Barton v Armstrong: Difference between revisions
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{{Infobox court case |
{{Infobox court case |
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| name = Barton v Armstrong |
| name = Barton v Armstrong |
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| court = Privy Council |
| court = [[Judicial Committee of the Privy Council|Privy Council]] |
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| imagesize = 100px |
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| date decided = {{start date|1973|12|05}} |
| date decided = {{start date|1973|12|05}} |
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| full name = Alexander Barton, Appellant v. Alexander Ewan Armstrong and Others, Respondents |
| full name = Alexander Barton, Appellant v. Alexander Ewan Armstrong and Others, Respondents |
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| citations = |
| citations = {{cite BAILII |year=1973 |court=UKPC |num=27 |format=1 |parallelcite=[1976] {{abbr|AC|Appeal Cases}} 104 }} |
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| judges = [[Lord Simon]], [[ |
| judges = [[Richard Wilberforce, Baron Wilberforce|Lord Wilberforce]], [[Jack Simon, Baron Simon of Glaisdale|Lord Simon of Glaisdale]], [[Geoffrey Cross, Baron Cross of Chelsea|Lord Cross of Chelsea]], [[Charles Shaw, Baron Kilbrandon|Lord Kilbrandon]], [[Garfield Barwick|Sir Garfield Barwick]] |
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| prior actions = ''Barton v Armstrong'' [1973] 2 [[NSW Law Reports|NSWLR]] 598 |
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| prior actions = |
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| subsequent actions = |
| subsequent actions = |
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| opinions = |
| opinions = |
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| decision by = Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon and Sir Garfield Barwick |
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| appealed from = [[Court of Appeal of |
| appealed from = [[New South Wales Court of Appeal|NSW Court of Appeal]] |
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| transcripts = |
| transcripts = |
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| keywords = [[Duress]] |
| keywords = [[Duress]] |
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}} |
}} |
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'''''Barton v Armstrong''''' |
'''''Barton v Armstrong''''',<ref name=PC>{{cite BAILII |year=1973 |court=UKPC |num=27 |format=1 |litigants=Barton v Armstrong |parallelcite=[1976] {{abbr|AC|Appeal Cases}} 104 |date=5 December 1973 |courtname=auto |juris=NSW}}.</ref> is an [[Australian contract law|Australian]] and [[English contract law]] case relating to [[duress]]. It held that a person who agrees to a contract under physical duress may avoid the contract, even if the duress was not the main reason for agreeing to the bargain. |
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==Facts== |
==Facts== |
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Barton was the managing director of a company, whose main business was in property development. Its main projects were going through 'Paradise Waters (Sales) Pty Ltd'. Barton made a deed so the company agreed to pay $140,000 to [[Alexander Armstrong (politician)|Alexander Armstrong]], a state politician, and buy his shares for $180,000. Armstrong was the chairman of the board. |
Barton was the managing director of a company, whose main business was in property development. Its main projects were going through 'Paradise Waters (Sales) Pty Ltd'. Barton made a deed so the company agreed to pay $140,000 to [[Alexander Armstrong (politician)|Alexander Armstrong]], a state politician, and buy his shares for $180,000. Armstrong was the chairman of the board. |
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Street J found Armstrong had threatened to have Barton killed. But the NSW Court of Appeal said Barton failed to discharge the onus that the threat had caused him to make the contract. |
[[Laurence Street|Street J]] found Armstrong had threatened to have Barton killed. But the [[NSW Court of Appeal]] said Barton failed to discharge the onus that the threat had caused him to make the contract.<ref>''Barton v Armstrong'' [1973] 2 [[NSW Law Reports|NSWLR]] 598 (30 June 1971), [[NSW Court of Appeal|Court of Appeal]] (NSW, Australia).</ref> |
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==Advice== |
==Advice== |
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[[Lord Wilberforce]] and Lord Simon, dissenting jointly, held that while in substantial agreement on the law, there was no duress on the facts, but the threats needed to be at least "a" reason for entering the contract. They held the case, |
[[Lord Wilberforce]] and Lord Simon, dissenting jointly, held that while in substantial agreement on the law, there was no duress on the facts, but the threats needed to be at least "a" reason for entering the contract. They held the case, |
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<blockquote>involves consideration of what the law regards as voluntary or its opposite… Absence of choice… does not negate consent in law; for this the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate. Thus, out of the various means by which consent may be obtained - advice, persuasion, influence, inducement, representation, commercial pressure - the law had come to select some which it will not accept as a reason for voluntary action: fraud, abuse of relation of confidence, undue influence, duress or coercion. In this the law, under the influence of equity, has developed from the old common law conception of duress - threat to life and limb - and it has arrived at the modern generalisation expressed by Holmes J - 'subjected to an improper motive for action' (''[[Fairbanks v Snow]]'' <ref>''[[Fairbanks v. Snow]]'', 145 Mass. 153, 13 NE 596 (1887)</ref>)</blockquote> |
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The three tests for physical duress....... are to, first, 'show that some illegitimate means of persuasion was used' and second that ‘the illegitimate means used was a reason (not the reason, nor the predominant reason nor the clinching reason)' and third that his evidence is 'honest and accepted'. |
The three tests for physical duress....... are to, first, 'show that some illegitimate means of persuasion was used' and second that ‘the illegitimate means used was a reason (not the reason, nor the predominant reason nor the clinching reason)' and third that his evidence is 'honest and accepted'. |
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Revision as of 10:38, 10 June 2017
| Barton v Armstrong | |
|---|---|
.svg) | |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Full case name | Alexander Barton, Appellant v. Alexander Ewan Armstrong and Others, Respondents |
| Decided | December 5, 1973 |
| Citations | [1973] UKPC 27, [1976] AC 104 |
| Case history | |
| Prior action | Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598 |
| Appealed from | NSW Court of Appeal |
| Court membership | |
| Judges sitting | Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon, Sir Garfield Barwick |
| Case opinions | |
| Decision by | Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon and Sir Garfield Barwick |
| Keywords | |
| Duress | |
Barton v Armstrong,[1] is an Australian and English contract law case relating to duress. It held that a person who agrees to a contract under physical duress may avoid the contract, even if the duress was not the main reason for agreeing to the bargain.
Facts
Barton was the managing director of a company, whose main business was in property development. Its main projects were going through 'Paradise Waters (Sales) Pty Ltd'. Barton made a deed so the company agreed to pay $140,000 to Alexander Armstrong, a state politician, and buy his shares for $180,000. Armstrong was the chairman of the board.
Street J found Armstrong had threatened to have Barton killed. But the NSW Court of Appeal said Barton failed to discharge the onus that the threat had caused him to make the contract.[2]
Advice
The Privy Council advised that Barton could avoid the contract for being under duress, and it did not matter that he may have agreed to the deal any way. Lord Cross, Lord Kilbrandon and Sir Garfield Barwick held that physical duress does not need to be the main reason, it must merely be one reason for entering an agreement. Lord Cross said the same rule should apply for duress as in misrepresentation, 'that if Armstrong's threats were 'a' reason for Barton’s executing the deed he is entitled to relief even though he might well have entered into the contract if Armstrong had uttered no threats to induce him to do so...'
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon, dissenting jointly, held that while in substantial agreement on the law, there was no duress on the facts, but the threats needed to be at least "a" reason for entering the contract. They held the case,
involves consideration of what the law regards as voluntary or its opposite… Absence of choice… does not negate consent in law; for this the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate. Thus, out of the various means by which consent may be obtained - advice, persuasion, influence, inducement, representation, commercial pressure - the law had come to select some which it will not accept as a reason for voluntary action: fraud, abuse of relation of confidence, undue influence, duress or coercion. In this the law, under the influence of equity, has developed from the old common law conception of duress - threat to life and limb - and it has arrived at the modern generalisation expressed by Holmes J - 'subjected to an improper motive for action' (Fairbanks v Snow [3])
The three tests for physical duress....... are to, first, 'show that some illegitimate means of persuasion was used' and second that ‘the illegitimate means used was a reason (not the reason, nor the predominant reason nor the clinching reason)' and third that his evidence is 'honest and accepted'.
See also
- Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326
- Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 350 F.2d 445 (C.A. D.C. 1965)
- Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Str 915
- Skeate v Beale (1840) 11 AD & E 983 held unlawful detention of goods is not duress.
Notes
- ^ Barton v Armstrong [1973] UKPC 27, [1976] AC 104 (5 December 1973), Privy Council (on appeal from NSW).
- ^ Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598 (30 June 1971), Court of Appeal (NSW, Australia).
- ^ Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 NE 596 (1887)