Monghyr Mutiny

An officer of the East India Company c.1765-70

The Monghyr Mutiny (also known as the White Mutiny) occurred among European officers of the East India Company in 1766.

Origins

Robert Clive

Robert Clive led British forces in India during the Seven Years' War (1756-63) against France and her allies. His victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 brought Mir Jafar to power as Nawab of Bengal and brought the province into the sphere of influence of the East India Company. Clive afterwards served as Governor of the company's Bengal Presidency. Clive returned to England in 1760 but failed to establish himself as a politician. Clive was appointed by the company as Governor of Bengal once more in 1765 at a time of crisis for the presidency, Mir Jafar had been deposed by Mir Qasim and the province invaded by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II.

private of the 1st Bengal European Regiment (circa 1756)

Upon landing at Calcutta he found the military situation had been saved by the company's victory at the Battle of Buxar but the administration in a poor state. Clive implemented the dual-system of company rule under the nominal sovereignty of the Emperor and Nawab. Tax revenues from Bengal and Bihar were increased and he sought to restrict rampant corruption by forbidding company officials from accepting gifts or entering into commercial trade. Clive's reforms extended to the army which he consolidated into three brigades based in healthier stations than they had been previously. Each brigade comprised one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of sepoy infantry, and a troop of sepoy cavalry. The First Brigade was stationed at Monghyr (Munger) under Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, the Second Brigade at Allahabad under Colonel Richard Smith and the Third Brigade at Bankipore (near Patna) under Colonel Robert Barker. The entire force numbered some 14,000–15,000 sepoys and 3,000 Europeans.

The officers in the company army had previously supplemented their salaries by engaging in largescale commercial trading, at the expense of military efficiency. The officer corps had demonstrated a lack of discipline in the disorder following the distribution of price money after the February 1756 Battle of Vijaydurg, during which a number of deaths occurred. The officers had also grown accustomed to receiving an allowance, the batta, as a supplement to their salaries. This had originally been awarded to cover officers' expenses in the field and the responsibility for payment had transferred to Mir Jafar, who doubled the allowance, while the troops were in his service. Clive later claimed to have spoken to the officers at this time to caution them that the "double batta" was a strictly temporary arrangement. After the fall of Mir Jaffar, Mir Qasim refused to pay the batta and in lieu of payment offered the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong to the company. The revenues from these districts exceeded the cost of the batta payments so the company accepted.

In peacetime the company came to consider the batta payments an unnecessary expense and ordered Clive to withdraw the allowance. Clive ordered changes to the batta to be implemented from 1 January 1766. It was abolished completely for troops stationed in the companies factories (trading posts) and restricted to half batta for the troops of the First and Third Brigades who were in garrison. The double batta was retained for the Second Brigade while they were posted to active duty in the territory of the Nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-Daula, to deter a possible Maratha invasion. This would cease upon their return to Allahabad, where they were permitted a full batta payment on account of the high living expenses at that post. The payments were still in excess of those allowed to the company's officers in other regions, such as those on the Coromandel Coast, who had never received a batta. In compensation Bengal officers Clive allocated them a portion of the company's profits on the salt, betel-nut and tobacco monopolies.

Planning

Although there were complaints made to Clive over the batta order, these did not initially strike him as serious in nature. However in a report made by Clive's private secretary Henry Strachey to a secret committee of the House of Commons, from which much of the historical record of the mutiny is derived, Strachey states that he believes the mutiny had been planned as early as December 1765. Strachey believed the mutiny had its origin at the Monghyr garrison where secret committees of officers, disguised as masonic lodges, met to plan the restoration of the batta. The officers from Monghyr appointed a correpsondence officer who communicated with others appointed in the Second and Third Brigades to seek their support. A plan of action was drawn up that all officers would resign their commissions en masse on 1 June 1766, if the batta order was not rescinded.

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The second brigade, replied to the lteer that they considered themselves on active service and would not join in the mutiny, though they woudl, if tehir service ceased and their allowances reduced. Each brigade nominated a correspondence officer who handled communications with regards the mutiny. Around 200 commissions were collected together to be delivered during the mass resignation.

The mutineers stated they would refuse their salary for June, whihc was usually paid in advance, so that they could avoid being accused of mutiny.

Subscriptionw as to support any officer whose resignation was accepted and to pay their passage home and for a commission in the British army of the same rank.

Teh officers swore oaths to recover the batta or else resign their commissions en masse. Teh officers, and some civilian company employees, contributed funds to support the cause.

Mutiny

The British fort at Mongyr painted in 1787

Sepoy of the third battalion of Bengal Native Infantry (raised 1769)

At teh end of April a mistake by the officers revealed the extent of their secret organisation, which included a majority of the senior officers. There was considerable ill feeling towards Clive personally including threats against his life. Clive disregarded these threats, claiming that the officers were "Englishmen, not assassins". 200 officers pledged to resign their commissions on 1 June 1766, but planned to offer their services for another 2 weeks thereafter by whcih time they expected Clive to have capitulated. They also swore to intervene to prevent any executions of their comrades. They swore to pain a penalty of £500 if they rejoined the company after resigning. Clive gathered the few reliable officers and commissioned many others from teh european soldiery and civilians. The ranka dn file, who the mutineers did not attempt to join to their cause, were promised a supplement for their servic. The mutiny was greatest in the Mongyr brigade under Sir Robert Fletcher. Clive directed his soldiers to fire upon the officers unless they immediately dispersed. No blood was shed

Clive thought the company's order to withdraw the batta was too soon but did not want to lower his own authority by making concessions to the officers. He did, however, fear that a Maratha invasion or a defection from his forces by the Sipahis, might compel him to reach a settlement. Clive write to Smith and Fletcher to urge them to seek support from the Subahdars, the Indian officers in the army. Teh Indian soldiers did not support their officers and indicated taht they were willing to fire upon the mutineers.

Clive learnt of the impending mutiny by letter from Fletcher dated 25 APril that stated that the officers of the 1st brigade intended in resigning their commissions. Fletcher enclosed a letter from Barker that contained details of a dispute at Bankipore where a captain had attempted to force an ensign to hand over his commission for the resignation and which the ensign refused. At the court martial that arose from the incident Barker first learned of the mutiny (he had been away on expedition at Bettea).

After discover the 1st and 3rd bridgaes decised to bring forward their regisnations to 1 May.

Clive notified Calcutta of the impending mutiny on 29 April and requested that the presidency of Madras furnish as many officers, cadets and volunteers as possible for service in Bengal to reinforce his numbers. Clive wrote to his brigade commanders to reinforce his orders to abolish the batta and ordered them to make it clear to the officers that he expected them to comply.

Ina letter to Clive of 27 april barker advised that the officers of the 3rd briagde were unanmous in their intentions to resign. CVlive ordered him and the other two commanders to find who held the commissions and to arrest them and any other officers who were involved in planning the mutiny. They were to be held for a trial by clive's officers, not within their own brigade.

Clive was suspicious that he received no reply from Fletcher at Monghyr who he suspected may be involved in the affair.

Fletcher notified Clive on 1 May that he had received the commissions of 42 of his officers in resignation. Barker had met with his officers and advised them that their proposed actiopn was mutiny and desertion and advised they reconsider. The officers replied that they had given their word to resign to the others.

Barker claimed he received 140,000 rupees (£16,000) from civilians in calcutta for the support of the mutinous officers. Clive requested that the company investigate who had sent this money.

Barker discovered his adjutant Ensign Robertson was a ringleader and, with three others, was arrested adn sent to Calcutta. Barker;s brigade was, as a reuslt, in a generally better state of discipline.Clive amrched for Monghyr on 6 may accomo[anied by General Carnac, a small numbe rof officers from the bdy guard and 5 other officers, as well as anumber of sepoys.

Teh mutineers write to brother officers at Fort St George to ask them to refuse to be deployed to Bengal. Clive thereafter wrote to Caluctta to request they hald all post from Madras

Fletcher arrested two officers he suspected of being ring leaders and sent them to Calcutta, but was not certain he had found the true leaders. En route Clive intercepted an express package containing the commissions of the officers of Barker's brigade, addressed to the governor and council in Calcutta, Barker having refused to accept them.

The council authorised cClive to accept any resignations he considered and that any such man be sent toCalcuatta.

The council requested volunteer officers from merchants in Calcutta, bit of 100 men of suitable age and ability only two were forthcoming. Thes emen stood a few weeks service of parade duty and were rewarded with duty free trde priveleges.

Fletcher cotninued to advise Clvie that he had full confidence in his fofciers and that no trouble would arise.

On the night of 13 May two battalions of sepoys were assembled at Mongyr in case the mutiny came. These were ordered under arms on the afternoon of 15 May to the European barracks. One commanded by Captain Smith and the other, lacking for loyal European officers, by an Indian officer.

The sepoy abttalions proceeded silently to seize the signal battery near the European quarters. This act seems to have forstalled the mutiny as the European soldiers and artillery were making moves to follow their mutinous officers. Smith threatened to fire upon them if they did not retire to their quarters. Fletcher then gave each man two rupees and ordered the officers to leave the garrison, which they did by 6pm. Only three remained in the whole brigade, of which two were put under arrest.

Aftermath

Clive and Carnac arrived on the morning of 15 May and issued orders to inspect the briagde the following morning. The brigade turned out in good order but with few officers.

Clive spoke by intepreter to the Indian soldiers and commended them for their steadiness. He made awards to several officers and NCOs and ordered two months double pay for the men.

The mutineers encamped a few miles out from the garrison awaiting others from the other briagdes. Clvie sent a detachment to order them to Calcutta, which succeeded in achieving this aim. The garrison was reinforced by a number of officers recalled from detachment and expected the arrival of around a dozen from Calcutta in the coming days. Clive and Carnac left on 17 May for Patna to assist Smith on the frontier and ordered Barker to sned his briagde to support SMith at Allahanad.

The mutiny at bankipore was much smaller and Barker had more loyal officers refuse to reisgn. Barker's European soldiers were also les supprotive of the officers, many being recent recruits. Barker had concerns for the artillery soldiers so took command of that unit himself.In Smith's brigade he had received the resignations of all bar two of his officers

Colonel smith arrested one officer.

He brought a reliabel battatlion of sepoys from Serrajepore to Allahabad. Smith secured form many of his officers the agreement to serve til the end of may. Smith arrested all of the officers of his command bar four who had proved reliable.After a speech all the officers submitted and were released bar six who were sent as prisoners to Patna.

On account of their continued service Clive restored all the officers in Barkes' command. The officers at Patna were sent on to Calcutta. Clive sent message tot ehh French and Dutch posts at Chandernahor eand Chinsura to request they offer no employment to the dismissed officers.

The mutinous officers in smiths command soon relented and requested permission to continue to serve. Smith, authorised by Clive, granted pardon to those who he wished to retain. Almost all of the mutinous officers recanted and wrote letters of submission to their seniors, requesting reinstatement. many of the younger officers had no other means of subsistence. All of the ensigns, many lieutenants and some of the captains were accepted back into the service.

Those who rejoined were compelled to sign a contract requiring one years notice of resignation. A number were held for trial, particularly those who had deserted int he fiel;d at Serrajepore, and others sent home. Vancinces were filled by officers drawn from the Madras army. Strachey claimed the new officer corps was the best ever seen in india to that time.

Inquiries

Clive hed a number of courts-martial after which many officers were cashiered. Though Fletcher helped to subdue the mutiny he was implicated by evidence in the courts-martial and was himself cashiered.

The judges considered themselves unable to pass death sentences for the offences due to doubts about their authority under the law. Fletcher later returned to India as commander-in-chief of the MAdras presidency and another cashiered officer, John Petrie, returned as a high ranking civil officer. The mutiny has been described as "one of the most dangerous storms which ever menaced the power of the East India Company". Clive afterwards fell ill and left India in January 1767. Clive had himself made a considerable fortune during his time in India.

A report of the mutiny was made by Henry Strachey, Clive's secretary, and presented to a secret committee of the House of Commons.

Strachey suspected that if the mutiny had succeeded the officers would have demanded the abolition of covenants prohibiting the receipt of gifts from the Indian nobility, the abolition of the powers of the company select committee over the army and a guarantee that the Indian officers would not be replaced by others appointed in their place.

Two dismissed officers refused to elave Calcutta and barricaed themselves in their rooms. They were arrested when they emerged after a number of days. Efforts to find the civilian subscribers proved in vain as tehy had written by private means and disguised taeir communications as letters to ladies, which they knew would not be intercepted and read.

Fletcher was ordered to place himself under arrest for mutiny and await court martial. He requested a civil trial in Calcutta but this was denied by clvie as the offence was against military law only.

Fletcher and five other officers were court-martialed and found guilty. The leniency of the court was perhaps because the act of parliament under whcih they were tried implied that a formal employment contract was necessary for a prosecution. Tehy woudl otherwise have received eath sentenced.

Ay least one of the officers sentenced to be cashiered had his sword and spontoon broken over his head, his sash cut up in front of him before a parade of all the troops at Bankipore. Afterwards Clive instituted formal contracts among all officers who he suspected had entered into the mutiny.

Teh court martial heard that Fletcher had been aware of the plans for a mutiny as early as December and it had been proposal that the officers reisgn

Teh judge advocate found that Fletcher had not made Clive, Carnac or the company authorities aware of the mutiny schemes

The court found that Fletcher had not made the scheme known to Clive until 25 APril.

Fletcher was found guilty of mutiny by breaching the third and fourth articles of the second section of the articles of war, for having incited sedition and failing to pass on knowledge of an intended mutiny. He was sentenced to be cashiered.

Clive left India in January 1767. His reforms did much to remedy the situation in India and left lasting changes but made him many enemies. Despite the reforms the East India Company had to appeal to the British government for financial assistance in 1772, subsequent parliamentary committees found corruption continued among some of the company's civil servants.

Possible campaign medal

A silver medal is thought to have been issued by Clive to the Indian officers of two battalions that he used to quell the mutiny at Monghyr in June 1766.

The obverse shows Minerva seated among palm trees while teh reverse is inscribed "non nisi digno" (not unless to one who is worthy) MDCCLXVI (1766).

"The earliest medal issued by the Company on the Indian soil"

Only awarded to Indian soldiers.

The medal, whose motto and use of Minerva might be better suited to a scholarly achievement, and which does not resemble other company medals is not mentioned in the company's official record.

By other accounts it is a medal of the Masonic Educational Insitute at Dresden.

This opinion was raised as early as 1927.

Bibliography

• British Numismatic Society (1927). British Numismatic Journal.
• Chakravorty, B. (1995). Stories of Heroism: PVC & MVC Winners. Allied Publishers. ISBN 978-81-7023-516-3.
• Clark, Samuel (2016). Distributing Status: The Evolution of State Honours in Western Europe. McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP. ISBN 978-0-7735-9857-7.
• Fisher, Michael H. (1997). Introduction and biographical essay to: The Travels of Dean Mahomet. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• The Freemasons' Quarterly Review (1846). The Freemason's Lexicon. Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, Paternoster-Row.
• Kaye, John; Malleson, George Bruce (2010). Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8. Cambridge University Press. p. 152. ISBN 978-1-108-02323-8.
• Martin, Robert Montgomery (1879). Our Indian Empire and the Adjacent Countries of Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Persia, Etc., Depicted and Described by Pen and Pencil. London Print. and Publishing Company.
• Strachey, Sir Henry (1773). Narrative of the Mutiny of the Officers of the Army in Bengal, in the Year 1766. Becket.
• United Service Institution of India (1929). Journal of the United Service Institution of India.