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==Legal Studies== |
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===Case Law=== |
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===Legal Principles=== |
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[[Substantial performance]] |
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[[Expectancy damages]] |
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[[Restitution damages]] |
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[[Reliance damages]] |
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[[Punitive damages]] |
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[[Nominal damages]] |
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==Philosophy of Language== |
==Philosophy of Language== |
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[[Grice|H.P. Grice's]] "[[cooperative principle]]" & [[Gricean maxims|his four maxims]] |
[[Grice|H.P. Grice's]] "[[cooperative principle]]" & [[Gricean maxims|his four maxims]] |
Revision as of 20:24, 5 September 2006
Legal Studies
Case Law
Legal Principles
Philosophy of Language
H.P. Grice's "cooperative principle" & his four maxims
Philosophy of Law
Positivism
John Austin's Legal Positivism
H.L.A. Hart's Rule of Recognition and Practice Theory of Social Rules
David Kellogg Lewis's description of how conventions come about from Convention: A Philosophical Study (as recounted by Andrei Marmor):
Standard instances of conventions are not agreements, rather they are practical (pragmatic) solutions to recurrent coordination problems.
A typical coordination problem arises, according to Lewis, when:
Several agents have a particular structure of preferences with respect to their mutual modes of conduct, namely that between several alternatives of conduct open to them in a given set of circumstances, each and every agent has a stronger preference to act as the other agents will, than his own preference for acting upon any one of the particular alternatives. Most coordination problems are easily solved by simple agreements between the agents to act upon one, arbitrary chosen alternative, thus securing uniformity of action among them. However, when a particular coordination problem is recurrent, and agreement is difficult to obtain, (mostly because of the large number of agents involved), a social rule is very likely to emerge, and this rule is a convention. - Coleman, Hart's Postscript, p.200
Interpretivism
Ronald Dworkin's Legal Interpretivism