish government persuaded the Germans to accept packages of food and medicine for the prisoners; furthermore, Denmark convinced the Germans not to deport the Danish Jews to the extermination camps. This was achieved by Danish political pressure, using the Danish Red Cross to frequently monitor the condition of the Danish Jews at Theresienstadt. Some 51 Danish Jews — mostly elderly — died of disease at Theresienstadt, but in April 1945, as the war drew to a close, the 400 or so surviving Danish Jews were turned over by the Germans to a representative of the Danish Red Cross.

Explanations

Different explanations have been advanced to explain the success of efforts to protect the Danish Jewish population in light of less success at similar operations elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe.

• Logistically, the operation was relatively easy. Denmark's Jewish population was small, both in relative and absolute terms, and most of Denmark's Jews lived in or near Copenhagen, only a short sea voyage from neutral Sweden. Although hazardous, the boat ride was relatively short and its covert nature was easier to conceal than a comparable land journey.

• Since the mid-nineteenth century, a particular brand of romantic nationalism had evolved in Denmark. The traits of this nationalism included emphasis on the importance of "smallness", close-knit communities, and traditions — this nationalism being largely a response to Denmark's failure to assert itself as a great power and its losses in the Gunboat War and the Second War of Schleswig. Some historians, such as Andrew Buckser, believe that the Danish form of non-aggressive nationalism, influenced by Danish philosopher Nicolai Grundtvig, encouraged the Danes to identify with the plight of the Jews, even though small-scale anti-Semitism had been present in Denmark long before the German invasion.

• Denmark's Jewish population had long been almost completely integrated into Danish society, and some members of the small Jewish community had risen to prominence, including one Nobel prize laureate. Consequently, most Danes perceived the Nazis' action against Denmark's Jews as an affront to all Danes, and rallied to their countrymen's protection.

• The deportation of Jews in Demark came one year after the deportations of Jews in Norway. That created an outrage in all of Scandinavia, alerted the Danish Jews and pushed the Swedish government to declare that it would receive all Jews that managed to escape the Nazis[3].

Notes

1. ^ Goldberger, Leo (ed.) (1987). The Rescue of the Danish Jews: Moral Courage Under Stress. New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-3010-8. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)
2. ^ Shirer, William L. (1956). The Challenge of Scandinavia. London: Robert Hale.
3. "[4]". {{cite web}}: External link in |title= (help); Missing or empty |url= (help)

References

• Buckser, Andrew. "Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust: Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of the Danish Jews." Shofar 19(2), 2001.
• Goldberger, Leo (ed.) (1987). The Rescue of the Danish Jews: Moral Courage Under Stress. New York University Press. ISBN 0-8147-3010-8. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help)
• Lampe, D. (1957). The Danish Resistance. New York:Ballantine Books.
• Pundik, Herbert (1998). In Denmark It Could Not Happen: The Flight of The Jews to Sweden in 1943. Hewlett, N.Y.: Gefen.
• Stræde, Therkel (1993). October 1943: the rescue of the Danish Jews from annihilation. with H. Rovsing Olsen. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Museum of Danish Resistance 1940-1945.
• Werner, Emmy E. (2002). Conspiracy of decency: the Rescue of the Danish Jews during World War II. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
• Yahil, Leni (1969). Rescue of Danish Jewry; test of a democracy. Morris Gradel (tr). {{cite book}}: Text "Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America" ignored (help)

External links

• Rescuers during the Holocaust This bibliography includes a number of books about the Danish rescue of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Denmark.