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One of the aspects where interpretations the massacre differ is in the motivation of the recruits for ending their training.
One of the aspects where interpretations the massacre differ is in the motivation of the recruits for ending their training.


One version states that the [[mutiny|mutinied]] because they were angered by the delay in receiving their allowance, the poor living conditions on Corregidor, and the experience of having to live on miserable rations for three months.<ref name="Majul1985" /><ref name="Smith2015" /><ref name="McCoy2009" />
One version states that they [[mutiny|mutinied]] because they were angered by the delay in receiving their allowance, the poor living conditions on Corregidor, and the experience of having to live on miserable rations for three months.<ref name="Majul1985" /><ref name="Smith2015" /><ref name="McCoy2009" />


Another school of thought posits that the project, code-named ''Jabidah'' involved the recruitment of Muslims trainees who were supposed to be trained to infiltrate and cause chaos in Sabah to strengthen Philippines' territorial claim.<ref name="Tan2009" /> These trainees were informed beforehand that they were joining the AFP to fight "[[Communism in the Philippines|communists]]", but subsequently learned the true nature of their mission during the latter part of their training.<ref name="MuslimPresident1994">{{cite book|author1=Macapado Abaton Muslim|author2=Philippines. Office of the President|author3=Mindanao State University. College of Public Affairs|title=The Moro armed struggle in the Philippines: the nonviolent autonomy alternative|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4ERxAAAAMAAJ|year=1994|publisher=Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University|isbn=978-971-11-1130-4}}</ref> Within this camp, some scholars argue that the massacre was due to the mutiny of the Muslim trainees who denied orders to infiltrate Sabah because they felt that the sabotage against Sabah was unjustified and that they also felt connected with fellow Muslims in Sabah.<ref>{{cite journal|url=|title=The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines|author=Lela Garner Noble|journal=Pacific Affairs|doi=|pmid=|year=1976|pages=405–424}}</ref> Other scholars argue that the trainees were killed upon learning the truth of their recruitment to ensure that the information was not leaked.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Max L. Gross|author2=Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (U.S.)|title=A Muslim archipelago: Islam and politics in Southeast Asia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aJHaAAAAMAAJ|year=2007|publisher=Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College|isbn=978-1-932946-19-2}}</ref>
Another school of thought posits that the project, code-named ''Jabidah'' involved the recruitment of Muslims trainees who were supposed to be trained to infiltrate and cause chaos in Sabah to strengthen Philippines' territorial claim.<ref name="Tan2009" /> These trainees were informed beforehand that they were joining the AFP to fight "[[Communism in the Philippines|communists]]", but subsequently learned the true nature of their mission during the latter part of their training.<ref name="MuslimPresident1994">{{cite book|author1=Macapado Abaton Muslim|author2=Philippines. Office of the President|author3=Mindanao State University. College of Public Affairs|title=The Moro armed struggle in the Philippines: the nonviolent autonomy alternative|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4ERxAAAAMAAJ|year=1994|publisher=Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University|isbn=978-971-11-1130-4}}</ref> Within this camp, some scholars argue that the massacre was due to the mutiny of the Muslim trainees who denied orders to infiltrate Sabah because they felt that the sabotage against Sabah was unjustified and that they also felt connected with fellow Muslims in Sabah.<ref>{{cite journal|url=|title=The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines|author=Lela Garner Noble|journal=Pacific Affairs|doi=|pmid=|year=1976|pages=405–424}}</ref> Other scholars argue that the trainees were killed upon learning the truth of their recruitment to ensure that the information was not leaked.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Max L. Gross|author2=Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (U.S.)|title=A Muslim archipelago: Islam and politics in Southeast Asia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aJHaAAAAMAAJ|year=2007|publisher=Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College|isbn=978-1-932946-19-2}}</ref>

Revision as of 03:50, 30 September 2019

Recreation of the Jabidah unit patch as described by Benigno Aquino Jr. in a privilege speech delivered at the Legislative Building, Manila, on 28 March 1968.[1] Jibin Arula, in a 2009 interview, recalled that his unit patch displayed "skull markings".[2]

The Jabidah massacre was a disputed massacre of Moro army recruits by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on 18 March 1968,[3] which is acknowledged as a major flashpoint that ignited the Moro insurgency in the Philippines.[4]

It is sometimes also known as the Corregidor massacre, because the killing took place on Corregidor Island in the Philippines.

Author Cesar Adib Majul notes that the administration of Ferdinand Marcos had suppressed coverage of the affair in the interest of national unity,[5] which led to little or no documentation about the incident. This led to varying accounts of the number of trainees killed, ranging from 11 to 68,[6][7] and the reasons behind the massacre.

Background

Philippine claims on Sabah

Main article: North Borneo dispute

The north-eastern part of Sabah had been under the rule of the Sulu Sultanate since it was given to them by the Sultanate of Brunei in 1658 for the Sulu Sultanate's help in settling a civil war in Brunei[8] before being "ceded"[9] (in which a translation in Tausug/Philippine Malay translated the word as padjak)[10] to the British in 1878.[9] During the process of decolonisation by the British after World War II from 1946, Sabah was integrated as part of the Malaysian Federation in 1963 under the Malaysia Agreement.[11] The Philippine government however protested this, claiming the eastern part of Sabah had never been sold to foreign interests, and that it had only been "leased" (padjak) by the Sulu Sultanate, and therefore remained the property of the Sultan, and by extension, the property of Republic of the Philippines. Diplomatic efforts to Malaysia and the United Nations during the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal proved futile.

Operation Merdeka

See also: Moro attacks on Sabah
Operation Merdeka
Part of North Borneo dispute and Konfrontasi
Date1967–1968
Location
Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia
Result

Mutiny

Belligerents
 Philippines  Malaysia
 •  Sabah
Commanders and leaders
Philippines Ferdinand Marcos
Philippines Eduardo Abdul Latif Martelino		 Malaysia Sultan Ismail Nasiruddin Shah
Malaysia Tunku Abdul Rahman
Malaysia Mustapha Harun

In 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal renewed the Philippines' 1922 claim over Sabah although the territory has been incorporated into Malaysia.[12][13] Operation Merdeka is a follow-up to this claim. The plan was for trained commandos to infiltrate Sabah and destabilise the state by sabotage which would then legitimise the Philippines' military intervention in the territory and claiming the state which many Filipinos felt was rightfully theirs.[14]

In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos secretly authorized Major Eduardo "Abdul Latif" Martelino, a Muslim convert, to take charge of the operations of a secret commando unit code-named "Jabidah" and embark on an operation called "Project Merdeka" (merdeka means "freedom" in Malay) to destabilize and take over Sabah.[15] The alleged mastermind, however, included leading generals in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Defense Undersecretary Manuel Syquio, and Marcos himself.[6]

The first phase of the operation saw Martelino, with an advanced party of some 17 agents entering Sabah three times to conduct reconnaissance and psychological warfare.[15] It was during the second phase of the operation that the massacre took place. After 180 young Tausugs from Sulu received basic training, they were transported to a remote section of Corregidor Island at the mouth of Manila Bay[14] where they were further trained in guerrilla operations and jungle warfare. Once on the island, the code name was changed to 'Jabidah'.[6] The real purpose of the formation of Jabidah was never publicised therefore leading to wide speculations and controversies regarding this top secret military plan.[5]

Accounts of the massacre

Escape of Jibin Arula

The Oplan Merdeka and the Jabidah Massacre first came to public attention on 18 March 1968, when two fishermen rescued a Muslim man named Jibin Arula from the waters just off Caballo Island in Manila Bay. They discovered that he had suffered gunshot wounds, and he later recounted that he was the lone survivor of an attempt by members of the armed forces to kill a group of Muslim army recruits.[6]

Basic narrative

There are various interpretations of the events of that morning. While some interpretations claim that the massacre never took place, the gist of the Jabidah massacre narrative is that for one reason or the other, the trainees refused to continue their training and demanded to be returned home. One batch of recruits were disarmed, with some of the trainees returned home and some others transferred to a regular military camp in Luzon. But another batch of recruits were killed by army troops, with only one survivor, Jibin Arula, managing to escape.[6]

Interpretations of the recruits' motives

One of the aspects where interpretations the massacre differ is in the motivation of the recruits for ending their training.

One version states that they mutinied because they were angered by the delay in receiving their allowance, the poor living conditions on Corregidor, and the experience of having to live on miserable rations for three months.[5][6][14]

Another school of thought posits that the project, code-named Jabidah involved the recruitment of Muslims trainees who were supposed to be trained to infiltrate and cause chaos in Sabah to strengthen Philippines' territorial claim.[16] These trainees were informed beforehand that they were joining the AFP to fight "communists", but subsequently learned the true nature of their mission during the latter part of their training.[17] Within this camp, some scholars argue that the massacre was due to the mutiny of the Muslim trainees who denied orders to infiltrate Sabah because they felt that the sabotage against Sabah was unjustified and that they also felt connected with fellow Muslims in Sabah.[18] Other scholars argue that the trainees were killed upon learning the truth of their recruitment to ensure that the information was not leaked.[19]

The official narrative denied that the reason for training the recruits were for infiltration in Sabah and that the massacre as stated in the Manila Bulletin, the government-controlled leading print media, occurred because the trainees could not endure hardship during the training.[20] With the lack of substantial evidence, it proved difficult to convict the officers involved in the massacre and thus they were acquitted, which further angered the Muslims.[21][22]

Initial responses

Senate expose

The opposition senator Benigno Aquino Jr. exposed that Jabidah was a plan by President Ferdinand Marcos to ensure his continuity of power.[1][23] The incident was used by members of the opposition to criticise Marcos' administration and this was largely covered by the press which caught the government off-guard.[17] The massacre can be seen as a political tool by the opposition to discredit President Ferdinand Marcos for his poor administration and neglect of the Muslims during his term.[24]

International reactions

In July 1971, then Prime Minister of Libya, Muammar Gaddhafi, wrote to President Marcos to express his concern. As the Philippines relied on Arab oil, the government tried to defend itself against any accusation and denied any religious repression taking place in Mindanao. The acting foreign Minister added that the problems stemmed from land and political issues which it was ready to solve internally.[22] Then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, also condemned the Philippine government and requested for congressional trial against the officers involved in the massacre.[6] Diplomatic ties between the Philippines and Malaysia were severed[22] as this event also further indicated to Malaysia that the Philippine government still had strong determination in its territorial claim to Sabah.[17] In general, this affair had increased the international community's awareness of the Moro issue in the Philippines.[22]

Role in igniting the Moro insurgency

Main article: Moro insurgency in the Philippines

In spite of disputes about the facts of the massacre, historians agree that the Jabidah Massacre was one of the most important flashpoints that ignited the Moro insurgency during Marcos' regime.[4]

Despite undergoing numerous trials and hearings, the officers related to the massacre were never convicted which served as a clear indication to the Muslim community that the Christian government had little regard for them.[25] This created a furor within the Muslim community in the Philippines, especially among the educated youth.[17] Muslim students saw the need through this incident to unite in protests and organised demonstrations and rallies in Manila with financial backing from Muslim politicians and university intellectuals. One such demonstration was situated near the Malacañang Palace, where the President and his family resided. The students held a week-long protest vigil over an empty coffin marked 'Jabidah' in front of the palace.[5]

The massacre significantly brought the Muslim intellectuals, who, prior to the incident had no discernible interest in politics, into the political scene to demand for safeguards against politicians who were using them.[4] Apart from the intellectuals, Muslims in Philippines in general saw that all opportunities for integration and accommodation with the Christians were lost and further marginalised.[6]

Founding of the Muslim Independence Movement

In May 1968, former Cotabato governor Datu Udtog Matalam announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) which was regarded by observers as the spontaneous backlash of the Jabidah Massacre.[4] The strong feelings and unity of the Muslim intellectuals were seen as the immediate reaction to the establishment of the MIM[26] which carried far-reaching impacts such as the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and continued armed struggle in the Southern Philippines until today.

Lucman impeachment call and the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization

Main article: Rashid Lucman

After the Senate exposé implied that President Ferdinand Marcos was ultimately responsible for the massacre Lanao del Sur, Congressman Haroun al-Rashid Lucman called for Congress to begin proceedings to impeach the President.[27] When his proposal didn't get enough congressional support, he became convinced that Muslims should rule themselves in Muslim Mindanao - a conviction which led him to eventually establish the Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) after the end of his term in 1969.[28]

Martial law and the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front

Main articles: Martial law under Ferdinand Marcos and Moro National Liberation Front

On 23 September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos announced that he had placed the entirety of the Philippines, including Muslim Mindanao, under Martial law. While Matalam's MIM was already defunct, one of its former members, Nur Misuari, established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) a month after the declaration of Martial Law, on 21 October 1972.[29] Lucman's BMLO eventually expressed support for the MNLF.[27]

Proclamation 1081 dissolved the various political groups that had been previously established in the Moro provinces, and with the MIM having already been dissolved, Marcos' declaration of martial law effectively assured the MNLF, which was more radical than its predecessors, would come to dominate the Moro separatist movement.[30]

Conflicting accounts

Scholars have opined that the media attention given Arula may have, to some extent, distorted his accounts.[31] The actual events remain unclear as documents were allegedly destroyed by Major Martellino.[6] Arula died in a traffic accident in Trece Martires, Cavite, sometime in August or September 2010.[32]

Some sources differ with the official account:

  • Andrew Tian Huat Tan numbers the victims between 28 and 64, and says that author and social anthropologist Arnold Molina Azurin has written that the massacre is a myth.[16]
  • William Larousse says that a survivor described recruits being shot in groups of twelve. Note 5 on page 130 gives a number of estimates by other sources ranging from 14 to 64.[25]
  • Authors at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies say that Jibin Arula, described as the sole survivor of the massacre, as numbering his fellow trainees killed at 11, while others numbered them at over 60.[33]
  • Alfred W. McCoy puts Arula in a second group of 12 recruits taken to be killed, and describes his escape.[14] Artemio R Guillermo puts the number of recruits at "about two hundred" and says that only one man escaped being massacred.[34]
  • Rigoberto Tiglao, an activist previously incarcerated during the martial law, contends that Jabidah massacre was a ploy by the Liberal Party to fatally blow President's Marcos re-election bid.[35]

Official acknowledgement

President Benigno Aquino III acknowledged the incident on 18 March 2013, when he led commemorations on the 45th anniversary of the massacre. This notably marked the first time that a ruling President had acknowledged the massacre as having taken place. Aquino also directed the National Historical Commission of the Philippines to designate the Mindanao Garden of Peace on Corregidor as a historical landmark.[36] Ground was broken to construct the landmark during a ceremony marking the 45th anniversary of the massacre.[37] During a ceremony marking the 47th anniversary of the massacre, a symbolic peace marker: 'Mindanao Garden of Peace: Corregidor Island' was turned over to the families of the survivors of the massacre.[38]

A 1990 film based on the event starred Anthony Alonzo, sharing the same name. However, details are fictionalized for the sake of artistic license.[39]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. (28 March 1968). "Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil?". Delivered at the Legislative Building, Manila, on 28 March 1968. Government of the Philippines. Archived from the original on 13 September 2015.
  2. ^ Arguillas, Carolyn O. (15 March 2009). "Q and A with Jibin Arula: 41 years after the Jabidah Massacre". Mindanews. Retrieved 29 March 2016.
  3. ^ Marites Dañguilan Vitug; Glenda M. Gloria (18 March 2013). "Jabidah and Merdeka: The inside story". Rappler. Archived from the original on 13 September 2015. Retrieved 13 September 2015.
  4. ^ a b c d T. J. S. George (1980). Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-580429-4.
  5. ^ a b c d Cesar Adib Majul (October 1985). The contemporary Muslim movement in the Philippines. Mizan Press. ISBN 978-0-933782-16-7.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i Paul J. Smith (26 March 2015). Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Taylor & Francis. pp. 5–. ISBN 978-1-317-45886-9.
  7. ^ Abdurasad Asani (1985). "The Bangsamoro People: A Nation in Travail". Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. 6 (2): 295–314. doi:10.1080/13602008508715944.
  8. ^ Rozan Yunos (7 March 2013). "Sabah and the Sulu claims". The Brunei Times. Archived from the original on 17 June 2014. Retrieved 20 September 2013.
  9. ^ a b British Government (1878). "British North Borneo Treaties. (British North Borneo, 1878)" (PDF). Sabah State Government (State Attorney-General's Chambers). Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 September 2015. Retrieved 24 February 2013.
  10. ^ Chester Cabalza. "The Sabah Connection: An Imagined Community of Diverse Cultures". Academia.edu. Retrieved 13 September 2015. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  11. ^ "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore (Agreement relating to Malaysia)" (PDF). United Nations. 1963. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 September 2015. Retrieved 13 September 2015.
  12. ^ "Appendix V: Aide memoire". Philippine Claim to North Borneo (Sabah), Vol. II. Government of the Philippines. 2 August 1962. Retrieved 26 March 2016.
  13. ^ "I. North Borneo Claim (Excerpt from President Diosdado Macapagal's State-of-the-Nation Message to the Congress of the Philippines)". Philippine Claim to North Borneo (Sabah), Vol. II. Government of the Philippines. 28 January 1963. Retrieved 26 March 2016.
  14. ^ a b c d Alfred W. McCoy (15 October 2009). Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State. Univ of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-23413-3.
  15. ^ a b "Marcos order: Destabilize, take Sabah". Philippine Daily Inquirer. 2 April 2000. Retrieved 19 June 2015.
  16. ^ a b Andrew T. H. Tan (1 January 2009). A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 194–. ISBN 978-1-84720-718-0.
  17. ^ a b c d Macapado Abaton Muslim; Philippines. Office of the President; Mindanao State University. College of Public Affairs (1994). The Moro armed struggle in the Philippines: the nonviolent autonomy alternative. Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University. ISBN 978-971-11-1130-4.
  18. ^ Lela Garner Noble (1976). "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines". Pacific Affairs: 405–424.
  19. ^ Max L. Gross; Center for Strategic Intelligence Research (U.S.) (2007). A Muslim archipelago: Islam and politics in Southeast Asia. Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College. ISBN 978-1-932946-19-2.
  20. ^ Syed Serajul Islam (1998). "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines". Asian Survey. 38 (5): 441–456. doi:10.2307/2645502. JSTOR 2645502.
  21. ^ David Wurfel (1991). Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Cornell University Press. pp. 154–. ISBN 978-0-8014-9926-5.
  22. ^ a b c d Moshe Yegar (2002). Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar. Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-0356-2.
  23. ^ Nasser A. Marohomsalic (2001). Aristocrats of the Malay Race: A Historic of the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines. N.A. Marohomsalic.
  24. ^ Rizal G. Buendia (2002). Ethnicity and Sub-nationalist Independence Movements in the Philippines and Indonesia: Implications for Regional Security. Yuchengco Center, De La Salle University. ISBN 978-971-555-437-4.
  25. ^ a b William Larousse (2001). A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in Mindanao-Sulu, Philippines : 1965–2000. Gregorian Biblical BookShop. ISBN 978-88-7652-879-8.
  26. ^ Mohammed Ayoob (March 1981). The Politics of Islamic reassertion. Croom Helm. ISBN 978-0-7099-0339-0.
  27. ^ a b "Martyrs & Heroes: LUCMAN, Haroun Al Rashid". Bantayog ng mga Bayani. 26 May 2016. Retrieved 24 January 2019.
  28. ^ Fallon, Joseph E. (August 1989). "Igorot and Moro National Reemergence". Fourth World Journal. 2 (1). Archived from the original on 18 August 2007. Retrieved 5 September 2007.
  29. ^ Yegar, Moshe (2002). Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma/Myanmar. Lexington Books. pp. 267–268.
  30. ^ "Moro National Liberation Front". Stanford University Mapping Militants Project. Retrieved 8 March 2019.
  31. ^ Rommel A. Curaming; Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied; Loh Kah Seng (2013). "On the Fluidity and Stability of Personal Memory: Jibin Arula and the Jabidah Massacre in the Philippines". Oral History in Southeast Asia: Memories and Fragments. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 84–89.
  32. ^ Arguillas, Carolyn O. (14 February 2011). "Lone survivor of Jabidah Massacre dies in vehicular accident". Mindanews. Retrieved 29 May 2016.
  33. ^ Michael Leifer; Kin Wah Chin; Leo Suryadinata (2005). Michael Leifer: selected works on Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 674. ISBN 978-981-230-270-0.
  34. ^ Artemio R. Guillermo (16 December 2011). Historical Dictionary of the Philippines. Scarecrow Press. p. 293. ISBN 978-0-8108-7511-1.
  35. ^ Rigoberto D. Tiglao (22 March 2015). "'Jabidah' was a big hoax". The Manila Times. Archived from the original on 22 November 2016.
  36. ^ "Noynoy insists Jabidah massacre true, wants it in history books". The Daily Tribune. House of Representatives of the Philippines. 19 March 2013. Retrieved 13 September 2015.[permanent dead link‍]
  37. ^ "Commemoration of the 45th Anniversary of Jabidah Massacre". Presidential Broadcast Staff. 18 March 2013.
  38. ^ "47th Jabidah massacre Groups call for stop on Mindanao offensives". Mindanao Times. 18 March 2015.
  39. ^ Jerry O. Tirazona. "Jabidah Massacre (1990 film)". Internet Movie Database. Retrieved 13 September 2015.

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