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On the 25 April 1990, [[United States Central Command|CENCTOM]] warned of a regional threat and subsequently increased intelligence. On the 21 July, the Iraqi army began to build up on the [[Iraq–Kuwait border|Iraq-Kuwait border]] with 3,000 vehicles. On the 24 July started upgrading air defenses. The National Intelligence Ageny (NIA) said that Iraq had enough forces to conduct military operations in Kuwait. On the 24 July, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler, told journalists, ''“We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.''<ref>Brands, H. W. “[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552567 George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991.]” ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'', vol. 34, no. 1, 2004, JSTOR pp. 113–131. Accessed 11 May 2020. </ref>''"'' On the 25 July, Saddam Hussein held a meeting with American diplomat [[April Glaspie]]. During the interview, April said, ''“we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait”'' and ''“we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America'''''.'''<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html "CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy"] ''New York Times'', 23 September 1990. Note: there are two slightly different versions.</ref>" Many historians believe that these comments green lighted Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In response to these accusations, April said, “''Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take ALL of Kuwait.''<ref>[https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=NYzffkAuh00C&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=Obviously,+I+didn%27t+think,+and+nobody+else+did,+that+the+Iraqis+were+going+to+take+ALL+of+Kuwait,&source=bl&ots=Uy1zivTTGY&sig=ACfU3U0TCVWklAIwl4H8sZy4woqbIt0SBA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjNl9X64c7qAhXFyDgGHYg4DxkQ6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=Obviously%2C%20I%20didn't%20think%2C%20and%20nobody%20else%20did%2C%20that%20the%20Iraqis%20were%20going%20to%20take%20ALL%20of%20Kuwait%2C&f=false United States-Iraqi Relations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session,] U.S. Government Printing Office, April 26, 1990. p 56</ref>” Under testimony, she said, "''we foolishly did not realize he was stupid, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our vital interests.''<ref>{{Cite news|last=Oberdorfer|first=Don|date=21 March 1991|title=GLASPIE SAYS SADDAM IS GUILTY OF DECEPTION|work=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/03/21/glaspie-says-saddam-is-guilty-of-deception/fbf93c7c-5007-423e-b10e-981703f97a90/|url-status=live|access-date=15 July 2020}}</ref>" By the 31 July, 80,000 soldiers and 20,000 support forces were ready to invade Kuwait.<ref>United States Central Command, ''[https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document6.pdf Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm]'', 11 July 1991. Executive Summary. Top Secret. pp 2-3</ref> On the 1 August, [[Richard N. Haass|Richard N. Haas]] told [[Brent Scowcroft]] that an invasion was imminent. <ref>Russell, Richard L. “[https://www.jstor.org/stable/798180?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A71cf7602c5c63320efcdd623f3b9ee96&seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq].” ''Political Science Quarterly'', vol. 117, no. 2, 2002, pp. 191–207. ''JSTOR'', Accessed 15 July 2020. pp 194-196.</ref> On the 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait marking the beginning of the Persian Gulf war.
On the 25 April 1990, [[United States Central Command|CENCTOM]] warned of a regional threat and subsequently increased intelligence. On the 21 July, the Iraqi army began to build up on the [[Iraq–Kuwait border|Iraq-Kuwait border]] with 3,000 vehicles. On the 24 July started upgrading air defenses. The National Intelligence Ageny (NIA) said that Iraq had enough forces to conduct military operations in Kuwait. On the 24 July, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler, told journalists, ''“We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.''<ref>Brands, H. W. “[https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552567 George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991.]” ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'', vol. 34, no. 1, 2004, JSTOR pp. 113–131. Accessed 11 May 2020. </ref>''"'' On the 25 July, Saddam Hussein held a meeting with American diplomat [[April Glaspie]]. During the interview, April said, ''“we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait”'' and ''“we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America'''''.'''<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html "CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy"] ''New York Times'', 23 September 1990. Note: there are two slightly different versions.</ref>" Many historians believe that these comments green lighted Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In response to these accusations, April said, “''Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take ALL of Kuwait.''<ref>[https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=NYzffkAuh00C&pg=PA56&lpg=PA56&dq=Obviously,+I+didn%27t+think,+and+nobody+else+did,+that+the+Iraqis+were+going+to+take+ALL+of+Kuwait,&source=bl&ots=Uy1zivTTGY&sig=ACfU3U0TCVWklAIwl4H8sZy4woqbIt0SBA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjNl9X64c7qAhXFyDgGHYg4DxkQ6AEwAHoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=Obviously%2C%20I%20didn't%20think%2C%20and%20nobody%20else%20did%2C%20that%20the%20Iraqis%20were%20going%20to%20take%20ALL%20of%20Kuwait%2C&f=false United States-Iraqi Relations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session,] U.S. Government Printing Office, April 26, 1990. p 56</ref>” Under testimony, she said, "''we foolishly did not realize he was stupid, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our vital interests.''<ref>{{Cite news|last=Oberdorfer|first=Don|date=21 March 1991|title=GLASPIE SAYS SADDAM IS GUILTY OF DECEPTION|work=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/03/21/glaspie-says-saddam-is-guilty-of-deception/fbf93c7c-5007-423e-b10e-981703f97a90/|url-status=live|access-date=15 July 2020}}</ref>" By the 31 July, 80,000 soldiers and 20,000 support forces were ready to invade Kuwait.<ref>United States Central Command, ''[https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document6.pdf Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm]'', 11 July 1991. Executive Summary. Top Secret. pp 2-3</ref> On the 1 August, [[Richard N. Haass|Richard N. Haas]] told [[Brent Scowcroft]] that an invasion was imminent. <ref>Russell, Richard L. “[https://www.jstor.org/stable/798180?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A71cf7602c5c63320efcdd623f3b9ee96&seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq].” ''Political Science Quarterly'', vol. 117, no. 2, 2002, pp. 191–207. ''JSTOR'', Accessed 15 July 2020. pp 194-196.</ref> On the 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait marking the beginning of the Persian Gulf war.


== Sea also ==
== See also ==


* [[Gulf War|Persian Gulf war]]
* [[Gulf War|Persian Gulf war]]

Revision as of 08:52, 15 July 2020

The Gulf War began on the 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The war was fought between the international coalition led by the United States of America against Iraq. Saddam Hussein's rationale behind the invasion is disputed and largely unknown. No Iraqi document has ever been discovered explicitly listing these.

Saddam's calculus

Economics

The casus belli of the is likely the dire economic situation Iraq was positioned with in 1990. In January 1979, the Iranian Shah monarchy was overthrown and replaced by the supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. To prevent the spread of Iranian Islamic extremism and other hegemonic claims of the Shatt Al Arab waterway, Iraq invaded Iran on the 22 September 1980. The Iran-Iraq was a devastating and killed more than one million individuals. The war resulted in the Iraqi army becoming the fourth biggest[1] in the world but also devastated its economy. Iraq owed $35 billion in short-time high interest loans and the cost of infrastructure damage amounted to over $230 billion.[2][3] In February 1989, Iraq established the Arab Cooperation Council which attempted to garner economic support. In 1989, Iraq provided financial aid to Jordan by providing free shipping. In 1989, Saddam accused of Kuwait of oil slant drilling under Rumaila oil field on the Iraqi border. In February 1990, Saddam Hussein believed that Iraq should be compensated for protecting the Middle East from the spread of radicalism. He suggested that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) should write off Iraq's wartime loans. Kuwait and UAE did write off some of their loans. Saddam also hinted at his idea to invade Kuwait by saying, "Let the Gulf regimes know...that if they will not give this money to me, I will know how to get it." On the 18th July 1990, Saddam accused Kuwait and the UAE of exceeding Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas and requested that they lower their production. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz said, "every $1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a $1 billion drop in Iraq's annual revenues." It is estimated that Iraq lost $14 billion as a result of Kuwaiti overproduction.[4] These factors resulted in Iraq's terrible economy. The invasion meant that Iraq owned 20% of OPEC.

Iraq and Kuwait's border dispute

The Kuwatiti entity dates back to 1716 but maps as early as 1652 has outlined Kuwait.[5] Kuwait predates Iraq by at least 200 years and thus, Iraq's hegemonic claims over Kuwait are unsubstantiated. On the 23 July 1923, the treaty of Lausanne established the new borders after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This resulted in Britain gaining sovereignty over the Mandate of Mesopotamia and Palestine. The borders were quite arbitrary and served the interests of Britain and France rather than the locals. On the 3 October 1932, Iraq was given Independence and on the 14 July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was replaced with a republic. In 1963, Iraq recognized Kuwait's borders and independence. Saddam Hussein later claimed that this was invalid as it was not ratified.[6] He also falsely suggested that Kuwait had been carved out of the Iraq by the United Nations.

The border between Iraq and Kuwait also lacks geographical barriers except for a desert. In 1992, Kuwait built a fence to prevent a possible re-invasion.

Strategic importance

Kuwait is a highly strategic location. Kuwait lies on the delta of the Persian Gulf and has a coastal length of approximately 290 km. In contrast, Iraq is largely landlocked with a coastal length of only 60 km. Furthermore, Iraq had one major port, Umm Qasr through the Kuwaiti controlled Khor Abdullah waterway. As a result, Iraq's economical growth has been slowed due a lack of trading opportunities. Furthermore, the Khor Abudallah waterway is prone to crowding and was blocked by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq also has a small navy and lacks a strong grip on the Persian Gulf.[7] Iraq failed to gain a lease on the strategically vital islands of Bubiyan, Warbah, and Failak. Kuwait also allowed Iraq's modified Al Hussein SCUD missiles to reach Qatar and Bahrain.

Kuwait is one of the richest countries in the world. As of 2017, Kuwait has the 15th largest GDP per capital of US$66,200.[8] In 1990, Kuwait had the most modern water treatment facilities in the Middle East. The invasion gave Iraq access to these riches.

Conspiracy

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait may be served to be an attack on the West. This is because Saddam believed that the USA was trying to an economic war upon Iraq. In the Iran-Iraq war, the USA had supported Iraq. This was undermined by the Iran–Contra affair, where the USA sold weapons to Iran. Saddam said, "[Kuwait and the UAE] are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security.[9]" Iraq hated Israel and on 3 April 1990, he threatened to “make the fire (chemical weapons) eat up half of Israel.[10]” Saddam believed that the West used Israel as a spearhead against the Middle East and to spread Western propaganda. He also believed that Kuwait and the UAE were Western pawns. In this sense, some have argued that Iraq invaded Kuwait to fight back.

Other

Some minor factors include Kuwait's negligence and limited defense especially since they were surrounded by several larger players. Furthermore, most Kuwaiti soldiers were on holidays and those who remained lacked adequate training, equipment, and morale. He also believed that the Soviet Union and France which were main traders and allies would back Iraq and refuse to condemn them.[11] This was not the case as the Soviet Union was more preoccupied with its inevitable dissolution, Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to maintain good relations with the United States, and they had little support to provide anyways. France quickly opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Finally, Saddam also had a long-standing dream to establish a greater Arab Empire and unite fellow Arabs. The invasion of Kuwait may have been a stepping stone to achieve this ideal.

Prelude

On the 25 April 1990, CENCTOM warned of a regional threat and subsequently increased intelligence. On the 21 July, the Iraqi army began to build up on the Iraq-Kuwait border with 3,000 vehicles. On the 24 July started upgrading air defenses. The National Intelligence Ageny (NIA) said that Iraq had enough forces to conduct military operations in Kuwait. On the 24 July, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler, told journalists, “We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.[12]" On the 25 July, Saddam Hussein held a meeting with American diplomat April Glaspie. During the interview, April said, “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” and “we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America.[13]" Many historians believe that these comments green lighted Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In response to these accusations, April said, “Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take ALL of Kuwait.[14]” Under testimony, she said, "we foolishly did not realize he was stupid, that he did not believe our clear and repeated warnings that we would support our vital interests.[15]" By the 31 July, 80,000 soldiers and 20,000 support forces were ready to invade Kuwait.[16] On the 1 August, Richard N. Haas told Brent Scowcroft that an invasion was imminent. [17] On the 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait marking the beginning of the Persian Gulf war.

See also

References

  1. ^ Collins, Shannon (11 January 2019). "Desert Storm: A Look Back". defense.gov. Retrieved 15 July 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  2. ^ "Iraq Economic Data (1989-2003)". CIA. 23 April 2007. Retrieved 15 July 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  3. ^ Efraim, Karsh (2009). The Iran-Iraq War. Rosen Publising group.
  4. ^ Paul, Drew (2018). Political Science and International Relations. Scientific e-Resources. p. 218.
  5. ^ ALKENAEE, MAHA (August 2011). "THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ HAS IT SUBSIDED?" (PDF). LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: 6–7 – via Core.
  6. ^ Brown, Harry (October 1994). "The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: Historical Background and the UN Decisions of 1992 and 1993". IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin: 69–73 – via Dur.
  7. ^ Guo, Rongxing (2006). Territorial Disputes and Resource Management: A Global Handbook. Nova Publishers. p. 73.
  8. ^ "The World Factbook". CIA. Retrieved 15 July 2020.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  9. ^ Ibrahim, Youssef M. (18 July 1990). "Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 July 2020.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  10. ^ Foreign Broadcast Information Service broadcast, April 3, 1990.
  11. ^ Woods, Kelvin (2006). Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside. Vol. Vol 85. No.3. Foreign Affairs. p. 3. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  12. ^ Brands, H. W. “George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 1, 2004, JSTOR pp. 113–131. Accessed 11 May 2020.
  13. ^ "CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy" New York Times, 23 September 1990. Note: there are two slightly different versions.
  14. ^ United States-Iraqi Relations: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 26, 1990. p 56
  15. ^ Oberdorfer, Don (21 March 1991). "GLASPIE SAYS SADDAM IS GUILTY OF DECEPTION". The Washington Post. Retrieved 15 July 2020.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  16. ^ United States Central Command, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 11 July 1991. Executive Summary. Top Secret. pp 2-3
  17. ^ Russell, Richard L. “CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no. 2, 2002, pp. 191–207. JSTOR, Accessed 15 July 2020. pp 194-196.
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