Operation Urban Warrior

Operation Urban Warrior is a United States Marine Corps (USMC) program and exercise meant to test Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), and Urban warfare in general. It was developed in the late 1990s by the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory partly in response to growing problem on inner-city fighting, and was especially made urgent following the incident in the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.

Recent events in Fallujah Iraq, seem to indicate that these ongoing urban warfare training programs have had a net positive result in the way US Marines operate on the military level, although the social, political, and environmental angles seem to be largely ignored.

General information

The program is possibly the most important in the United States military; while the U.S. is believed to have the best conventional military force in the world, the majority of its most powerful weapons systems are meant to fight on open territory much like the open deserts of the Gulf War or in forest regions. Cities pose a problem, as most cities are too small to allow large weapons systems like the M1A1 Abrams tank to maneuver in. Secondly, the presence of civilians makes it difficult both logistically and morally to simply bomb a city to defeat enemy troops.

Thirdly, the growing force of unconventional forces such as militia, terrorists, or insurgent forces living within a civilian populace makes it highly necessary to physically enter cities and go from house-to-house to fight. Along with these is the realization that the standard infantryman has not become obsolete in the face of modern weapons and technology, but has in fact become even more important in recent years. (See Land Warrior)

Part of Urban Warrior's purpose is to conduct and refine disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations for use in the United States and abroad. Thus Urban Warrior has a dual purpose: to fight enemies in urban environments, and gain the support and trust of the local population by engaging in humanitarian efforts.

Some lessons learned from Urban Warrior were applied in the 2003 invasion of Iraq as well as the occupation. The fighting in the cities of Najaf and Falluja have clearly shown that militia often have the advantage of home territory and local support. One other problem is that religion, ideology, and/or culture may also play in the favor of the enemy; non-combatants may prefer to side with them on basis of nationalism, tribal connections, or simply a general dislike or even outright hatred of what they see as a foreign invading force. This fact was clear in Mogadishu, when civilians chose to support the Habr Gedr militia as opposed to the United Nations (and the U.S.) humanitarian forces, despite the fact that it was the Habr Gedr and other militia clans starving them into submission.

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MOUT T-pattern BDUs. Tested but never adopted, the uniform has since been superceded by the MARPAT uniforms

While Urban Warrior is a good effort, there needs to be much more developed by not only the USMC, but the United States Military as a whole to look into the socio-cultural and ethical impact of urban warfare. Especially given that terrorist forces are increasingly willing to play those as a card.

An experimental Urban-Camouflage Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) was developed and used during the 1999 Urban Warrior MOUT exercises. The pattern, sometimes called T-pattern or T-block, consists of three gray tones in geometrical patterns, the idea behind which was as a 'pattern breaker' to make Marine troops harder to hit. Like all modern U.S. BDUs, it is made of a lightweight rip-stop material. The pattern was never officially adopted, and have since been replaced with the new MARPAT camouflage uniforms.

Quotations

"Our enemies, having watched Desert Storm on CNN, know they cannot engage the United States with conventional methods. These potential foes view cities as a way to limit the technological advantages of our military. They know that cities, with their narrow streets, confusing layout and large number of civilian non-combatants, place limits on our technological superiority and especially our use of firepower. We have to develop technologies that allow us to win while minimizing collateral damage."

- Col. Mark Thiffault, Director, Joint Information Bureau, Urban Warrior