Talk:Arthur Schopenhauer

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But was this discussion not cleared and settled in 2004 ? Hans Rosenthal (ROHA) (hans.rosenthal AT t-online.de -- replace AT by @ ) (12012006)

The ethnicity of Schopenhauer's birthplace

Danzig, in Schopenhauer's time, was not a "Polish enclave," although it was politically allied with and tied to the Polish crown.

In English, to say that someplace is a "Polish enclave" means first and foremost an ethnnically Polish area, which Danzig was not at the time. This would mislead English readers (this IS the English Wiki) who don't know the city's complex ethnographic and political history – which is most of them – to think that Schopenhauer either was Polish or grew up in an ethnically Polish community.

As a contrasting example: Kaliningrad today is a Russian enclave, or exclave, in that it is inhabited predominantly by Russians (and some other ex-Soviet people), Russian is its lingua franca, and it is de jure part of the Russian Republic.

The point of this article is to tell the story of Schopenhauer the person and philospher. I understand that Schopenhauer was free from the disease of nationalism, but that doesn't change the fact that ethnically he was German.

If readers wish to know more about Danzig/Gdansk, they can consult entries about the city and its history. One can safely assume that readers who look for an article on Schopenhauer are interested mainly in him, not his hometown.

I plead with our Polish friends to kindly desist from this irrational and pointless ethnocentric vandalism.

Sca 19:22, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

And how would you call an enclave of the Polish state inhabitated primarily by Poles (of all ethnicities, Polish and German included)? Come on, Sca, you're really nitpicking now. Gdańsk was as Poliush back then as New York is American nowadays. Although the latter has incredibly low percentage of WASPs, nobody is arguing that the majority of its inhabitants are Italian Americans, Portorican Americans, Polish Americans and so on. Just like nobody is trying to break down the American population onto ethnic groups just for the sake of such a short article as this one. And, above all, this is an article on Arthur Schopenhauer, not on Complexity of Gdańsk's historical and ethnic pattern. Halibutt 22:16, 6 October 2005 (UTC)

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Ridiculous. What do you mean, "inhabited primarily by Poles"? Get real.

The history of New York is not remotely parallel with the history of the former province of Danzig-West Prussia.

Admit it, Halibutt, you would like the history of this area to simply be devoid of Germans. Dream on. You are a nice guy, but your head is in the ethnocentric sand.

Sca 02:23, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

Sca, perhaps it's completely unbelievable for the Americans, but there were other societies formed in a similar way before the US were formed. Note that I'm not speaking of ethnicities, but of nationalities. Perhaps you simply started to discuss with your own view on what I might've said and not with my actual words. That's not what I expected of you.

Poland was one of such cases - you didn't have to be a Pole (ethnicity) in order to be a Pole (nationality). Danzigers were as Polish as Lithuanians of Grodno or Bambergers of Poznań, not to mention Dutch of Warsaw (Olędrzy of Saska Kępa), Scots of Pomerania or any other group of servants of The Republic. Part of my own ancestors were Poles yet were Lithuanians - and there was no contradiction in it. Just like nowadays, I can be both a Jew and a Pole. And you can be both a German and an American. Compare the articles on ethnicity and nationality or citizenship instead of accusing me of trying to make the Germans of Danzig look less German.

They were Germans, yet they were Poles by nationality, since the city they lived in was a part of Poland for ages. And their culture, traditions, or language have little to do with the political ownership of the city. The townspeople of Gdańsk had even greater civil rights than many of the szlachta since they lived in a Royal city. And the same situation is true for countless of other cities in the world nowadays. Antwerp is primarily inhabitated by Dutch people, yet the city is a part of Belgium and people living there are citizens of Belgium, not of the Netherlands. Same with Avondale, Chicago which is inhabitated mostly by Poles, Germans and Portoricans, yet it is a part of the United States of America, not of Poland, Germany or Puerto Rico. Or am I speaking rubbish here? Am I trying to make the Poles of Chicago look less Polish?

Next time try to understand what I say, not what you think I might've said. Halibutt 02:57, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

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Once again, Halibutt, you are missing the point. The discussion is not about the history of Poland or the history of Danzig/Gdansk. The discussion is about what the words "a Polish enclave" will mean to English readers today, in the 21st century. And as has been pointed out repeatedly, "a Polish enclave" to them will mean an ethnically Polish area, which Danzig in the time of Schopenhauer was not. For the umpteenth time: Schopenhauer was, ethnically, German. He spoke German as his native language and wrote in German ("Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung").

I understand the basis for your claim that Danzigers were of Polish nationality, but find it irrelevant to the basic issue outlined above. We are not talking about political history, we are talking about ethnicity.

I understand that there were several ethnic elements present historically in Pomerelia/West Pressia, i.e. Germans, Poles and Kushubes, and that there were some Dutch and Low German settlers in Danzig and the Vistula delta to the east of Danzig, where dikes were built to control flooding. But Danzig itself was overwhelmingly German in speech and ethnic character until the idiocy of WWII changed the region's ethnic composition forever.

Sca 12:23, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

Politically, Danzig was not more independent in 1788 than Warsaw, Cracow or Wilno. It still had some specific privileges and was one of the richest towns of Poland, but much of its power was already limited by the reforms. And in 1791 it was directly incorporated into the Polish state, just like all other parts under the rule of king Stanislaus.

And this is the true basis of the dispute here. You are basically arguing that he was not born in Poland since Danzig was populated by Germans mostly. Poland is a geo-political term here while you prefer to use some strange ethnic-political mixture. While I find your reasoning an absurd, you might have a point here. After all why should political borders matter... when speaking of political borders?

Now seriously, since 1772 Danzig was a Polish enclave (see the linked articles) and it was not until 1793 that the city was annexed by Prussia. The article on enclave does not even mention the problems you raise, so perhaps you're simply over-sensitive?

However, if you really believe that the ethnic history of the city he was born near to is so important to this article, then feel free to expand it or create some sort of a related article on the [[ethnic and political status of the city of Danzig at the time Arthur Schopenhauer was born. Over and out. Do as you please. Halibutt 20:14, 7 October 2005 (UTC)

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No, Halibutt, I am not arguing that he was not born in Poland as it existed politically at the time. What I am arguing - and the point you still are not understanding - is that to English-speaking readers, "a Polish enclave" means ethnically Polish. If we say, "a Polish enclave surrounded by Prussia," English-speaking readers will think that Danzig was ethnically Polish, surrounded by an ethnically, so to speak, Prussian (i.e. German) area. This is incorrect.

In this article, we don't care about the political status of Danzig; what's relevant is its ethnicity at the time, and Schopenhauer, as the structure of his name makes obvious, was not Polish ethnically but German. To put it more simply in the context of our long discussions: Schopenhauer was not born in Gdansk, he was born in Danzig. Gdansk as we know it today came into existence only after 1945.

Sca 14:00, 8 October 2005 (UTC)

Translation of "Vorstellung"

Pardon me for intruding on the world of thought, but isn't "Vorstellung" often translated as "Imagination" rather than "Representation," which to me seems awkward? I've also seen it translated as "Idea," i.e. "The World as Will and Idea," but this strikes me as simplistic.

Sca 19:18, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

"Vorstellung" is "representation," in that it is the presence in a mind of the image of an object that is thought to be externally present. Understanding of this requires a certain amount of mental reflection. It was best explained by both George Berkeley and Schopenhauer.

Lestrade 13:07, 12 October 2005 (UTC)Lestrade

It is also translated as "Representation" in French, though no German-French dictionary gives "représentation" as the primary meaning of the word. Mostly, as you said, it is given the meaning "idea" but it largely depends on the context. For example, a "Vorstellung" in theatrical parlance is what we call a "représentation" (a "performance" in English) of a play. And indeed the meaning given by Schopenhauer to "Vorstellung" is far more akin to a theatrical performance of a play (the play of one's life, so to speak) than to an "Idea", which almost everyone sees as unmovable and unchanging (from Plato). In this latter case, Schopenhauer talks about "Idee" and this term refers exclusively to the Platonic sense (although modified by Schopenhauer to fit his system). Also, the meaning "idea" applied to "Vorstellung" is given in my German-French dictionary as a "gedankliches Bild", which loosely means "intellectual image". It thus means something (an image) you have built (indeed, "Bild" and "to build" quite evidently share the same roots) in your mind, not something already conceived a priori or otherwise received (namely, an "Idea"). In French we would then sometimes translate this meaning of "Vorstellung" as a "gedankliches Bild" as "expectation" or "understanding (the faculty of creating concepts)" depending on the context. Also, "Vorstellen" is translated as both "to present oneself" and "to imagine something (i.e. to represent something to oneself)". "Imagination" would be more correctly given by "Vorstellungkraft", loosely "the faculty of representation".

We thus see that indeed "Idea" is a simplistic and erroneous translation as it does not give the full meaning of the word (it leaves out the process that is inherent in forming a representation) and because it interferes with the platonic "Idee" of Schopenhauer (which is surely not synonymous with "Vorstellung") and that "Imagination" would be incorrect as it both overreaches the scope of the original term and add the unnecessary, derogatory alternative meaning of "fictional" (i.e. not linked to any sensory input).

Bidouleroux 22:57, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Your above speculations show: You have never ever read a single line of the Schopenhauer works. And this fact makes the discussion about the article "Schopenhauer" so difficult. You are talking about something which you have no clear idea of. By the way: the translation "The World as Will and Representation" is still the closest one you can find in the English language. This should have become clear from mere reading of the Wikipedia article about Arthur Schopenhauer. Hans Rosenthal (ROHA) (hans.rosenthal AT t-online.de -- replace AT by @ ) (19012006)

New Essay on Schopenhauer posted to the Web

Several of the quotations in this Wiki-article seem to be mysteriously "lifted" from the following essay:

• An essay on Schopenhauer's (debated) place in the history of European philosophy, detailing his relationship to earlier sources

...not that there's anything wrong with that!

There really isn't very much (in English) about Schopenhauer on the web --so I hope this essay detailing what his relationship to earlier thinkers was (and wasn't) will lend a bit of clarity to any ensuing discussions.

The question about the translation of "Vorstellung" is fair enough; the choice of "Representation" was made by E.F.J. Payne, and has become conventional in discussing Schopenhauer's work. It is an improvement on "Idea"/"Ideal", used in earlier translations. In normal German usage (e.g., in a newspaper), one would not translate the term with such a "technical" equivalent; but then, this is philosophy, isn't it? Philosophy consists in accuracy, and a highly technical vocabulary seems to arise wherever we discuss it.

Yes, I agree. But why do you contribute your above lines in the way of "Unkwown" ? If you trust your own writings, then nothing should be withholding you from sending them with your name and address. So what is your problem with this ? Hans Rosenthal (ROHA) (hans.rosenthal AT t-online.de -- replace AT by @ ) (12012006)

magnetic iron bars etc

There is an anonymous editor who is insisting on adding the following unnecessary, long-winded, ungrammatical and foreign language text to the article:

Schopenhauer analysis one of Hegel's assertions:

"Daselbst also, in der Abtheilung >>Physik<< , § 293 (zweite Auflage, von 1827), handelt er vom specifischen Gewichte..." What Hegel asserts in this paragraph is: If some iron bar is magnetized at the one end of its sides, then it sinks down on this side, hence the mass on this side of the iron bar must have become "specifically more massive". Schopenhauers comment on this claim was: "Alles was auf einer Seite schwerer wird, senkt sich nach der Seite: dieser magnetisierte Stab senkt sich nach einer Seite: also ist er daselbst schwerer geworden." ("Every thing that becomes heavier on one of its sides, sinks down to this side: this magnetized bar sinks down to one side: hence it has become more massive on this very side.") And Schopenhauer continues: "Ein würdiges Analogon zu dem Schluß: >>Alle Gänse haben zwei Beine, Du hast zwei Beine, also bist Du eine Ganz.<<" (A worthy analogon would conclude: >>All geese have two feet, you have two feet, hence you are a goose<<").

Is it really necessary to include this discussion of an odd, tiny, questionable fragment of Hegel's writings? I feel that it detracts from the article. I tried to shorten the discussion here, but ROHA was inpressed. He reverted my change and used my text to expand the discussion. Does this really help the article? — goethean ॐ 20:14, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

What I think is really necessary is to correct one false claim from the user goethean, saying that ROHA is an "anonymous editor", while every single reader of the Wikipedia knows it better: The anagram ROHA is always and in any place within the Wiki associated with the full name and the email address of Hans Rosenthal (ROHA) (hans.rosenthal AT t-online.de -- replace AT by @ ) (19012006) PS: So, please, user goethean, do not play the Wikipedia readers false.

??? --Knucmo2 20:33, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

Leibniz

Schopenhauer claimed that Leibniz was the first to make a formal statement of the principle of sufficient reason. However, he didn't invent it.Lestrade 00:07, 15 April 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Leibniz was supposed to have influenced Schopenhauer? You decide, after reading the following quotes from Schopenhauer:

I could never succeed in really thinking myself into the monadology, pre-established harmony, and the identity of indiscernibles.

— The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 2, Ch. 46

I cannot assign to the Theodicy ... any other merit than that it later gave rise to the immortal Candide of the great Voltaire. In this way, of course, Leibniz's often-repeated and lame excuse for the evil of the world, namely that the bad sometimes produces the good, obtained proof that for him was unexpected.

— Ibid.

Lestrade 13:16, 15 April 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Panpsychism

Schopenhauer did not claim that the universe was full of a soul or spirit.Lestrade 00:07, 15 April 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

I would like to see one quote from Schopenhauer in which he claims that the universe is objectively made out of knowing mind or minds. On the contrary, he claimed that the universe appears, in the way that it appears, only as a mental picture or representation in the mind of an observer or subject. This is transcendental idealism, not panpsychism.Lestrade 13:27, 15 April 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Non-Influences

Leibniz and Leopardi did not influence Schopenhauer. Since the person who makes a positive statement is responsible for showing proof, please show some evidence to convince everyone of their alleged influence. Although, such evidence could only come from quotations that are exhibited by a person who has actually read Schopenhauer.Lestrade 16:49, 15 April 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

I will try to find a quote without ever reading Schopenhauer... I have a book of philosophy quotations.  ;)

Influences, as given by Schopenhauer

In his manuscripts there is the line that Ich gestehe ..., daß ich nicht glaube, daß meine Lehre je hätte entstehn können, ehe die Upanischaden, Plato und Kant ihre Strahlen zugleich in eines Menschen Geist werfen konnten. (I admit that I do not believe my doctrine could have been conceived, before the Upanishads, Kant, and Plato have shed light into man's mind). Apparently, there is an order in the listing, with the Upanishads being most important. The influences listed in the template in the article, on the other hand, are informatory overload. I will adapt the template and move the influences listed to the article itself '129.247.247.238 01:45, 29 April 2006 (UTC)'

If you are the person who added Popper to the list, then yes, this is definitely accurate. I've read in Bryan Magee's book "Confessions of a Philosopher" that Schopenhauer was the first philosopher that Popper read also. --Knucmo2 20:28, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

Popper distances himself from Schopenhauer on many points, e.g. pessimism, but he uses Schopenhauer's polemics against Hegel in his own writings extensively ("The Open Society and its Enemies"). Further, he sees in Schopenhauer an example of philosophising in the Kantian tradition. Since Popper himself claimed a strong connection to that tradition (through Jakob Friedrich Fries), Popper should be mentioned.

On the other hand, I think the list of influences on Schopenhauer should be scrutinized. '-129.247.247.238 13:09, 8 May 2006 (UTC)'

Fichte

I have called Fichte's idealism "extreme" for good reason: my basic understanding of Fichte is that he says that the phenomena that we experience is actually created by our minds and the human body in nature. This was certainly a radical position compared with Kant, Schelling, Berkeley and Hegel. --Knucmo2 08:36, 29 April 2006 (UTC)

Buddhaist (sic)

Google for Schopenhauer and Buddhaist. You will find entries in the German wikipedia as well as a page from the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft (in German, unfortunately). Also, English links appear. Is that enough? '-129.247.247.238 23:17, 1 May 2006 (UTC)'

The Buddha again

I set a link to Theravada when citing the connection to the Buddha, because Schopenhauer was familiar with writings from the Theravada tradition. Maybe that should be mentioned explicitly. '-129.247.247.238 13:03, 8 May 2006 (UTC)'

Sadly, no, Schopenhauer was not well-read in Theravada Buddhism. The complete list of sources on Buddhism that S. had access to was relatively small, and if you look over his collected comments on the subject, you'll see that he picked up the assumption that "Buddhism of the Burmese school", viz, Theravada, was somehow unimportant to the history of the religion. Instead, Schopenhauer makes repeated references to the Prajnaparamita Lit. (early Mahayana & Madhyamaka works) --but, honestly, he had only a very vague notion of what the distinctions were between these groups. Schopenhauer's work on Hinduism has a similarly "distant" relationship to the source texts; and this is "fair enough", as Schopenhauer doesn't make any false claims to competency or knowledge of Sanskrit & Pali sources. His statement about "Metemphyschosis" and ethics have actually become influential among many Hindus and Buddhists in Asia --although they had little to do with any school of either religion to begin with.

At any rate, I have never seen any indication that Schopenhauer was especially familiar with Theravada sources; he did, however, pretend to be familiar with Prajnaparamita-Madhyamaka sources.

Pretend to be familiar? If you read the last paragraph of his main work, you will see that he had a very good understanding of the Prajna-Paramita. Should I quote it here for you?Lestrade 21:09, 3 June 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

I would appreciate a link to the passge. — goethean ॐ 17:58, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

I would like to add that though Schopenhauer didn't read alot about Buddhism, he did have alot of knowledge on this subject compared to others at his time. The same goes for Nietzsche. The only problem was that they misimterpreted certain parts of buddhism.User_talk:Dionisian_Individual 11:07, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

In the "Sinology" chapter of his On the Will in Nature, Schopenhauer listed all of the many books and articles that he had read regarding Buddhism. They include many academic works by recognized scholars. The list can be seen at http://www.payer.de/neobuddhismus/neobud0301.htm in Section 2.4 entitled "Was konnte Schopenhauer vom Buddhismus wissen?". 66.82.9.73 18:16, 7 August 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Schopenhauer was responding to the objection that "...after our observations have finally brought us to the point where we have before our eyes, in perfect saintliness, the denial and surrender of all willing, and thus a deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering, this now appears to us as a transition into empty nothingness." He then explained that "...the concept of nothing is essentially relative, and always refers to a definite something that it negates." Most of his final paragraph is as follows:

But we now turn our glance from our own needy and perplexed nature to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having reached complete self-knowledge, has found itself again in everything, and then freely denied itself, and who then merely wait to see the last trace of the will vanish with the body that is animated by that trace. Then, instead of the restless pressure and effort; instead of the constant transition from desire to apprehension and from joy to sorrow; instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope that constitutes the life-dream of the man who wills, we see that peace that is higher than all reason, that ocean-like calmness of the spirit, that deep tranquility, that unshakable confidence and serenity , whose mere reflection in the countenance, as depicted by Raphael and Correggio, is a complete and certain gospel. Only knowledge remains; the will has vanished. We then look with deep and painful yearning at that state, beside which the miserable and desperate nature of our own appears in the clearest light by contrast. Yet this consideration is the only one that can permanently console us, when, on the one hand, we have recognized incurable suffering and endless misery as essential to the phenomenon of the will, to the world, and on the other see the world melt away with the abolished will, and retain before us only empty nothingness. In this way, therefore, by contemplating the life and conduct of saints, to meet with whom is of course rarely granted to us in our own experience, but who are brought to our notice by their recorded history, and, vouched for with the stamp of truth by art, we have to banish the dark impression of that nothingness which as the final goal hovers behind all virtue and holiness, and which we fear as children fear darkness. We must not even evade it, as the Indians do, by myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahman, or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. On the contrary, we freely acknowledge that what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all who are still full of the will, assuredly nothing. But also conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing.

— The World as Will and Representation. Vol. I, §71

Schopenhauer added this footnote:

This is also the Prajna-Paramita of the Buddhists, the "beyond all knowledge," in other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist. See Isaac J. Schmidt, On the Mahajana and Prajna-Paramita.

— Schopenhauer's Footnote

Lestrade 19:30, 5 June 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Nietzsche's misunderstanding

The "Common misconceptions" section underscores the quintessence of Nietzsche's repudiation of Schopenhauer's thought and philosophy, namely, he formulated a wholesale rejection of his pessimistic ideas, and as such this material—

Nietzsche seems to have made this misinterpretation, leading some people to a distorted view of Schopenhauer. The following sentence from The Twilight of the Idols is often quoted:

He has interpreted art, heroism, genius, beauty, great sympathy, knowledge, the will to truth, and tragedy, in turn, as consequences of "negation" or of the "will's" need to negate.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols

Schopenhauer did see all these things as means to a more peaceful and enlightened way of life, but none of them were "denial of the will-to-live". Only asceticism is referred to in that way. Nietzsche also claimed that Schopenhauer did not recognise that suffering had a redemptive quality, yet his recognition of this seems blatantly clear in part 4 of The World as Will and Representation.

—is in turn a misconception about Nietzsche's position; therefore, if no objections, from an academic source, are put forward, then I will go about deleting this from the section entirely. — ^ignis _scripta 21:23, 29 June 2006 (UTC)

Wrong Approach

User:213.249.135.36 tried to insert information on Schopenhauer's writings regarding dialectics. However, the information was placed in the "Philosophy" section of the Schopenhauer article. User:Aey deleted the information as being unrelated to Schopenhauer's philosophy. It would have been better if User:213.249.135.36 had created a separate Wikipedia article on the topic and then merely referenced it in the main Schopenhauer article.Lestrade 14:50, 22 July 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Politics section

I've noticed some anonymous users have the propensity to declare what is "reality" regarding Schopenhauer. I'll put it simply: follow the guidelines of Wikipedia and nothing will be dismissed. If there are any further points regarding said material, then try to discuss it here before inserting it; gratuitous quoting isn't "sourced material" -- but scholar's interpretations are acceptable. And don't make false accusations about other users -- it won't get you far (see WP:AGF). Aey 09:45, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Pronunciation guide

A pronunciation guide has been added recommending that people say the name as [ˈaɐtuːɐ ˈʃoːpənˌhaʊɐ]. Is this an attempt to represent a German pronunciation of the name? Curious, since it contains the non-English vowel [ɐ]. If instead it is an attempt to represent a non-rhotic English pronunciation, it should be changed to represent the pronunciation of the majority of native English speakers. FWIW, the name "Arthur" was somewhat unusual in a German speaking area in the late eighteenth century; it is of English origin, and as such the English native pronunciation ['aɽθəɽ] is perfectly acceptable in English. - Smerdis of Tlön 16:51, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Denial of Will - Nirvana equivalence is incorrect as stated.

I am new to this, so rather than edit the article, I am posting my suggestion here. I do hope the change will be made, though. Here is the sentence that jumps out at me:

"Buddhist Nirvana is equivalent to the condition that Schopenhauer described as denial of the will."

I see the parallel, and I understand that Schopenhauer's philosophy has traditionally been described as sharing ground with Buddhism, so I agree that some comparisson is appropriate, but having just read that "denial of the will" could come about as a result of profound suffering and the loss of the will to live, I must assert that this is not the same thing as Buddhist Nirvana. That sounds more like major depression with sever suicide risk, something not at all conducive to reaching Nirvana.

Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism both describe Nirvana as liberation, specifically from Samsara, the cycle of death and re-birth. I don't think Schopenhauer was talking about liberation from Samsara. He was talking about Liberation from something, clearly, but not Samsara.

In Mahayana Buddhism, one who is liberated from Samsara continues to exist, but does not suffer and generates no karma. One in such a rare state can choose to help all sentient beings, and can eventually become a Buddha. In the Tibetan tradition which I studied, this is what happened in the case of the Śākyamuni, (the historical Buddha) and will happen 995 more times before the end of this universe, with the next Buddha, Maitreya, due to appear in about 180,000 years, or maybe it was generations.

So, I obviously haven't kept up my studies, but my point is that we are a long way from Schopenhaur's "denail of the will" now, yet all these concepts are essential to "Buddhist Nirvana."

Perhaps the solution is as simple as adding "Schopenhauer believed that Buddhist Nirvana is..." or "(such and such Schopenhauer writer) believed that Buddhist Nirvana is..."

Thank you. Sevenwarlocks 23:12, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

Gautama Siddhartha himself was affected by seeing the suffering of other people. That is how his awakening and his journey towards Nirvana began. After observing sickness, old age, and death, he became an ascetic. An ascetic relinquishes willing, craving, and desire. When he realized his Four Noble Truths, Buddha showed how Nirvana was related to self-denial.

Schopenhauer associated Nirvana with denial of the will in the following passage:

[T]o die willingly, to die gladly, to die cheerfully, is the prerogative of the resigned, of him who gives up and denies the will-to-live. For he alone wishes to die actually and not merely apparently, and consequently needs and desires no continuance of his person. He willingly gives up the existence that we know; what comes to him instead of it is in our eyes nothing, because our existence in reference to that one is nothing. The Buddhist faith calls that existence Nirvana, that is to say, extinction.

— The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, Ch. 41

Schopenhauer correctly understood the meaning of Nirvana. In a footnote to this passage, Schopenhauer listed the various etymologies of the word Nirvana, according to his reading. These were “to blow out,” “extinguished,” “a lull or calm,” “extinction,” “annihilation,” “absence of sinful desires,” “departed or escaped from misery,” or “complete vanishing.” Also, “Nirvana is the opposite of Samsara, which is the world of constant rebirths, of craving and desire, of the illusion of the senses, of changing and transient forms, of being born, growing old, becoming sick, and dying.”

Professor Moira Nicholls listed some correspondences between Nirvana and denial of the will.

First, neither Nirvana nor denial of the will is amenable to adequate description in ordinary language. Second, neither Nirvana nor denial of the will entails nihilism; that is, neither entails the denial of all possibility of value in existence. Finally, both Nirvana and denial of the will signify the end of craving or willing and the cessation of suffering.

— Moira Nicholls, “The Influences of Eastern Thought on Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself,” The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, Ch. 6

Schopenhauer discussed the relative nothingness that results from denial of the will:

We must not evade it, as the Indians do, by myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahman, or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. On the contrary, we freely acknowledge that what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all who are still full of the will, assuredly nothing. But also conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways, is – nothing.

— The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I, §71

If Nirvana is the absence of craving, and its result, the absence of suffering, isn't that equivalent to denial of will? Absence = denial. Craving = Will.

Lestrade 13:24, 7 September 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Greetings Lestrade, please allow me to grant that you know a great deal more about Schopenhauer than I, but in describing the relationship between denial of will and Buddhist Nirvana, equivalence is too strong a word. To put a finer point on my argumet, any independent study of Gautama Siddhartha's teachings, no matter how duitiful, is not, in itself, Buddhism. Buddhism is a vast tradition - a religion, as practiced - even if its underlying teachings make for a satisfying non-religious philosophy. Physical reincarnation of the spirit in a new form, and Nirvana as the end of reincarnation, are fundamental beliefs of the religion. Any conception of Nirvana that lacks this element is not Buddhist Nirvana.

In my own Buddhist study and practice, I found scant acceptance within the religion of the de-mystified, scientifically inoffensive Buddhist derivates so common in the west. The view of Nirvana that permeats western thinking is just that - a western view. Schopenhauer could have understood the etymology of the word Nirvana better than Gautama Siddhartha for all I know, but that doesn't make his view align with the Buddhist religion. Let me ask, what is the advantage of stating Schopenhauer's assertion of their equivalence as if it were a point of fact?