Talk:United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine

Technical Description of Resolution

1 Resolutions of the General Assembly are adopted not passed.

2 Below is the key wording of the resolution: it is a recommendation:-

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;..... — Preceding unsigned comment added by Trahelliven (talk • contribs) 21:22, 9 January 2012 (UTC) sorry I forgot to sign it.Trahelliven(talk) 08:30, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Aren't all General Assembly resolutions recommendations?

At any rate, even if it is important for us to tell readers that it was a recommendation (I am skeptical) surely this does not belong in the lede. The first priority has to be telling readers what the partition plan called for. I am generally strongly against putting anything in the lede that detracts from first time reader intelligibility. Jsolinsky (talk) 23:11, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Aren't all General Assembly resolutions recommendations? The short answer is No. When a state is admmitted by the General Assembly, at least in the admission of Yemen and Pakistan in 1947, the operative words were Decides to admit (108 II).http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2/ares2.htm. I have not checked further resolutions in the list.

To say that the General Assembly passed it (meaning the plan) is not quite what the resolution said. A first time reader in the present case might be led to believe that the resolution was more than a recommendation.

The correct title of the plan was Plan of Partition with Economic Union; it shoul be described as such.Trahelliven(talk) 10:20, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

Actually, the short answer is yes except for admitting new members which requires a Security Council resolution first. It's all explained in the UN Charter. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 20:58, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

To No More Mr Nice Guy

Jsolinsky Aren't all General Assembly resolutions recommendations?

No More Mr Nice Guy Actually, the short answer is yes except for admitting new members which requires a Security Council resolution first. It's all explained in the UN Charter.

Trahelliven The short answer is stiil NO: Resolutions 117(II), 125(II), 148(II), 149(II), and 150(II), none are recommendations. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2/ares2.htm Trahelliven(talk) 16:30, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

For completeness, perhaps I should have noted that none of the resolutions listed deal with the admission of a state to the UN. Trahelliven(talk) 17:30, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

Can anyone assist me? The reference at the end of the first paragraph in the lede is a cumbersome way to the text of Resolution 181(II). To the immediate right appears an easier way of accessing the Resolution - Code: A/RES/181(II) (Document). Could someone assist me in substituting the reference with what appears to be the easier access? I apologise for my technical incompetence. Thanks. Trahelliven(talk) 16:66, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

I replaced the ref with a direct link to the resolution. If you're using firefox, you can use the cite4wiki addon which makes a nicely formatted ref. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 20:17, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

No More Mr Nice Guy. Thanks. Trahelliven(talk) 16:66, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

Implementation of the plan

The article as it stands has a glaring omission. Was it ever implemented? I have tried to make my answer to that question as bland as possible. I would have thought that the history of the area of the former Mandate gives the answer. I have therefore, in breach of all the rules, not attempted to give any reference though I am sure that others might find one. Has anyone got any suggestions:

1 Can anyone find an appropriate reference?

2 Can it can be expanded without endless edits and reverts?

3 Is it simply fatuous to insert a section along these lines? Trahelliven (talk) 14:10, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

Wikipedia is full of situations in which obvious facts are included without a reference. They only get removed if something is challenged. As things stand, we have clearly explained the plain. What came to pass is different. Therefore, it is plain that the plan never came to pass. I have moved it back into the introduction where I think it belongs. (Also, a section with only this one fact seems a little unnecessary) Jsolinsky (talk) 03:52, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

I agree. Trahelliven (talk) 15:25, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

If not stating as clearly as you suggested that "the plan was not implemented", several sources emphasized that the British gave back their Mandate in expetecting that the UN would ask them not to give this back and that would permit them to use "stronger" methods against the Jewish revolt. Sources also points out that after the UNO voted the plan, they didn't collaborate to the its implementation, eg in refusing to the administrators of the UNO to start their job in Jerusalem. In February '48 they also supported the annexation of the Arab side of Palestine by Transjordan. So, it should be reasonnable to write that at least the British didn't collaborate to the implementation of the Partition plan. 81.247.89.201 (talk) 22:49, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

The article should definitely indicate that the British were unhelpful. It does presently say this: "Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with the UN Palestine Commission during the transitional period or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor."

I think that, given the recent discussion, the article is likely to be extended into the parties behavior during the civil war period (to the extent it has direct bearing on the implementation or non-implementation of the partition). That would necessarily include the actions of the British.

That said, I'd like to see any references suggesting that the British wanted a free hand to use "stronger" methods. There are an awful lot of references indicating that the British desperately wanted out of Palestine. Jsolinsky (talk) 23:06, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

We had a long discussion about the British actions with regards to the PP a few months back. I'm pretty sure it was on this talk page. I'll have a look later. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:48, 10 January 2012 (UTC)

Here it is. It's a bit hard to follow as a certain editor who's now topic banned "participated" in it, but there are some good sources and comments in there for anyone who wants to dig them up. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 00:05, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

This is a good point and highlights the fact that the lede is misleading. It suggests that the approved plan led smoothly to the Israeli declaration, ignoring the important facts that being the UNGA (not the UNSC) the resolution was non binding, that the UNSC declined to vote on it (see comments by Warren Austin), instead making attempts to diffuse the fighting (see United Nations Security Council Resolution 42) and that this was all followed by the Truman Trusteeship proposal. These facts are well covered in the scholarly literature and should be summarised here. See e.g. here. Oncenawhile (talk) 00:31, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

Actually, the intro says that "Immediately after UN adoption of the Resolution, the Civil War broke out" and "The partition plan was never fully implemented." That's about what I'd expect. I agree that it needs to be supplemented with more detail in the body. But I'm not sure what else we would put on top. Jsolinsky (talk) 01:46, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

Agree - those two sentences are quite enough. I have moved the other sentences down to a "subsequent events" section, which needs completion. Oncenawhile (talk) 08:47, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

@Jsolinsky : you are right that numerous (if not all) sources state that the British wanted to leave (reasons given were that the cost of maintaining order in Palestine was astronomic and that British public opinion didn't understand that "boys" were dying over there). I am quite sure that Tom Segev, in One Palestine. Complete explains (or assumes ?) that the British didn't collaborate with UN because they were frustrated not to have received the support of the AG that would have enabled them to use against Jews (read LHI and IZL) the same methods as the ones they had used against Arabs in 36-39.

In any case, I don't think it is that much important and should be in ther article. 91.180.117.27 (talk) 11:45, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

@Once: I don't think that the new lede is a net improvement over the old lede (although I DO think that the addition of the new body section is an improvement, and will likely prove the first stage in an even larger improvement). I agree that the British declaration of termination and evacuation can be removed from the lede. BUT, I think that the establishment of Israel, and the 1948 war should be present, as these were amongst the most important outcomes. Jsolinsky (talk) 13:39, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

I agree. The creation of Israel and the Arab invasion are connected to the plan not being implemented. I also think that the fact the British left rather than tried to implement the plan is also important for the lead. Not sure how to summarize all those things in a couple of sentences, though. By the way, saying the plan was "never fully implemented" implies it was partially implemented which I don't think is correct. It wasn't implemented full stop. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:00, 11 January 2012 (UTC)

I also agree. Trahelliven (talk) 06:25, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

Hi Jsolinsky, I am happy with your proposal - i.e. that there should be mention of the creation of Israel in the lede. As NMMNG rightly says, it'll be difficult to get the wording right because a lot happened in between (including a reversal of US policy) and ignoring that would incorrectly imply that one thing led directly to the other. Oncenawhile (talk) 02:08, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

Truman trusteeship proposal

A deletion discussion is ongoing regarding the subsequent event in international diplomacy following the Partition Plan - please could all interested editors kindly contribute to the discussion here Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Truman trusteeship proposal. Oncenawhile (talk) 23:11, 12 January 2012 (UTC)

Myth

Simha Flapan wrote that it was a myth that Zionists accepted the UN partition and planned for peace, and that it was also a myth that Arabs rejected partition and launched a war.

What it this statement supposed to mean? This is completly contradictory with the rest of the article. So its upon the reader to decide whether the Jews accepted the resolution and whether the Arabs rejected it? StoneProphet (talk) 10:03, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

As an indication of a revisionist current? -- AnonMoos (talk) 10:27, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Hopefully of some use in throwing light on Flapan's statement, sources and extracts from sources which address Arab and Jewish reactions to partition in more detail:

Palestine Post. 15 Jul 1937. David Ben-Gurion. The Jews.

Avi Shlaim, The Debate About 1948, from The Israel/Palestine Question (edited by Ilan Pappé): p162 - "It is true that all the Arab states, with the exception of Jordan, rejected the UN partition plan. It is true that seven Arab armies invaded Palestine the morning after the State of Israel was proclaimed. It is true that the invasion was accompanied by blood-curdling rhetoric and threats to throw the Jews into the sea. It is true that in addition to the regular Arab armies and the Mufti’s Holy War army, various groups of volunteers arrived in Palestine, the most important of which was the Arab Liberation Army, sponsored by the Arab League and led by the Syrian adventurer Fawzi al-Qawuqji. More importantly, it is true that the military experts of the Arab League had worked out a unified plan for the invasion and that this plan was all the more dangerous for having had more limited and realistic objectives than those implied by the wild Pan-Arab rhetoric. But King Abdullah, who was given nominal command over all the Arab forces in Palestine, wrecked this plan by making last-minute changes. His objective in sending his army into Palestine was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state, but to make himself master of the Arab part of Palestine, which meant preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state."

Mike Berry and Greg Philo, Israel and Palestine Competing Histories:
p13ff - Ben-Gurion's position in the wake of Peel Commision: "The Peel Commission proposed that the north-west part of Palestine, accounting for 20 per cent of the country though containing its most fertile land, would become a Jewish state, while the remaining 80 per cent would become an Arab state linked to Transjordan. A corridor to the sea would remain under British control, as would Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The proposal received a mixed reception among Jews. One group, centred on Jabotinsky’s Revisionists, argued that a Jewish state should only be set up in the whole of Palestine and Transjordan. Another, which included Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, argued that this was a historic opportunity to create the Jewish state. The Israeli historian Simha Flapan suggests that Ben-Gurion accepted the plan as a stepping stone to Zionist control of all of Palestine, and points to comments he made before the Zionist executive in 1937 that: ‘after the formation of a large army in the wake of the establishment of the [Jewish] state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the whole of the Palestine’ (Ben-Gurion, cited in Flapan, 1987: 22). The Israeli historian and Ha’aretz columnist Tom Segev (2001) suggests that for Ben-Gurion the proposal (inherent in the Peel recommendations) for the ‘forced transfer’ of the Arab inhabitants out of the proposed Jewish state, and the creation therefore of a ‘really Jewish’ state, outweighed all the drawbacks of the proposal."
p24 - 1947: "Gilbert (1999) suggests they were also wary of alienating Arab opinion because they were concerned to protect their oil interests in the region. The foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, perhaps with this in mind, indicted that he favoured ‘an independent unitary State in Palestine, with special rights for the Jewish minority, but incorporating as much as possible of the Arab plan’ (cited in Gilbert, 1999: 142). Bevin also argued that a Zionist government in Palestine would be unlikely to accept any partition as fi nal but would sooner or later seek to expand its borders. Arab hostility to the Zionist project, he predicted, might lead to long-term instability in the region: ‘If Jewish irredentism is likely to develop after an interval, Arab irredentism is certain from the outset. Thus the existence of a Jewish State might prove a constant factor of unrest in the Middle East’ (cited in Gilbert, 1999: 142). In February 1947 the British decided to end the mandate and hand the question of Palestine to the United Nations."
p25 - "The Arab states as well as a number of others indicated that they did not consider themselves bound by the resolution as they argued it violated the terms of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1990)."
p27 - "The reaction of the Zionist leadership is more contested. Some historians, such as Bregman (2003), argue that the partition resolution was seen as a triumph because it allowed for the creation of a Jewish state in an area three times that recommended by the Peel plan ten years earlier. Shlaim claims that the reaction was more ambivalent. He suggests that it was accepted by most Zionist leaders with a ‘heavy heart’ because they ‘did not like the idea of an independent Palestinian state, they were disappointed with the exclusion of Jerusalem, and they had grave doubts about the viability of the State within the UN borders’ (2000: 25). He notes that it was dismissed out of hand by Jewish paramilitary groups, who demanded all of Palestine for the Jewish state. Gilbert suggests that the Zionist leadership realised that war was inevitable and that Ben-Gurion ‘contemplated the possibility of fi ghting to extend the area allotted to the Jews’ (1999: 149). Gilbert cites orders from Ben-Gurion that Jewish forces should ‘safeguard the entire Yishuv [Jewish community in Palestine] and settlements (wherever they may be), to conquer the whole country or most of it, and to maintain its occupation until the attainment of an authoritative political settlement’ (Ben-Gurion, cited in Gilbert, 1999: 149). Hirst (1977) suggests that the partition plan was accepted by the Zionists because they anticipated they would quickly be able militarily to overwhelm the Arabs, and unilaterally expand the borders of the Jewish state."
p28 - "The UN partition plan did not solve the problems in Palestine. The Arab Higher Committee rejected it outright and called a three-day strike. The Mufti of Jerusalem announced a jihad or struggle for Jerusalem. Fighting between the two communities broke out in early December 1947, and the situation quickly deteriorated into a civil war in which both sides attacked civilian as well as military targets (Gilbert, 1999)."
p28 - "In early April, Zionist forces launched a major offensive code named Plan Dalet. According to Avi Shlaim, the aim of Plan Dalet was ‘to secure all the areas allocated to the Israeli state under the UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them’ (2000: 31). Arab towns and cities were captured and their populations removed so as ‘to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements’ in anticipation of an attack by the combined armies of the neighbouring Arab states (2000: 31)."
p31 - "The declaration did not specify the borders of the new state, because Ben-Gurion wanted to keep open the possibility of expansion beyond the UN borders."
p35ff - "A third UN truce came into effect on 31 October, which lasted until 22 December, when Israel again broke the truce by launching Operation Horev. This was highly successful, with the Israeli army driving the Egyptians out of the Negev and following it into Egypt proper. Eventually Britain intervened on the Egyptian side under the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and after forceful pressure from President Truman Ben- Gurion agreed to withdraw his troops from the Sinai and accept a new truce."

Encyclopedia of the Palestinians (2005), Abdullah and the Zionists, p7 -

"The irreconcilable conflict

between the Arab and Jewish national movements in Palestine provided the setting for the emergence of the special relationship between the Hashemite emir and the Jewish Agency. The two sides had a common protector, Britain, and a common enemy, al-Hajj Amin AL-HUSAYNI, the mufti (Islamic law expert) of Jerusalem and the leader of the Palestinians. Al-Hajj Amin had not only opposed the Zionist movement, but was also Abdullah’s principal rival for the loyalty of the Palestinians and for

the control of Palestine."

"It was not until

1937, when the PEEL COMMISSION suggested that Palestine might be partitioned and that Abdullah might rule the Arab part, that Palestine became

the main focus of Abdullah’s territorial ambition."

"During World War II, Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni

threw in his lot with Nazi Germany; Abdullah and the Zionists remained loyal to Britain. Britain rewarded Abdullah for his loyalty by conferring formal independence on the Mandated territory of Transjordan in March 1946. The Zionists, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, intensified the struggle for a state of their own. However, they needed an Arab leader willing to accept a partition of Palestine and to live in peace with a Jewish state; King Abdullah appeared to be the only ruler prepared

to accept the partition of Palestine."

Richard Forer - Commit Yourself To The Truth, Cutting Through the Confusion About Israel/Palestine (1, 2), 22 June 2010:

Here is what Morris (who is a Zionist and believes that Palestinians are 'psychopaths' and 'serial killers') says in Righteous Victims, p.138:

[Weizmann and Ben-Gurion] saw partition as a stepping stone to further expansion and the eventual takeover of the whole of Palestine... [Ben-Gurion] wrote to his son, Amos: ‘[A] Jewish state in part [of Palestine] is not an end, but a beginning... Our possession is important not only for itself ... through this we increase our power, and every increase in power facilitates getting hold of the country in its entirety. Establishing a [small] state ... will serve as a very potent lever in our efforts to redeem the whole country.

The above passage by Ben-Gurion expresses a common intention that he and the majority of Zionists shared for more than a decade before 1948. Confirmation of this can be found in many books on the subject.

    ←   ZScarpia   16:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC) (11:00, 31 January 2012 (UTC): expanded introductory sentence)

That's nice; however, I didn't bother to read any further down than the passage where there was conflation and confusion between the reaction to the 1937 Peel plan and the reaction to the 1947 United Nations plan (two very different plans offered ten years apart under very different circumstances) -- since it has been pointed out repeatedly on these article talk pages that blurring of the differences between 1937 and 1947 is not a constructive or productive strategy (since it has not and will not result in useful article improvements). Meanwhile, in ca. December 1947 the Jewish and Arab leaderships publicly conveyed acceptance and rejection respectively to the United Nations through their recognized community institutions (the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee etc.). There can be various commentaries on and explanations of this fact (if they are sourced and relevant), but this must remain as the factual starting point... AnonMoos (talk) 17:02, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Thanks, that's pretty much the answer that I anticipated you'd give (in the tone that I expected). Note that I did say that the sources discussed reactions to "partition", not "The UN Partition Plan". Despite the fact that some of the extracts talk about reactions to the 1937 Plan, they do throw light on the general attitude of Jewish leaders to partition and on the question that was asked here about the quote from Flapan. Any "conflation and confusion" being performed, is entirely a product of your reading, I think. You wrote: "Meanwhile, in ca. December 1947 the Jewish and Arab leaderships publicly conveyed acceptance and rejection respectively to the United Nations through their recognized community institutions (the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee etc.)." The extracts contradict that and, as you know, if reliable sources contradict each other, you cannot present what they say as statements of fact, but as statements of points of view. That assumes that any sources you may present which support what you have said are accepted as reliable. Personally, I would say that any source which supports what you have said is over-simplistic and shouldn't be accepted as reliable on the matter of reactions to the Partition Plan. One thing to note is that indications of acceptance or rejection were not asked for and that whether the Partition Plan was implemented or not did not depend on them. Also, there were more sources of leadership on the Jewish and Arab sides than the two you indicate and the others also expressed opinions about the Plan.     ←   ZScarpia   18:00, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

However, this article is about the 1947 partition plan specifically (not partition generally). Therefore information about 1937 should only be included if there's relevant useful evidence that attitudes about the 1937 plan carried over to attitudes about the 1947 plan. Any addition to the article of material about attitudes towards the 1937 plan, without accompanying valid specific information linking 1937 to 1947, would be ipso facto "conflation and confusion"... AnonMoos (talk) 18:33, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Nobody, as yet, has suggested adding anything to the article. Though, as far as including material goes, if sources discussed reactions to the Peel Plan in relation to the UN Partition Plan, that would make what they said a candidate for inclusion.     ←   ZScarpia   18:50, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Anonmoos, I recommend you read the other quoted sources, too. --Dailycare (talk) 20:33, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Frankly, I have little interest in doing so -- ZScarpia has been around these article talk pages long enough to be very well aware that many are of the opinion that such 1937 Peel Plan material is effectively irrelevant to the 1947 plan; and long enough to have observed that raising such 1937 Peel Plan stuff on article talk pages never results in practical significant improvement of 1947 articles -- yet ZScarpia freely and voluntarily chose to drink the 1937 Peel Plan kool-aide, and raise the issue yet again without much realistic prospect of a different outcome than the previous discussions here... AnonMoos (talk) 00:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I think you misunderstand the game plan. If you bring up the same issue over and over, maybe one day you'll have enough people supporting your revisionist interpretation of history to get it put in the article. Then the ball is in the court of those who want to remove it. There's no other reason for someone who, as you correctly observe, has seen and participated in this same discussion multiple times without getting the results he wants to bring it up yet again. Trying to fuzz the difference between the 1937 and 1947 partition plans might get someone who doesn't know enough about the issues to support said revisionist interpretation. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 04:53, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Please provide evidence justifying each of your points. Alternatively, strike out your comment.     ←   ZScarpia   11:30, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Anonmoos, sorry I was under the impression that you meant to disagree with ZScarpia. If you only meant to comment on one of the sources, that's of course fine. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:18, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing with anything he asserted, because his introduction of the Ben Gurion 1937 Peel Plan quote on the talk page of an 1947 article is a tiresome and tedious unconstructive maneuver which abruptly cut short any consideration by me of the remainder of his remarks. ZScarpia has been on these middle-east article talk pages long enough to be quite well aware that it was unconstructive thing to do (i.e. unlikely to lead to any different results than the last several times it was done), but he chose to indulge himself anyway... AnonMoos (talk) 00:29, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Do you understand that by inserting a dividing line before my comment you're altering it's apparent purpose? My comment was a response to the question raised about the statement sourced from Flapan. Putting a line in makes it appear as my comment is the beginning of a new section. The reason that I didn't indent my comment was to make it clear that it is addressed to everyone. Also, you do realise that making speculative assertions about my motivations isn't the done thing, don't you?     ←   ZScarpia   11:11, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

If there is no disagreement, as per Anonmoos' comment timestamped 00:29, we can probably just end this discussion then. --Dailycare (talk) 20:32, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Final section of the article is incorrect

In particular, the final sentence of the article is simply outrageous:

"In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all."

Even if one ignores the fact that the ICJ only has a mandate to issue non-binding opinions, and the fact that the Partition Plan itself was a General Assembly Resolution and therefore a non-binding recommendation, the very text of the Partition Plan itself indicates that it is, in its entirety, a recommendation, a proposal that could only become binding if it were adopted by BOTH sides and implemented accordingly.

Due to Arab opposition, the British Mandatory refused to implement it and the Security Council refused to authorize its implementation and sent it back to the General Assembly. The General Assembly relieved the Palestine Commission of its responsibilities under UN Res. 181, disbanding it and implanting a UN Mediator who came forward with new proposals designed to supersede the recommendations in the original Partition Plan. These too did not come to fruition.

A number of legal scholars, e.g. Judge Lauterpacht and Prof. Julius Stone, have given legal arguments which further demonstrate why the Partition Plan has no legal validity in international law.

Excerpts from these, and a number of statements on the matter from UN bodies, can be found in the link below.

http://www.mythsandfacts.org/conflict/10/resolution-181.pdf

For instance, A July 30, 1949 working paper of the UN Secretariat entitled "The Future of Arab Palestine and the Question of Partition" noted that:

“The Arabs rejected the United Nations Partition Plan so that any comment of theirs did not specifically concern the status of the Arab section of Palestine

under partition but rather rejected the scheme in its entirety.”