Operation Uric

Operation Uric
Part of the Rhodesian Bush War (or Second Chimurenga)
Date 1-7 September 1979 Location Mapai, Gaza Province, Mozambique 22.848084°S 31.960901°E / -22.848084; 31.960901
Belligerents
Rhodesia South Africa	ZANLA (ZANU)
Commanders and leaders
Ian Smith
Strength
Rhodesia: 360 SAAF: ?	ZANLA
Casualties and losses
Rhodesia - 15 South Africa - 3	ZANLA - 360

Operation Uric was a cross-border raid carried out in Mozambique by operatives of the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Rhodesian Bush War, with combat assistance from the South African Air Force. During the operation, which took place from 1 to 7 September 1979, up to 400 Rhodesian and South African military personnel attacked bridges and a major staging point for Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) insurgents in Gaza Province. The battle eventually drew in elements of the Mozambican army and police, who sustained heavy casualties. Along with Operation Miracle, this was one of the largest Rhodesian external operations of the war.

Targets

During the Rhodesian Bush War (or Second Chimurenga) the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) had to deal with an increasing flow of externally trained insurgents coming into Rhodesia, latterly Zimbabwe Rhodesia, from its neighbouring countries, especially from Zambia and Mozambique, the latter in particular after its independence in 1975.

The objectives of Operation Uric were to attack the ZANLA forces in their command and training center before they could enter Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and to cut off supply routes into the Gaza Province of Mozambique. It was also hoped that the destruction of communication and railway lines, roads and bridges as far as 200 miles into Mozambique would have an impact on the economic situation and the morale of those who supported ZANLA and Robert Mugabe.

Targets were the bridges at Aldeia Da Barragem along with a vital irrigation canal feeding a major agricultural area in Mozambique. Air strikes were planned on FRELIMO installations in Mapai and Maxaila to demoralise the occupants. Afterwards the base at Mapai would be taken and destroyed by Zimbabwe-Rhodesian ground forces.

Attack

Plaque honouring seventeen Rhodesian and South African servicemen killed during Uric.

Prior to the attack, 200 Zimbabwe Rhodesian troops had been deployed into an area 161 kilometres (100 mi) inside of Mozambique east-southeast of Chigubu. Helicopters were at Chipinda Pools airstrip within Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The attack only began on 5 September because of bad weather conditions. Rhodesian SAS troops were airlifted to Aldeia De Barragem and four other targets to destroy bridges and infrastructure. Hawker Hunter jets and Cessna Lynx aircraft bombed the area and provided air support. During evacuation of a wounded soldier one AB-205A helicopter was shot down by a RPG-7 with the technician killed on impact. The pilot Flt Lt Dick Paxton was rescued by the SAS.

On 6 September the Army Base at Mapai was bombarded by Hawker Hunters destroying the command centre and the main radar station. Afterwards the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian troops were transported by helicopter to attack positions near the base. During transport operations a South African Puma helicopter was hit by an RPG-7 at 22.740028°S 32.105278°E / -22.740028; 32.105278 killing all 14 Zimbabwe-Rhodesian commandos and the three South African Air Force crew on board. This was the highest loss of life for the Rhodesian Security Forces in a single incident during the war. The crash site was later bombed in an attempt to cover the South African markings on the Puma helicopter. The Mapai base was fortified by interconnecting zig-zag trenches which provided good cover for the defenders. Heavy fighting took place between the Rhodesian Army and FPLM soldiers. Mapai was repeatedly bombarded by Hunter jets and Canberra bombers. Shortly before sundown the decision to withdraw was taken by the Supreme Commander of the Rhodesian Army General Walls.

Aftermath

The battle resulted in over 300 dead ZANLA and FRELIMO soldiers and a number of damaged bridges, buildings and infrastructure. Zimbabwe Rhodesian casualties were 15. Despite the achieved kill-ratio of over 20:1 the operation was not regarded as a success by the Zimbabwe Rhodesian military. It became obvious to the Rhodesian Security Forces that they would soon become technologically inferior to their enemies, who were well equipped and trained by their Soviet advisors. Zimbabwe Rhodesian soldiers were well trained and motivated, but international sanctions such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 232, and isolation lead to increased problems in replacing aircraft, arms and ammunition.

Politically the operation lead to Samora Machel putting pressure on Robert Mugabe to take part in the Lancaster House peace talks. He wanted to prevent Mozambique from being dragged further into the war with Zimbabwe Rhodesia, which already had negative effects on its economy.

References

• Cilliers, J.K. (1984). Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia. Routledge.
• Petter-Bowyer, Peter (2003). Winds of Destruction: The autobiography of a Rhodesian combat pilot. 30 South Publishers.
• Jackson, Neill; Van Malsen, Rick (2011). The Search for Puma 164: Operation Uric and the Assault on Mapai. 30 South Publishers.

External links

• Operation Uric at www.rhodesia.nl
• Operation Uric at www.rhodesianforces.org
• The Search for a PUMA Helicopter Lost at Mapai, 6 September 1979