Isoroku Yamamoto

Isoroku Yamamoto
File:Yamamoto-Isoroku-improvedContrast.jpg Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
Allegiance	Empire of Japan
Years of service	1901-1943
Rank	Fleet Admiral
Unit	Combined Fleet
Commands	Imperial Japanese Navy
Battles / wars	Russo-Japanese War World War II
Awards	Order of the Chrysanthemum, (1st Class) Order of the Golden Kite (1st class) Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords (Germany, honorary)

Isoroku Yamamoto (Japanese: 山本五十六, Yamamoto Isoroku) (4 April 1884 – 18 April 1943) was an Admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during the first four years of World War II and alumnus of Harvard University (1919 - 1921).

He is considered to be one of Japan's greatest and most influential naval strategists. He died during an inspection tour while en route to the Solomon Islands when his aerial convoy was ambushed by American aircraft. He held several important and critical posts in the Imperial Japanese Navy. He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the United States for both tactical prowess and for preventing his men from committing war crimes.

Family background

Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano in Nagaoka, Niigata. His father was Sadayoshi Takano, a lower-ranking samurai of Nagaoka-Han. "Isoroku" is an old Japanese term meaning "56"; the name referred to his father's age at Isoroku's birth.

In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family and took the Yamamoto name. It was a common practice for Japanese families lacking sons to adopt suitable young men in this fashion to carry on the family name. In 1918, Isoroku married a woman named Reiko with whom he had four children: two sons and two daughters.

Early career

After graduating from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1904, Yamamoto served on the cruiser Nisshin during the Russo-Japanese War. He was wounded at the Battle of Tsushima, losing two fingers (the index and middle fingers) on his left hand. He was later nicknamed “80 sen” by some of his favorite geisha because of this disability. Returned to the Naval Staff College in 1914, emerging as a lieutenant commander in 1916.

Preparing for war, 1920s and 1930s

Admiral Yamamoto, U.S. file photo

Yamamoto was a political dove and was fundamentally opposed to war with the United States by virtue of studies at U.S. Naval War College andHarvard University (1919-1921), his tour as an admiral's aide, and two postings as naval attaché in Washington D.C. He was promoted to captain in 1923. In 1924, at the age of 40, he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation. His first command was the cruiser Isuzu in 1928, followed by the aircraft carrier Akagi. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation, and (as vice admiral) served as head of the Aeronautics’ Department before accepting a post as commander of the First Carrier Division.

He participated in the second London Naval Conference of 1930 as a rear admiral and the 1934 London Naval Conference as a vice admiral, as the government felt that a career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms limitations talks. Yamamoto personally opposed the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the subsequent land war with China (1937), and the Tripartite Pact (1940) with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew for the bombing of the gunboat USS Panay in December 1937. These issues made him a target of assassination by pro-war militarists.

He was reassigned from the Navy Ministry to sea as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet (30 August 1939), partly to make him harder for assassins to reach. He was promoted to full admiral, 15 November 1940. Yamamoto warned Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe with a prescient statement to avoid war with the United States: "If I am told to fight... I shall run wild for the first six months... but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year."

In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi as an unwise investment of resources.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in Japanese Naval Aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers due to Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the G3M and G4M medium bombers. His demand for great range and the ability to carry a torpedo was intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of attriting the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific in war. The planes did achieve long range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. These planes were lightly constructed and when fully fueled, they were especially vulnerable to enemy fire. This earned the G4M the sardonic nick-name "the Flying Cigarette Lighter." Ironically, Yamamoto died in one of these aircraft.

The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for great range in a fighter aircraft. This partly drove the requirements for the A6M Zero which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability. Both qualities were again purchased at the expense of light construction and flammability that later contributed to the A6M's high casuality rates as the war progressed.

As Japan moved toward war during 1940, Yamamoto gradually moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results. Prompted by talented young officers such as Minoru Genda, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into the First Air Fleet, a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit. This innovation gave great striking capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target; both boon and bane would be realized in war. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the Philippines and sink the British Force "Z".

In January 1941, Yamamoto went even farther and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, the Naval General Staff had planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines and land-based air units whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until engaging in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryukyu Islands on the west and the Marianas Islands on the east. This battle was intended to take place when the American forces had finally been worn down to parity with the Japanese Navy.

Correctly pointing out that this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military productive capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek a decision with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preemptive strike, and then following that with a "Decisive Battle" that would be sought offensively, rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, that if the Americans could be dealt such terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. As it turned out, however, the note officially breaking diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered late, and he correctly perceived the Americans would be resolved upon revenge and unwilling to negotiate. Yamamoto's thoughts on this matter were later dramatically encapsulated in the apocryphal "sleeping giant" quote uttered in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora!

The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along and Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by threatening to resign to get his way. Admiral Osami Nagano and the Naval General Staff eventually caved in to this pressure, but only insofar as approving the Pearl Harbor Raid. Surprise attacks were a Japanese military tradition when starting a war and they could see their way clear to supporting such to give themselves six months to secure the resources of the Netherlands East Indies without the interference of the American navy.

The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl Harbor Raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including how to launch torpedoes in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and how to craft armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.

References: Evans & Peattie (1997), Peattie (2002).

The attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941

Main article: Attack on Pearl Harbor

As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet of six carriers armed with about 400 planes, commenced hostilities against the Americans on 7 December 1941, launching 358 of those aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves. The attack was a complete success according to the parameters of the mission which sought to sink at least four American battleships and prevent the U.S. Fleet from interfering in Japan's southward advance for at least six months. American aircraft carriers were also considered a choice target, but were not prioritized ahead of battleships.

In fact, five American battleships were sunk, three more damaged, and ten other cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, and had more than enough available firepower to continue to exploit this stunning success, but First Air Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo did not take advantage of it, and withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented that Nagumo did not seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers that were absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. But Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk that his surface force might be found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. Further, his aircraft also lacked appropriate ordnance for attacking the machine tools and drydocks of the shipyard, or even the revetted fuel tanks, whose destruction could have been far more serious losses than that of the fighting ships themselves. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves to launch and recover a third, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Too much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight and wishful thinking and it is instructive to note that he did not punish Nagumo in any way for his withdrawal, which was after all according to plan, and the prudent course.

On the political level, the attack was a disaster for Japan, rousing American passions for revenge due to its being a "sneak attack". In fact, the Japanese had begun all their modern wars in this fashion and it was fully expected they would do so again — just not at Pearl Harbor. The shock of the attack coming in an unexpected place, with such devastating results and without the "fair play" of a declaration of war galvanized American determination to avenge the attack.

As a strategic blow intended to prevent American interference in the Netherlands East Indies for six months, the attack was a success, but unbeknownst to Yamamoto, a pointless one. The U.S. Navy had abandoned any intention of attempting to charge across the Pacific to the Philippines at the outset of war in 1935. In 1937, the U.S. Navy had further determined that even fully manning the U.S. Fleet to wartime levels could not be accomplished in less than six months, and myriad other logistic assets needed to execute a trans-Pacific movement simply did not exist and would require two years to construct after the onset of war. In 1940, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark had penned "Plan Dog" which emphasized a defensive war in the Pacific while the U.S. concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany first, and consigned Admiral Husband Kimmel's Pacific Fleet to merely keeping the I.J.N. out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia.

References: Evans & Peattie (1997), Miller (1991), Peattie (2002).

Six months of running wild, December 1941 to May 1942

With the American Fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese war plan devised by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy General Staff. The First Air Fleet proceeded to make a circuit of the Pacific, striking American, Australian, Dutch and British installations from Wake Island to Australia to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Fleet caught the American 7th Air Force on the ground in the Philippines hours after Pearl Harbor, and then proceeded to sink the British Force "Z" (battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse) underway at sea.

Under Yamamoto's able subordinates, Vice Admirals Ozawa, Kondo and Takahashi, the Japanese swept the inadequate remaining American, British, Dutch and Australian naval assets from the Netherlands East Indies in a series of amphibious landings and surface naval battles that culminated in the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942. With the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, and the reduction of the remaining American positions in the Philippines to forlorn hopes on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor island, the Japanese had secured their oil- and rubber-rich "Southern Resources Area".

Having achieved their initial aims with surprising speed and little loss (albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist them), the Japanese paused to consider their next moves. Since neither the British nor the Americans were willing to negotiate, thoughts turned to securing and protecting their newly seized territory, and acquiring more with an eye toward additional conquest and/or attempting to force one or more enemies out of the war.

Competing plans developed at this stage, including thrusts to the west against India, the south against Australia and the east against the United States. Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for varying purposes, including "horse-trading" for support of his objectives.

Plans included ideas as ambitious as invading India or Australia, as well as seizing Hawaii. These grandiose ventures were inevitably set aside as the Army could not spare enough troops from China for the first two, and Japan lacked the shipping to support the latter two. Instead, the Imperial General Staff supported an Army thrust into Burma in hopes of linking up with Indian Nationalists revolting against British rule, and attacks in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands designed to imperil Australia's sea line of communication with the United States.

Instead, the Imperial General Staff chose to pursue elements of the western and eastern options. The Army would attack into Burma, while the Navy would extend the defensive island perimeter to the east in an effort to sever the sea line of communications between the U.S. and Australia. Yamamoto agitated for an offensive Decisive Battle in the east to finish the American fleet, but the more conservative staff officers were unwilling to risk it.

In the midst of theses debates, the Doolittle Raid struck Tokyo and the surrounding areas, galvanizing the threat posed by the American aircraft carriers that had launched it in the minds of the staff officers, and giving Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way. The Naval General Staff agreed to Yamamoto's Midway (MI) Operation, subsequent to the first phase of the operations against Australia's link with America.

Yamamoto rushed planning for the Midway venture and the concurrent diversionary effort against the Aleutians, while dispatching a force under Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi, including the Fifth Carrier Division (the large, new carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku), to support the effort to seize the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal for seaplane and airplane bases, and the town of Port Moresby on Papua New Guinea's south coast facing Australia.

The Port Moresby (MO) Operation proved an unwelcome reverse. Although Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the Port Moresby invasion fleet turned back when Takagi clashed with an American carrier task force in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. Although the Japanese sank a large American carrier in exchange for a smaller carrier, the Americans damaged the carrier Shokaku so badly she required dockyard repairs. Just as importantly, Japanese operational mishaps and American fighters and anti-aircraft fire devastated the dive bomber and torpedo plane elements of both Shokaku’s and Zuikaku’s air groups. These losses side-lined the Zuikaku while she awaited replacement aircraft and replacement aircrew (and saw to the tactical integration and training of the latter). These two ships would be sorely missed a month later at Midway.

References: Dull (1978), Evans & Peattie (1997), Lundstrom (1984).

The Battle of Midway, June 1942

Main article: Battle of Midway

Yamamoto's plan for the Midway (MI) Operation was an extension of Yamamoto's efforts to knock the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify its defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it would be necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle.

Yamamoto's plan was to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet (2 light carriers, 5 cruisers, 13 destroyers and 4 transports) against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu.

The following day, the First Mobile Force (4 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would raid Midway and destroy its air force. Once Midway's air power was neutralized, the Second Fleet (1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 11 transports) would land 5,000 troops to seize the atoll from the American Marines.

The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the American carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterward, the First Fleet (1 light carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers), in conjunction with elements of the Second Fleet would mop up remaining American surface forces and complete the destruction of the Pacific Fleet.

To guard against mischance, Yamamoto initiated two security measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) over Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the American carriers were there. The second was a picket line of submarines that would detect the movement of the American carriers toward Midway in time for the First Mobile Force, First Fleet and Second Fleet to combine against it.

The plan was well thought out, well organized and finely timed. Against 4 carriers, 2 light carriers, 11 battleships, 16 cruisers and 46 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle the Americans could field only 3 carriers, 8 cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of available aircraft and submarines was there seeming parity between the two sides. Barring something extraordinary, it appeared Yamamoto held all the cards.

Unfortunately for Yamamoto, something extraordinary had happened. The worst fear of any commander is that somehow the enemy will learn his battle plan in advance, which is exactly what American cryptographers had discerned from breaking Japan's primary naval code. As a result, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to circumvent both of Yamamoto's security measures and position his outnumbered forces in the exact position to conduct a devastating ambush.

Admiral Nimitz dispatched a destroyer to guard the intended refueling point of Operation K's flying boats, causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether the Pacific Fleet was still at Pearl Harbor. He also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the Japanese submarine picket line before the Japanese submarines arrived, negating Yamamoto's back-up security measure. Nimitz's carriers then positioned themselves to ambush the First Mobile Force when it struck Midway. The Aleutians feint was properly ignored, and days before Yamamoto and his forces could reasonably expect American carriers to interfere in the Midway operation, they destroyed the four carriers of the First Mobile Force on 4 June 1942 in an attack that caught the Japanese carriers at precisely their most vulnerable moment.

With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when their tactical commander prudently withdrew to the east rather than risk a night surface encounter in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage. Correctly perceiving that he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew his forces from the field, having no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of "running wild" and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.

Yamamoto's plan for the MI Operation has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state that it violated the principles of conservation of force, and was too complex for the logistical and cryptographic restraints the IJN operated under. Other commentators point to similarly complex Allied operations, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began.

Actions after Midway

The Battle of Midway solidly checked Japanese momentum, but it was not actually the turning point of the Pacific War. The I.J.N. planned to resume the initiative with operations (FS) aimed at eventually taking Samoa and Fiji to cut the Australian life-line to the United States. This was expected to short-circuit the threat posed by General Douglas MacArthur and his American and Australian forces in New Guinea. To this end, development of the airfield on Guadalcanal continued and attracted the baleful eye of Yamamoto's opposite number, Admiral Ernest King.

King ramrodded the American invasion of Guadalcanal and beat the Japanese to the punch, descending on the island in August 1942 and precipitating a bitter struggle that lasted until February 1943 and commenced a battle of attrition Japan could ill-afford. Admiral Yamamoto remained in command, retained at least partly to avoid diminishing the morale of the Combined Fleet. However, he had lost face in the Midway defeat and the Naval General Staff were disinclined to indulge further gambles. This reduced Yamamoto to pursuing the classic defensive Decisive Battle strategy he had attempted to overturn.

Guadalcanal caught the Japanese over-extended and attempting to support fighting in New Guinea while guarding the Central Pacific and preparing to conduct the FS Operation. The FS Operation was abandoned and the Japanese attempted to fight in both New Guinea and Guadalcanal at the same time. Already overextended, they perpetually fell short of success for lack of shipping, lack of troops, and a disastrous inability to coordinate Army and Navy activities.

Yamamoto committed Combined Fleet units to a series of small attrition actions that stung the Americans, but suffered losses he could ill-afford in return. Three major efforts to carry the island precipitated a pair of carrier battles that Yamamoto commanded personally at the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands in September and October, and finally a wild pair of surface engagements in November, all timed to coincide with Japanese Army pushes. The timing of each major battle was successively derailed when the Army could not hold up its end of the operation. Yamamoto's forces caused considerable loss and damage, but he could never draw the Americans into a decisive fleet action. As a result, the Japanese Navy's strength began to bleed off.

Particularly harmful were the severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles that emasculated the carrier air groups. With Guadalcanal lost in February 1943, there was no further attempt to seek a major battle in the Solomon Islands although smaller attrition battles continued. Yamamoto shifted the load of the air battle from the depleted carriers to the land-based naval air forces. Some of these units were positioned at forward bases in the Solomon Islands, and while on an inspection trip to these positions on 18 April 1943, Yamamoto once more fell victim—this time personally—to American code-breaking. A squadron of American P-38 fighters ambushed his plane and its escorts.

References: Dull (1978).

Yamamoto's death

Main article: Death of Isoroku Yamamoto

To boost morale following Guadalcanal, Yamamoto decided to make an inspection tour throughout the South Pacific. On 14 April 1943, the US naval intelligence effort, code-named "Magic", intercepted and decrypted a message containing specific details regarding Yamamoto's tour, including arrival and departure times and locations, as well as the number and types of planes that would transport and accompany him on the journey. Yamamoto, the itinerary revealed, would be flying from Rabaul to Ballalae Airfield, on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands, on the morning of 18 April 1943.

Admiral Nimitz consulted Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander, South Pacific, then authorized a mission on 17 April to intercept Yamamoto's flight en route and down it.

The 339th Fighter Squadron of the 347th Fighter Group, 13th Air Force, was assigned the mission, since only their P-38 Lightning aircraft possessed the range to intercept and engage. Pilots were informed that they were intercepting an "important high officer," although they were not aware of who their actual target was.

On the morning of April 18, despite urgings by local commanders to cancel the trip for fear of ambush, Yamamoto's planes left Rabaul as scheduled for the 315-mile trip. Shortly after, eighteen specially-fitted P-38s took off from Guadalcanal. They wave-hopped most of the 430 miles to the rendezvous point, maintaining radio silence throughout. At 09:34 Tokyo time, the two flights met and a dogfight ensued between the P-38s and the six Zeroes escorting Yamamoto.

1st Lt. Rex T. Barber engaged the first of the two Japanese bombers, which turned out to be Yamamoto's plane. He sprayed the plane with gunfire until it began to spew smoke from its left engine. Barber turned away to attack the other bomber as Yamamoto's plane crashed into the jungle.

One US pilot—1st Lt. Raymond K. Hine—was killed in action.

The crash site and body of Admiral Yamamoto were found the next day in the jungle north of the then-coastal site of the former Australian patrol post of Buin by a Japanese search and rescue party, led by Army engineer Lieutenant Hamasuna. According to Hamasuna, Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane's wreckage, his white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of his samurai sword, still upright in his seat under a tree. Hamasuna said Yamamoto was instantly recognizable, head dipped down as deep in thought. A post-mortem of the body disclosed that Yamamoto received two gunshot wounds, one to the back of his left shoulder and another to his left lower jaw that exited above his right eye. Despite the evidence, the question of whether or not the Admiral initially survived the crash has been a matter of controversy in Japan.

This proved to be the longest fighter-intercept mission of the war. In Japan it became known as the "Navy kō Incident"(海軍甲事件). It raised morale in the United States, and shocked the Japanese who were officially told about the incident only on 21 May 1943. To cover up the fact that the Allies were reading Japanese code, American news agencies were told that civilian coast-watchers in the Solomon Islands saw Yamamoto boarding a bomber in the area.

Captain Watanabe and his staff cremated Yamamoto's remains at Buin, and the ashes were returned to Tokyo aboard the battleship Musashi, Yamamoto's last flagship. Yamamoto was given a full state funeral on 3 June 1943, where he received, posthumously, the title of Fleet Admiral and awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, (1st Class). He was also the only foreigner awarded Nazi Germany's Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. Part of his ashes were buried in the public cemetery in Tama, Tokyo (多摩霊園), and the remainder at his ancestral burial grounds at the Chuko-ji Temple in Nagaoka City.

Trivia

• Yamamoto was an avid gambler, enjoying shogi, billiards, bridge, mah jong, poker, and other games that tested his wits and sharpened his mind. He frequently made jokes about moving to Monaco and starting his own casino. While other military leaders avoided the image of being "soft", Yamamoto continued to practice calligraphy and wrote poems, though his poems were critiqued by some as being monotonous. He was also known to frequent the company of geisha, reflecting the fact that he was never very close with his wife, Reiko. He did, however, father four children with his wife, two sons and two daughters. Reiko revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer to his favorite geisha Kawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some controversy.

References

• Agawa, Hiroyuki; Bester, John (trans.). The Reluctant Admiral. New York: Kodansha, 1979. ISBN 4-7700-2539-4. A definitive biography of Yamamoto in English. This book explains much of the political structure and events within Japan that lead to the war.

• Davis, Donald A. Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005. ISBN 0-312-30906-6.

• Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.

• Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.

• Glines, Carroll V. Attack on Yamamoto (1st edition). New York: Crown, 1990. ISBN 0-517-57728-3. Glines documents both the mission to shoot down Yamamoto and the subsequent controversies with thorough research, including personal interviews with all surviving participants and researchers who examined the crash site.

• Hoyt, Edwin P. Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. ISBN 1-58574-428-X.

• Lundstrom, John B. The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984. ISBN 0-87021-189-7.

• Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87021-759-3.

• Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55750-432-6.

• Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001. ISBN 1-55750-431-8.

• Ugaki, Matome; Chihaya, Masataka (trans.). Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-45. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8229-5462-1. Provides a high-level view of the war from the Japanese side, from the diaries of Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, Admiral Matome Ugaki. Provides evidence of the intentions of the imperial military establishment to seize Hawaii and to operate against the British navy in the Indian Ocean. Translated by Masataka Chihaya, this edition contains extensive clarifying notes from the U.S. editors derived from U.S. military histories.

External links

• Yamamoto biography From Spartacus Educational
• World War II Database: Isoroku Yamamoto biography
• World War II Database: Death of Yamamoto
• Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese Navy US Naval Historical Center
• Pacific Wrecks. Place where Yamamoto Type 1 bomber crash
• The Great Pacific War Sixteen years before Pearl Harbor attack, an English naval expert Hector Bywater uncannily prophesied in detail the war in the Pacific. Could Yamamoto have been influenced by Bywater remarkable plan too?