Giedroyc–Mieroszewski doctrine: Difference between revisions
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In Politics of Poland, the Gedroyc–Mieroszewski doctrine is a set of principles to follow in the relations of Poland with Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine, which incorporated significant parts of the Second Polish Republic in the aftermath of World War II. It was named after its proponents, Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski.
Initially it was addressing the attitude of the post-World War II Polish emigres, especially around the Polish government-in-exile in London, and basically calling for the recognition of the post-war status quo. [1] Later it was adapted towards the goal of the moving of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania away from the Soviet and later Russian sphere of influence.[2]
References
- ^ "Do uczniów Giedroycia", Przeglad, November 7, 2002
- ^ "Białoruś. Dobry sąsiad mówi po polsku", Gazeta Wyborcza, January 8, 2017
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