Monghyr Mutiny

An officer of the East India Company c.1765-70

The Monghyr Mutiny (also known as the White Mutiny) occurred among European officers of the East India Company in 1766.

Origins

A later depiction of Shah Alam II with an East India Company officer

Robert Clive led British forces in India during the Seven Years' War (1756-63) against France and her allies. His victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 brought Mir Jafar to power as Nawab of Bengal and brought the province into the sphere of influence of the East India Company. Clive afterwards served as Governor of the company's Bengal Presidency. Clive returned to England in 1760 but failed to establish himself as a politician. Clive was appointed by the company as Governor of Bengal once more in 1765 at a time of crisis for the presidency, Mir Jafar had been deposed by Mir Qasim and the province invaded by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II.

Upon landing at Calcutta he found the military situation had been saved by the company's victory at the Battle of Buxar but the administration in a poor state. Clive implemented the dual-system of company rule under the nominal sovereignty of the Emperor and Nawab. Tax revenues from Bengal and Bihar were increased and he sought to restrict rampant corruption by forbidding company officials from accepting gifts or entering into commercial trade. Clive's reforms extended to the army which had previously had no organisation above the battalion level. Clive consolidated the units into three brigades and centralised them in healthier stations than they had been posted to previously. Each brigade comprised one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of sepoy infantry, and a troop of sepoy cavalry. The First Brigade was stationed at Monghyr (Munger) under Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, the Second Brigade at Allahabad under Colonel Richard Smith and the Third Brigade at Bankipore (near Patna) under Colonel Robert Barker. The entire force numbered some 14,000–15,000 sepoys and 3,000 Europeans.

Robert Clive

The officers in the company army had previously supplemented their salaries by engaging in largescale commercial trading, at the expense of military efficiency. The officer corps had demonstrated a lack of discipline in the disorder following the distribution of price money after the February 1756 Battle of Vijaydurg, during which a number of deaths occurred. The officers had also grown accustomed to receiving an allowance, the batta, as a supplement to their salaries. This had originally been awarded to cover officers' expenses in the field and the responsibility for payment had transferred to Mir Jafar, who doubled the allowance, while the troops were in his service. Clive later claimed to have spoken to the officers at this time to caution them that the "double batta" was a strictly temporary arrangement. After the fall of Mir Jaffar, Mir Qasim refused to pay the batta and in lieu of payment offered the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong to the company. The revenues from these districts exceeded the cost of the batta payments so the company accepted.

In peacetime the company came to consider the batta payments an unnecessary expense and ordered Clive to withdraw the allowance. Clive ordered changes to the batta to be implemented from 1 January 1766. It was abolished completely for troops stationed in the companies factories (trading posts) and restricted to half batta for the troops of the First and Third Brigades who were in garrison. The double batta was retained for the Second Brigade while they were posted to active duty in the territory of the Nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-Daula, to deter a possible Maratha invasion. This would cease upon their return to Allahabad, where they were permitted a full batta payment on account of the high living expenses at that post. The payments were still in excess of those allowed to the company's officers in other regions, such as those on the Coromandel Coast, who had never received a batta. In compensation Bengal officers Clive allocated them a portion of the company's profits on the salt, betel-nut and tobacco monopolies.

Planning

The British fort at Monghyr, depicted in 1787

Although there were complaints made to Clive over the batta order, these did not initially strike him as serious in nature. However in a report made by Clive's private secretary Henry Strachey to a secret committee of the House of Commons, from which much of the historical record of the mutiny is derived, Strachey states that he believes the mutiny had been planned as early as December 1765. Strachey believed the mutiny had its origin at the Monghyr garrison where secret committees of officers, disguised as masonic lodges, met to plan the restoration of the batta. The officers from Monghyr appointed a correpsondence officer who communicated with others appointed in the Second and Third Brigades to seek their support. The correspondence officer of the Second Brigade responded to the letter from Monghyr stating that the officers of the brigade considered themselves on active service and would not join the mutiny at this time but would do so if, upon returning to garrison, the batta payment was reduced. The Third Brigade was more committed in its resolve and there was almost unanimous support for the mutiny among its officers.

The plan was for all officers to resign their commissions en masse on 1 June 1766 if the batta order was not rescinded, though as a bargaining strategy tehy would agree to serve unpaid for a further two weeks to allow Clive time to meet their demands. To avoid accusations of mutiny the officers would refuse to draw their salary for June, which was paid in advance. Some 200 officers joined the plot, swearing oaths to not accept reinstatement unless the batta was restored on penalty of a fine of £500. The officers also swore oaths that they would intervene to prevent the executions of any of their comrades. Acknowledging that some officers may be dismissed from the service as a result of the action a subscription was raised among the mutineers and some of the civilians in Calcutta to pay for passage to Britain and for replacement commissions in the British Army for any such man.

Discovery

Sir Robert Fletcher

Clvie first learnt of the impending mutiny by a letter from Fletcher, dated 25 April, in which he stated that the officers of the his brigade had communicated their intentions to resign their commissions. Fletcher enclosed a letter from Barker which stated that he had uncovered the impending mutiny at a court martial held after a captain had attempted to force an ensign to hand over his commission. Barker claimed he had not learnt of it earlier due to being away from the cantonment on an expedition to Bettiah. The discovery of the plot seems to have convinced the mutineers to bring forwards the date of their resignations to 1 May. Clive ordered Barker and Fletcher to find those involved in the plot and arrest them, for trial by officers of Clive's choosing (they would normally be tried by officers of their own brigade). Clive received no reply to this letter and began to suspect that Fletcher may have been involved in the affair.

Clive considered that the company's order to withdraw the batta was premature but did not want to appear weak by making concessions to the officers. There was considerable ill feeling towards Clive as a result and some threats against his life were made, which he dismissed saying the officers were "Englishmen, not assassins". However, Clive worried that the threatened Maratha invasion or a spread of the mutiny to his Indian regiments would compel him to reach a settlement.

Clive wrote to Calcutta on 29 April to notify the company leadership of the mutiny and to request as many spare officers, cadets in training and European volunteers as could be found be sent to reinforce him. Although some existing military personnel were sent the request for civilian volunteers went largely unheeded. Of around 100 men of suitable age and ability in Calcutta only two volunteers were forthcoming; these men, who stood a few weeks of parade duty in the city, were rewarded with duty free trade privileges. It seems that the mutineers wrote to their friends elsewhere in India to ask that they refuse to deploy to Bengal. When Clive discovered this he wrote to Calcutta to ask that they hold all post from Bengal.

At the same time Clive wrote to his brigade commanders to reinforce his order that the batta be reduced, to make it clear to the officers that he would not abide dissent in this matter and to request that the commanders seek support from the subedars in case their troops were needed. It appears that the subedars supported Clive and indicated that they would, if necessary, fire upon the mutineers.

Suppression

On the new date of the mutiny, 1 May, Fletcher received the commissions of 42 of his officers and informed Clive of this. He arrested two officers and ordered them to Calcutta, but was not certain if these were the ringleaders. The mutiny was less widespread in Barker's brigade, and he refused to accept the commissions offered to him. Barker discovered his adjutant, Ensign Robertson was a ring leader and sent him and three others to Calcutta under arrest. Barker also discovered 140,000 rupees (£16,000), sent to support the mutineers from civilians in Calcutta, into which Clive requested the company investigate.

A private of the 1st Bengal European Regiment (circa 1756)

Clive gathered the few reliable officers he had to hand - his aide-de-camp John Carnac, his body guard and five others - plus a number of sepoys and marched for Monghyr on 6 May. En route he intercepted an express package containing the commissions of officers from Barker's brigade sent to the company leadership in Calcutta. Clive also received communications from Fletcher stating that he had full confidence in his officers, despite their resignations, and thought no trouble would arise. Clive also received authorisation from the company council to accept any resignations tendered and that such men should be sent to Calcutta.

At 9.00 pm on the night of 12 May a detachment of officers loyal to Clive arrived at Monghyr. They spent the next day visiting the officers there to try to persuade them to return to their duties and end the mutiny. Some of the officers alleged that Fletcher was the originator of the mutiny and had witheld information from them. Some of these officers were detached from the mutineers in the fort, while Clive's men remained in the garrison in case the mutiny came about.

On the night of 13 May night two battalions of sepoys under Captain Smith, one of the officers detached from Monghyr, were brought to the exercise ground as a precaution. They slept on the ground and the next morning Smith proposed to Fletcher that the sepoys be brought into the fort to take charge of the principal entrances. That afternoon Fletcher ordered Smith to bring the soldiers to the barracks of the European regiment, stating that they had mutinied. Smith's sepoys seized the signal battery overlooking the barracks which seemed to forestall the European other ranks, who had drawn arms and seemed to be making moves to join their officers. Smith's men fixed bayonets and ordered the Europeans to withdraw to their quarters. At this juncture Fletcher appeared and harangued the other ranks, who replied that they had turned out in the belief that it was Fletcher's order. After granting the men two rupees apiece Fletcher ordered almost all of the officers out of the fort. Fletcher afterwards claimed to have forestalled the mutiny, having detected it in January. Though Clive doubted this as the earliest communication he had received from Fletcher regarding the mutiny was 25 April. Arbuthnot (1899) claims that Fletcher had "played a double game" since the earliest stages of the mutiny. He alleges that he encouraged or even instigated the affair and only switched to Clive's side at the last moment.

Aftermath

Sepoy of the third battalion of Bengal Native Infantry (raised 1769)

Clive and Carnac arrived on the morning of 15 May and issued orders to inspect the briagde the following morning. The brigade turned out in good order but with few officers.

Clive spoke by intepreter to the Indian soldiers and commended them for their steadiness. He made awards to several officers and NCOs and ordered two months double pay for the men.

The mutineers encamped a few miles out from the garrison awaiting others from the other briagdes. Clvie sent a detachment to order them to Calcutta, which succeeded in achieving this aim. The garrison was reinforced by a number of officers recalled from detachment and expected the arrival of around a dozen from Calcutta in the coming days. Clive and Carnac left on 17 May for Patna to assist Smith on the frontier and ordered Barker to sned his briagde to support SMith at Allahanad.

The mutiny at bankipore was much smaller and Barker had more loyal officers refuse to reisgn. Barker's European soldiers were also les supprotive of the officers, many being recent recruits. Barker had concerns for the artillery soldiers so took command of that unit himself.In Smith's brigade he had received the resignations of all bar two of his officers

Colonel smith arrested one officer.

He brought a reliabel battatlion of sepoys from Serrajepore to Allahabad. Smith secured form many of his officers the agreement to serve til the end of may. Smith arrested all of the officers of his command bar four who had proved reliable.After a speech all the officers submitted and were released bar six who were sent as prisoners to Patna.

On account of their continued service Clive restored all the officers in Barkes' command. The officers at Patna were sent on to Calcutta. Clive sent message tot ehh French and Dutch posts at Chandernahor eand Chinsura to request they offer no employment to the dismissed officers.

The mutinous officers in smiths command soon relented and requested permission to continue to serve. Smith, authorised by Clive, granted pardon to those who he wished to retain. Almost all of the mutinous officers recanted and wrote letters of submission to their seniors, requesting reinstatement. many of the younger officers had no other means of subsistence. All of the ensigns, many lieutenants and some of the captains were accepted back into the service.

Those who rejoined were compelled to sign a contract requiring one years notice of resignation. A number were held for trial, particularly those who had deserted int he fiel;d at Serrajepore, and others sent home. Vancinces were filled by officers drawn from the Madras army. Strachey claimed the new officer corps was the best ever seen in india to that time.

The threateneed Mahratta invasion, against which Smith's brigade had moved, did not come to pass.

Inquiries

Clive hed a number of courts-martial after which many officers were cashiered. Though Fletcher helped to subdue the mutiny he was implicated by evidence in the courts-martial and was himself cashiered.

The judges considered themselves unable to pass death sentences for the offences due to doubts about their authority under the law. Fletcher later returned to India as commander-in-chief of the MAdras presidency and another cashiered officer, John Petrie, returned as a high ranking civil officer. The mutiny has been described as "one of the most dangerous storms which ever menaced the power of the East India Company". Clive afterwards fell ill and left India in January 1767. Clive had himself made a considerable fortune during his time in India.

A report of the mutiny was made by Henry Strachey, Clive's secretary, and presented to a secret committee of the House of Commons.

Strachey suspected that if the mutiny had succeeded the officers would have demanded the abolition of covenants prohibiting the receipt of gifts from the Indian nobility, the abolition of the powers of the company select committee over the army and a guarantee that the Indian officers would not be replaced by others appointed in their place.

Two dismissed officers refused to elave Calcutta and barricaed themselves in their rooms. They were arrested when they emerged after a number of days. Efforts to find the civilian subscribers proved in vain as tehy had written by private means and disguised taeir communications as letters to ladies, which they knew would not be intercepted and read.

Fletcher was ordered to place himself under arrest for mutiny and await court martial. He requested a civil trial in Calcutta but this was denied by clvie as the offence was against military law only.

Fletcher and five other officers were court-martialed and found guilty. The leniency of the court was perhaps because the act of parliament under whcih they were tried implied that a formal employment contract was necessary for a prosecution. Tehy woudl otherwise have received eath sentenced.

Ay least one of the officers sentenced to be cashiered had his sword and spontoon broken over his head, his sash cut up in front of him before a parade of all the troops at Bankipore. Afterwards Clive instituted formal contracts among all officers who he suspected had entered into the mutiny.

Teh court martial heard that Fletcher had been aware of the plans for a mutiny as early as December and it had been proposal that the officers reisgn

Teh judge advocate found that Fletcher had not made Clive, Carnac or the company authorities aware of the mutiny schemes

The court found that Fletcher had not made the scheme known to Clive until 25 APril.

Fletcher was found guilty of mutiny by breaching the third and fourth articles of the second section of the articles of war, for having incited sedition and failing to pass on knowledge of an intended mutiny. He was sentenced to be cashiered.

Clive left India in January 1767. His reforms did much to remedy the situation in India and left lasting changes but made him many enemies. Despite the reforms the East India Company had to appeal to the British government for financial assistance in 1772, subsequent parliamentary committees found corruption continued among some of the company's civil servants.

Arbuthnot states "Not one of Clive'. other achievements have surpassed, in the courage which he evinced, and in the genius which he displayed, his suppression of this mutiny. "

Fletcher with influence in parliament, later secured a return to India. Posted to command the Madras Army as a brigadier general in 1772 he soon came into conflict with the governor, Josias Du Pre. He was dismissed from the council in January 1773 and soon after returned to England. He was posted again to India in command of the Madras Army in 1775 and again got into a dispute with the governor Lord Pigot. After Pigot was arrested by the faction to which Fletcher belonged he took a sea voyage to help his tuberculosis during which he died.

Possible campaign medal

A silver medal is thought to have been issued by Clive to the Indian officers of two battalions that he used to quell the mutiny at Monghyr in June 1766.

The obverse shows Minerva seated among palm trees while teh reverse is inscribed "non nisi digno" (not unless to one who is worthy) MDCCLXVI (1766).

"The earliest medal issued by the Company on the Indian soil"

Only awarded to Indian soldiers.

The medal, whose motto and use of Minerva might be better suited to a scholarly achievement, and which does not resemble other company medals is not mentioned in the company's official record.

By other accounts it is a medal of the Masonic Educational Insitute at Dresden.

This opinion was raised as early as 1927.

Bibliography

• Arbuthnot, Sir Alexander John (1899). Lord Clive: The Foundation of British Rule in India (PDF) (Builders of Greater Britain ed.). London: T. Fisher Unwin.
• British Numismatic Society (1927). British Numismatic Journal.
• Chakravorty, B. (1995). Stories of Heroism: PVC & MVC Winners. Allied Publishers. ISBN 978-81-7023-516-3.
• Clark, Samuel (2016). Distributing Status: The Evolution of State Honours in Western Europe. McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP. ISBN 978-0-7735-9857-7.
• Fisher, Michael H. (1997). Introduction and biographical essay to: The Travels of Dean Mahomet. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• The Freemasons' Quarterly Review (1846). The Freemason's Lexicon. Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, Paternoster-Row.
• Kaye, John; Malleson, George Bruce (2010). Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8. Cambridge University Press. p. 152. ISBN 978-1-108-02323-8.
• Martin, Robert Montgomery (1879). Our Indian Empire and the Adjacent Countries of Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Persia, Etc., Depicted and Described by Pen and Pencil. London Print. and Publishing Company.
• Strachey, Sir Henry (1773). Narrative of the Mutiny of the Officers of the Army in Bengal, in the Year 1766. Becket.
• United Service Institution of India (1929). Journal of the United Service Institution of India.