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The doctrine stressed the need for rebuilding good relations between [[Eastern European]] countries, which on Poland's part called for a rejection of any imperial ambitions and controversial territorial claims, accepting the post-war border changes.<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name="Lorek2009"/>><ref name=liberteworld/> It supported independence for [[Belarus]] and [[Ukraine]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> It also called for treating other Eastern European countries as equally important as Russia, and for refusing any special treatment for Russia.<ref name=spw/><ref name=lit/> The doctrine was not antagonistic towards Russia, but it required that both Poland and Russia should abandon their struggle over domination of other Eastern European countries (in this context, primarily meaning the [[Baltic states]], Belarus and Ukraine (which let to yet another name for the doctrine, the ULB doctrine, with ULB standing for Ukraine Lithuania Belarus).<ref name=liberteworld/><ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name=spw/><ref name=lit/>
The doctrine stressed the need for rebuilding good relations between [[Eastern European]] countries, which on Poland's part called for a rejection of any imperial ambitions and controversial territorial claims, accepting the post-war border changes.<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name="Lorek2009"/>><ref name=liberteworld/> It supported independence for [[Belarus]] and [[Ukraine]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> It also called for treating other Eastern European countries as equally important as Russia, and for refusing any special treatment for Russia.<ref name=spw/><ref name=lit/> The doctrine was not antagonistic towards Russia, but it required that both Poland and Russia should abandon their struggle over domination of other Eastern European countries (in this context, primarily meaning the [[Baltic states]], Belarus and Ukraine (which let to yet another name for the doctrine, the ULB doctrine, with ULB standing for Ukraine Lithuania Belarus).<ref name=liberteworld/><ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name=spw/><ref name=lit/>


This doctrine was supportive of the [[European Union]], and aimed at removing Eastern European countries from the Russian/Soviet [[sphere of influence]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> The doctrine became realized in the [[foreign policy of Poland]] once the country regained its own independence from the Soviet influence following the [[fall of communism]] in 1989, and begun integrating into the EU structure (eventually [[Poland and the European Union|joining EU in 2004]]).<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name="Lorek2009"/><ref name=spw/> One of the examples of the employment of that doctrine was the Polish support for Ukraine membership in EU and NATO.<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> The doctrine resulted in some tensions in the [[Polish-Russian relations]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> It has also been questioned by some publicists and politicians, particularly in the 21st century,<ref name=spw/> and it has been suggested that this doctrine has been abandoned in the recent years by [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Poland)|Polish Foreign Ministry]],<ref name=liberteworld/> although others argue the policy is still in force and endorsed by the Ministry.<ref name=lit/>
This doctrine was supportive of the [[European Union]], and aimed at removing Eastern European countries from the Russian/Soviet [[sphere of influence]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> The doctrine became realized in the [[foreign policy of Poland]] once the country regained its own independence from the Soviet influence following the [[fall of communism]] in 1989, and begun integrating into the EU structure (eventually [[Poland and the European Union|joining EU in 2004]]).<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/><ref name="Lorek2009"/><ref name=spw/> One of the examples of the employment of that doctrine was the Polish support for Ukraine membership in EU and NATO.<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> The doctrine resulted in some tensions in the [[Polish-Russian relations]].<ref name="Szczerbiak2012"/> It has also been questioned by some publicists and politicians, particularly in the 21st century,<ref name=spw/> and it has been suggested that this doctrine has been abandoned in the recent years by [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Poland)|Polish Foreign Ministry]],<ref name=liberteworld/> although others argue the policy is still in force and endorsed by the Ministry.<ref name=lit/><ref>''O Giedroycia sporu nie ma. Rozmowa z Radosławem Sikorskim''. In: Nowa Europa Wschodnia 1/2010, p. 69–77 {{pdf|http://www.new.org.pl/files/docs/new110.pdf}}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==
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==External links==
==External links==
*[http://pulaski.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=342%3Ajeli-nie-ulb-to-co-doktryna-giedroycia-w-xxi-w-&catid=13%3Aprogram-wschodni&Itemid=53&lang=pl „Jeśli nie ULB, to co? Doktryna Giedroycia w XXI w.” | 17 czerwca 2010]
*[http://pulaski.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=342%3Ajeli-nie-ulb-to-co-doktryna-giedroycia-w-xxi-w-&catid=13%3Aprogram-wschodni&Itemid=53&lang=pl „Jeśli nie ULB, to co? Doktryna Giedroycia w XXI w.” [If not ULB then what? Giedroyc Doctrine in the 21st century] | 17 czerwca 2010]
*Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, ''[http://www.rp.pl/artykul/486685.html Pożegnanie z Giedroyciem]'', Rzeczpospolita, 28-05-2010
*Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, ''[http://www.rp.pl/artykul/486685.html Pożegnanie z Giedroyciem]'' [Farewell with Giedroyc], Rzeczpospolita, 28-05-2010
*Andrzej Brzeziecki, [http://www.new.org.pl/2010-06-10,abdoktryna_ulb_koncepcja_giedroycia_i_mieroszewskiego_w_xxi_wieku.html Doktryna ULB – koncepcja Giedroycia i Mieroszewskiego w XXI wieku] ([http://www.new.org.pl/2010-07-02,zndoktryna_ulb_koncepcja_giedroycia_i_mieroszewskiego_w_xxi_wieku.html] - commentary by Zdzisław Najder)]
*Andrzej Brzeziecki, [http://www.new.org.pl/2010-06-10,abdoktryna_ulb_koncepcja_giedroycia_i_mieroszewskiego_w_xxi_wieku.html Doktryna ULB – koncepcja Giedroycia i Mieroszewskiego w XXI wieku] [ULB doctrine - Giedroyc and Mieroszewski's concept in the 21st century] ([http://www.new.org.pl/2010-07-02,zndoktryna_ulb_koncepcja_giedroycia_i_mieroszewskiego_w_xxi_wieku.html] - commentary by Zdzisław Najder)]
*Marcin Wojciechowski, ''Co po Giedroyciu? Giedroyc!'' [What after Giedroyc? Giedroyc!]. In: Nowa Europa Wschodnia 1/2010, p. 69–77 {{pdf|http://www.new.org.pl/files/docs/new110.pdf}}


[[Category:Foreign relations of Poland]]
[[Category:Foreign relations of Poland]]

Revision as of 10:21, 7 March 2013

Giedroyc doctrine (Template:Lang-pl) was a political doctrine of some post-war Polish emigree politicians and activists, focusing on reconciliation between Eastern European countries.

The doctrine was named after a Polish emigree politician, Jerzy Giedroyc, who developed it in the 1970s in the Kultura journal, together with Juliusz Mieroszewski (occasionally the doctrine is even called the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine[1][2]) and the "Maisons-Laffitte group".[3][4][5][6][1] It can be traced to the interwar Prometheism ideals of Józef Piłsudski.[6]

The doctrine stressed the need for rebuilding good relations between Eastern European countries, which on Poland's part called for a rejection of any imperial ambitions and controversial territorial claims, accepting the post-war border changes.[3][6]>[5] It supported independence for Belarus and Ukraine.[3] It also called for treating other Eastern European countries as equally important as Russia, and for refusing any special treatment for Russia.[4][1] The doctrine was not antagonistic towards Russia, but it required that both Poland and Russia should abandon their struggle over domination of other Eastern European countries (in this context, primarily meaning the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine (which let to yet another name for the doctrine, the ULB doctrine, with ULB standing for Ukraine Lithuania Belarus).[5][3][4][1]

This doctrine was supportive of the European Union, and aimed at removing Eastern European countries from the Russian/Soviet sphere of influence.[3] The doctrine became realized in the foreign policy of Poland once the country regained its own independence from the Soviet influence following the fall of communism in 1989, and begun integrating into the EU structure (eventually joining EU in 2004).[3][6][4] One of the examples of the employment of that doctrine was the Polish support for Ukraine membership in EU and NATO.[3] The doctrine resulted in some tensions in the Polish-Russian relations.[3] It has also been questioned by some publicists and politicians, particularly in the 21st century,[4] and it has been suggested that this doctrine has been abandoned in the recent years by Polish Foreign Ministry,[5] although others argue the policy is still in force and endorsed by the Ministry.[1][7]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d e Živilė Dambrauskaitė, Tomas Janeliūnas, Vytis Jurkonis, Vytautas Sirijos Gira, Lithuanian – Polish Relations Reconsidered: A Constrained Bilateral Agenda or an Empty Strategic Partnership?, p.126-127 online, also Template:Pdf
  2. ^ http://www.przeglad-tygodnik.pl/pl/artykul/do-uczniow-giedroycia
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h Aleks Szczerbiak (23 April 2012). Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?. CRC Press. pp. 1904–1905. ISBN 978-1-134-17902-2. Retrieved 7 March 2013.
  4. ^ a b c d e Piotr A. Maciążek, Słownik PolitykiWschodniej, Template:Pdf
  5. ^ a b c d http://liberteworld.com/2011/03/08/the-giedroyc-era-ended-in-foreign-policy/
  6. ^ a b c d Andreas Lorek (February 2009). Poland's Role in the Development of an 'Eastern Dimension' of the European Union. GRIN Verlag. pp. 23–24. ISBN 978-3-640-25671-6. Retrieved 7 March 2013.
  7. ^ O Giedroycia sporu nie ma. Rozmowa z Radosławem Sikorskim. In: Nowa Europa Wschodnia 1/2010, p. 69–77 Template:Pdf
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