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Maharbal (fl. 2nd century BC) was Hannibal's cavalry commander during the Second Punic War. He was often critical to the success of the side of Carthage over Rome. Throughout his Italian campaign Hannibal maintained an advantage in mounted soldiers and thus relied upon them and Maharbal to give himself a sizeable edge.

Maharbal is most famously known for what he allegedly^[1] said in a conversation with Hannibal immediately following the Battle of Cannae. According to Livy the conversation went like this: after Maharbal expressed interest on marching to Rome immediately: "I commend your zeal," he (Hannibal) said to Maharbal, "but I need time to weigh the plan which you propose." "Assuredly," Maharbal replied, "no one man has been blessed with all God's gifts. You, Hannibal, know how to gain a victory; you do not know how to use it."^[2] The famous Latin for the last sentence of the conversation goes like this: "Vincere scis, Hannibal; victoria uti nescis."

Military accomplishments

Maharbal (Fl. M.Ö. 2. yüzyıl) İkinci Pön Savaşı sırasında Hannibal'in süvari komutanı oldu. Sık sık Roma'nın Kartaca tarafının başarısı için kritik oldu. Onun İtalyan Kampanya boyunca Hannibal monte askerleri bir avantaj korumuştur ve böylece onları dayanıyordu ve kendisi büyükçe bir avantaj sağlamak için Maharbal. Maharbal en ünlü iddiaya göre [1] derhal Cannae Savaşı sonrasında Hannibal ile bir konuşma söylediklerini tanınır.Konuşma Livy göre böyle gitti: hemen Roma'ya yürüyen üzerine Maharbal ifade ilgi sonra: "Ben sizin heves takdir," diye (Hannibal), Maharbal dedi "ama ben seni öneriyorum planı tartmak için zamana ihtiyacım var." "Kuşkusuz," Maharbal "kimse insanın Allah'ın bütün nimetleri ile olmuştur Sen, Hannibal, zafer kazanmak için biliyorum., Siz nasıl kullanılacağını bilmiyorum" diye yanıtladı. [2] son cümle için ünlü Latinkonuşma şöyle devam ediyor: "Vincere SCI, Hannibal; victoria uti nescis."

Battle of Lake Trasimene (217 BC)

At the Trasimene, 6000 Romans who had escaped from the battle occupied a strong position in one of the neighbouring villages. These survivors were induced to lay down their arms, on receiving from Maharbal a promise of safety. Hannibal, however, refused to ratify the capitulation, alleging that Maharbal had exceeded his powers. He dismissed, without ransom, all those men who belonged to the Italian allies, and only retained the Roman citizens as prisoners of war. (Polyb. iii. 84, 85 ; Liv. xxii. 6, 7 ; Appian, Annib. 10.) Maharbal, despite being a cavalry commander, led Iberian skirmishers and infantry to round up the Romans who had survived the battle.

The consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, who was en route to meet with his co-consul Flaminius, had sent his cavalry ahead, led by the praetor C. Centenius. After the battle of Trasimene, Maharbal (leading a detachment of spearmen and cavalry) successfully intercepted C. Centinius and his detachment of 4000 cavalry. When Maharbal's force met with Centenius half of the Romans were killed, and the rest retreated. The surviving Roman cavalry were followed to a hill where they eventually surrendered.^[3]

After this battle, Maharbal was apparently sent with the Numidian cavalry to ravage the rich Falernian plains.

Trasimene anda, savaştan kaçmış 6000 Romalılar komşu köylerin birinde güçlü bir konumdaydı. Bu kişiler güvenlik Maharbal bir sözden alma, silah bırakmaya ikna edildi. Hannibal, ancak Maharbal yetkilerini aştığını iddia, kapitülasyon onaylamayı reddetti. O, fidye olmadan, İtalyan müttefikleri ait tüm bu adamlar işten ve sadece savaş esiri olarak Roman vatandaşların korudu. (Polyb. iii 84, 85;... Liv xxii 6, 7,.. Appian, Annib 10) Maharbal, bir süvari komutanı olmasına rağmen, led İber Süvarileri ve piyade savaş hayatta vardı Romalılar kadar yuvarlak. Onun co-konsolosu Flaminius ile karşılamak için yolda olduğu konsolosu Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, praetor C. Centenius önderliğinde, öncesinde onun süvari gönderdi. Trasimene, Maharbal (mızraklı ve süvari müfrezesi açan) savaşı başarıyla C. Centinius ve 4000 süvari onun dekolmanı ele sonra. Maharbal kullanıcısının kuvvet Centenius ile bir araya geldiğinde Romalılar yarısını öldürdü, ve geri kalanı geri çekildiler.Kalan Romalı süvariler onlar sonunda teslim bir tepeye kadar takip edildi. [3] Bu savaşın ardından, Maharbal görünüşte zengin Falernian ovalara etkilemesi Numidian süvari ile gönderildi.

After Cannae

Maharbal's fate after the Battle of Casilinium (Liv. xxiii. 18), is not known. A person of that name is mentioned by Frontinus (Strateg. ii. 5. § 12) as employed by the Carthaginians against some African tribes that had rebelled. However, it is not clear if this is the same Maharbal as Hannibal's cavalry commander. He may have died around the time of the siege of Casilinium, or shortly thereafter.

Bibliography

Smith, William (1849). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. Vol. 2. C. C. Little and J. Brown; [etc., etc. ]. p. 905. LCCN 07038839.
Lazenby, J.F. (1998). Hannibal's War. University of Oklahoma Press. pp. 64–6, 85. ISBN 0-8061-3004-0.

Notes

^ More recently, scholars have pointed out that the story derives from a notoriously corrupt and therefore unreliable manuscript of Livy, that Cannae was too far away to make a quick march on Rome feasible, that Hannibal's army was exhausted and in need of recovery (and resupply), and that Maharbal himself may not have been there. Livy's accounts of Cannae itself have been called into question; among other things, he attributed the Roman defeat partly to the rash behavior of the consul Gaius Terentius Varro, but internal evidence (from Livy himself) shows that the Senate and People of Rome did not blame Varro for the defeat, and that Lucius Aemilius Paullus was more likely to have been in command. In short, Livy is notorious for favouring the aristocratic and Senatorial party in his histories, and not an entirely reliable source. See Dexter Hoyos. "Maharbal's Bon Mot: Authenticity and Survival" The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2000), pp. 610-614 [1] (subscription required). Retrieved 12 October 2007
^ -Livy, The History of Rome 22.51
^ (Polyb. iii. 86 ; Liv. xxii. 8 ; Appian, Annib. 11.)

External links

"August 3, 216 B.C. - Cannae; Was Maharbal Correct?". Total War Forum thread.

Template:Persondata

[1] More recently, scholars have pointed out that the story derives from a notoriously corrupt and therefore unreliable manuscript of Livy, that Cannae was too far away to make a quick march on Rome feasible, that Hannibal's army was exhausted and in need of recovery (and resupply), and that Maharbal himself may not have been there. Livy's accounts of Cannae itself have been called into question; among other things, he attributed the Roman defeat partly to the rash behavior of the consul Gaius Terentius Varro, but internal evidence (from Livy himself) shows that the Senate and People of Rome did not blame Varro for the defeat, and that Lucius Aemilius Paullus was more likely to have been in command. In short, Livy is notorious for favouring the aristocratic and Senatorial party in his histories, and not an entirely reliable source. See Dexter Hoyos. "Maharbal's Bon Mot: Authenticity and Survival" The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2000), pp. 610-614 [1] (subscription required). Retrieved 12 October 2007

[2] -Livy, The History of Rome 22.51

[3] (Polyb. iii. 86 ; Liv. xxii. 8 ; Appian, Annib. 11.)

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@@ Line 15: / Line 15: @@
 After this battle, Maharbal was apparently sent with the Numidian cavalry to ravage the rich Falernian plains.
+Trasimene anda, savaştan kaçmış 6000 Romalılar komşu köylerin birinde güçlü bir konumdaydı. Bu kişiler güvenlik Maharbal bir sözden alma, silah bırakmaya ikna edildi. Hannibal, ancak Maharbal yetkilerini aştığını iddia, kapitülasyon onaylamayı reddetti. O, fidye olmadan, İtalyan müttefikleri ait tüm bu adamlar işten ve sadece savaş esiri olarak Roman vatandaşların korudu. (Polyb. iii 84, 85;... Liv xxii 6, 7,.. Appian, Annib 10) Maharbal, bir süvari komutanı olmasına rağmen, led İber Süvarileri ve piyade savaş hayatta vardı Romalılar kadar yuvarlak.
-==Battle of Cannae (216 BC)==
+Onun co-konsolosu Flaminius ile karşılamak için yolda olduğu konsolosu Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, praetor C. Centenius önderliğinde, öncesinde onun süvari gönderdi. Trasimene, Maharbal (mızraklı ve süvari müfrezesi açan) savaşı başarıyla C. Centinius ve 4000 süvari onun dekolmanı ele sonra. Maharbal kullanıcısının kuvvet Centenius ile bir araya geldiğinde Romalılar yarısını öldürdü, ve geri kalanı geri çekildiler.Kalan Romalı süvariler onlar sonunda teslim bir tepeye kadar takip edildi. [3]
+Bu savaşın ardından, Maharbal görünüşte zengin Falernian ovalara etkilemesi Numidian süvari ile gönderildi.
-Maharbal's role in this famous battle is uncertain.  Roman historians are themselves divided on his presence or absence, and the most reliable of them, Polybius, does not mention his presence at all.<ref>Polybius's omission of his name is probably most significant, because he was the closest in age to the survivors of Cannae, and he was close friends with [[Scipio Aemilianus|the grandson]] of [[Aemilius Paullus|one of the consuls]] who died at Cannae.</ref>
-According to Livy, Maharbal commanded the right wing of the Carthaginian army at the battle of Cannae. Appian, on the contrary, assigns him on that occasion the command of the reserve of cavalry.
-Livy claims that immediately after the victory, Maharbal urged Hannibal to push on at once with his cavalry upon Rome itself, promising him that if he did so, within five days he should sup in the Capitol. On the refusal of his commander, Maharbal is said to have observed, that Hannibal knew indeed how to gain victories, but not how to use them. (Liv. xxii. 13, 46, 51 ; Appian, Annib. 20, 21 ; Floras, ii. 5 ; Zonar. ix. 1 ; Cato ap. Gell. x. 24 ; Plutarch, Fab. 17, erroneously assigns this advice to a Carthaginian of the name of Barca.)   However, modern historians judge Hannibal's decision more reasonably than did William Smith and his contemporaries. They point to the fact that Hannibal's army was exhausted, that Rome was able to raise fresh legions, that Rome itself was defended by formidable walls, and that Hannibal had no siege machinery.<ref>See a summary of historians' opinions at "The aftermath of Cannae: why did Hannibal not go for Rome?" 26 June 2006 on the blog ''Roman History Books and More'' written by Irene B. Hahn. [http://romanhistorybooks.typepad.com/roman_history_books_and_m/2006/06/post_2.html]</ref>
 ==After Cannae==