Battle of Ctesiphon (1915)

Template:Battlebox British Expeditionary Force D, mostly made up of Indians and under the command of Gen. Sir John Nixon, had met with success in Mesopotamia since landing at Fao upon the Ottoman Declaration of War November 5, 1914. The only real reason for landing in Mesopotamia was to defend the oil refinery at Abadan at the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab. Adopting a forward defence policy and throughout the year, the British Advance parties met with great success under Gen. Sir Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend. Then the advance came to a halt at Ctesiphon.

Battleground

Ctesiphon lies on the left bank of Tigris River in the barren Iraqi desert, about 380 miles upstream from Basra, 40 mi. North of Kut al-Amara, and 16 mi. South-East of Baghdad. It is a great defensive position lieing in a 6 mile long loop in the river. At the town there is a ruined palace, remains of the Imperial Parthian capital. Of the palaces remains, most famous is the Arch of Ctesiphon, dominating the surrounding desert at 85 ft.

The Turks had formed a well camoflaged and formidable line of trenches crossing the river. There were two lines of trenches, the main line was 2 miles east of the arch and the second a mile west. There was also a twenty foot high ancient wall three miles south of the main line used for observation by the Turks.

The Turkish forces consisted of approximately 18,000 rifles and 52 guns. By the time the British attacked they had been reinforced from Baghdad bringing the number of rifles up to 30,000.

The British force consisted of the 6th Poona Division, at a strength of 11,000 men. These figures may vary and many of the men were in occupation duty, with a large garrison at the recently captured and strategic town and river junction of Kut el-Amara, captured seven weeks earlier after meeting the Turks in the Battle of Es Sinn.

Leadup to the Battle

The British advance was delayed by seven weeks. This was as much due to the bad weather and wet ground as Gen. Townshends reluctance to advance in the face of an extended and rather poorly equipped supply line. But the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the region, Sir John Nixon, wanted to keep the momentum of this successful year long offensive to one of the 4 great cities of Islam, Baghdad, going. Thus, with great trepidation, he commenced his march.

The Turks, after many of the earlier engagements of the war, retreated hundreds of miles away. This is what the British expected to happen after their overrunning of the positions at Es Sinn. But the Turks, instead of retreating into Baghdad as was expected, merely fell back to the carefully prepared defensive positions at Ctesiphon.

British Attack Plan

Townshend planned, for the attack, to separate his force into four columns. Three, mostly infantry columns, were scheduled for a frontal attack, and designated columns A, B, and C. The other column, referred to as the flying column, was made up of a mix of cavalry and infantry, and supposed to swing around the left flank of the Turkish lines.

Movements and the Clash

Townshend, intending to copy his success at Es Sinn, ordered a night march in the closing hours of November 21, 1915, with the aim of attacking at dawn on the 22nd. The attack happened on schedule but many of the attackers got lost marching at night. His attack, due not only to a shortage of men, but also poor ground conditions on the west bank, just sent forces against the east, the much stronger position.

The advance was supposed to be supported by river gunboats, namely the HMS Firefly. Yet there were two things that prevented it from becoming a factor in the battle. First of all, Turkish guns on the west bank, the line not assaulted, rained fire upon her. Secondly, the Turks had a habit of sinking river boats to make a draught far too shallow for men of war. And Ctesiphon, 16 mi. from Baghdad, was certainly going to be defended from such weapons. The Tigris was also extensively mined.

At the beginning of the battle, C-Column, the one closest to the river bank, immediately came under heavy small arms and artillery fire and got stalled before they reached the first trench line. A-Column, in the middle, was held up similarly.

To the far right, B-Column, made up of mainly Punjabis and Gurkhas, did reach the first line of trenches, but with heavy losses. This success could've been exploited if they'd decided to try and roll up the lines on their left, the line holding up A and C. But instead they pursued the retreating enemy towards the arch.

Townshend, in one of histories great acts of incompetence, ordered C-Column to retreat, rotate, and try and exploit Bs breakthrough. This movement was rather large and complicated, meaning it took a lomg time. This task was made no less difficult with the Turks on the wall firing into their flank. The flying column was bogged down fighting Turkish and Arab Cavalry and indeed seemed to be moving at a much slower pace than the infantry attack.

The Poona Division was able to carry the first line by the end of the day. But, indeed, the attack had sustained to heavy casualties. The force was too far from reinforcement and too exhausted to even think about carrying the second line that day. The Turks on the other hand, were in plenty a fighting mood. The first days battle was over.

Second Day

On the second day, the Ottomans, under Gen. Nur Ud-Din, attacked. This morning counter-attack, intended to retake the first line of trenches, was very weak and collapsed almost immediately. That night, they tried again in greater strength. This time there was much hard fighting, but the British held.

Day Three

Nur Ud-Din ordered a general withdrawal following the attack. Townshend found out about this retreat to late to exploit the opportunity. Even if he found out earlier, it's questionable whether anything could've been done about it.

The 6th Poona Division had sustained a 40% casualty rate, losing about 4,600 troops. They were exhausted from the heavy fighting of the past two days and had a strength of about 8,500 that could be used in the battle. They might have been able to win but it would've turned into a Pyrrhic victory. Thus, Townshend also ordered a general retreat.

The Ottoman Army had sustained casualties of 9,500. But they had short supply lines and were able to reinforce themselves from Baghdad. Thus with this advantage, Nur Ud-Din, learning of this new development, halted the retreat and then pursued the British.

Aftermath

The Turks then continued to pursue the Division to Kut el-Amara (Sometimes Kut al-Amara or just Kut). Where they laid siege to the British from December until April. There the 6th Poona Division surrendered resulting in one of Imperial Britains most humiliating defeats.

Ctesiphon and its' agtermath revealed Englands greatest weakness in the Mesopotamian Campaign. An inadequate supply line. The journey from Ctesiphon to Basra, which should've taken a week at most, took 13 days. They were undersupplied and their medical corps was immensely inadequate for the task at hand.

After this, the British would stop underestimating the Turks. In the aftermath of the Siege of Kut, Gen. Nixon would be fired and be replaced by Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, who revamped the whole Expeditionary Force and made it adequate to pursue operations in Iraq.

Sources

Baker, C. (2003). The Battle of Ctesiphon: 22 - 24 November 1915. The Long, Long Trail: The Story of the British Army in the Great War of 1914-1918. Retrieved August 16, 2005 from http://www.1914-1918.net/meso_bat7.htm

Ctesiphon (n.d.). Retrieved August 16, 2005 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ctesiphon

Duffy, M. (2002). Battles: The Battle of Ctesiphon, 1915. The First World War. Retrieved August 16, 2005 from http://firstworldwar.com/battles/ctesiphon.htm

Millar, Ronald W. (1970). Death of an Army: The Siege of Kut, 1915- 1916. London: Houghton Mifflin.

Bruce, A. (n.d.). 22nd - 25th November 1915 - The Battle of Ctesiphon. [Electronic Version]. An Illustrated Companion to the First World War.