Desert Crossing 1999: Difference between revisions
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|quote= For any other information about our Web site, please contact nsarchiv@gwu.edu |
|quote= For any other information about our Web site, please contact nsarchiv@gwu.edu |
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}}</ref> According to Air Force General [[Victor E. Renuart, Jr.|Victor Renuart]], the exercise's conclusions were considered but rejected because they called for an invasion force of three armored divisions, while CENTCOM planners favored a force of only one armored division bolstered by a light infantry division.<ref>{{cite book|title=[[Fiasco (book)|Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq]]|author=Thomas E. Ricks|publisher=Penguin Press|location=New York|year=2006}}</ref> |
}}</ref> According to Air Force General [[Victor E. Renuart, Jr.|Victor Renuart]], the exercise's conclusions were considered but rejected because they called for an invasion force of three armored divisions, while CENTCOM planners favored a force of only one armored division bolstered by a light infantry division.<ref>{{cite book|title=[[Fiasco (book)|Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq]]|author=Thomas E. Ricks|publisher=Penguin Press|location=New York|year=2006|page=34}}</ref> |
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== References == |
== References == |
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Revision as of 21:40, 27 January 2013
"Desert Crossing" 1999 was a series of war games known simply as Desert Crossing that were conducted in late April 1999 by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The games were led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.) "When it looked like we were going in[to the 2003 invasion of Iraq], I called back down to CENTCOM and said, 'You need to dust off Desert Crossing.' They said, 'What's that? Never heard of it.'" .[1][2] According to Air Force General Victor Renuart, the exercise's conclusions were considered but rejected because they called for an invasion force of three armored divisions, while CENTCOM planners favored a force of only one armored division bolstered by a light infantry division.[3]
References
- ^ Introduced by Roger Strother (November 4, 2006). "Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game". National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 207. National Security Archive. Retrieved January 30, 2012.
"Desert Crossing" 1999 Assumed 400,000 Troops and Still a Mess
{{cite web}}: line feed character in|quote=at position 31 (help) - ^ "National Security Archive Web Site Terms and Conditions". National Security Archive. September 11, 2009. Retrieved January 30, 2012.
For any other information about our Web site, please contact nsarchiv@gwu.edu
- ^ Thomas E. Ricks (2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin Press. p. 34.
See also
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