St. Francis Dam

St. Francis Dam
California Historical Landmark
Official name	St. Francis Dam disaster
Reference no.	919

The St. Francis Dam was a curved concrete gravity dam, built to create a large regulating and storage reservoir as part of the Los Angeles Aqueduct. It was located in San Francisquito Canyon, about 40 miles (64 km) northwest of Los Angeles, California, approximately 10 miles (16 km) north of the city of Santa Clarita. The name "St. Francis" is an anglicized version of the name of the canyon.

The dam was designed and built between 1924 and 1926 by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, then named the Bureau of Water Works and Supply. The department was under the supervision of its General Manager and Chief Engineer, William Mulholland.

At two and a half minutes before midnight on March 12, 1928 the dam failed catastrophically and the resulting flood killed up to 600 people. The collapse of the St. Francis Dam is considered to be one of the worst American civil engineering failures of the 20th century and remains the second-greatest loss of life in California's history, after the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and fire. The disaster marked the end of Mulholland's career.

Planning and design

In the early days of Los Angeles, the city's water supply was obtained from the Los Angeles River. Water was brought from the river by a series of ditches called zanjas. A private water company, the Los Angeles City Water Company, leased the city's waterworks and provided water to the city. Hired in 1878, as a zanjero (ditch tender) Mulholland proved to be a brilliant employee who after doing his day's work would study textbooks on mathematics, hydraulics, geology and taught himself engineering and geology. Mulholland quickly moved up the ranks of the Water Company and was promoted to Superintendent in 1886.

In 1902, the City of Los Angeles took over the city's water supply and the city council established the Water Department with Mulholland continuing as Superintendent. The city charter was amended in 1911 and the Water Department was renamed the Bureau of Water Works and Supply, again with Mulholland continuing as Superintendent, he was also named as its chief engineer.

Mulholland supervised the design and construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, which at the time was the longest aqueduct in the world and used gravity alone to bring the water 233 miles (380 km) from the Owens Valley to the city of Los Angeles. The enormous project was completed in 1913, on time and under budget, despite several setbacks. Excluding incidents of sabotage by Owens Valley residents in the early years, the aqueduct has operated well throughout its history and is still in operation today..

In the process of designing and building the Los Angeles Aqueduct, Mulholland had considered sections of San Francisquito Canyon as a potential dam site as early as 1911. He felt that there should be a reservoir of sufficient size to provide water for Los Angeles for an extended period of time in the event of a drought or if the aqueduct was damaged by an earthquake. In particular he favored the area between where power house No. 1 and No. 2 were to be built, were with what he perceived as favorable topography, a natural narrowing of the canyon downstream of a wide, upstream platform and thereby would allow the creation a large reservoir area with a minimum possible dam. He ordered exploratory tunnels excavated into the hillside area of what would later be the western side of the dam and also water percolation tests performed. Although the reddish sandstone conglomerate appeared crumbly, it passed all of his tests. With the Los Angeles Aqueduct to be run through the eastern side of the canyon, to Mulholland, the location would be ideal.

The population of Los Angeles was increasing rapidly and with this rapid growth came the demand for a larger water supply. Between 1920 and 1926 alone seven smaller reservoirs were built and modifications were made to raise the height its largest of the time, the Lower San Fernando, by seven feet but the need for a larger reservoir was obvious. Originally, the planned site of this new large reservoir was to be in Big Tujunja Canyon, above the city now known as Sunland, located in the southeast portion of the San Fernando Valley, but the high value placed on the ranches and private land needed were, in Mulholland's view, an attempted hold up of the city purses. He ceased the attempts at purchasing those lands and renewed his interest in the area he had explored twelve years earlier, the federally owned and far less expensive land in San Francisquito Canyon.

The approximate extent of the reservoir created by the dam

Construction and modification

The St. Francis would be only the second concrete dam to be designed and built by the Bureau of Water Works and Supply. The first was the near identical, in size and shape, Mulholland Dam, on which construction had begun one year earlier. Construction began without the usual fanfare for a municipal project of this nature. The Los Angeles Aqueduct had become the target of frequent sabotage by angry farmers and landowners in the Owens Valley and the city was eager to avoid any repeat of these expensive and time-consuming repairs. By June 1923 the studies and surveys for the St. Francis reservoir had been completed. At the time the reservoir as planned was to have a capacity of 30,000 acre⋅ft (37,000,000 m³) and called for a dam to be built to the elevation of 1,825 ft (556 m) above sea level, which is 175 ft (53 m) above the stream bed.

In his July 1, 1924, report to the Board of Public Service Commissioners, Mulholland gave the capacity of the reservoir as 32,000 acre-feet (39,000,000 m³). On the same day Office Engineer W. Hurlbut informed Mulholland that all of the preliminary work on the dam had been completed. Construction of the dam itself began five weeks later when in early August the first concrete was poured. In March 1925, prior to Mulholland's yearly report to the Board of Public Service Commissioners, Hurlbut again reported to Mulholland on the progress of the St. Francis dam and reservoir. He stated the reservoir would have a capacity of 38,000 acre-feet (47,000,000 m³) and that the dam's height would be 185 ft (56 m) above stream bed level. Office Engineer Hurlbut wrote, in explanation of these changes, which was presented to the Board of Public Service Commissioners that, "Additional surveys and changes in the plans have disclosed that at crest elevation of 1835 feet above sea level the reservoir will have a capacity of 38,000 acre-feet."

The 10-foot (3.0 m) increase in the dam's height over the original plan of 1923 necessitated the construction of a 588-foot (179 m) long wing dike along the top of the ridge adjacent to the western abutment in order to contain the enlarged reservoir. Exactly when this change in design took place does not appear in any records although, it would appear that it was after construction had begun.

Prelude to disaster

Water began to fill the reservoir on March 1, 1926. It rose steadily and uneventfully, other than several temperature and contraction cracks which appeared in the dam and some minor seepage under the abutments. Mulholland and his assistant, Harvey Van Norman, inspected the cracks and leaks and judged them to be within expectation for a concrete dam the size of the St. Francis. At the beginning of April of that year, the water level reached the area of the inactive San Francisquito Fault line in the western abutment. Some seepage began almost immediately as the water covered this area. Workers were ordered to seal off the leak, although they were not entirely successful and water continued to permeate through the face of the dam. A two-inch pipe was laid from the fault line down to the home of the dam keeper, Tony Harnischfeger, and the seepage it collected was used by him for domestic purposes. Water that collected in the drainage pipes under the dam to relieve the hydrostatic uplift pressure was carried off in this manner as well. In April 1927 the reservoir level was brought to within ten feet of the spillway, and during most of the month of May the water level was within three feet of overflowing. It is significant to note that there were no large changes in the amount of the seepage that was collected and month after month, the pipe flowed about one-third full. This is an insignificant amount for a dam the size of the St. Francis, and on this subject Mulholland said, "Of all the dams I have built and of all the dams I have ever seen, it was the driest dam of its size I ever saw." The seepage data recorded during the 1926–1927 period does show that the dam was an exceptionally dry structure.

On May 27 the problems in the Owens Valley escalated again with the dynamiting of a large section of the Los Angeles Aqueduct. A second incident a few days later destroyed another large section. The near full reservoir behind the St. Francis dam was the only source of water from the north and withdrawals began immediately. The Daily Record of High Water Elevations of the St. Francis Dam shows that between May 27 and June 30 alone, between 7000 and 8000 acre-feet were used. Through June and July the Owens Valley fight continued, as did the interruptions in the flow from the aqueduct. This in turn continued the withdrawals from the reservoir.

In early August, the Owens Valley conflict was at its height when suddenly the Inyo County Bank closed the doors of all their branches. An audit of the bank revealed the owners, Wilfred and Mark Watterson, who had not only been Inyo County’s financial leaders but also who had organized the valley residents into a unified opposition, were not only bankrupt themselves, there were large cash shortages from the vault and numerous inconsistencies found in the banks accounting books. The two were indicted for embezzlement and later they were tried and convicted on 36 counts. All of the local business had been transacted through their banks, and the closures had left merchants and customers with little more than what small amount of money they had on hand at the time. The attacks on the aqueduct ceased, and in the face of the collapse of both resistance and the Owens Valley economy, the city sponsored a series of repair and maintenance programs for aqueduct facilities that stimulated local employment.

Once again the St. Francis reservoir level rose. The level rose steadily for the next six months until in early February 1928, when the water level was brought to within one foot of the spillway. On March 7, 1928, the reservoir was three inches below the spillway crest and having reached full capacity, Mulholland ordered that no more water be turned into the St. Francis. Unlike its prior filling the year before, it was not uneventful. Several new cracks appeared in the dam and the wing dike and there were also new areas of seepage seen under both abutments.

During the morning of March 12, while conducting his usual inspection of the dam, the dam keeper discovered a new leak in the west abutment. Concerned not only because other leaks had appeared in this same area in the past but more so that the muddy color of the runoff he observed could indicate the water was eroding the foundation of the dam, he immediately alerted Mulholland. After arriving, both Mulholland and Van Norman began inspecting the area of the leak. Van Norman found the source and by following the runoff determined that the muddy appearance of the water was not from the leak itself, but came from where the water contacted loose soil from a newly cut access road. The leak was discharging 2 to 3 cubic feet per second (15 to 22 US gallons (57 to 83 L; 12 to 18 imp gal)) of water, by their approximation and at times the volume being discharged was inconsistent, they later testified to this at the Coroner's Inquest.

Twice as they watched, an acceleration or surging of the flow was noticed by both men. Mulholland felt that some corrective measures were needed although this could be done at some time in the future. For the next two hours, Mulholland, Van Norman and Harnischfeger inspected the dam and the various leaks and seepages finding nothing out of the ordinary for a large dam. With both Mulholland and Van Norman convinced that the new leak was not dangerous and that the dam was safe, they returned to Los Angeles.

Collapse and flood wave

Two and a half minutes before midnight on March 12, 1928, the St. Francis Dam catastrophically failed.

Although there were no eyewitnesses to the collapse, the time of 11:57:30 p.m. is the accepted time of the failure. This is due to the known facts that at this time, personnel of the Bureau of Water Works and Supply at both Receiving Stations in Los Angeles and at Powerhouse No. 1 noted a sharp drop in the voltage on their lines. Also, it was at this same time that a transformer at Southern California Edison's Saugus substation exploded. That transformer was connected to their Lancaster power line which ran up the western hillside of the canyon near the dam to poles that were located about ninety feet above the east abutment. It was established during the investigations that this line was severed as the eastern hillside and abutment gave way. The grounded lines caused a short which in turn caused the transformer to explode.

No fewer than four separate people passed the dam within an hour of the failure and none of them noticed any conditions which were out of the ordinary. A motorcyclist named Ace Hopewell had ridden past the dam, by his approximation, ten minutes before midnight. In his testimony at the Coroner's Inquest, he stated that he rode up the canyon and had passed both Powerhouse No. 2 (a hydroelectric power plant) and the dam without seeing anything which would cause concern. Although, he went on to state that at approximately one mile (1.6 km) upstream of the dam he heard, above the sound of his motorcycle, what to him was much like "rocks rolling down the mountain." He stopped and checked the hillsides above him. The sound which he had heard earlier was behind him, and he assumed this had possibly been a landslide, as these were common to the area. It is believed that he was the last person to have seen the St. Francis Dam intact.

As the dam collapsed, the reservoir's 12.4 billion U.S. gallons (47 billion liters) of water began to surge down San Francisquito Canyon in a dam break wave. The dam keeper and his family were most likely among the first casualties caught in the flood wave, which was at about 140 ft (43 m) high when it hit their cottage, approximately 1/4 mile (400 m) downstream from the dam. The body of Leona Johnson, the woman who lived with the Harnischfegers (often mistakenly reported later as Harnischfeger's wife) was found fully clothed and wedged between two blocks of concrete near the base of the dam. This led to the suggestion she and the dam keeper may have been inspecting the dam immediately prior to its failure. Neither Tony Harnischfeger's body nor that of his six-year-old son, Coder, were ever found.

Five minutes after the collapse, having traveled a distance of one and one-half miles (2.4 km) at an average speed of 18 miles per hour (29 km/h), the now 120-foot-high (37 m) flood wave destroyed the heavy concrete Powerhouse No. 2 and took the lives of 64 of the other 67 workmen and their families who lived nearby. The water traveled south down the canyon and began emptying into the Santa Clara riverbed. The amount of water was too great and caused it quickly to begin overflowing its banks, flooding parts of present-day Valencia and Newhall. The deluge, now 55 ft (17 m) high, was generally following the course of the river bed west. In doing so, hit and demolished Southern California Edison Saugus substation, leaving the entire Santa Clara River Valley and part of the city of Ventura without power.

At this time, near 1:00 AM, at least four miles of the state's main north-south highway (now Interstate 5) was under water and a short distance away, near what is presently the area around Six Flags Magic Mountain amusement park to State Route 126, the flood was washing away the town of Castaic Junction. At a speed of 12 mph (19 km/h) the water continued on and entered the valley. Approximately five miles downstream, near the Ventura and Los Angeles county line, on the flats of the river bank the Edison Company had set up had a temporary construction camp for its 150 man crew. Due to miscommunication and confusion among the Edison personnel, no warning was sent and 84 of them died.

The Santa Clara River Valley's lone telephone operator, Louise Gipe, was at her station located in Santa Paula when she received a message shortly before 1:30 AM that the St. Francis Dam had broken and a tremendous wall of water was sweeping down the valley. She was given orders to notify the authorities and then warn those who lived in the low lying areas. She immediately called California Highway Patrol officer Thorton Edwards, who lived in Santa Paula, and then began calling the homes of those in danger. Edwards, within a short time joined by another officer, Stanley Baker, used their motorcycles to awaken and warn residents by leaving their sirens running and criss-crossing the streets in the danger zone. The two policemen continued this until the rising floodwater forced their retreat.

The flood devastated much of the towns of Fillmore, Santa Paula and Bardsdale before emptying its victims and debris into the Pacific Ocean near Ventura at Montalvo at 5:30 AM. The flood had taken only 5 hours and 27 minutes to travel the 54 miles (87 km) from the reservoir and dam site. At this time, it was almost two miles (3 km) wide and traveling at a speed of 6 mph (9.7 km/h). Bodies of victims were recovered from the Pacific Ocean, some as far south as the Mexican border.

Newspapers across the country carried accounts of the disaster. The front page of the Los Angeles Times ran four stories, including aerial photos of the obliterated dam, the city of Santa Paula after its wake and a partial list of the dead. It also set up a Times Flood Relief Fund, to receive donations from around the country. The Times also reported that Mullholland issued a statement saying, "I would not venture at this time to express a positive opinion as to the cause of the St. Francis Dam disaster... Mr. Van Norman and I arrived at the scene of the break around 2:30am this morning. We saw at once that the dam was completely out and that the torrential flood of water from the reservoir had left an appalling record of death and destruction in the valley below." In the article, Mullholland stated that it appeared that there had been major movement in the hills forming the western buttress of the dam. He added that three eminent geologists, Robert T. Hill, C. F. Tolman and D. W. Murphy had been hired by the Board of Water and Power Commissioners to determine if this was the cause. It was noted that there were no tremors reported at seismograph stations and an earthquake could be ruled out as the cause of the break.

Investigation of the failure

The collapse of the dam prompted the creation of over a dozen separate investigations into the cause of failure. Almost all of these comprised investigative panels of prominent engineers and geologists. The more notable of these groups and committees were those sponsored by California governor C. C. Young, headed by A. J. Wiley, the renowned dam engineer and consultant to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Boulder (Hoover) Dam Board; the Los Angeles City Council, which was chaired by the Chief of the Reclamation Service, Elwood Mead; the Los Angeles County coroner, Frank Nance and Los Angeles County District Attorney Asa Keyes. There were others convened: The Water and Power Commissioners started their own inquiry, as did the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors who hired J. B. Lippincott. The Santa Clara River Protective Association employed the geologist and Stanford Univesity professor emeriitus, Dr. Bailey Willis and eminent San Francisco Civil Engineer and past president of the American Society of Civil Engineers Carl E. Grunsky.

Although they were not in unanimous agreement on all points, most very quickly reached their respective conclusions. The governor's commission met on March 19 and submitted their 79-page report to the governor five days later. Although this was sufficient time to correctly answer what they had been ask to determine, what they were deprived of was the sworn testimony at the Coroner's Inquest, which was the only inquiry that took into consideration factors other than geology and engineering. The need for answers and quickly, is more understandable in light that it had its roots in the Swing–Johnson Bill, which would provide the funding for constructing the Hoover Dam, was before Congress at the time. Supporters and responsible leaders alike realized the jeopardy of which the latter was now in. Although the water and electricity the project would provide was needed, the idea of the construction of such a massive dam of similar design and that it would create a reservoir seven hundred times larger then that had been held behind the St. Francis did not sit well with many in light of the recent disaster and the devastation, all of which was fresh in their minds.

The governor's commission was the first to release its findings, which was titled Report of the Commission appointed by Governor C. C. Young to investigate the causes leading to the failure of the St. Francis dam near Saugus, Californa, became the most widely distributed report. Like most of the other investigators, they perceived the new leak as the key to understanding the collapse. The commission it should be noted, believed that "the foundation under the entire dam left very much to be desired" but placed the cause of the failure on the western hillside. "The west end," the commission stated, "was founded upon a reddish conglomerate which, even when dry, was of decidedly inferior strength and which, when wet, became so soft that most of it lost almost all rock characteristics." The softening of the "reddish conglomerate" undermined the west side. "The rush of water released by failure of the west end caused a heavy scour against the easterly canyon wall ... and caused the failure of that part of the structure." There then "quickly followed ... the collapse of large sections of the dam."

The committee appointed by the city council, for the most part, concurred in placing the cause of the collapse to "defective foundations" and wrote, "The manner of failure was that the first leak, however started, began under the concrete at that part of the dam which stood on the red conglomerate ; this leak increased in volume as it scoured away the foundation material already greatly softened by infiltrated water from the reservoir which removed the support of the dam at this point and since no arch action could occur by reason of the yielding conglomerate abutment, made failure of the dam inevitable." Likewise, they concluded the failure most likely followed a pattern similar to that which was proposed by the governor's commission, although they did acknowledge that "the sequence of failure is uncertain." The committee ended their report with the following conclusions:

1. The type and dimensions of the dam were amply sufficient if based on suitable foundation.
2. The concrete of which the dam was built was of ample strength to resist the stresses to which it would normally be subjected.
3. The failure cannot be laid to movement of the earth's crust.
4. The dam failed as a result of defective foundations.
5. This failure reflects in no way the stability of a well designed gravity dam properly founded on suitable bedrock.

There consensus between most all the investigators was that the initial break took place at or near the fault line, which had been a problem area since water first covered the area, on the western abutment. The only theory to vary greatly from the others was that of Dr. Bailey Willis and Carl Grunsky. They believed that the portion of the east abutment below the dam was the first to give way, clearing the way for the collapse to take place. With most of the basic questions as to the cause seemingly answered, the experts turned their attention toward speculating on the sequence of events as the dam failed with its reservoir filled.

Huge concrete block from the west abutment of the dam about half a mile below the dam. The block is approximately 63 feet long, 30 feet high, and 54 feet wide. The dam wing wall is in the distance. (March 17, 1928)

Looking across the canyon at the damsite today; the wing dike necessitated by the increased height of the dam is visible on the left, and the outline of land slides are visible on the far side of the canyon.

Remains of the "Tombstone" section of the dam in 2009. The partially buried edges of the stair-stepped face of the dam are visible.

Aftermath

The center section of the dam, later nicknamed "The Tombstone", remained standing. The rest of the dam broke into numerous smaller and several large pieces, most of which were washed downstream. The largest piece, weighing 10,000 tons, was found about three-quarters of a mile (1200 m) below the dam site.

A few months after the collapse 18-year-old Lercy Parker fell to his death from the standing section after his friend had thrown a dead rattlesnake at him as a joke. In May, 1929, the upright section was toppled with dynamite and the remaining blocks were demolished with bulldozers and jackhammers to discourage sightseers and souvenir hunters from exploring the ruins. The wing dike, which had also remained intact, was used by Los Angeles firemen to gain experience in using explosives on building structures. The St. Francis Dam was not rebuilt, though Bouquet Reservoir in nearby Bouquet Canyon and Castaic Dam in the town of Castaic were subsequently built in 1934 and 1973, respectively, as replacements for the St. Francis Dam.

To this day, the exact number of victims remains unknown. The official death toll in August 1928 was 385, but the remains of victims continued to be discovered every few years through the mid-1950s. Many victims were swept out to sea when the flood reached the Pacific Ocean and were never recovered while others were washed ashore, some as far south as the Mexican border. The remains of another victim were found deep underground near Newhall in 1992, and the current death toll is estimated to be more than 600 victims, excluding the itinerant farm workers camped in San Francisquito Canyon, the exact number of which will never be known.

At the Coroner's Inquest, the leak that Tony Harnischfeger had spotted was cited as evidence that the dam was leaking on the day of the break and that both the Bureau of Water Works and Supply and Mulholland were aware of it. Mulholland told the jury he had been at the dam not only on the day of the break, due to the dam keepers call, but on the day before, as well, on a routine inspection. He testified that he had observed nothing of concern on either day, nor any dangerous conditions. Mulholland further testified that leaks in dams, especially of the type and size of the St. Francis, were common. During the Inquest Mulholland was heard to say, "the only people I envy in this whole thing are the dead." As the Inquest was nearing a close, he said, "Don't blame anyone else, you just fasten it on me. If there was an error in human judgment, I was the human, and I won't try to fasten it on anyone else."

At the Coroner's Inquest, the jury determined that a portion of responsibility for the disaster lay with the Bureau of Water Works and Supply and the department's General Manager and Chief Engineer, William Mulholland for an "error in engineering judgment". Although, they did clear Mulholland of any criminal charges since neither he nor anyone else at the time could have known of the instability of the rock formations on which the dam was built. The hearings also recommended that "the construction and operation of a great dam should never be left to the sole judgment of one man, no matter how eminent."

Mulholland retired from the Bureau of Water Works and Supply in March 1929. His assistant, Harvey Van Norman, succeeded him as chief engineer and general manager. Mulholland was retained as Chief Consulting Engineer, with an office, and received a salary of $500.00 a month. In later years, he retreated into a life of self-imposed semi isolation. He died in 1935, at the age of 79.

In response to the St. Francis Dam disaster, California Legislature created a dam safety program in 1929 and the California Department of Water Resources was created in 1956 by Governor Goodwin Knight following severe flooding across Northern California in 1955, combining the Division of Water Resources of the Department of Public Works with the State Engineer's Office, the Water Project Authority, and the State Water Resources Board.

Analysis

The failure of the dam is now believed to have begun when the eastern abutment of the dam gave way due to a landslide. The material on which the eastern abutment of the dam had been built was itself part of an ancient landslide, but this would have been impossible for almost any geologists of the 1920s to detect. Indeed, two of the world's leading geologists at the time, John C. Branner of Stanford University and Carl E. Grunsky, had found no fault with the San Francisquito rock. The dam was also built squarely over the San Francisquito fault, although this fault is likely inactive.

J. David Rogers, a professor of geological engineering at Missouri University of Science and Technology, published a comprehensive account of geologic actions which likely led to the dam's failure. He attributed the failure to three major factors: the instability of the ancient landslide material on which the dam was built, the failure to compensate for the additional height added to the dam's design, and the design and construction being overseen by only one person.

A critique of Rogers' historical analysis of the dam's collapse was published in the journal California History in 2004 by historians Norris Hundley Jr. (Professor Emeritus, UCLA) and Donald C. Jackson (Professor, Lafayette College). While accepting most of Rogers' geological analysis of the failure, the article makes more clear the differences and deficiencies of the structure built in San Francisquito Canyon and how it fell somewhat short of the standards for large-scale concrete gravity dams as practiced by other prominent dam engineers in the 1920s.

Mulholland Dam reinforced

Shortly after the disaster, many living below Mulholland Dam, which creates the Hollywood Reservoir, petitioned the City of Los Angeles to reinforce it. The dam, almost identical in shape and design to the St. Francis Dam, was reinforced by piling tons of earth and rock on its face.

Present-day remains

The only visible remains of the St. Francis Dam are weathered, broken chunks of gray concrete and the rusted remnants of the handrails that lined the top of the dam and the wing dike. The ruins and the scar from the ancient landslide can be seen from San Francisquito Canyon Road, about five miles (8 km) north of the community of Newhall.

The site of the disaster is registered as California Historical Landmark #919. The landmark is located on the grounds of Powerhouse No. 2 and is near San Francisquito Canyon Road.

The road sustained heavy storm damage in 2005 and when rebuilt, it was routed away from both the remains of the dam and the damaged portion of the roadway.

A mass grave for victims of the disaster is at Ivy Lawn Memorial Park, in nearby Ventura.

In popular culture

• Robert Towne made numerous references to Mulholland, the California Water Wars, the aqueduct, and the St. Francis Dam disaster in his screenplay for the 1974 Neo-noir movie Chinatown. Mulholland is split between the characters of Noah Cross and the city's chief engineer Hollis Mulwray. In one scene, Hollis Mulwray makes a specific reference to the St. Francis Dam disaster, speaking of the fictitious "Van der Lip Dam":

  In case you've forgotten, gentlemen, over five hundred lives were lost when the Van der Lip Dam gave way. Core samples have shown that beneath this bedrock is shale similar to the permeable shale in the Van der Lip disaster. It couldn't withstand that kind of pressure there. And now you propose yet another dirt-banked terminus dam with slopes of two and one half to one, one hundred twelve feet high and a twelve thousand acre water surface. Well, it won't hold. I won't build it. It's that simple. I am not making that kind of mistake twice. Thank you, gentlemen.

• Also in 1974, the movie Earthquake showed the Mulholland Dam meeting a nearly identical demise to that of the St. Francis.
• Rock musician Frank Black has made several references to the St. Francis Dam disaster in his songs, including the tracks "St. Francis Dam Disaster" and "Olé Mulholland".

See also

• Baldwin Hills Reservoir
• Dam failure
• List of dams and reservoirs in California
• Malpasset Dam
• Teton Dam
• Vajont Dam

References

Notes

Further reading

• Horton, Pony R. "A Test of Integrity: The Original Story Upon Which The Docu-Drama is Based".
  • A popular article detailing the St. Francis Dam disaster. Based on Horton's 25 years of research into the story. Informational sources include Horton's interviews with Catherine Mulholland, Dr. J. David Rogers, and Robert V. Phillips, former Chief Engineer & General Manager, LADWP.
  • A slightly lengthened version of Pony Horton's A TEST OF INTEGRITY was published in a book entitled "The Raven and The Writing Desk; The 6th Antelope Valley Anthology," in 2009 by MousePrints Publishing of Lancaster, CA. ISBN Number: 0-9702112-7-9

• Jackson, Donald C. and Hundley, Norris. "Privilege and Responsibility: William Mulholland and the St. Francis Dam Disaster." California History (Fall 2004) p:8–47.
  • This article provides extended analysis of how Mulholland's efforts in designing and building the St. Francis Dam compared with other prominent concrete gravity dams built in the 1920s

• Nunis Jr., Doyce B. (Ed.). St. Francis Dam Disaster Revisited. Historical Society of Southern California. 2002. ISBN 0-914421-27-1
  • This collection of articles about the dam includes contributions from Catherine Mulholland, William Mulholland's granddaughter, and Dr. J. David Rogers.

• Outland, Charles F. Man-Made Disaster: The Story of St Francis Dam. A.H. Clark Company: 1977. ISBN 0-87062-322-2
  • Outland's study of the dam and the ensuing flood, first published in 1963, is the only widely published comprehensive work about the dam, the failure, and the disaster. The book is the result of good original research and this expanded edition is available from most public libraries, book stores and online book dealers.

External links

• "SAN FRANCISQUITO CANYON and the ST. FRANCIS DAM". Santa Clarita Valley Historical Society. Retrieved March 29, 2003.. Several photographs of the dam under construction, completed, its ruins, and a list of the victims.
• St. Francis Dam Disaster 30-minute television program available online.
• Remembering the St. Francis Dam Disaster, by Michele E. Buttelman, The Signal March 11, 2001.
• Google Earth image of the St. Francis Dam ruins
• "Application of the Method of Characteristics to the Dam Break Wave Problem", Journal of Hydraulic Research, 47 (1), pp. 41–49.
• St Francis Dam Flood, image gallery at USGS
• List of victims