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#The universe has a cause of its existence.
#The universe has a cause of its existence.
#Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent)
#Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent)



====Discussion====
====Discussion====
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Every event must have a cause, and each cause must in turn have its own cause, and so forth. Hence, there must either be an infinite regress of causes or there must be a starting point or first cause. Al-Kindi (as Aristotle) rejected the notion of an infinite regress and insist that there must be a first cause, and the first cause must be God, the only uncaused being.
Every event must have a cause, and each cause must in turn have its own cause, and so forth. Hence, there must either be an infinite regress of causes or there must be a starting point or first cause. Al-Kindi (as Aristotle) rejected the notion of an infinite regress and insist that there must be a first cause, and the first cause must be God, the only uncaused being.


Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover (This is the Aristotelian form of the argument also propounded by Averroes). The premise is that: every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover.
Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover (This is the Aristotelian form of the argument also propounded by Averroes). The premise is that: every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover.


There are two Islamic perspectives with regard to the cosmological argument. A positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument with thinkers sucha as Al-Kindi, and Averroes. And a negative response which is quite critical of it with thinkers such as Al-Ghazzali and Iqbal which maybe seen as being in opposition to this sort of an argument.
There are two Islamic perspectives with regard to the cosmological argument. A positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument with thinkers sucha as Al-Kindi, and Averroes. And a negative response which is quite critical of it with thinkers such as Al-Ghazzali and Iqbal which maybe seen as being in opposition to this sort of an argument.


Al-Kindi is one of the many major and first Islamic philosophers who attempt to introduce an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises. In fact, his chief contribution is the cosmological argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his On First Philosophy.<ref>Nasr, trans. Seyyed Hossein, An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1993 pp. 168</ref>
Al-Kindi is one of the many major and first Islamic philosophers who attempt to introduce an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises. In fact, his chief contribution is the cosmological argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his On First Philosophy.<ref>Nasr, trans. Seyyed Hossein, An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1993 pp. 168</ref>


He presents four different versions of this argument, all are variation of the cosmological argument which require a cause.
He presents four different versions of this argument, all are variation of the cosmological argument which require a cause.


'''The first argument''' revolves around the principle of determination (tarjjih), that is prior to the existence of the universe it was equally likely for it to exist or not to exist. The fact that it exists implies that it required a determining principle which would cause its existence to prevail over non-existence. This principle of determination is God.<ref>Atiyeh, G. N. Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs. Islamabad:Islamic Research Institute, 1985</ref>
'''The first argument''' revolves around the principle of determination (tarjjih), that is prior to the existence of the universe it was equally likely for it to exist or not to exist. The fact that it exists implies that it required a determining principle which would cause its existence to prevail over non-existence. This principle of determination is God.<ref>Atiyeh, G. N. Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs. Islamabad:Islamic Research Institute, 1985</ref>


This is similar to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason<ref>Russell, Bertrand, ''A History of Western Philosophy''. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 568</ref><ref>Cassirer, Ernst Kant’s Life and thought. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981,pp. 73</ref> Leibniz argues that everything in the world is contingent that it may or may not have existed. Something will not exist unless there is a reason for its existence. This rests on his premise that the actual world is the best possible world, as such we can account for everything in it as being there for a specific reason. But the universe as a whole, requires a further reason for existence, and that reason for Liebniz is God.
This is similar to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason<ref>Russell, Bertrand, ''A History of Western Philosophy''. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 568</ref><ref>Cassirer, Ernst Kant’s Life and thought. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981,pp. 73</ref> Leibniz argues that everything in the world is contingent that it may or may not have existed. Something will not exist unless there is a reason for its existence. This rests on his premise that the actual world is the best possible world, as such we can account for everything in it as being there for a specific reason. But the universe as a whole, requires a further reason for existence, and that reason for Liebniz is God.


'''A second argument''' of his draws its inspiration from Islamic and Aristotelian sciences. He argues that only God is indivisible, and everything other than God is in some way composite or multiple. Kindi describes his concept of God,
'''A second argument''' of his draws its inspiration from Islamic and Aristotelian sciences. He argues that only God is indivisible, and everything other than God is in some way composite or multiple. Kindi describes his concept of God, he has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-maqulat). He has no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable… He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahdah). Everything else must be multiple.<ref>Sharif, M. M. A History of Muslim Philosophy. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966, pp. 429</ref>
He has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-maqulat). He has no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable… He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahdah). Everything else must be multiple.<ref>Sharif, M. M. A History of Muslim Philosophy. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966, pp. 429</ref>


This for Kindi was a crucial distinction upon which he rested some of his main arguments for God’s existence. In Kindi’s theory only God’s oneness is necessary whereas that of all others is contingent upon God. Hence all other beings single or multiple must emanate from the ultimate essential being. In addition this first being must be uncaused, since it is the cause of everything else.<ref>Fakhry, Majid ''A History of Islamic Philosophy''. New York : Columbia University
This for Kindi was a crucial distinction upon which he rested some of his main arguments for God’s existence. In Kindi’s theory only God’s oneness is necessary whereas that of all others is contingent upon God. Hence all other beings single or multiple must emanate from the ultimate essential being. In addition this first being must be uncaused, since it is the cause of everything else.<ref>Fakhry, Majid ''A History of Islamic Philosophy''. New York : Columbia University Press: Longman, 1983, pp. 78</ref>
Press : Longman, 1983, pp. 78</ref>


The material world cannot exist ad infinitum because of the impossibility of an actual infinite (a concept borrowed from Aristotle). The material world can also not be "eo ipso" eternal, because of the impossibility of an infinite duration of time, since the existence of time is contingent upon the existence of bodies and motion, which have been shown to be finite. As such the world requires a creator, or rather a generator (mudhith) in Kindi’s scheme, who could generate the world ex nihilo.<ref>Fakhry, Majid ''A History of Islamic Philosophy''. New York : Columbia University Press : Longman, 1983, pp. 74–78</ref>
The material world cannot exist ad infinitum because of the impossibility of an actual infinite (a concept borrowed from Aristotle). The material world can also not be "eo ipso" eternal, because of the impossibility of an infinite duration of time, since the existence of time is contingent upon the existence of bodies and motion, which have been shown to be finite. As such the world requires a creator, or rather a generator (mudhith) in Kindi’s scheme, who could generate the world ex nihilo.<ref>Fakhry, Majid ''A History of Islamic Philosophy''. New York : Columbia University Press: Longman, 1983, pp. 74–78</ref>


'''The third and fourth''' arguments he presents are similar versions of the first cause argument, and hence are subject to the same criticisms that apply to any cosmological argument. These criticisms come not only from Western scholars but also Islamic ones. Al-Ghazzali is unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Kindi. In response to them he writes: "According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behoove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible." <ref>Al-Ghazzali, Tahafut Al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers), translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963 pp. 90–91</ref>
'''The third and fourth''' arguments he presents are similar versions of the first cause argument, and hence are subject to the same criticisms that apply to any cosmological argument. These criticisms come not only from Western scholars but also Islamic ones. Al-Ghazzali is unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Kindi. In response to them he writes: "According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behoove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible." <ref>Al-Ghazzali, Tahafut Al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers), translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963 pp. 90–91</ref>


Ghazzali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus undermines one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument.
Ghazzali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus undermines one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument.


Al-Kindi's argument has been taken up by some contemporary Western philosophers and dubbed the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Among its chief proponents today is Dr. William Craig.<ref>Ramey, B. The Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Summary. 1998 (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/kalam.html)</ref> It proposes to show (contrary to what Ghazzali thought) that the universe must have necessarily had a beginning. A contrast is drawn between two concepts, the “potential infinite” and an “actual infinite.”
Al-Kindi's argument has been taken up by some contemporary Western philosophers and dubbed the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Among its chief proponents today is Dr. William Craig.<ref>Ramey, B. The Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Summary. 1998 (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/kalam.html)</ref> It proposes to show (contrary to what Ghazzali thought) that the universe must have necessarily had a beginning. A contrast is drawn between two concepts, the “potential infinite” and an “actual infinite.”


Craig's proposal is as follows:
Craig's proposal is as follows:
Line 67: Line 64:


====First sub-set of arguments====
====First sub-set of arguments====

Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:


Line 75: Line 71:


====Second sub-set of arguments====
====Second sub-set of arguments====

Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:
Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:


Revision as of 11:14, 15 December 2011

The Kalām cosmological argument is a variation of the cosmological argument that argues for the existence of a First Cause for the universe. Its origins can be traced to medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers, but most directly to Islamic theologians of the Kalām tradition.[1] Its historic proponents include John Philoponus,[2] Al-Kindi,[3] Saadia Gaon,[4] Al-Ghazali,[5] and St. Bonaventure.[6] A prominent contemporary Western proponent is William Lane Craig.[7]

The basic premise of all of these is that something caused the Universe to begin to exist, and this First Cause must be God. It is also applied by the Spiritist doctrine as the main argument for the existence of God.

Historical background

The Kalām argument was named after the Kalām tradition of Islamic discursive philosophy through which it was first formulated. In Arabic, the word Kalām means "words, discussion, discourse."

The cosmological argument was first introduced by Aristotle and later refined by Al-Kindi, Al-Ghazali (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).[8] In Western Europe, it was adopted by the Christian theologian and Saint of the Roman Catholic Church, Thomas Aquinas. Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover; this Aristotelian form of the argument was also propounded by Averroes. The premise is that every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover. One of the earliest formations of the Kalām argument comes from Al-Ghazali, who wrote, "Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."[1]

Two kinds of Islamic perspectives may be considered with regard to the cosmological argument. A positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument and a negative response which is quite critical of it. Among the Aristotelian thinkers are Al-Kindi, and Averroes. In contrast Al-Ghazzali and Muhammad Iqbal[9] may be seen as being in opposition to this sort of an argument.

The argument has several forms, the basic first-cause argument runs as follows:

Argument

Classical argument

The Kalām cosmological argument:[10]

  1. Everything that has a beginning of its existence has a cause of its existence;
  2. The universe has a beginning of its existence;
    Therefore:
  3. The universe has a cause of its existence.
  4. Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent)

Discussion

Every event must have a cause, and each cause must in turn have its own cause, and so forth. Hence, there must either be an infinite regress of causes or there must be a starting point or first cause. Al-Kindi (as Aristotle) rejected the notion of an infinite regress and insist that there must be a first cause, and the first cause must be God, the only uncaused being.

Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover (This is the Aristotelian form of the argument also propounded by Averroes). The premise is that: every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover.

There are two Islamic perspectives with regard to the cosmological argument. A positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument with thinkers sucha as Al-Kindi, and Averroes. And a negative response which is quite critical of it with thinkers such as Al-Ghazzali and Iqbal which maybe seen as being in opposition to this sort of an argument.

Al-Kindi is one of the many major and first Islamic philosophers who attempt to introduce an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises. In fact, his chief contribution is the cosmological argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his On First Philosophy.[11]

He presents four different versions of this argument, all are variation of the cosmological argument which require a cause.

The first argument revolves around the principle of determination (tarjjih), that is prior to the existence of the universe it was equally likely for it to exist or not to exist. The fact that it exists implies that it required a determining principle which would cause its existence to prevail over non-existence. This principle of determination is God.[12]

This is similar to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason[13][14] Leibniz argues that everything in the world is contingent that it may or may not have existed. Something will not exist unless there is a reason for its existence. This rests on his premise that the actual world is the best possible world, as such we can account for everything in it as being there for a specific reason. But the universe as a whole, requires a further reason for existence, and that reason for Liebniz is God.

A second argument of his draws its inspiration from Islamic and Aristotelian sciences. He argues that only God is indivisible, and everything other than God is in some way composite or multiple. Kindi describes his concept of God, he has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-maqulat). He has no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable… He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahdah). Everything else must be multiple.[15]

This for Kindi was a crucial distinction upon which he rested some of his main arguments for God’s existence. In Kindi’s theory only God’s oneness is necessary whereas that of all others is contingent upon God. Hence all other beings single or multiple must emanate from the ultimate essential being. In addition this first being must be uncaused, since it is the cause of everything else.[16]

The material world cannot exist ad infinitum because of the impossibility of an actual infinite (a concept borrowed from Aristotle). The material world can also not be "eo ipso" eternal, because of the impossibility of an infinite duration of time, since the existence of time is contingent upon the existence of bodies and motion, which have been shown to be finite. As such the world requires a creator, or rather a generator (mudhith) in Kindi’s scheme, who could generate the world ex nihilo.[17]

The third and fourth arguments he presents are similar versions of the first cause argument, and hence are subject to the same criticisms that apply to any cosmological argument. These criticisms come not only from Western scholars but also Islamic ones. Al-Ghazzali is unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Kindi. In response to them he writes: "According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behoove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible." [18]

Ghazzali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus undermines one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument.

Al-Kindi's argument has been taken up by some contemporary Western philosophers and dubbed the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Among its chief proponents today is Dr. William Craig.[19] It proposes to show (contrary to what Ghazzali thought) that the universe must have necessarily had a beginning. A contrast is drawn between two concepts, the “potential infinite” and an “actual infinite.”

Craig's proposal is as follows:

Contemporary argument

William Lane Craig has formulated the argument as follows:[20]

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
  4. This cause is the God of Classical Theism, and is a personal being, because He chose to create the universe.

With two sub-sets of arguments.

First sub-set of arguments

Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:

  1. An actual infinite cannot exist.
  2. An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
  3. Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

Second sub-set of arguments

Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:

  1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite.
  2. The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
  3. Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

Discussion

Craig argues that the first premise is supported most strongly by intuition, but also by experience. He asserts that it is "intuitively obvious," based on the "metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing,"[21] and doubts that anyone could sincerely deny it.[20] Additionally, he claims it is affirmed by interaction with the physical world. If it were false, he states, it would be impossible to explain why things do not pop into existence uncaused.[21]

The second premise is often supported by philosophical arguments and scientific verification for the finitude of the past.[22] Craig claims that the number of past events cannot be infinite, meaning that the universe must be finite and therefore must have begun to exist. He also cites the Big Bang theory as evidence for the second premise. Craig interprets the Big Bang as the temporal beginning of the universe, and discounts the Cyclic model, vacuum fluctuation models, and the Hartle-Hawking state model which suggest otherwise.[23]

The argument concludes, often through a process of elimination, that the cause of the universe must be a personal, uncaused, beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, enormously powerful, and enormously intelligent being,[24] which is God.

Objections and criticism

The argument has been criticized [25] by such philosophers as J. L. Mackie, Graham Oppy, and Quentin Smith, and physicists Paul Davies and Victor Stenger.

Stenger has argued that quantum mechanics disconfirms the first premise of the argument, that is, that something can not come into being from nothing. He postulates that such naturally occurring quantum events are exceptions to this premise, like the Casimir effect and radioactive decay. Craig responds to this in two different ways: (1) the indeterministic origination of virtual particles in the quantum vacuum is not true creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing) since the vacuum contains a sea of fluctuating energy, empty space, and is governed by physical laws; none of which are "nothing." (2) Craig points out that the interpretations to which Stenger appeals are indeterministic interpretations which are one of many interpretations, some of which are wholly deterministic and none of which are actually known to be true. Thus, Craig rejects this as a refutation of premise one. However, Stenger continues that "...Craig is thereby admitting that the "cause" in his first premise could be...something not predetermined. By allowing probabilistic cause, he destroys his own case for a predetermined creation."[26]

Ghazali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus disputes one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument.

Muhammad Iqbal also rejects the argument stating, “Logically speaking, then, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in total.” For Iqbal the concept of the first uncaused cause is absurd, he continues: "It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."[27]

Kant also rejects any cosmological proof on the grounds that it is nothing more than an ontological proof in disguise. He argued that any necessary object’s essence must involve existence, hence reason alone can define such a being, and the argument becomes quite similar to the ontological one in form, devoid of any empirical premises.[28]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Craig 1994: 80
  2. ^ Herbert A, Davidson, “John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 89 (1969), pp. 357–391.
  3. ^ Al-Kindi, On First Philosophy, with an Introduction and Commentary by Alfred L. Ivry (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 67–75
  4. ^ Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 41- 44
  5. ^ al Ghazali, Kitab al lqtisad, with a foreword by Î. A. Çubukçu and H. Atay (Ankara: University of Ankara Press, 1962), pp. 15–16.
  6. ^ Francis J. Kovach, 'The Question of the Eternity of the World in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas-A Critical Analysis', Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974), pp. 141–172.
  7. ^ Craig, William Lane; The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2000); ISBN 978-1579104382
  8. ^ Averroes, Ibn Rushd, The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut) London:Luzac, 1954, pp. 58
  9. ^ Iqbal, Muhammad The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam Lahore:Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986
  10. ^ Nasr, trans. Seyyed Hossein, An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1993
  11. ^ Nasr, trans. Seyyed Hossein, An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines. Albany : State University of New York Press, 1993 pp. 168
  12. ^ Atiyeh, G. N. Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs. Islamabad:Islamic Research Institute, 1985
  13. ^ Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, p. 568
  14. ^ Cassirer, Ernst Kant’s Life and thought. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981,pp. 73
  15. ^ Sharif, M. M. A History of Muslim Philosophy. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966, pp. 429
  16. ^ Fakhry, Majid A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York : Columbia University Press: Longman, 1983, pp. 78
  17. ^ Fakhry, Majid A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York : Columbia University Press: Longman, 1983, pp. 74–78
  18. ^ Al-Ghazzali, Tahafut Al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers), translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963 pp. 90–91
  19. ^ Ramey, B. The Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Summary. 1998 (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/kalam.html)
  20. ^ a b Craig 1994: 92
  21. ^ a b Craig 2007
  22. ^ Craig 1994: 94
  23. ^ Craig 1994: 100–116
  24. ^ Craig 1996
  25. ^ Reichenbach 2008: 4.1
  26. ^ Stenger, V.J. God: The Failed Hypothesis, Prometheus Books: New York, 2007, p. 124.
  27. ^ Iqbal, Muhammad The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986
  28. ^ Cassirer, Ernst, "Kant’s Life and thought", New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981

See also

References

  • Craig, William Lane (1994). Reasonable Faith. Wheaton: Moody Press. ISBN 0-89107-764-2.
  • Craig, William Lane (2000). The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Eugene: Wipf & Stock Publishers. ISBN 1-57910-438-X.
  • Craig, William Lane (2008). Reasonable Faith. Wheaton: Crossway Books. ISBN 978-1-4335-0115-9.
  • Craig, William Lane; Moreland, J. P. (2009). The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford: John Wiley and Sons. ISBN 978-1-4051-7657-6.
  • Craig, William Lane (2007). "Causal Premiss of the Kalam Argument". Reasonable Faith with William Lane Craig: Q&A. Reasonable Faith. Retrieved 27 November 2009.
  • Craig, William Lane (1996). "Initial Arguments: A Defense of the Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God". The Craig-Smith Debate: Does God Exist?. Leadership University. Retrieved 28 November 2009.
  • Reichenbach, Bruce (2008). "Cosmological Argument: 4.1 The Causal Principle and Quantum Physics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Retrieved 1 December 2009.
  • Russell, Bertrand (1957). Edwards, Paul (ed.). Why I Am Not A Christian. New York: Simon and Schuster.
  • Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon. ISBN 019824682X.
  • Craig, William Lane; Smith, Quentin (1993). Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford: Clarendon. ISBN 0-19-826348-1.
  • Oppy, Graham (1995). "Reply To Professor Craig". The Secular Web Library. The Secular Web. Retrieved 3 December 2009.
  • Barker, Dan (1999). "Cosmological Kalamity". The Secular Web Library. The Secular Web. Retrieved 3 December 2009.

Further reading

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