Talk:Free will

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"The question of free will has been a central issue since the beginning of philosophical thought"

Has it really? This should be cited. Did Heraclitus or Parmenides 'discuss' this issue? Or are we speaking about non-Western philosophies, which I potentially discussed this issue earlier, but it would be preferable if the article could state which Western philosopher, as well as others, first discussed this issue. Tsop 23:36, 1 April 2007 (UTC)

Libet refs

Re: the Libet (1983) ref. There are numerous previous articles by Libet on timing of actions, but this is the first to introduce the rotating dot/second hand manipulation to get at the timing of the sensation of conscious will question; it is also considered the most important reference on this subject by modern commentators (see e.,g the Haggard 2005 TiCS paper). The closest previous is:

• Libet et al., 1982 Libet, B., Wright, E.W. Jr, Feinstein, B. and Pearl, D.K. (1982), ‘Readiness potentials preceding unrestricted “spontaneous” vs pre-planned voluntary acts’. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 54, pp. 322–35.

But this only focuses on the fact that the RP precedes spontaneous actions (previous studies had used actions in response to commands). User:edhubbard forgot to sign... It was posted about 10:00, 18 August, 2006 (UTC)

Ok, I just wasn't casting doubt. I just wanted confirmation from someone who knows about it, whethere that would be the appropriate citation. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:38, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Don't worry, I know. I was just saying that I had gone back and double-checked. I make plenty of reference mistakes (even a couple in published OR papers!) so no worries. Edhubbard 10:44, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Biology and free will

this section needs specific references (with page numbers, etc). i'm very familiar with this topic, but i don't recongize the precise claims being made, even where they are attributed to a source. --Rikurzhen 11:07, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

I would appracite your help in getting it right, then, certianly. I founds the section lacking cmplòetely in sources and tried to match text with whatever sources I could find that conatined ideas resembling it. E.g., there was a statement about Desmond Morris. The only thing I have by Morris that expresses a sory of determinism is The Naked Ape. some parts are just.....bizarre. I left them with ciatiomns needed tags.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias

Pinker is a good source (The Blank Slate, chapter 10 "The Fear of Determinism"). However, it doesn't match with what's actually written there. I'll give it some more thought. --Rikurzhen 11:25, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

I just went back through the edit log on the page, and it seems like the vast majority of what is in the section from "Desmond Morris" onward was added by an IP user on June 21, 2006. This is the only thing posted by this user. So, my guess is that this is probably not good stuff, but I don't have the expertise to either clean it up or make a decision on which bits are cancerous and which can be safely left. It seems like there might be a couple of salvagable sentences at the begining, but I am not sure about the rest. My expertise is in neuroscience/cognitive science (see my user page) and I have been doing what I can on those parts, but I see that you are a grad student in genetics, so this is definitely something that you know more about than either of us that are working on the project now. Edhubbard 11:32, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Many of the factual statements about biology are true, but the statements linking them to free will appear to be made up. Pinker's view is that fear of determinism in the context of "genetics" and "evolution" is a mistake, that it is "a confusion of explanation with exculpation"(p.179), and that responsibility doesn't require behavior to be uncaused, only that it responds to praise and blame. --Rikurzhen 11:38, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Nice job on that section!! Just one criticism:

The view of most researchers is that many human behaviors can be explained in terms of humans' brains, genes, or evolutionary histories.

Terms like "most", "some", "a few" are frowned on becasue of WP:WEASEL. The view of which researchers? Even citations would be sufficient.

Tourette syndrome

User Sandy writes in Featured article review: "I've been watching the statement in there about Tourette syndrome for a long time. I have no idea what it's trying to say, so I hope you [Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias] can address that. I can't figure out what a neurological condition has to do with Free will." Maybe the following addition will help:

"While normals may also perform involuntarily movements (e.g., the patellar reflex), the movements and utterances that Tourette's patients make will usually be regarded as under free will in a normal person."

...or something similar? - fnielsen 22:31, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Trying to catch up here, and without having reviewed what has been inserted in the article so far, a few comments:

Just a note: be careful of slippery slopes. I follow the medical and other TS literature very closely, and I'm not aware of any successful legal defense using TS as an "excuse".

Also, some clearing up of terminology: "normals" is problematic, implying people with tics aren't normal. A better word is needed.

Involuntary is also problematic. Please read Tourette syndrome, where you will see how the TS literature explains involuntary vs. unvoluntary in describing the semi-voluntary nature of tics. Again, it's tricky, so be careful of slippery slopes. In fact, it might be better to use another movement disorder as an example, since tics have been described as a voluntary response to an involuntary urge. You might want to focus instead on dystonias, choreas, or other movement disorders, since they don't involve a premonitory urge as in TS.

Third, "Tourette's patients" is also problematic, since the majority of people with TS never need medical attention. They are not all "patients" (or even worse, the British custom of referring to them as "sufferers"). Wiki guidelines (somewhere, I'm too busy to go look for them right now) advocate first-person language: people with Tourette's.

In general, I haven't yet figured out what this article was trying to say in relation to free will and TS, but will try to keep up with you all as you refine it. Sandy 18:16, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Sandy, 1) that para about "normals" and so on was not added to the text 2) I think, but I'm not an expertthat Edhubbard has addressed the issue of "involunrty versus "unvolunarty" in his revisions of that section. Whether another medical condition is more appropripate I will leave to you folks to work out. 3) Interesting point. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:25, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Hi Fnielsen, Thanks for your comments. I think I see what you were after with these comments, and I have tried to expand them to clarify my interpretation of your arguments. However, it should be noted that this section, and to a certain extent, the section above on neuroscience and free will, assume a certain viewpoint, namely that the brain creates our sense of free will, and it is only a matter of knowing whether this occurs before, after, or even independently of our actions. This being a philosophy entry, such assumptions are bound to provoke controversy, and perhaps would justify either eliminating or forking some of this more complex (and loaded) material. Let's see what the other editors have to say, and of course, if I've misinterpreted you, please feel free to correct anything that I've added. Edhubbard 00:40, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm not exactly sure. Oliver Sacks once wrote (don't remeber the book, don't remeber the condition right now) of the case of a patient who had extensive damage to some portion of the prefrontal cortex. The patient was fundamentally unable to make decisions. According to Sacks, his center of "agency" had been severely compromised. For example, he would stand in the shower for hours on end (even an entire day) thiking about his next action and not being able to carry it out. If experiments could be carried out (perhpas they have?) on chimps or bonobos which "knocked out" such an agency center in the brain, and the chimps could no longer act or make any other decision, then it would have been demonstrated that action, at least, is not under the control of some ontologically indepenednt thing called "free will" ir "self". There would still remain the question about thuought, desires and so on. If imaging technology can be refined to the point that it could detect changes in the brain that correspond to every change in thought, desire and so on, then an expeiemnt could hypothetically be set up so that one could determine wthere the "agency"-damaged indivuduals thoughts and desires really "belonged" to him or not. It could, in fact, be determined that "this" area of the brain is what creates the illusion of free will. I see no reason, in principle, why free will (of the metaphysical libertarian kind) cannot be falsified by further scientific investigation. I don't think all neorscintifict and cogntive science investigators just assume that the brain creates the illusian of free will (rightly so, IMO). Even if they do, it seems to me that this assumption wil eventually be called into question and there will be a serach for the neural correlate of free will, as there is now the neural correlate of consciousness. Being a philosphical naturalist, I believe that philosophy formulates the basic questions and science eventually provides the answers. Being a pessismit about free will, I think that science will eventaully prove that the existence of such a phenomenon is absurd. The processes in the barin which cause the sensation of free will must be investigated through futher experimentation of the right kind.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:21, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

I haven't yet reviewed what has been inserted in the article, but take care with Sacks, since not all of his views are shared by all of his peers. Sandy 18:16, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Nothing in the text about Sacks. I was just responding to Ed about "my take" on the importance of science to this topic.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:30, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

At a personal level, I agree with you on all counts, Francesco, but I also wanted to flag this new section to you and the other editors to make sure that 1) its relevance to the philosophical question of free will was clear, and 2) to make sure that we don't get hit with an NPOV tag unnecessarily. Feel free (pun intended) to change anything in that section to make it better fit with the flow of the article. Edhubbard 08:31, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Good point. Actually, there was a similar problem with the emergentist section. I found this statement bizarre: in generative philosophy of.....there is no free will. Hmm??? Do you mean that it has solved the problem or what? So, I changed it to "it is assumed that there is no free will." I will scan through and see if there are any other strong implications of factual truth like that. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:50, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Another thing is that the NPOV policy, with regard to science, just means that if the majority view of biologists, say, is that determinism of some kind is true, then it just has to be documented that that is the majority view.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:04, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

OK, so I should have checked the article first: I see most of my wording and references from the TS article have already been used. I would make these changes (among the many movement disorders involving involuntary movements, only TS and tics disorders have the premonitory urge, utterances are tics, and avoid the use of patients).

For example, in persons with Tourette syndrome and related syndromes tic disorders , patients will involuntarily make movements, such as tics, and utterances, make involuntary movements and utterances called tics, despite the fact that they would prefer not to do so when it is socially inappropriate. Tics are described as semi-voluntary or "unvoluntary", because they are not strictly involuntary: they may be experienced as a voluntary response to an unwanted, premonitory urge. Tics are experienced as irresistible and must eventually be expressed. People with Tourette syndrome are sometimes able to suppress their tics to some extent for limited periods of time, but doing so often results in an explosion of tics afterward. The control which can be exerted (from seconds to hours at a time) may merely postpone and exacerbate the ultimate expression of the tic.

Sandy 18:23, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree with Sandy on her edits. It's always a tough business when we deal with medical "conditions" (a term which is supposed to be neutral in the community, but has negative connotations in the broader world; see my pet project, the synaesthesia page). And Sandy is right, a lot of the science was a cut and paste from the Tourette's page, so a couple of the things that she mentions here might need to be double checked there, too. I'll get those changes right away. My main goal here was to improve and expand the original section by FNielsen enough that it can be seen as relevant to free-will issues, but it can always be improved. Edhubbard 07:31, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Oh, I see. All the changes were in the lead sentence, which we inherited from previous versions. There's nothing to double check on the Tourette's page. My bad. Edhubbard 07:38, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Yep ... Nothing to check on the TS page: I wrote it, and I'm the only TS person writing on Wiki :-) Much better now: I didn't understand what the article was saying before these changes. Now it makes sense. Sandy 11:13, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Lead para

Hi all. The first sentence of this article seems wrong: free will is a philosophical problem, surely, not a particular (libertarian) answer to that problem. How about this (as a first go):

The problem of free will is the prpblem of whether human beings really at freely, and therefore of what freedom of action means. Addressing this problem requires both understanding the relation between freedom and causation, and determining whether all events are subject to causation. Positions taken on the problem therefore argue both over determinism versus indeterminism - whether all events are caused or not - and over compatibilism against incompatibilism - whether freedom can coexist with determinism or not. So, for instance, hard determinists about free will argue that determinism is true, and that this makes real free will impossible.

Any thoughts? Cheers, Sam Clark 11:17, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

I've edit that para a bit: main problem was just the term pessimsism. I think "hard determinism" is more commonly used for that position. Pessimism, I think, is the idea that free will is false, whether determinism ois true or not.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:02, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Pessimism is a possible and by no means necessary psychological consequence tied more with fatalism than strict determinism. Zeusnoos 13:23, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Hey Sam. I've worked mostly on trying to find sources, restructring and copyediting up to this point. There is still much work to be done on the old boy, espcially in the phi section. I thought I would leave the lead for last. Besides the problems you hae noted, it is not even close to a summary of the article.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:10, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

New determinism section

Ok, I've changed the intro. The previous version did beg the question and there was that horrible, out-of-the blue, sentence about Marx and Engles versus relgious authroties. I've devoped the determinims section so as to get the varios determinisms we are not interetested in discussin out of the way. I don't think we can adress all dtermeiens in this artcile. But if someone disagree, please leave a note. Now, I'm just going to add refs for that part. Then, I have to get off for the day.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 12:49, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Hmmm=

Well, whatever the quality, one thing that cannot be said now is that this article lacks references. LOL!! --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:04, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

We seem to have lost all the images. Let's put at least a few back in. Maybe a famous philosopher, and some scientific image, and maybe a religious one. Bmorton3 17:12, 21 August 2006 (UTC)

Lost all?? There was only one when I first looked at it: an hyper-inflated image of D'Holbach in about the middle of the page. It was almost scary. I cut it down to 100pp and then, seeing that it still looked awkward with no other images, I just cut it out. t was weird. I will check in the history to see if there were any others. In any case, I agree there should be a few judiciously placed images added. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:12, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Leopoldus and Lobulus

Great image!! I will get the link to the transcipt of the whole trial. Darrow makes one of the most impsiring, near-philosophical, speeches I've ever heard from a lawyer. He just comes right out and says it: I could never be a prosecutor. What a horrible occupation. You have to try to fix blame on soemone in a universe as screwed up as this one. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:17, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Computability and free will

I was going to put in the following paragraph, but as this article is being reviewed for had at one point Featured status, I decided to throw my contribution to the dogs and see what people think. I think it should go in the "Science and free will" section, but whether under the new subheading "Computability and free will" or under "Physics..." or "Neuroscience...", I don't know. Here it is:

In his controversial book A New Kind of Science, author Steven Wolfram suggests that it may be possible for what fully appears to be free will to exist in a deterministic world because of what he calls the principle of computational equivalence. This principle posits that many computations of sufficient complexity are basically equivalent in the scope of what they can compute, and that their results cannot be obtained by any simpler computation.

If the workings of one's brain can be thought of as a "computation", then there is technically no such thing as free will. Yet if the principle of computational equivalence applies to the brain's workings, then there exists no way even in principle to determine what the outcome of the thought process will be that is any simpler than just observing the outcome of the process itself. So for every conceivable practical purpose, free will exists as an intrinsically intractable illusion brought on by the principle of computational equivalence.

To get some feel for the principle of computational equivalence, examples of such computations where that principle applies would (most likely) include NP-hard computations.

The early word "controversial" sounds like POV, but I believe that can be demonstrated. On the other hand, it certainly ins't essential. I am sure this could use some other rewording, but I think it may be a valuable contribution. Comments? Baccyak4H 15:29, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

The subject is infinite!!

We may have to fork off the science section. Especially if we start adding the Wolframs, computational versus connectionist free will, free will as decsribed by Jennifer Lopez, etc........--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:12, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree that we have to be careful about adding any more to the science. From a philosophical point of view, this is a sign of an active field and question. However, from the standpoint of the free-will encyclopedia entry, we have to keep it on track. My vote is that we not add more stuff right now, as the article is still under FAR, but once that passes, we think about forking off the science and free will section, and then we should add the Wolfram thing... Wolfram's arguments remind me of Hofstader and Dennett's arguments about "as if" semantics/intentionality, given the recursive level-jumping abilities of human cognition. Perhaps Wolfram is on to something here, but it seems too speculative to include at this point. Discussing Wolfram's idea, and any controversy around it would definitely push us into forking. It's so close right now, I keep holding my breath when I look at the change log... Edhubbard 16:21, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

This sounds like a sub-variety of emergentist theory. Would it make more sense to rephrase the "Determinism and Emergent Behaviour" section to include computation complexity arguments? That stuff is already partly forked to Emergence. Let promote the Emergence link to a partial fork but leave the rest of the science for now. Bmorton3 16:24, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

The question is never really what should be added to this article, but what short summaries should be left in it. Ideally, ALL the sections should be like the physics and free will, theology and free will, biology and free will section. There hsould be a link to main article: compatibilism (that should be seprated from incompatibilism, BTW) , for example, with a summary of three of four paras. [Determinism], same thing. The neuroscience section may need to be fairly extended. But, the point is, even if it were taken out, we should ask; "What needs to be left in this (main) overview article?"--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 16:36, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

Bmorton3, I like your first go through. Much more concise than my suggestion, in the right place, with reference. Baccyak4H 17:10, 22 August 2006 (UTC)

ISBN numbers

Does anyone know why older books don't have ISBN numbers on them? What the heck does ISBN stand for anyway?

Never mind. I got the answers at ISBN.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:11, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

Images

ooh I like the Libet image!!! I looked for a good one and couldn't find one! Schopenhauer is good too. Bmorton3 20:06, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

The statement in moral responsbility section

There is a statement in the "moral responsibility" section to the effect that one can reject free will and yet maintain that people are morally respobsility based in their character. A murder is dedetremined to murder, an honest man to act honestly, and so on. Bmorton3 suggest that this position can be attributed to virtue ethicists such as Alasdair MacIntytre, Philipa Foot or whomever. I have not read the actual writings of most of the people, but I was under the impression that virtue ethicists claim that virtues such as honesty, honour, valour, etc., are things that can be developed by choice. I'm not sure about this point. The articles here and the one on the SEP don't help very much in clarifying this simple issue either. Furhter, Neitzche wrote a great deal about virtues as dictinvt from moral values and such. He seems to strongly imply in various places that these virtues are fixed (either hereditray or learned). At the same time, he often ridicules this who are "too weak" to punish. If you put these notions together, you get something very close to the idea that mudereres are detsined to murder, honorable men are destined to be honorable, etc.. The problem is that, as usual with Neitzche, it's difficult to pin down to one passage or quote. Also, there are so many differing interpreatations that any attemopt to do so would probably amoung to origninal reserach. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of Aristole in the Nichomahean Ethics. Galen Srawson definitely denies free will, but I don't know what his position on moral responsibility is. Unless someone can come up with something, we may have to just cut that one out.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:46, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Pretty tough to find on this topic. What about this one: [1], although.. hm. he is a compatiblist. I have a feeling Freud or neo-Freudians would take this view point. Neo-Freudians more probably, since I don't think Freud cares much about the metaphysical idea of moral responsibility. Poor Yorick 08:49, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Very interesting view. It's good to find someone else around at this time of day. They are basically saying that moral responsibility is not a function of indivudual acts (this is a view shared by virtue ethisicts) but of character. If you have a murderous character, then you will tend to murder. That act of murdering is a reflection of the bad charater of the person in the first place. Howvere, one is not resppsniblfe for one's character. I think it's fine. Thamks. We can just modify the text a bit and bring it more in line with this view. Then we have a couple of references. Good job.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:11, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Virtue theorists in general beleive that it is character that is the appropriate target of moral judgements rather than actions (and I can find cites for that). Thus, whether character is developed freely or not it is still true that it is the character that is the appropriate target of praise and blame and punishment or reward, quite apart from whether the character was freely developed or not (which you're right they get cagey on quickly). But I agree that the cite you guys found is fine. I meant to mention P.F. Strawson (not his son Galen, whoops) whose beliefs on moral responsibility are developed in "Freedom and Resentment" 1962, which is linked at the bottom of P. F. Strawson, it is the locus classicus of the "reactive attitude" approach to moral responsibility and free will discussion, which might deserve some mention. Did any of the "Tookie" stuff make the point the last claim was trying to make? Bmorton3 14:01, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Yes, that's the general idea I have gotten about virtue ethics. It's very similar to what Cummins and the others are saying in any case. PF Strawson's view is indeed important and influential. We may have to make room for it. But, if not, it can be discussed in cthe compatibilims article or something. I did not look at the Tookie Williams stuff. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 14:12, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, the whole section on moral responsibility is rather poor. The section should go from definitions of free will and moral responsibility first before commenting on the state of the art.

For instance, once you have defined free will as the ability to decide in agreement with one's principles or main goals and moral responsibility as the ability to include the threat of punishment into one's decision process, the remark on insanity becomes clearer and can simply be deducted as well as the case of young infants, drug addicts (to be cured) ...

This defintion also suggests that Dennett, for once, may have missed the point of moral responsibility and free will.

The quote from Sartre is funny in that this is very common knowledge (but hey ! Sartre is a respectable source).

The whole account on the semantic disputes between compatibilits is obscured by the lack of definitions. Equiped with the above definitions it is clear that determinism robing an agent from responsibilty totally misses the point unless one goes for non utilitarian view of responsibility : this must be made clear !MikalZiane 20:16, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Moral responsibility requires no freewill. Every person is an agent who acts in his own behalf, unlike a computer which acts on behalf of the one who programs it and has no opinion one way or the other, feels no pain from failure nor thrill from victory, nor is rewarded nor punished to its own awareness by anything it does. Everyone may be completely determined by his own nature which he had no hand in making, but this is not meaningful in reference other agents of the same construction. among agents each is working towards his own goals and desires regardless of origins and will interact with other agents accordingly. Morality arises from the awareness of what is painful and pleasant to the agent can be assumed to be such to another similar agent and used to calculate ones moves towards ones own goals. Agents can defend what they earn and take what they want from other agents unable to defend what they hold and form collectives for mutual protection and benefits which is the basis for law and society. None of this requires freewill to the absolute degree, only the relatively free agency of the individual to persue his own goals for his own desires and reasons. This can be modelled in computers of sufficient complexity but not to the degree of our ability as agents actually experiencing things as for our own benefit or detriment. which indicates that consciousness is an important part of reality that pure determinism cannot explain.Jiohdi 13:56, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

Not go back!!

After the work that was put in by vasrious people here, I would hope that the intention is not to go back to the sort of mess that we inherited from the previous editors.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:55, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

User Lacatosias's Deletion

I had added the following paragraph to the article because I thought that it was of importance. The paragraph contains clear and simple assertions about the subject of this Wikipedia article by two famous thinkers. It actually presents the essence of free will in a very few words. However. User:Lacatosias decided that the contents of this paragraph were not of any value. By reprinting it here, I leave it to the reading public to decide whether there is any worth in the paragraph. In view of the frivolous references to popular culture that are allowed to remain in many serious Wikipedia articles, I have to admit that I was surprised to see that this paragraph was quickly removed from the article.

In his On the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer simply and clearly stated, “You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.” Einstein, in his 1928 speech to the German League for Human Rights, assented. “I don’t believe in the freedom of the will,” Einstein said. “Schopenhauer’s saying, that a human can very well do what he wants, but can not will what he wants, accompanies me in all of life’s circumstances and reconciles me with the actions of humans, even when they are truly distressing. This knowledge of the non-freedom of the will protects me from losing my good humor and taking much too seriously myself and my fellow humans as acting and judging individuals.”

Lestrade 15:00, 25 August 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Look the issue is where it should go if we put it in. Free-will is already on the long side and we can easily produce tons and tons of relevant quotes to fill it up. We don't have a Free Will in pop culture section yet. I suppose you could create one and put the Einstein quote there, if you really wanted to. It doesn't fit well in physics, cause it isn't about physics. There is already a Schopenhauer quote in the section on Schopenhauer. If there were consensus that this quote was better we could replace it, but I don't think we'd want 2 Schopenhauer quotes, certainly not as block quotes. You could also create another page, and reference it here. If you wanted a Schopenhauer on free will page, you could create that, put lots of Schopenhauer quotes, including Einstein's reference too him, and then we could re-work how Schopenhauer is discussed on the main page. But just adding more quotes, even when they are relevant, is going to slowly get the page in the kind of trouble that almost lost it its FA status. Bmorton3 15:19, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

I was just trying to adress this issue, folks. I'ìve replcaed one of the Shopengauer quotes (there are now 2 in that section) and I decided to put the Einstein quote in the physichs and free will sections to provide it woth spem context:

Einstein himself put his position on free will in these terms in a 1928 speech to the German league for Human Rights.

I don’t believe in the freedom of the will. Schopenhauer’s saying, that a human can very well do what he wants, but can not will what he wants, accompanies me in all of life’s circumstances and reconciles me with the actions of humans, even when they are truly distressing. This knowledge of the non-freedom of the will protects me from losing my good humor and taking much too seriously myself and my fellow humans as acting and judging individuals.

I need a source for this!! Otherwise it's useless in any case. Now, I have to leave in a rush!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:23, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

In reference to the "useless" quote, take a minute from your busy schedule to visit

http://www.einstein-website.de/z_biography/credo.html Lestrade 18:57, 25 August 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Nice bit of sophistry, but you know I meant "useless beccause unsourced",and not "useless because inane or irrelevant" by that idiot Einstein. Geesh!! Anyway,I'm glad we could resolve this amicably. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 19:59, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

As you will now see, he first wuote os in the text. The one from Einsetein needs a source. Problem solved!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:25, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Hi all, I agree that we need to be selective about how much we add. The goal of wikipedia is to be an encyclopedia. As Bmorton noted on the FAR page, there is a danger that the page becomes too long, and/or cluttered with things that are off topic, redundant, or even simply non-optimal. See, for example, the discussions above on science and free will. I am going to make a few minor additions to that, now that it's Friday and I finally have some time away from OR to work on wikipedia, but they will be small and (hopefully) focused and relevant enough to make it worth keeping them. I think the same constraints have to be kept in mind with quotes by Shopenauer or Einstein. It seems like Lacatosias has made a reasonable compromise after Lestrade posted here, of including the quotes without letting the page grow too long. Edhubbard 16:11, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

New image

I tend to be a very visual thinker, so I thought that perhaps some people would appreciate this simplified diagram of the possible philosophical positions regarding the problem of free will. I created the image using MS Word, and then converted to png going through Photoshop. I have the original text and can modify the image to specs if anyone wants a higher resolution version, of if you have any thoughts about chaning it around. One thing that I noticed is that my thinking seems clearer if I put the question of determinism first, and the question of whether free will exists or not as secondary. If we just reorder the two quesions in the intro this will flow, and there will be a good fit between the image and the text. Let me know what you think. Edhubbard 23:23, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

I've uploaded an improved version of the image. Now all the possible philosophical positions are located at the same level, so we aren't putting on above another. I have also added question marks for the two main questions, and colored those boxes orange. The blue and gray have been lightened, as they appeared somewhat too dark on my screen at thumbnail size (although it was ok at full size). Let me know if you have any other changes. Edhubbard 23:53, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Great thanks!Bmorton3 13:45, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

Moral responsibility

I've added several new paragraphs on what neuroscience means for our understanding of free will and moral responsibility to the end of the moral responsibility section. It's a complex issue, and I've leaned very heavily on one paper that seems really good to me (the Greene and Cohen paper). If anyone has time to look it over, and perhaps edit it a bit more, please feel free. At this point, it doesn't quite flow with the rest of the section in the way that I would hope. Edhubbard 14:04, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

I'll see if I can edit it down a bit and try to make it more philosophically neutral. But I don't see a real problem. I wanted to add something like this all along, but I don't have access to a library and have only my personal library (relatively scarce on this kind of material) and the Internet to rely on. It's all factually accurate, though, and I should be able to find some other sources to back it up. The moral responsibility section did seem to need something. My only reservation is that we shoudln't go inot conseuqntialism, juctice and so on and wind up opening up the whole question of moral philosophy.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:09, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

Sounds good to me. I sort of wondered about the consequentialist/retributivist part, myself, but felt like it might open us up to pushing a particular viewpoint about how neuroscience was undermining the notion of free will. A couple of useful sources from the web, with free pdfs, etc. Neuroethics and Josh Greene's site (disclaimer: Josh is a friend of mine, but I don't think that makes me inherently biased; especially for a talk page). Feel free to go to those two pages for other articles, etc, etc.

In other news, I'll be on vacation from Aug. 29 to Sept. 15, actually in your area. We're going to Rome, Napoli, and then Florence. So, no edits from me... I think my girlfriend would kill me ;->. Edhubbard 15:27, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

Oh hoh!! have a good trip and enjoy the magnificent ancient wonders of Rome. DO NOT underestimate Napoli, however!! It is a more ancient (founded by the Greeks as Neopolis) and less ostentatios city than Rome, but if you really look around, you can find an infinity of cultural and artistic wealth there. Florence is another universe. I haven't been up there in many years. Thanks for the links. Apart from Wikipedia, I've always been fascinated with this kind of stuff.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:44, 26 August 2006 (UTC)

Enjoy, Italy. As I've said I went to a great conference on all this stuff in May, but the webpage that had all the papers was taken down last month, they'll be a book version out in a year or so, and there will be lots of great stuff to add to the moral responsibility part, we could easily push this to a sub-page based on what is already out there if we wanted. Bmorton3 13:50, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

I find the whole section on Greene and Cohen's paper useless since their conclusion (that the legal system does not require a libertarian interpretation of free will) is obvious and in any case does not require neuro science (but proper definitions of free will and moral responsibility). A real conclusion to this section on moral responsibilty is necessary, not a new red herring. MikalZiane 14:19, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Weak free will as a foundation for moral responsibility

Surprisignly this article does not clearly define free will. It is fine to give a historical account of the disputes but depending on the defintion of free will one could answer the questions "is there free will" or "is free will compatible with determinism" differently. The article on compatibilsm is better on this point.

A compatibilist could define (weak) free will as the ability to decide according to one's principles (or main goals ...). This ability may depend not only on the person making the decision but on the moment of decision and on the kind of decision. Then, moral responsibility can be defined as sensibility to the threat of (some) punishment. A counter example could be a drug addict willing to (say) be healthy but not able to resist the urge of using drug (even if this first implies commiting a crime). Weak free will enables moral responsibility since (in principle) the threat of going against a free man's goals (surviving, not going to jail ...) influences the free man's decisions.

This is not "strong free will" since the illusion of random choice is dismissed as non relevant to moral responsibilty. Equipped with this defintion I guess it is much easier to see the point of compatibilists, is it not ? MikalZiane 15:37, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

Featured article review

Many of you have done amazing work on this article in roughly two weeks. I finally looked at the state of this article when nominated for FAR—what a difference! (I am almost done with my own copy review of it.) Truly the best of Wikipedia here! Outriggr 09:10, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

Yes, it was almost intimidatingly bad. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:24, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

Audio file

I actually think this is a servicable article; thus, I uploaded an audio file reading its contents. I hope this makes it a better article yet. Brinticus 18:59, 15 September 2006

Thanks!Bmorton3 16:40, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

Such a big article about something that doesn't exist.

--Greasysteve13 07:22, 22 September 2006 (UTC)

A miniscule article on one of the deepest, most challenging topics that mankind has ever, or will ever, have to confront. With PROFOUND impliactions for every single thing that we ever do, say, believe, think, feel, touch. "Big" indeed....--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:43, 22 September 2006 (UTC)

There is no need to be grandiloquent here. The fact that there have been many disputes on the matter is no hint of a profound topic but rather of semantic confusion. I claim that the issues are rather simple once you define the concepts properly. MikalZiane 20:24, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Fine, we disgree profoundly on this. But, ONCE AGAIN, neither what you claim now what I claim is relevenat to an encylopedia article and you know it. So stop being a troll trying to insert Original Rserach and POV or you will eventaully get yourelf kicked out of here.--Francesco Franco 16:07, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Tell me Lacatosias how your comment above is less POV than mine ? MikalZiane 19:31, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

It isn't. That's exactly my point. This whole section is not only POV, it is an irrelveant discussion of the topic of free will, not the article. The person who posted the original comment was wrong to post it. I was wrong to respond and you were worn to respond to my response. It should be deleted by some administrator.--Francesco Franco 20:15, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Ok I got your point: do what I say, no what I do ;-) I wrongly assumed than a guy with that many barnstars could not act wrongly. My mistake.MikalZiane 20:23, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Yep, barnstars != moral infallibility (or any other kind). Your mistake.--Francesco Franco 07:14, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

something different to consider

I don't believe in free will because the term seems oxymoronic.. if your actions are caused, they are not free, and if uncaused, they are not willed... however there does seem to be one majorly relevant factor that seperates us from say any computer. We care about what will happen to us personally, and our caring effects our actions and decisions in a way that leads to the concept of freewill. computers do not feel pain nor pleasure as far as anyone can tell and so they dont really have any part of them that CARES whether they win nor lose nor how they play the game. They dont worry about the out come, they dont fear pain coming to them and so have no need to get out of its way... this selfish self centered self determining concern is also what creates meaning for us.. our caring asigns value to every aspect of reality. Science has a very difficult time dealing with consciousness and its impact on the world because there is no easy way to measure nor quantify what is the root of caring about measuring and quantifying. After saying all this, it seems that at the core, the goal of everything is no different from standard physics... we want peace of mind or energy balance just like any other element of nature.. when our mind becomes dis-eased we move to bring it back to balance... at the pinnacle of satisfaction there is no goal higher to reach for, otherwise we would not be satisfied... but satisfaction is fleeting and quickly lost to some new disturbance that requires attention because living systems cannot stay alive in a completely balanced state... so we are driven by our nature, certainly not free of it..but individually we are free agents working out our own agendas to bring about our own satisfactions. This realization came from the remarks Gary Gasparov made after beating and losing to DEEP BLUE the IBM chess program... he said something along the line of, there was no thrill of victory in beating a machine that did not care if it lost. Jiohdi 20:54, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

What you are discussing is a serious concern about the consequences of the non-existence of free will. It is similar to the intuitive concenr that many people feel that, without genuine free will, they would not be able to take credit for their artistic, scientific, or other acheivements. If I'm not free, I didn't actually DO this or this, etc.. Dostoyevski once put the whole thing this way: (paraphrasing) "science will one day prove that man is nothing more than a piano-stop and everything can be calculated to the minutest detail, etc. And what will man do? He will destroy the crystal palace (created by science) and declare that he is NOT a piano-stop just to prove that he is not a piano-stop. He will aslo declare that 2 and 2 is five, if he likes. This is becasue man is the "ungrateful biped." On other words, man is unfree, but will never accept that fact. He can't. It would rob him of the illusion of importance. But none of this is new or goes into the article though.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:11, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

seems to me that freewill is not the actual issue in anyones mind, what really matters is the freedom to do what one wishes to accomplish his own goals and that is an external concern. we can never be free of what we are and what we have become because of our experiences, but we do care about what will become of our own goals and that is where the only freedom that matters is found. can I take credit for my talents? not really, but can I be compensated for having them, absolutely!! in this respect I am not different from any machine that is employed to accomplish a task, it must be serviced and purchased, so my time is valuable, not only to me but to anyone who needs to deal with me...no freewill required. am I responsible for my actions? not in any metaphysical sense, but again like any machine, if I become a hazard I must be dealt with. We dont hold rabid dogs responsible for getting rabies but we do remove them from society and humanely put them to sleep because at this time they cannot be cured. I find humans should not be treated worse than this and the current prison system, based on the myth of freewill is absurd. We take a threat to society, place it in a de-humanizing enviornment and when it is worse than when it was admitted, we release it into the general population with a safe for use stamp on it because it did its time according to another mythical justice balancing sheet.Jiohdi 13:48, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

Humanely put the incurably troublesome to sleep,eh?? Sounds very familiar. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 14:12, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

About some interpretation of Science regarding Freewill

I have notice Someone left out very important info that comes from respected magazine (Scientific American Mind, for example); To erase and copy and paste a previous record of this same page/article on wikipedia would be too easy, but I won't play those games. This article shouldn’t represent Wikipedia. Everybody erase whatever they want, even if the info is clearly from a legitimate source. Then come those who wants to advocate a point with a "fair-words" mask (specially those who seek to vanish the "freewill" concept from our world- and they have no idea what they are talking about; If you knew that you have no freewill , then you will try so hard to prove that freewill exist, that you would contradict your previous statements just for the relief of the notion that you can , indeed, become whatever you want). Imagine to say to Einstein that he would never amount to nothing, because he cannot control his passionate heart or his attention in order to become a physicist. Good news that teacher was wrong. And It wasn't luck that he became a physicist. It was his motivation, the same thing that defeat his weird proceedings at school; And that's the point: We try so hard to prove that we are not free because we cannot control everything in our lives that we forgot there things that we can control, and that freewill isn't about control in everything of our behavior, but about control in the most essential things of our ethical behavior. To believe in these things we don't need to address notions of a complete control of our destinies or a completely simultaneous action to notion nervous system. Only the part that ask "Can we change our behavior so that we prevent ourselves to engage in murder, rape, addiction, pathological gambling, stealing, etc.?" - And the answer to that question takes the form of a repetitive "Yes, WE can"... Notice the WE... We need to stop framing the question. Scientifically... Let's consider the plabebo/nocebo effect... Can we deny the power of that? NO; Another view: If this articles says that some scientist controlled to some degree the actions of some volunteers in an experiment, and use that implicitly as a notion against freewill, then this article is implicitly wrong, because the only thing that prove is that a group of educated people (Humans) affected at will, in deliberate fashion, the actions of another human being- We could change behavior in a reproducible, at will manner, at least statistically- BY the way, 80% influence leave room for a 20%- a low but not negligible number, and , judging by the experiment, from 60% to 80%, that leave room to figure out it is somewhat not as easy as you might imply with the sequence of the sentences in the article, which put it (maybe without the intention) that we are controlled even when we feel free. Consider that we don't need always a logical explanation to our behavior, cause social psychology have established that we are often bias in our decisions. Even the FDA can be bias, and that's why they pre-commit to the double-blind type of trial. We can prevent. If our mind isn't always rational, then a decision framework between our impulses and our rational goals can be seen. And evidence suggests it have been seen in action (Limbic System vs. Prefrontal Cortex). Here we all could train our mind to use more the limbic System or the Prefrontal Cortex, and the capacity to modify behavior in a controlled fashion, one that we could use again and again with fairly good results, be it with drugs, electroshock, therapy or electronically- controlled devices, is an example of freewill. Again, evidences indicate that this is probable. Are we going to contradict ourselves and put as wrong the Behavioral Science partial success, those written in another article of Wikipedia, their findings of behavior modification? What about Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (or self-defeating prophecy); could we deny it? (Take a young delinquent with some brain and a little heart and tell him he’s too stupid to stop being a punk and become a honorable Professional; Chances are he will defy your claim and change his behavior, just to show you who’s the punk now). Can we deny that the discovery of a genetic basis for aggressive behavior, for example, opens the possibility for new drug treatments? - Also, aside from experimental status, Can we deny that today we can change or alter some genes in our human cells? Can we deny that neural prothesis today is used however experimental it might be, and that those devices are indeed programmed by an engineer to perform - or exclude- certain tasks? Can we use these devices to prevent a rape or a murder? However inhumane it might sound, it is not only possible but probable, even very viable these days. But if the criminal volunteer to use the device it sounds less offensive (less than his actual raping or killing of a victim. Fortune we have. We don't need those radical methods. There is evidence that therapy and Psychiatry often helps. Remember we don't need a 100% improvement to say that someone is doing everything on his power to take responsibility for his ethical actions. Maybe freewill is about that. Honestly trying. The sure thing is that freewill isn't what we thought. We are not as free as we believed. But, do these render the concept obsolete? No; We need something that speed up our motivation to change and that's the Freewill Concept- it's like a placebo effect, and maybe (just maybe) doesn't exist as something pre-established, rather it exist as long as the believe create and develop it. That is not to say it doesn't exist or that is not possible. I know it's unfair to regard us as guilty as sin when we can't control ourselves, but that's the point, instead of the old concept, put a new version that is honest enough so that we are motivate to take responsibility but understand our limitations on behavioral control. There things we do control. Things that have to do with commitment. If freewill doesn't exist, moral responsibility is a fraud...And you can say goodbye to fairness. Ethical responsibility is like the rules of basketball- It doesn't derive it existence from the genes or the place the players live, but from commitment from those players to play the same game with those rules. Freewill is the same. A pre-commitment, based on new scientific grounds, can be worked upon. Then Freewill is conservative: it is not destroyed nor created; only changes form.

Oh, this is just an WP:OR essay. Ok, no harm done. Though people DO get angry when I do this on politics talk pages for some reason.--Francesco Franco 07:33, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, I knew they'd start back sooner or later. No comment. --Francesco Franco 07:30, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

Signed comment on article page?

I moved the following, signed text (which therefore appered to be a comment) from the main article page:

Free will could be defined (somehow like Hume did) as the ability to decide in agreement with one's principles or main goals. Then, moral responsibility could be defined as sensibility to the threat of punishment. Free will (which then depends not only on the person but on the decision to make) is then necessary to moral responsibility as well as it requires some kind macroscopic determinism.MikalZiane 20:26, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

If you would like this text added to the main article, please provide some citations for this. Otherwise, it will be treated as unreferenced OR, and therefore inappropriate for the main page. Edhubbard 20:32, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

Talkimng about Hume, I'm fairly sure that he did believe in free will but this "On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along" suggests otherwise. Perhaps a might "before" "realize"?

Sorry for signing the "comment". It is a mere synthesis on the link of free will with moral responsibility so that I thought it would recapitulate the section nicely. This definition of free will is close to Hume's (mentionned above in the same section) and the definition of moral responsibility is simply utilitarian (maybe a link to the article on justice would be useful).MikalZiane

Hi MikalZiane, I assumed that it was a comment, and therefore belonged on the talk page for three reasons.

1) It was signed. Nothing in article space should be signed, and everything on talk pages should be.

2) It was unreferenced. There is no reason for a whole paragraph on wikipedia to be unreferenced. Wikipedia is so often flooded with original research (see my point 3) that almost everything needs to be cited anymore (not quite to the level of "the sky is blue" but close!).

3) It seemed to be your opinion (i.e., WP:OR). Phrases like "could be defined" have no place in an article. Statements like "Hume defined..." or even "Searle suggested that Hume argued that Aristotle was wrong" followed with an appropriate reference belong in an article.

Finally, the text does not really seem to add anything new. I don't think that we need a summary of what is already there. Perhaps we can see what the other editors think, and we'll see if there is something that we've missed that needs to be added here. Edhubbard 21:00, 2 October 2006 (UTC)

I understand your points Edhubbard but :

a) if you read the discussion (as well as the talk on compatibilism) you'll see that some readers seem confused by the article and especially by the compatibilist view;

b) especially the link between Hume's (or compatibilists') free will and moral responsibility is not very clear in the section on moral responsibility; by highliting that there is a logical link between Hume-like free will and a utilitarian view of justice the compatibilists' point seems much clearer I think;

c) the whole article does not really discuss how free will and determinism could be defined and the impact of those definitions on the issues.

I acknowledege that my signing the paragraph was a mistake and I see that the style was not appropriate. On the other hand this "clarification" would go well at the end of the moral responsibility section or maybe be included in the paragraph on Hume but it does not fit as the parapraph ends in some confusion but simply listing some responses and counter responses rather thand trying to give a synthesis.

This is indeed my point on this article : there is too much tracking of disputes and too little synthesis so that I am surprised by the bronze star. I understand that original research is excluded from articles but on the other hand if editors simply list disputes the risk is to be confusing. Some syntheses must be made and some links highlighted.

How can this article get a bronze star when there is simply no conclusion recapitulating the issues but a list of unrelated hare-braned disputes ! MikalZiane 12:05, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Our job as an encyclopedia is to present information to readers in a summarized, NPOV way. Any conclusion here would be POV, whose side would be conclude on? The disputes (hare-brained or not, unrelated or not) are simply on-going, and have been for a long time. That is the nature of philosophy. Bmorton3 15:49, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Sure Bmorton3 but the point is not to take side but to clarify the issues, not simply to list disputes simply because they have been published. Take Edhubbard's contribution to the "Moral responsibility section": he summarized a totally useless paper from Greene and Cohen which simply diverts the reader from the issues. He uses 14 lines for that ! But he at least he was NPOV and he quoted a respectable source ! This is becoming ridiculous. Neutrality is simply illusional, the editor necessarily makes editorial choices. At least these choices should be honest if not neutral and should try and clarify the issues.

Philosophy is not a mere list of disputes: what a cynical view. Wikipedia readers deserve more than mere philology : they deserve real articles that clarify the issues.MikalZiane 20:00, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

No, philosophy is certainly NOT a mere list of disputes. But this is not a philosophy article. It is an encyclopedia article about a PHILOSOPHICAL topic which states the issues, the various positions taken and the argumentation used to defend those positions. To go further would be to engage in philosophizing. That's not the idea here, old boy.--Francesco Franco 08:05, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Sure but this article does not really state the issues : it does not even try and define free will precisely nor moral responsibility. This article became a (poor) article in the field of history of ideas and not a article on a philosophical topic ! A philosophical topic ought not simply be explained by listing all the disputes and confusions more or less related to the topic.

In this very case what must be done is first explaining that the defintion of free will is precisely the cornerstone of all the disputes. Then recall why (historically) the concept(s) of free will emerged and especially the link with moral responsibility. This is partially done is the article but not clearly. Other aspects of free will such as the link with origination must be mentionned in the introduction too but as an editorial choice probably be discussed in a seperate section as it brings confusion.

Then a section on moral responsibility and free will could hightlihght that Free-Will as self-determination defintions enable moral responsibility provided that it is defined in a utilitarian perspective. It would be useful then to list other possible defintions of moral responsibility and check out whether the links with some definition of free will have already been pointed out (or is obvious). An so on.

Of course the state of the art will be introduced, but only to support the article not to merely augment it with a new reference. No new ideas would be proposed, but maybe new didactic tricks. MikalZiane 13:30, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

"The state of the art"....ok, I get it now. Thanks for entertaining us here, but Wikipedia is not a forum. (;--Francesco Franco 13:36, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

I'm sorry for weighing in here -- I don't visit this page much -- but what is it that Mikal has proposed just lately (Oct 4 13:30) which is unacceptable? The possibility that the free will debate is a merely verbal one has quite a place in the history of the subject. This was Hume's argument in the Enquiry (Section 8), though he shied away from use of the term 'free will', since it was the hot-button item in the first place. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 14:38, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Edit-creep, ladies and gents. I warned you. I can tell just where this is going.

but to adress your question specifically: Yes, this is dicussed in the article. It is NOT what Mikail propose to insert just lately. He proposed this:

Free will could be defined (somehow like Hume did) as the ability to decide in agreement with one's principles or main goals. Then, moral responsibility could be defined as sensibility to the threat of punishment. Free will (which then depends not only on the person but on the decision to make) is then necessary to moral responsibility as well as it requires some kind macroscopic determinism

Now, let me take it apart very carefully so that everyone who has some experience editing FAs, such as Sandy, but not knowledgeable about philosophy can easily get it. "Free will could be defined".... violates WP:WEASEL and WP:NOR. I think this is obvious. "Somehow like Hume did" does not constitute a reference. "Moral responsibility could be defined...." same exact thing. The final sentence is obviously a conclusion (erroneously, BTW) drawn from the first two unverified premises. That's it. I have to get off-line. Please read more carefully next time, lucidish. Or is it that you are trying to get me to abandon this thing too. --Francesco Franco 14:59, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

With all due respect, that didn't answer the question, because it appealed to something besides the 13:30 post. Perhaps I was unclear in my question. I wanted to know what it was in the 13:30 proposal which was unacceptable.

The sentences which followed were meant to address and reference one of Mikail's core greivances, that the free will discussion is a merely verbal dispute. His lack of reference etc. is all a fault, sure, but that's why I provided one (Enquiry, section 8). Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 15:49, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, my response was that this point is already addressed in the article in the section on "other views". It may need to be expanded a bit. I will can easily do that myself when I have time. I obviously know Hume and can find the reference and have the whole thing finidhed in less than half an hour. Is there anythin else? Do you also support his vie that the article is "poor", that is needs to overhauled from top to bottom, the meanignlsess nonsens that he actually did try to insert above or the other OR that he has stated on this page? Basically, there are two sides on this matter, this article can be taken over by cranks like what's his name or not? If it does, I go. You can either support me or not. Where do you stand?--Francesco Franco 16:19, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

I do not by any stretch of the imagination support the view that the article is poor. In fact, I disagree with many of the things Mikal has said elsewhere on this page. (For instance, his flippant dismissal of the law/philosophy related article which Ed Hubbard added, and seeming resistence to NPOV standards). But when I ask questions about specific points, I really mean them to be focused on those points, with no prior bias toward or against the persons involved. I'm genuinely sorry if this upset you. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 00:16, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

No, no no,. Iìm not going to do this for you in fact. HA. If you want to expand on the topic of free will as sementic illusion, Lucish, BE MY GUEST!! Make sure it's references and make sure it flows with the rest of the article. Otherwise, I will revert it as garbage. Plain and simple. --Francesco Franco 16:26, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, I've expanded on the section about the ilussion of free will as a merely verbal matter a bit. From here on, no more. Let me explain something Lucidich, the reason he can't cite sources is that he does not know anything about philosophy and will not take the time to work his ass off to do the research to find out what the almost infinite versions of compatibilism are. That's something that I do, you see. It's MY LIFE. He's a software engineer who just happens to be playing around here and expressing hiw own ridiculous opinions, just like any good troll and crank. If you defend him......enough said. Asking ME for favors, for god's sake!!--Francesco Franco 17:12, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Very entertaining Francesco Franco. So you say I will be kicked for NPOV while you obviously do not even respect elementary etiquette. The original insertion was clumsy and lacked references and was signed. Ok, wow, big deal. I already agreed. The rest of my points remain and contrary to what you think I have read on free will. But what I understood quickly from philosophy classes is that reading is one thing but thinking by yourself is way more important. Most of the students (even the graduate students) in philosophy that I met confused philosophy and history of philosophy. I was even insulted in class by a felow student because I suggested that (and tried to explain why) Kant's third antinomy was poor. Now Lacatosias if you think this article must list all the versions of compatibilism, fine go ahead, it seems easier to you that trying to find a way to present the issues clearly. MikalZiane 20:14, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Mikal, I share your greivance with respect to popular scholarship. Nevertheless, let's face it: this venue (Wikipedia) is not about thinking for yourself, except in the narrow sense that your own passions and ideas can lead you to research ideas which others have endorsed in other papers, and then show a more general audience about these interesting papers. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 00:16, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Lucidish, of course you are right. My point is that finding the crucial articulations in the issues goes beyond erudition, especially for this kind of topic where confusions and quiproquos abound. I reckon that more effort to highlight them and less effort on exhaustivily accounting for all POVs could improve the article. MikalZiane 20:43, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for falling for the bait. Arrogant as said, no, Ed? No comment.--Francesco Franco 07:17, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

You ARE right about one thing, though: Writing good encylopedia articles about philosophy (fundamnetally History of Philosophy or history of ideas or whatever you want to call it) does not make one anywhere near a good philosopher. But, then, I never claimed to be a good philosopher!! I do try to do philosophy, but at school or in my own unpublished, and probably unpublishable, essays. I am just a loser with serious physical and mental illnesses who happens to love philosophy, history of philosophy, history in general, literature, science, poetry, and any other form of knowledge that exists on the face of the earth. Whatever I do, I do the best that I can. I can do no more. --Francesco Franco 07:34, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Of course, Bmorton, Dbuckner, Sam Clarke, and several others, who ARE published philosophers (unlike yourself) have all expressed appreciation for my contributions here. Indeed, I suggest you take a look at User:Dbuckner's user page comments about the state of catastropic state of philosophy on Wikipedia....except for my contributions. He no longer contributes here because of people like yourself, I strongly suspect. --Francesco Franco 07:45, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Here's some evidence that I do think for myself sometimes (violating the rules) and the harsh rebuffs I get from admins when I do. No admins seem to care here. I think I easily won that argument, BTW. --Francesco Franco 07:59, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Ok Francesco Franco, I see that you consider this article as, somehow, your baby, and you are defending it like a tigress. I can understand that, since you have put a lot of effort in it. But if was a bit harsh on the state of the article, do not take it personally, apparently you worked on saving it. I just say there is still (or again) a serious opportunity for improvement by first introducing the main definitions of free will and moral responsibility and highlithing the link between them. I am new here and my attempt to do it was inappropriate but you are certainly able to do it yourself.

There is some truth in the position that the current article gives a misleading impression that the notion of free will is univocal and unproblematic. Alos, the section on moral responsibility seems to be an irrevelant addition instead of a central part of the issue. It's difficult to rework this things wihtout opening the pandora's box of infinite lsts of peoples preferred definitions, though. I will work on it a bit.--Francesco Franco 08:56, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

State of this article after everyone on god's green earth added their improvements

[Here it is. This phenomenoin has been dubbed edit-creep. If the process now starts all over again, the same exact thing will happen and it will end up in FAR again in a few months so that a limited group of about 3 or 4 editors can pointlessly fix it again. It is the eternal recurrence of the worst of all possible worlds. Dbuckner is right. This is hopeless. --Francesco Franco 16:38, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

No, it's not. I noticed that one of the proposals on the "Experts retention" proposal was "lock featured articles." My recommendation: Take your eyes away, don't look, and come back once a month or so. Do a giant diff between the version that's accumulated random crap and the featured version, and starting with the featured version, only add back the reasonable changes. People may whine over WP:OWN, but since you got it back to FA status, I doubt anyone will complain. SnowFire 20:26, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

I don't. --Francesco Franco 15:37, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Francesco, if edit creep has again deteriorated the article, I support an immediate revert to the post-FAR version of your choice. MichaelZaine, please refrain from adding unsourced original research. Thank you, Sandy 21:39, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

• I don't follow you FF. Your link is not to a diff. This diff is what I would say has changed since the article came back into form (if you'll allow me to include in the "good" version my copy edit, BMorton3's correction, and a bot that fixes ISBN's), and none of the subsequent edits look problematic to me. I'm all for your general concern but I don't see any evidence of edit creep yet (!!). –Outriggr § 23:52, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

I was referring to the accumulated edit-creep that had originally transformed this article from an FA to the monstrosity that I linked to. If some of the suggestions on the talk page, and elsewhere, are added, then edit-creep is inevitable once again. This is actually very simple. I have not made a logical argument, but a falsifiable empirical assertion. Think of this article as sort of experimentum crucis. --Francesco Franco 07:53, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

OK - there were a couple of ways to read your first comment and I chose the wrong one (or, I just read it incorrectly). –Outriggr § 23:28, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Sandy are you talking of the article or the discussions ? I already acknowledge my mistake concerning the article (albeit pointing out its poor state, the ambiguity of "neutrality" and "respectable source" and the need to add synthesis (not original matter)).MikalZiane 07:28, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Referring to the article: I was only pointing out that unsourced material can't be added to the article. Sorting things out on the talk page is appropriate. Sandy 14:06, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

If the "synthesis" you propose is not sourced, it will be deleted immediately per WP:V, WP:NOR, WP:WEASEL and so on. Further, it is arguable that synthesis, in philosophy, IS original research. Finally, there are many, many articles in philosophy that need to be radically improved much more than this one. How about working on consciousness, philosophy, mind, Alexius Meinong, Daniel Dennett, ad infinitum. 99.9% of the articles that User:Dbuckner has found in his exhative examination of ALL the articles listed in the category "Philosophy" (or whatver the heck he is doing) need SERIOUS ATTENTION. Go fix THEM. You ARE an expert, aren't you? --Francesco Franco 07:59, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

PS: Your quarrels with WP:NPOV and WP:Reliable sources should be taken up on their respective talk pages (good luck (0;) and not taken out on this article. --Francesco Franco 08:18, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

I explained why in this very article, especially in the section on moral responsibility, some referenced material is confusing or useless when clarification of synthesis is needed. Whether or not this clarification or synthesis is, or is not, philosophy is not the point. The point is how this article can be improved. The point is that by trying to ban original material one should not become blind to the point of banning any chance of clarification. This very article is not clear and readers (read the discussions) are confused. Definitions must be given, and the links between issues must be highlited. A mere litany of referenced material is not enough. This does not mean that totally new ideas are welcome but that (possibly) new ways to explain things in a didactic way should be welcome. When a professor teaches a class he or she may do it his or her own way and be a creative teacher without presenting any new research.

Let's be specific. If I say "X, Y and Z proposed this definition of Free Will and the common point of those definitions is that Free Will is ... " is it banned or not ? If I say "note that this defintion is directly linked to a utilitarian view of justice" is it banned or not even if I do not know if somobedy has already pointed out this obvious (as obvious that the sky is blue) relationship ? MikalZiane 12:57, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

"People are confused, read the comments". Most of the comments on this page go back to loooooooong before the recent FAR salvaging operation. Since then there have been very few. Most of them seem to be yours. --Francesco Franco 13:17, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Mikal, I understand your frustration. Nevertheless, I've found that making an argument in this venue while relying on unsourced statements is like going to a gunfight without a bulletproof vest. No matter whether you're right or wrong, you'll still end up hurt.

Could you say a bit more on this "utilitarian" connection? To say things are connected is not to say how they are connected, and in the latter you will find genuine clarity. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 14:50, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Sure Lucidish. From a utilitarian perspective the main point of punishment is deterrence: "The credible threat of punishment might lead people to make different choices" utilitarism. From this perspective, responsibility is sensibility to the threat of punishment: the ability to include the threat of punishment into one's decision process to possibly refrain from breaking the rules (not necessarily though, depending for instance on the odds to get caught). Punishing one who is not able to include this threat is simply diminishing total welfare (as well as equity since total welfare is a poor measure if it is not balanced with some equity rule to limit punishment to the smallest acceptably deterrent one). Now if the point of free will is to found moral responsibility (ignoring origination) a sufficient definition is the ability to decide in agreement with one's principles and main goals. From this perspective it does not matter what caused the decision to break a rule : what is relevant if whether or not the threat of punishment is (on average) effective at minimal cost (on welfare). So, from this perpective "hard determinism" is not an issue but as said in the article (some kind of macroscopic) "determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility". This minimal determinism is required by the very assumption that the responsible agent is trying to achieve goals. Admitedly it must also be possible to find a punishment which will go against a rule breaker's principles or goals (e.g. stay alive ...). If this is not possible because those goals are unknown for instance, then one might be wrongly considered as responsible because it was not understood that the threat of punishment was inneffective.

This said, can I be explained the point of this paragraph in the article: "The legal system and notions of justice can thus be maintained even in the face of emerging neuroscientific evidence undermining libertarian intuitions of free will." ?

Mentionning the article I must get back to this paragraph "Hard determinists are forced to accept that individuals often have "free will" in the compatibilist sense, but they deny that this sense of free will can ground moral responsibility. The fact that an agent's choices are unforced, hard determinists claim, does not change the fact that determinism robs the agent of responsibility." The connection between free will and moral responsibility is not because choices are unforced. The point is whether or not choices depend on the threat of punishment. It is a major confusion not to realize that what is "forced" depends on the viewpoint and especially what varies (here it must be threat of punishment/no threat). Warning the reader about this potential confusion is crucial. MikalZiane 21:17, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Intellectually, I sympathize with some of the tacit and explicit positions you take. For instance, I agree with one of your asides, that responsibility is an abstract notion that's outlines the plausible criteria for being a target of the punishment or praise of a moral agent.

Still, I want to make three comments. First, a sense of agency gives people a greater sense of happiness, even if it were a mere placebo or illusion. So it's not right to say that "it does not matter what caused the decision to break a rule" from a utilitarian perspective. For whatever reason, the idea of having a totally external locus of control is simply a bummer, and so, it matters to us. Second, neither the libertarian nor the hard determinist must deny that there is "goal-achievement", they just deny that there was or wasn't any really genuine or significant choice to do otherwise. Unless one provides further (unobvious) argument, the mere concept of goal-achievement is untouched by a free will discussion. Third, you seem to imply that a utilitarian is absolutely beholden to disregard holding people accountable when it seems unlikely to have an impact, but there are complex issues having to do with integrity and so on that famously need and deserve a utilitarian treatment in order for the doctrine to survive. (I think it can meet these challenges, but I don't think the answers are obvious.) Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 01:04, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

I am not sure I got your first point. It may matter to people to realize that their decisions are under external influence. On the other hand I think it should not matter to a utilitarian definition of responsibility. Am I right ? Or are you suggesting to alter the definition of responsibility to soothe the people by punishing those that they perceive as responsible ?

About your second point. I am not sure that "genuine" or "significant" matters (whatever that means to libertarians or hard determinists) here from a utilitarian perspective. My point is that what matters from a utilitarian view of responsibility is whether or not a threat of punishment is (on average) deterrent or not. In order to minimize useless punishment those who were not able to take the threat into account must not be punished (provided that they can be identified). Obviously, punishments are chosen to go against most people's goals. The only question then is whether or not an agent is able not to go againts his or her goals (which first assumes that he or she has stable enough goals and enough rationality to infer the consequences of his or her actions with respect to those goals).

About your third point. You are certainly right that there are subtleties that I missed or ignored but how do you think that integrity-related issues could impact the definition of utilitarian responsibility and thus free will ?MikalZiane 20:14, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

(1.) You seemed to be alleging in the comment I quoted that the facts about the determinism/libertarianism debate are of no significance to utilitarianism. But utilitarianism is extremely sensitive to the facts about what makes people happy, and what makes them unhappy. And if people were able to know (and thus had good reason to believe in) one or the other, then that would make them either happy or unhappy, depending on which doctrine comes out ahead. Thus, utilitarianism would care a great deal about the (knowable) facts about our agency. (2.) I more or less agree with your latest comment, but find it hard to connect it to the stuff I was replying to. Maybe I was reading too much into your emphasis on "goal-achievement". (3.) Integrity can be understood best when we admit that agency is itself an incorrigible value. I've written (informally) on this subject, you can read the relevant section here if you're interested. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 23:42, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

(1.) I think I got your point about my "it does not matter what caused the decision to break a rule". I meant that what ultimately matters is whether or not the threat of punishment cab be taken into account by the agent. In doing this you are quite right that the whole decision process of the agent might have to be scrutinized. What I said was ambiguous. My point was that the fact that an agent is under external influence or any kind of influence is not per se an argument pro or against the agent's responsibility.

(3.) Sure I'll have a look at it.

---

You DO NOT want to get me started on philosophy of language and other matters, do you Lucidish?? If it's not cited, I have the right to revert it. Especially on a Featrured Article. Have you done any, by the way?? --Francesco Franco 15:05, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Francesco, I wasn't talking to you there. You know that I appreciate your help on PoL, and admire both your skill and independence. But I have not said anything here doubting any reversions. Lucidish _{{ Ben S. Nelson }} 15:56, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Um.....you REALLY don't want to play this game with me. This is going to get quite nasty and probably very, very personal. I don't mind bneing kicked off Wikipedia in fact in order to defend the bulk of what I've done in this article. There WILL be editwars, peronsal attacks and everything I can possibly do to ensure that this thing doesn't return to the shit that was here before. If this is not your wish, you should step out of this dispute now before it is too late. If it is, you WILL BE hurt in the struggle as well, I can assure you.--Francesco Franco 16:32, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

But here is something more frightening

basically, I just commited vandalism to this FA page and there has been no reversion for almost half-an-hour now!! What's the point? This is called monitoring? This is not working, folks. --Francesco Franco 09:00, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Ok, if folks prefer this version, what can I tell you? It's all yours. JESUS CHRIST Wackipedia indeed!! --Francesco Franco 09:04, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Two points, Franceso. 1) I'm in a very different time zone from you, and it's not likely I will revert anything while I'm sleeping. 2) It is extremely unlikely I would suspect one of your edits as being incorrect or even review them; I will check the edits of contributors I don't know. Please don't use the article to make a point. Sandy 14:09, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

That's fair about making a point. But a lot of people do this sort of thing to test how effective this project is at reverting vandalism or, worse, slanders of public figures. It is important that people revert quickly.--Francesco Franco 15:11, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

But I'm not a student of philosophy, and I would never suspect that one of your edits might need to be reverted: I wouldn't even review them, since you're the expert. If I see an edit from you on my watchlist, I'm not likely to even check it. Sandy 15:13, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

I knew that YOU, and most people in the US, were asleep and wouldn't have checked. What I was concerned with is just the general possibility that articles can be easily vandalized. Aren't there general vandal-watchers out there? When my usepage is vandalized it's almost alwyas reverted immediately bu people I don't even know.--Francesco Franco 15:20, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Tourette syndrome is vandalized (coprolalia) regularly: over time, I have managed to get it on numerous people's watchlists, and I have a cadre of vandal-watchers keeping an eye on it. The problem is, the typical vandalism that occurs there is easy to spot, and I suspect that the vandal-watchers (who know that I'm the regular on that article) don't bother to check *my* edits. I don't think having a corp of vandal watchers would help you as it helps me, because this article doesn't typically get coprolalia-type vandalism: you can only rely on the good faith of all of us who have it on our watchlists. Sandy 15:26, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

(resetting indent): I have to second Sandy's point here Francesco. As you know, I saw it, and even commented on your personal talk page that if it had been anyone but you, I would have reverted it. What might be a fairer test is to log out, and try it with an IP address, and see how long some anonymous editor, instead of the person who has invested the most time on the page, can get away with the same thing. Or, you can take my response time to your talk page (about 20 minutes) as an outside estimate of what you could expect on a normal day from someone in the same time zone as you, since I hesitated to see what you were doing before posting to your talk page. It's not as bad as you might fear. Edhubbard 15:34, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, I had forgotten. Someone did catch it. Well, anyway, I apologize for the unnecessary disturbance, then--Francesco Franco 15:36, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Comments

"Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain." (Aquinas).

Lacatosias asked me to comment on this nonsense. I assume the problem is random and unbalanced (or worse) edits to previously balanced, and better, articles. I have long since given up on this thing, but, one last time...

Taking one of these random edits: "Free will could be defined (somehow like Hume) as the ability to decide in agreement with one's principles or main goals. Then, moral responsibility could be defined as sensibility to the threat of punishment. Free will (which depends not only on the person but on the decision to make) is then necessary to moral responsibility as well as it requires some kind macroscopic determinism. "

1. 'somehow like Hume' is poor grammar. Reason, 'Free will' is the grammatical subject of the sentence, and so 'like' must refer back to the subject. But the author means something else, something like 'as it was defined by Hume'.

2. I'm not sure Hume defined it in this way at all. At least provide a citation. But in any case, any addition occurring at such a late stage in the article (several sections in) should have already been discussed. When I look at earlier references to what Hume said, they are different. E.g. that "that a person acts freely only when the person willed the act and the person could have done otherwise". No reference to 'principles' or 'main goals'.

3. 'sensibility of' should either be 'sensitivity to' or 'sensibility of'. Which? If the former, it is implying that sensitivity to pain or whatever = moral responsibility. Surely not. Animals are sensitive to punishment (i.e. they feel pain), but are they morally responsible? If the latter, it is implied that the consciousness of punishment = moral responsbility. Not sure why that follows, either of itself or from anything else said in the article.

4. There should surely be a comma after 'as well'?

5. What does the reference to 'macroscopic determinism' mean. I don't like either real salads or word salads.

In short, the real badness of this edit is not philosophical, but just plain inability to write. But why am I complaining? That only makes people think badly of me. Furthermore, whatever effect it achieves, will be undone in a few hours or even minutes, in the encyclopedia that anyone can edit. Dbuckner 16:03, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Wow, my first attempt to edit an article was a mistake and was poorly written. I already acknowledged it twice and the edit was removed long ago now. So this is the third time now ;-) I realized that since I am not a native speaker I'd rather stick to the discussion page to suggest editions for some time and at least be more careful. If I was lazy it was partly due to the fact the article is at some places anarchic and thus I had not realized what level of carefullness was necessary.

1. ok

2. I should have been more rigorous ok

3. I was influenced by the French word "sensibilité", so it should have been "sensitivity to", but not to pain, read more carefully please, to the threat of punishment. I explained this in the "State of the article ..." section.

4. indeed

5. The point is that determinism or indeterminsm at the quantic level is irrelevant to moral responsibility and this version of free will, while obviously without some kind of determinism at the macroscopic level, the very idea of trying to achieve goals or to avoid a punishment does not make sense.

MikalZiane 17:32, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

MZ: you've been redundantly chastened by about 4 people here, probably enough to turn most new editors away from WP. Unfortunately, you've chosen an article with a number of disgruntled protectors, who hang around partially to make a point about all the problems with Wikipedia (I am not saying this tongue in cheek). A similar edit on another article might have netted you no commentary whatsoever. The main reason I'm writing is to give a bit of perspective that this sort of thing doesn't happen with most edits, if in fact you haven't edited enough to know that already. –Outriggr § 18:41, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

No, you're absolutely right. Such thorough vetting and scrutiny of edits rarely takes place on philosopny articles on Wikipedia. That's why 99.9999999999999% of them are an abomination and everyone knows it. If not, please go take a quick scan throough Dbuckner's user contribuitions for the last week or so. He has identified and tagged so many terrifyingly atrocious philosophy articles that I have really come to deeply resent anyone (even Jerry Fodor or [[Saul Kripke] mush less a non-expert) critizing the half-way decent ones that I have worked on, in particular. Go fix some of the other ones and establish your credentials as a good editor of philosophy articles before whining and throwing out Original Reserach that it simply a silly modificiation of radical behaviorism. --Francesco Franco 07:20, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Oh, you mean I hang around to make a point about the lack of quality on Wikipedia? Please take another look at my edit count!! LOL. I have over 7,000 edits (nearly 4,000 are main space article edits). As you know, I can take edit for almost entirly writing from scratch 2 of the 6 or 7 FAs in philosophy. The bulk of this one I rescued from FARC oblivion myself. I helped out in the rescue of Omnipotence Paradox. I have had some role in most of the philosophy Featured Articles on Wikipedia. If you look at the GAs, three or four of them (almost all) were subtstanially written by me. I had two others listes, but I REMOVED THEM MYSELF because they don't have in-line citations and are rather techincal. However, I did leave this project for four months back in the summer. My patience is running very thin again, right now. --Francesco Franco 07:54, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

I didn't mean any offense by "disgruntled protectors". I thought of a better word too late: disillusioned. Nothing I said is meant to take away from your contributions. But as I found this dialogue interesting, I felt that some explanation was due to new user MZ, who, despite his stipulated philosophical shortomings, really doesn't deserve to be treated like this. Now, maybe I should go review the whole dialogue again (and maybe I'd retract this), but he's been called a crank, and recently an "idiot" by EdHuddard on FF's talk page, and none of this seems like a good approach. (You guys have really high standards, I guess, for non-idiocy.) All he's done is tried to establish a philosophical discussion, from my POV. The strong devotion of a number of you to quality, rigor, etc. is admirable, but it ought to be tempered with finding a less grumpy way to accomplish these. So FF - your talk page says you're leaving. Sorry to hear that, and best regards. –Outriggr § 21:15, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

I suppose my first (except for adding two references in a CS article where in fact I saw people sign their editions !) edition will not get me an exceptionnal newcommer award then ?;-) MikalZiane 19:25, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

Well, all I can say is, keep trying. :-) –Outriggr § 23:13, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

What he said :-) Nothing like a trial by fire, huh ? Since you're still getting your feet wet, have a look at an uncontroversial topic like, oh maybe Hugo Chavez, Anti-Americanism, or Fred Phelps LOL ! Sorry for the rough entry: please leave me a talk page message if you ever need anything. I only came to these parts via the Free will FAR, and I take full credit for the writing these folks took from my Tourette syndrome page. Sandy 05:42, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

BTW, all this nonsense seems to have frightened off yet another expert (one of the last 2 or 3 in philosophy) who does not hold some kind of grudge aagaint Wikipedia (BMorton3). I suspect he's just about had it by now. Good work!! Also, I didn't know that EdHubbard or Bmorton had some kind of grudge againts Wikipedia?? All the evidence indicates the contary. Hmmm...What a red herring. --Francesco Franco 07:27, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Nah I was frightened off by my DEAN and my Department Chair who formally told me to stop working on Wikipedia and focus on publishing instead so I don't get fired. I'm disobeying just popping in on a Thursady afternoon to see how many different places on WP my work is being descibed as "embarrassing" "unencyclopedic" "pathetic" "not worldwide" or contrarywise "excellent" "epic." And my university doesn't consider work on WP to be "peer reviewed." It's certainly reviewed, maybe they object to the "peer" bit ... I'll come back and help when I feel my job will allow it. FF keep playing the grouchy defender, :) MZ, keep doing your best to improve articles and try to forgive grouchy defenders who have had many, many experiences with people who aren't really trying to improve them, they are only pretending to. Bmorton3 21:27, 11 January 2007 (UTC)

PS you don't need to look at my edits to find these abominations. Just put "Category:Philosophy articles needing attention" in the search box and you get the whole list. I've just put the Philosophy article back on clean-u. Someone removed it under the impression that a nice picture will cure the problem of bad writing. Dbuckner 08:28, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

As I said above FF, the criticisms I made towards this article were not aiming at you. The article is not so good (any more ?) despite you and because of people (such as me, will you add correclty) who add their "improvements". I realized that and will not edit wihtout much more care now. In the meantime I suggested a few possible opportunites for improvement.MikalZiane 19:36, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, that's it!! Well, you're all now free to do what you will with the article (and all other philosophy articles). I'll be back to look at the "improvements" in a few months time at the next FAR (probably FARC). But I won't touch it again, since I did such a "bad" job getting it back to Featrured Articles status (best of the best, right Sandy??) before. Giid luck and goodbye--Francesco Franco 07:19, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

At last: now that you and DBuckner have been exhauted I can finally restore the article to what it should be, that is a warning that Free Will is merely the ability to say that the moon is made of green cheese ! Let's go ! So you see: you canoot leave the article unwatched, please stay.MikalZiane 13:28, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Don't worry MZ. The article isn't unwatched. However, I would be very happy if your (attempt at) humor was be enough to bring Francesco back. Despite the personal battle you had with him here, Francesco is one of the best philosophy editors on wikipedia, and the project is much better with him than it will be without him. Indeed, our entry here is better than the one in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (you will see that one deals almost exclusively with the defintional issues you feel are lacking, but includes very little of the "problem of free will" issues discussed in this one) and is more complete than the one written by Galen Strawson (which is more similar to the one we have created here, but lacks any of the scientific discussions). You should spend some time comparing this entry with ones written for professional encyclopedias; you will see that it compares quite favorably. You will also see that any encyclopedia entry is a compromise between comprehsiveness and length (readability). I certainly have no doubts that it deserves its bronze star, and this in very large majority due to Francesco's hard work (not to belittle the contributions of others, but a quick look at the edit history shows who did the majority of the work). Edhubbard 14:21, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for mentionning the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I quickly read the article and found it very good indeed. The defintions are introduced and discussed before distinguishing among compatibilists ... In fact the article even partly replies to your complaining at my linking Hume to the defintion I suggested. Of course the connection I made was clusmy but there is indeed a connection and the defintion I suggested (as what I thought was the typycal compatibilist's) is quite close to that of 1.2 in the SEP article. I even see my clumsy "sensible" correctly phrased as "sensitive to". The other difference is that what I considered a pretty obvious connection to a utilitarian notion of responsibility (namely my insisting on the fact that the sensitivity that really matters is that to the threat of punishment) was not mentionned. This might be original then and thus if not obvious must not be mentioned. (I still think it is pretty clear though). Incidently, I suppose that some animals should be granted free will regarding some of their choices: some are able to take into account a threat of punishment.

What "problem of free will" issues are discussed in the wikipedia article that make it better than the SEP article. Honestly I find the SEP one much clearer.MikalZiane 16:07, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

Did you also look at the Galen Strawson Routledge Encyclopedia entry? One of the points I was trying to make is that different encyclopedia entries approach this differently, yet both of them are considered to be excellent encyclopedias (although given your love of definitions, I assumed you would prefer the SEP). That is, the SEP entry primarily addressed the question of "what is free will?" but largely left out answers to the question "Does free will exist?" instead referring the reader to the various positions via links. Similarly, the SEP entry spends a long time on "Theological Wrinkles." The Routledge entry, on the other hand, written by Galen Strawson, deals more with the second question and does not even discuss differing definitions of free will.

The most important point I want to make is that the particular version of the article that we have here isn't necessarily bad, as you continually suggest, but rather made different choices about how to approach the discussion of free will and these are choices that professional philosophers, writing other encyclopedia entries, have had to make too. As for what's lacking, one of the big things that is lacking from either the SEP or the Galen Strawson is the issue of how scientific data may bear on the traditional philosophical debates. The SEP gives it only a paragraph, while the Routledge entry, although it is much longer (five pages long) doesn't really deal with any of these issues. Because wikipedia tries to always keep entries short, editors don't have the same latitude to write equally long articles. Instead, what we need to do on wikipedia to write "summary style" entries, which provide a road map, and then link to pages that provide more detail. This is one of the constraints of wikipedia that must be dealt with when trying to write what is considered a good or even better, featured article. This means that invariably things are left out (see the large amount of cutting that was done to move all of the Theological Aspects of Free will to Free will in theology). This is not because this is an unimportant topic, but rather that it was already so big that it violated the principle of summary style. As you can see from previous discussions on this page, we also had thought about "forking" some of the other aspects of free will. Perhaps some of the "what is free will" types of things could also have to be done that way. However, this really has to be done with a cohesive vision of the article. Edhubbard 16:29, 7 October 2006 (UTC)

The question of whether Free Will exists or not only makes sense once it has been defined. In fact the existence of the rational-deliberation kind of free will does not seem problematic at all. As for the other aspects of free will, I understand that the illusion of first cause is, well, an illusion. I have to read the SEP article more carefully on the other aspects of free will to see if there is a real philosophical problem because I found little help on this matter on the wikipedia one. Where is it addressed: it is not even mentionned in the table of contents which is surpising if it is the focus of the article. Well, I liked the section on Honderich because I was too lazy to carefully read my copy of his "The consequences of Determinism" and what I had quickly read was not enough to understand his point. I think this section could be extended to be really helpful (especially once the scientific stuff is forked).

Concerning the scientific data, I do not see much of it related to free will in the wikipedia article. It is said for instance that "This vision entailed that free will must be an illusion". What kind of free will are we talking about here ? The next paragraph on quantum mechanics is really poor too I think. Cassirer sorted this question for good (if it ever needed to be sorted out): QM and free will is a big red herring. I like the quote in the genetics section: "Responsibility doesn't require behavior to be uncaused, as long as behaviour responds to praise and blame" but it would make more sense if free will was first explicitly defined in these terms. Moreover, this is not scientific data but simply infering from the definition which has nothing to do with genetics. I do not mean that genetics or more generally biology could not clarify why some people are not receptive to such or such kind of praise or blame but this is not what is discussed in the article. The next sections on neuroscience and neurology could be forked I guess as they do not bring anything crucial to the philosophical debate on free will I reckon. With my background in computer science I should be able to understand the section on Determinism and emergent behaviour but I failed to see the point. Finally the last three sections on hindu, buddhism and theology were puzzling since "This article covers the non-theological aspects of free will. For the theological aspects, see Free will in theology". MikalZiane 00:09, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

So maybe the hindu and buddhist sections explain some philosophical aspect of free will then. I had trouble to see it though and it looks like the point is to say that both are confused about free will. The quote from monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu seems pretty naive unless some subtely has not been explained (but then why this puzzling quote if not to confuse the reader even more). "If things were totally caused there would be no way you could develop a skill - your actions would be totally predetermined." I fail to see why if things were "totally caused" skills could not be developed. One could very well not be able to play chess in the morning, learn it in a few hours, and be able to play chess (at beginner's level) in the afternoon while all of this could be predetermined.MikalZiane 11:30, 10 October 2006 (UTC)

Supercausality and free will

I have removed the following section: Chris King in the article Chaos, Quantum-transactions and Consciousness (2003), starts from Einstein’s energy-momentum relation, and states that all quantum objects are constantly faced with bifurcations which force the system to operate choices (supercausality). King quotes Eccles, Penrose and Hameroff who proved the existence of quantum structures in living systems and arrives to the conclusion that life is moved not only by mechanical causes but also by retrocausality (syntropy). According to King, a new and innovative description of the relation between mind and brain derives from this constant state of choice in which living structures are immersed. This constant state of choice would force living systems into a state of free will which would be common to all the levels and structures of life, from molecules to macrostructures, and organisms. This constant state of free will, would originate chaotic dynamics which organize in fractal structures. King suggests that, in order to understand what consciousness really is, it is necessary to start from free will, because at this level it becomes necessary to definitely refuse any attempt to use mechanical approaches.

Since it seems to be OR. There are two citations, yes, but the first one doesn't state the journal, or in any way help us to verify it. The claims about Eccles, Penrose, and Hameroff are inflated. These authors (Penrose and Hameroff, in particular) have argued that such effects exist, but to date there is no empirical evidence that quantum mechanical structures (i.e., microtubles) are unique to the brain, and there is no evidence that such effects play any causal role. The other citation appears to be a self-published website, which is not a reliable source. Things without reliable sources should not be added to any wikipedia article, but especially to a featured article. Edhubbard 07:40, 3 November 2006 (UTC)

Lucas, Godel and other arguments for Freewill

The article says (correctly) that there are three main positions (Compatabilism, Hard determinism and Libertarianism) + others, but only gives sections to C, HD and I (= HD + L). It also leaves out any mention of John Lucas and Godel. This is one of the most interesting arguments in philosophy and really should not be neglected. Anyone mind if I (a) put it in and (b) change the name of the section from Incompatablism to Libertarianism per the summary? NBeale 21:12, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Hi NBeale, It looks like we are working on/watching many of the same articles, although from slightly different perspectives (the most important shared one being a commitment to improving wikipedia articles). I'll give you my feelings on your questions in reverse order. (b) I looked at the current lay-out, and I don't think it's quite right to say that there is HD, C, and I. It's more Determinism, just explaining the different uses of the term, then Compatibilism and Incompatibilism (following the figure). Both HD and L are covered under Incompatiblism. I think that the best thing to do, following the logical flow diagram I created, would be to make sub-sub headings under incompatiblism. However, the current structure of that section doesn't really lend itself to sub-sub-headings, since it discusses some of the debate between HD and L as a give and take. Given that this is a FA, it would definitely be good to sandbox this and work on it off the main page before making any edits.

(a) I'm not familiar with the Lucas argument. It might fit into the L section, and would then be reasonable to include that in the sandbox working on this. One other thing to note is that the Free Will article had grown substantially between the time that was first an FA and when it was FAR'd, so that one of the things that Francesco Franco did was to create a subpage for the extended details of the Free will in theology debates. Does the Lucas argument better fit here or there? Edhubbard 22:01, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Hi Ed. Lucas is all about mathematical logic - not theology at all. re structure, let's sandbox and see what's best - would you like to create one? BTW I've corrected the howler about Laplace's Demon, how that got in is beyond me. Might as well say "imagine an entity that can predict the future, it could predict the future" I'm not very happy with what's written but at least it isn't self-evidently false! NBeale 22:50, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Ok, I'm giving the sandbox a try here: sandbox. Let's see if that works. Edhubbard 23:03, 12 November 2006 (UTC) Ok, it seems to work. I've put the whole Incompatibilism section in the sandbox, and created "dummy" fourth level headings there. As we head into the week, I'll have less time to work on this, but feel free to fiddle with it. If you want specific feedback, you can always put a message on my chat page. Edhubbard 23:07, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Lucas and Godel (magnificent mathematician, aweful philosopher) were both profoundly mystical thinkers whose views are considered rather marginal, if not dismissed ouright, in the current philosophical discussion about free will. I wouldn't give them too much space if I were you. It would open the door to the an extraodrinary mess of crankish theories and hypthoses that belong in the religion article. But then again , this is the Wackipedia that anyone crap on.--Francesco Franco 10:42, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

Hofstadter (then Dennett and Hofstadter) wiped that stuff out about 15 years ago and it has hardly been heard from since, for heaven's sake. Penrose arguments are even sillier. --Francesco Franco 13:31, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for the input Francesco... Glad to see you are still around some. If we end up doing anything in that sandbox there, your input would be greatly appreciated. I did see, just from the Lucas page that Hofstadter had argued against that view, but the fact that it has hardly been mentioned since, I didn't know. Edhubbard 16:45, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

Here's a list of some of the most prominent contemporary libertarians: Peter Van Inwagen, Fritz Warfield, Tim O’Connor, David Widerker, Randy Clarke, Carl Ginet, Robert Kane, Laura Ekstrom, David Wiggins, William Rowe, Roderick Chisholm, Richard Taylor. Carl Ginet and van Invagen are the originators and strongest proponents of the so-called "Consequence argument" for incompatibilism. It would be more useful to look in this direction for serious pro-libertarian arguments.--Francesco Franco 18:22, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

But, from what I remember of the article, there is already a good discussion of Ginet and van Invagen. If these are the best of the arguments out there, and they're already included, what do we gain by including the Lucas argument, which isn't currently part of the philosophical debate? Edhubbard 20:42, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

(reset) Quick check even with Google Scholar shows that Lucas's argument is alive and well, cited in major review in 2005, and also of course by Penrose. By all means ref Hofstader's reply and Lucas's response. Francesco Franco labelling anyone who disagrees with him "crankish" is not useful. Let's let the arguments speak for themselves NBeale 19:02, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

NBeale, can you provide the citation for this "major review" in 2005. I ran a scholar search, and the only thing I came up with on the first page is a book chapter in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, which looks like a different tack on refuting what they call the Lucas-Penrose argument. My search was "John Lucas free will Godel" without the quotes. Perhaps you did a slightly different search? Edhubbard 21:59, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, that's all fine with me. I'm no longer an active contributor anyway. I just look in every now and then to see how badly things have degenerated since I last attempted to salvage the monstrosities that inevitably result fromn edit-creep, profound ignorance of philosophy, agenda-pushing cranks (your case) and so on. Have a go at will. Just ask yourself one question though: is this the way it would be done in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, the Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy, the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, etc,.etc.. ad infinitum? For that matter, there is another way to test this out: try posting the argument on the Garden of Forking Paths blog (moderated by the leading philosophers in the field and see what reaction you get. What's the problem with van Invagen, Carl Ginet, and all the others? Do you know they're arguments? Do you EVEN KNOW WHO THEY ARE?? Never mind. It's all yours. ---Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:24, 15 November 2006 (UTC)-09:12, 15 November 2006 (UTC)

Re labeling and cranks: No indeed!! There used to be two outstanding' philosophy editors who worked on this very page, more expert than myself and whose views I disgreed with profoundly. Never had any problems with a single one of their edits. And this was the case with many other philosophy sections and articles. The real problem is that all these folks have mostly long since been scared off by the prevalence of cranks and other nonsense. (0:--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:24, 15 November 2006 (UTC)

I agree with Lacatosias that Lucas' argument on freewill is at best of marginal interest and that Penrose's arguments are really poor. I think it is ok though to mention them briefly especially if counter arguments are mentionned too. About Lucas's argument on the page referenced above: in "Hence m has freewill." what definition of free will is used? Lucas has merely "showed" that someone's actions cannot always be predicted (by a consistent logical system). Big deal ! This is hardly "one of the most interesting 20th Century ideas in philosophy". What is the connection with moral responsibility (a key aspect of free will if not the only meaningful one)? Again, free will as having unpredictable behavior is a void concept.

In fact there is no reason to believe, as Penrose and I guess Lucas, that humans can prove more things about logical systems that a properly chosen logical system could do. There is in fact every reason to believe the contrary: once the prooof is written down with sufficient details it is a proof in some formal system.

Dennett's main point againts Penrose is that people (including mathematicians) do not behave like consistent systems but also that not completely consitent formal systems (e.g. with some rare bugs) can be useful in practice. Live beings take chances and so computers can. MikalZiane 16:49, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Bio-Environmental Determinism

Moved to Discussion page from the article: TejBT 08:09, 14 November 2006 (UTC) Bio-Environmental determinism would lead us to the following: All thoughts and actions of any being are the results of interaction of two factors. On one side (the inner side) is the predisposed orientation of the 'being' and its code of behaviour impregnated in the brain and body by the DNA, and on the other side (the outer side) are all the environmental forces that are imapacting on that being continually. At all times, the thoughts and actions of that being, are the resultant of those two sets of forces, on none of which the being has any control. Act one must precisely in accordance with the dictates of these two set of forces. Then, where does the force of free will come, if there is any, and on what other basis can one act differently than one does, if there is none.

This concept can be easily verified by a simple self-test. For any decision one makes, ask a question to oneself, without 20/20 hindsight of the knowledge of results, would the decision be any different than one made if one puts oneself in the same situation, with nothing having changed?" The true answer shall always be NO. (TBT TejBT 08:09, 14 November 2006 (UTC))

I don't really see the need for this. Bio-enviromental determinism follows common-sensically from a mix of biological determinism and environmental determinism, both of which are already mentioned. Just a sophisticated sounding neologism for an obvious and probably universally accepted idea: genes and environment together determine behavior, not one or the other alone. On the other hand, just because it's obvious to me....perhaps a sentence or two can be added to the determinims section.--Francesco Franco 09:57, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Saint Augustine

In the section on compatibilism, Cfcapps added the following paragraph: Saint Augustine, an early Christian philosopher, reconciled theological determinism with free will by positing the idea of “self-predestination.” Although God eternally knows every choice human beings will make, and in his creation predestines some for eternal salvation and others for eternal damnation, he does so in accordance with the free choices of his creatures. In other words, God predestines some to be saved because he knows from eternity that they choose to be saved, and others to be damned because he knows from eternity that they choose to be damned. Current Christian compatibilists have applied St. Augustine’s theory to other forms of determinism, such as causal determinism, as well. They argue that physical laws do indeed represent the material cause for human actions, but that the universe, including its laws, exists as it does for a reason: God creates the world, including human beings, such that human actions occur as they do because of free choice. In other words, while hard determinists believe physical laws cause people’s choices, Augustinian compatibilists believe people’s choices ultimately cause physical laws.

I have moved it here since I am not sure that it belongs on the main free will entry, as opposed to the Free will in theology page. It certainly disccuses a theologian's thinking, and deals with questions of free will in the face of an omniscient God, so from that perspective, it should be on the other page (which, in fact, doesn't currently say anything very insightful about Augustine). Cfcapps, if you have a reason you feel that it absolutely should be here as opposed to there, please explain here. Edhubbard 07:46, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

The French article on free will starts with the augustinian concept of free will and I think it is a good idea since it explains the very idea behind the concept: an attempt at solving the paradox of an omniscient "perfectly good" creator of (partially) evil humans. This historical origin of the concept should really be mentionned in the main article and only then warn that the specifically theological aspects belong to the "free will in theology" article. Without this, the historical link to moral responsibility is not clear.

On the other hand the above explanation how Augustine's view is unclear: it does not solve the paradox by itself. The French article reminds us that Augustine had to add that free will is necessary to human's dignity.MikalZiane 13:54, 17 November 2006 (UTC)

A quantum soul?

I'm sorry if this has been debated or if I missed any mention of it in the article, but I believe I've read some arguments about the possibility of a human soul exerting free will by affecting nerve synapses in the brain on a quantum level. I guess this would amount to "choosing" between the different quantum probabilities of how you would react in a certain situation. I can't seem to remember where I heard this though, does anyone know more about it? If there are such theories, I believe they might be worth a mention under Physics and free will. Not that I particularly believe it to be likely myself, just feeling a bit agnostic today, and entertaining notions shouldn't be left out :) - Jonatan Crafoord 16:31, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Yes, this is a pressing matter. I think Newt Gingrich mentioned something like this in his book God, the religious right, the soul of the synapse and other mysterious inanities that those damned left-wing intellectuals never told you about because they are all satanists like Alistair Crowley. HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!! HAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAOk,

Also, it was mentioned by Sartre, who wrote (approximately):

The relations of one to one in corporaeal service to the ulimate sentiene of sapience (this is, of course, the sense of the sentience of sapeicne which pre -cedes and does not anti-date the in-going of the ens for-itself in revealing itself in the natural being of existence as phenomenological self-identity as that which goes toward the world-self-being as self in such and in se) this being the negation of the scientistic perceptuality of the availbaility of the pour-sou and dealing with capacities of super-chiasmatic abilities to co-operate and co-colimate the cumulative meanings of sense and reference (bedeutung of the analytic shcools) would reference something which is not knowlable but which is already known as shared pre-cognitive pre-science.

You are "free" to change this text as you see fit, unless you feel strongly otherwiseand cannot resist the desire to do the one thing or the other. But then you must look to higher-order considerations and you will win no prizes for that because Harry Franfurt already beat you to that theory. The hierachy seems to lead to infinite regress though: let's face it. You must ask Baphomet.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 17:17, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Thank you for your very serious and thought out answers -.- Jonatan Crafoord 20:28, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Your welcome. It was an answer worthy of the question. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:16, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Two questions OR

"Free" "will" -- a division of the "free will" concept into two independent concepts: original research?

Hi Jonatan Crafoord, I reverted the following text:

The question of whether free will exists is a notoriously difficult area of investigation. In part, this is because it poses two distinct questions at one time: 1)Does will exist?, and 2)Is it free, or independent, of everything?.

pointing out that it was Original Research WP:OR. My feeling that it is OR is based on two things.

1. This is only one of many possible ways to divide the problem... indeed, this particular division is somewhat redundant. A more penetrating analysis is the one with MikalZane above, which points out that the two interrelated questions are 1) what is free will? and 2) does free will exist? But again, the point is, why pick this way of dividing up the slightly different ways of dealing with the free will problem over any other
2. Given this, who says that it is "notoriously difficult" for the particular reasons you have suggested?

This is the essence of OR. You have made a claim about why something is hard, created a division that you find helpful, and tried to explain it in that manner. However, if no other verifiable source also makes this claim then you are engaging in original research. Given that this article is a featured article, editors on it are much more sensitive to "edit creep" and are likely to revert first, work with people later. This is especially true in philosophy where people assume that after reading a few books, or taking a couple of classes, they are suddenly qualified to insert their own opinions into a philosophy article. Edhubbard 20:53, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

(I wrote this before reading Edhubbard's views, there was an edit conflict): The question of whether free will exists is a notoriously difficult area of investigation. In part, this is because it poses two distinct questions at one time: 1)Does will exist?, and 2)Is it free[, or independent]?. [This has been removed by someone for being "Original Research". I added it because it's self-evident, and thus not "research". As the term in fact has two words, I'm puzzled as to what makes people treat "free will" as an indivisible concept, and not as two different, as would be the case with any other "concept" subordinated terms consisting of two words. What do you people think?] (Addressing Edhubbard's views): I disagree that this particular division is "somewhat redundant", and that MikalZane's division is better. I've simply treated the concepts "free", and "will", independently, as is natural when one has a two-worded term. Narssarssuaq 21:09, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, but this is just the point I wanted to make... It's your opinion. Whether I think that one version of the division is better, and you think that another is better is irrelevant to wikipedia. What matters is if someone, in a verifiable, reliable source has specifically said that the reason the problem of free will is hard is because it is really two problems, 1 and 2, whatever we put into 1 and 2. Without that, the division you want to introduce is just so much OR. In general, I tend to agree that there are two subproblems, but until and unless you (or anyone else) finds a suitable source (and given this is philosophy, probably several, just to make sure that it's also notable enough for wikipedia) we cannot add this sort of thing to an article. Edhubbard 21:46, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Fair enough, although I've had this sort of discussion at least one time too many in philosophical issues. Introducing the ideal of Methodic doubt into philosophy was a horrendously silly thing to do, as it's a Pandora's box of inertia: infinite doubt means zero progress. And as Philosophy thus often refuses any authorative method of reaching the solution of any given problem, it is not the correct engine to solve this problem either. I hope a paragraph eventually will be added on linguistic views on Free will. Narssarssuaq 23:07, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

Ah, well, you seem to be confusing two seperate issues. One is philosophy as it's practiced in the world of working philosphers, where issues of sketicism and doubt certainly play an important role, and the other is wiki-world (or, as some have called it, wakipedia). Here, as long as you can find verifiable, reliable references to someone who has made a particular point (whether you agree with it or completely disagree with it), you certainly can add it. If you cannot, no matter how self-evident it may seem to you, you can expect to have it labeled OR, and swiftly reverted. If you have references to this point you want to add, write a draft paragraph, including your references, and we will try to incorporate it into the article. If not, those who worked hard to make this article a featured article, and restore it to that status after accumulated edit creep will be swift to revert things. The fact that the article is already featured does not mean that it has to stay exactly as it was for all time, but it does mean that new additions are going to held to the standard of actually improving the article relative to the state it would be in without them. Unreferenced speculation about why free will is a hard problem (and indeed, it is a hard problem) does not make the article better... Similarly, the lead should be a summary, so if something isn't treated in depth in the body of the article, it shouldn't be added into the lead. Edhubbard 23:32, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

I agree with your views here. As to "confusing things": After concluding the discussion about the article with the words "Fair enough", I was referring to "philosophy as it's practiced in the world of working philosphers". And I still hope linguists some time in the future can illuminate this subject. Narssarssuaq 00:51, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

As for "This is especially true in philosophy where people assume that after reading a few books, or taking a couple of classes, they are suddenly qualified to insert their own opinions into a philosophy article" -- I definitely see your point. Philosophy's huge problem is that even taking a lot of philosophy courses doesn't always make you qualified to resolve these kinds of linguistic questions. Quoting - for example! - St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Hindu philosphy is of little help as long as their statements were made at a time when knowledge lagged behind ours. It's mostly interesting merely from a historical, and a celebrity, point of view. Also, it shows hints of the Appeal to authority fallacy so often comitted in philosophy. Academic philosophy's very strange tendency to be more preoccupied with persons than with actual fact has made it rather unfamiliar with sciences such as Functional grammar, Generative grammar etc etc etc. I'm sorry for being harsh here and for perhaps directing this monologue into a too distant meta-realm, but I think this is slightly annoying. Narssarssuaq 21:28, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

No, this is false. There are many, many modern philosophers (e.g. Dennett, possibly Fodor, Searle (bizarrely and contradictorily enough but truly), Churchlands, and anyone who follows Quinian naturalism) who do not believe that philosophy can provide answers to anything. It just formulate and reformulated the problems, provides arguments, conceptual clarification, etc.. until some empirically testable and investigable hypotheses break off from the main trunk and a science develops that can actually determine which views are (more or less) correct. This is what happened with linguistics, to take your own example. Formal semantics is now somewhere between philosophy and linguistics. Ontology is becoming a branch of artificial intelligence, etc... Very few analytic philosophers subscribe to Cartesian systematic doubt anymore. They tend to be mostly religious folks, paradoxically enough. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:53, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Narssarssuaq 17:48, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, if you REALLY feel the need to get your views

into an encyclopedic format, there are almost infinitely many other options these days, if you think you have the qualifications and knowledge required (as I never cease to point out): Brittanica, Americana, Italiana, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on-line Dictionary of Philosophy (FOLDOP), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Cambridge Companion to Philosophy, Oxford Companion to free will, Cambridge Companion, Routledge Companion, Fredrick Williams' Analogous Monumentalism and other ideas which strike the fancy of ME, because I AM IMPORTANT, GODAMMN YOU ALL!! In fact, there is now the Citizendium, the Undergroundium, the Gerundium, the EGOpedia (or, if there is not, there WILL be shortly). So what are you so bothered about? --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:27, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Again, this is meta-talk, but OK: The satirical quote "other ideas which strike the fancy of ME, because I AM IMPORTANT, GODAMMN YOU ALL!!" underscores one of the points I was trying to make. As "philosophical debate" - paradoxically - much more than other academic braches is governed by monologues instead of dialogue, the importance of the author's status becomes very important. This is simply because there is no unity on how to handle concepts in a non-ambiguous way. In mathematics, concepts are defined and handled without any ambiguities (and therefore, authority plays absolutely no role). This is to a much larger degree possible also in philosophy - but in that case, people will need to waste less time reading the history of philosophy, and more time studying philosophy that can actually be applied to something. That is, less existentialist bullshit committing the Appeal to emotion fallacy, more semantics. As someone above indicated; some philosophers think they're experts on psychology, physics, semantics etc. just from reading a few philosophical books - and some at novice and even intermediate level apparently never get past variations of the Relativist fallacy, making them impossible to discuss with. I'm very disappointed of the present state of the subject of philosophy, although I'm sure there is a lot of progress being made that I'm not aware of, and I don't exclude the possibility of me being overly negative here (and it's no criticism to anyone in this particular discussion!). In sum, to link this to the article: I think the philosophical viewpoints should be toned down. Narssarssuaq 17:48, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Inconsistency between figure and text.

The text of "Freed Will in philosophy" states: Neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.

According to the figure non-detirminism always leads to libertarianism. And therefore non-determinism always leads to free fill. If non-determinism alway leads to free will than choosing non-determinism actually does mean taking a stance in the debate about free will.

I would like to change the title of the figure from "A simplified taxonomy of the possible philosophical positions regarding free will." to "A simplified taxonomy of the most important philosophical positions regarding free will." Maybe not "most important" but "relevant" or something like that. Pukkie 09:45, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Ouch!! I hadn't even noticed that whopper until you mentioned it. The text is correct and the figure needs to be fixed, obviously. Unfortunately, I didn't do the figure and am, basically, graphically handicapped, so I can't fix it!! But your suggestion is satifactory to me, unless someone else wants to redo the whole diagram.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 18:25, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Whopper seems a bit harsh to me. Anyway I retitled the figure. Pukkie 06:58, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

Determinism is roughly defined as the view that all current and future events are necessitated by past events combined with the laws of nature. Neither determinism nor its opposite, non-determinism, are positions in the debate about free will.[1]

This claim simply isn't true.

If the thoughts and actions of the all beings in the universe are predefined events, then there is no choice of alternative possibilities, and "free will" doesn't exist.

Conversely, if a given being can in the slightest way alter the course of history through individual choices (including the historical event of making such a choice), the future is not set, and the universe is not deterministic. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 216.254.142.195 (talk) 17:59, 13 March 2007 (UTC).

Free will and determinism can only exist in a modern world.

I will first explain the variableness and nonsense of these concepts:

Modern to me equates a person who lives NOT as a farmer. He depends on others for his basic needs INDIRECTLY. He does not directly supply his own food, clothing, and shelter. Most people in this world do not own their own land through which all their needs are met (not those who debate free-will or determinism).

So, if you are a "farmer" (for lack of a better word) how do you apply determinism and free-will to your everyday activities. Do you have CHOICE whether or not to plant the seed in order for you to have food in the harvest season? Is it your fault that you must work for your food? Why do we even have the concept of not working in the field and still eating? Is it your fault that a cycle of four seasons is already DETERMINED for you, which DETERMINE whether you live or die?

See, after a certain nation or community is able to master the calculation of seasons and thus develop a surplus of food, he has the TIME to develop other inventions like: war, tools, language (spoken and written), money and other such post-agricultural revolutionary creations.

So, my point is that these concepts only arose after some became agriculturally free, while a few others were creating the surplus. So, free-will and determinism are variably, and can only exist in a post-agricultural nation. 68.189.83.24 09:45, 2 December 2006 (UTC) Ilia Desiatnikov.

Ok everyone then, I guess that finally settles the matter. Let's just move on from this one. Thanks for resolving that one for us. Very impressive indeed. And I thought Steven Pinker was something with that book of his that explained everythign about how the mind worked in about 600 pages. But this takes the cake. Thank goodness I looked in on this page today!!--- glen gary glen ross

Ilia, I recommend that you read the article. The problem (or perhaps pseudo-problem, in the instances where it's not defined properly) is more general than you may think. Narssarssuaq 14:33, 3 December 2006 (UTC)

The good thing about the above strange edit is that it made me realize that there is nothing in the article about a marxist view of free will. I have the concept ("marxist view of free will") vaguely in my mind as recalled from spoken conversations, but is there something systematic and, if so, would it need to be added? Massimamanno 03:05, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

Reverted

Lacatosias reverted the article a long way back in time. Was this justified? If yes, one must re-add what was actually good about the newer edition. Narssarssuaq 16:08, 3 December 2006 (UTC)

No, I don't think so; and anyways, the new version is much better. Methinks Lac is, to paraphrase Kierkegaard, "dismayed and indignant to a high degree with the establishment", that being Wikipedia ;) Poor Yorick 10:34, 4 December 2006 (UTC)

Not exactly. It's not Wikipedia specifically, and Keirkegaard's quote is still too narrow. But you're in the right direction if you follow a little futher along that existenialist line (Camus, Beckett, absurdism) or maybe back to Shopenhauer and Leopardi: "dismayed and indignant to a high degree with the state of the universe". --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:00, 4 December 2006 (UTC)

If the article keeps getting reverted a long way back in time in this manner, with no regard to what has actually improved, it will feel like no use trying to improve anything. You may just as well lock the article. Narssarssuaq 17:34, 4 December 2006 (UTC)

What does nature v. nurture have to do with determinism v. free will? NOTHING. Nature AND Nurture are determines by genetics and environment.

Norm 68.44.91.155 09:28, 13 December 2006 (UTC)

Language

Why is it that this article uses "she" as a sexless pronoun? I'll probably get around to changing it to "they" in a day or two. BioTube 18:40, 28 December 2006 (UTC)

The usage is common in current philosophy.1Z 20:15, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Yeah, depending on the writer it's either an attempt to be neutral, to be feminist, or tongue-in-cheek. People complained about the male-centrism of using "he" as the default pronoun, so everyone switched to just using "she", since nobody complains about that, and the reader is left to interpret it as he or she wishes. I do agree it's uncommon in non-academic writing, though, so perhaps not appropriate for a general-audience encyclopedia. --Delirium 20:51, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Too centered on determinism?

I know this article has been "peer reviewed" (in wikipedia's own sense) and featured, but I have a really fundamental criticism about its structure. The concept of "determinism", as (somewhat) opposed to that of "free will" has been mostly superseded by the broader concept of "physicalism". In a sense, the peculiar features of a deterministic world are not essential in understanding whether free will exists. Let me make the familiar example of "could I have done otherwise":

Suppose that you are taken back to the time a few seconds or minutes before you took your last hard decision between A and B, in the exact same physical state and with no foreknowledge of the following future. Suppose you had decided A, is it possible that "replaying" it you instead decide B? There are at least 3 possible answers:

1. No, because the future is completely determined by the physical state of the universe at any given time.
2. Yes, because there are intrinsically random variables involved in the physical evolution of the universe which can very well affect my decision; coming from quantum mechanics (in some interpretation) or from some other stochastic law of nature. However, if by sheer chance all these variables took exactly the same values as the first time, then I would take the same decision.
3. Yes, because my decision process is at least in part independent of the laws of nature, so if the process is repeated even in the same exact physical state, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be the same.

-- Case 3 is impossible. Human behaviour can't be independent of the laws of nature, because human behaviour is part of the definition of the laws of nature. Once you posit a belief in laws of behaviour of all things within the universe (including humans and their thought processes), then the debate over free will ends.

Now, 1) is a statement of belief in physical determinism. 2) denies determinism, but denies free will also: in a sense one could call that position "hard physicalism". 3) is a statement of belief in free will, and denial of physicalism, (one such position is cartesian dualism) which is mostly independent of whether one believes in determinism or non-determinism regarding the physical evolution of the universe when uninfluenced by human will. The difference could come out when to the person who answered 3) is asked the question "How could it possibly be so?" Then one could answer (at least):

3a) Well, my conscious will could change the states of some underlying neuronal layers of my brain, down to ultimately changing the physical state of elementary particles composing them, according to its decision of A or B, to make sure that the whole "self" acts accordingly to such decision. Yes, physical dynamics would have a discontinuity in the evolution of some particles at the times corresponding to human conscius decisions, which would be extremely difficult, but not in principle impossible, to observe.

3b) Well, my conscius will could choose the outcome of intrinsically random events (coming from quantum mechanics in some interpretation or some other stochastic fundamental theory) happening in some neuronal layers of my brain, in agreement with its decision of A or B, to make sure that the whole "self" acts accordingly to such decision, rather than letting them happen by chance. No discontinuity in physical dynamics could be seen by an observer, since he would never know whether the relevant random variables were really chosen at random, or "choosen consciously".

Now here is the connection between physical determinism and the problem of free will, in the fact that non-determinist physical theories offer a perhaps more plausible (contradiction-free? non falsifiable? choose your own term here) solution to the enigma of the compatibility of laws of nature and human will (leaving out a myriad of other problems which the article, which is generally well done, considers: this is just a sketch). However, developements in chaos theory make the difference between 3a) and 3b) even more blurred, since they show that pseudo-random behaviour is possible even in in deterministic systems, thus offering the possibility of an answer very similar to 3b) even for someone believing in a deterministic fundamental theory. In all other respects, in any case, one shoud regard the fundamental dichotomy as the one between physicalism and free will. I am not giving specific references, as I believe all the partecipants to the current debate are aware of the above issues (Dennett, for example, states them quite clearly in The elbow room, as does Voss in the essay cited at the bottom of the current article [2]) and I am not asking that the article is redone overnight. After all, in an historical perspective the debate indeed has been centered on the dichotomy between free will and determinism: the clarification of these issues has happened recently, mainly following the last century developements in fundamental physics; and furthermore, there is the problem of including the position on theological determinism in an unifying view. However, I would like this problem to be taken more seriously: currently, the main graph in the article has simply an arrow that takes from "Determinism:False" to "Libertarianism", with the only warning being in the paragraph about Physics and free will:

The possibility that the universe at the macroscopic level may be governed by indeterministic laws, as it is at the quantum level, has revived interest in free will among physicists. Quantum mechanics predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all. However, if an action is taken due to quantum randomness, this in itself, means that free will is still absent, as such action can not be controllable by someone claimed to posses such free will.

I personally believe this is not enough, and that the structure of the article may give a mistaken impression about the debate to readers, privileging obsolete/historical positions and neglecting more modern ones. I of course am reluctant to make major edits on my own, given the featured state, presence of "listen to this artcle" etc; this comment (rather, this longish essay: sorry for that) is aimed at seeing whether there is consensus to start applying some changes in this direction. Massimamanno 05:20, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

The idea that physicalism, not determinism, is the problem presupposes that randomness is just as incompatible with FW as determinism. However, that is itself subject to debate currently.

Thought experiments where the entire state of the universe is rewound to time T make it look unlikely that physical indeterminism is much use: a random event at time T can only set you off on a different direction from the one you would have taken -- that is you would perform an action not fully determined by your state of mind (or rather brain) at the time.

However, most definitions of FW only require that a free action be not full determined by external circumstances. (Obviously, one's actions are determined in some sense by events inside one's body). That legitimises a different thought-experiment, in which external circumstances leading up to time T are the same, but events inside the central nervous system are not. Thus, there is a sense in which one could have thought (imagined, planned) differently leading up to time T, and then have done something different at time T on that basis -- without any disconnection between one's action and one's state of mind at time T.

Thus indeterministic FW is based on events leading up to to time T, and not just events at time T. What of control? You assume, as almost everybody does, that the only way to control indeterminism is to pre-ordain which way the quantum dice fall. However, the brain as a whole does not have to act on a single low-level indeterministic event any more than it has to act on a single low-level deterministic event. What one neuron or sub-system does is combined with a great deal of other activity to produce the final result. Thus the brain (or rather the more-or-less deterministic sub-systems of the brain) can "control" indeterminism by failing to act on it or filtering it out -- after it has occurred.

Note that at no time do I appeal to a "self" or "consciousness" separate from the activity of tht brain! 1Z 20:46, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

There are two comments I wish to make about what you write: the first is that I believe something you write is wrong, the second is that I believe something else you write is probably correct, but I don't understand it.

"However, most definitions of FW only require that a free action be not full determined by external circumstances. (Obviously, one's actions are determined in some sense by events inside one's body). That legitimises a different thought-experiment, in which external circumstances leading up to time T are the same, but events inside the central nervous system are not. Thus, there is a sense in which one could have thought (imagined, planned) differently leading up to time T, and then have done something different at time T on that basis -- without any disconnection between one's action and one's state of mind at time T."

What does this mean? According to the above definition, determinism has no problem with free will either! In a situation where I am taken back to when I decided A but my mental states (and only my mental states) have been changed so that I decide B, I of course will decide B. There is no problem whatsoever with this in classical mechanics. If you are troubled by the fact that I wrote "seconds or minutes" before the decision, take an year instead. Nothing changes! Is it possible that you decide B, rather than A, starting from identical physical states of one year before your decision and if by sheer chance all random variables in the universe take the same exact values during the whole year? If you think it is, tell me so and how.

Thus the brain (or rather the more-or-less deterministic sub-systems of the brain) can "control" indeterminism by failing to act on it or filtering it out -- after it has occurred.

I recognize this position exists (sometimes the wind and sail metaphor is used), but I don't understand it, mainly because I have mostly read it explained using quantum gravity, which is a theory I don't know (and am not even sure precisely exists).

I assume you are alluding to Penrose's theory. My "version" does not invlove quantum gravity or macroscopic superposed states, or any "new" physics beyond a source of indeterminism (which is not particularly new).1Z 15:18, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

However, it surely needs to be mentioned in Wikipedia: this, for me, is simply a case of a supposed "compatibilist" position between physicalism and free will. Massimamanno 14:33, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

The position I am selling is not compatibilist in the standard sense because 1) it does not seek to re-define FW 2) it require real, fundamental indeterminism and is therefore clearly not compatible with determinism.

It is similar to Kane's position, which is mentioned in the article.

As I said before, I resist the substitution of "physicalism" for "determinism" because it implies that there is no hope for showing the compatibility of FW and indeterminism.1Z 15:18, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

Reversion to featured version.

Figured I should probably explain myself.

Peterdjones: It's nice that you're being bold and updating Wikipedia. However, this is a featured article. This means that it's already been established to be pretty good; the people who helped get it here are real philosophers who know what's up. No offense, but the prose you're adding is not that great ("However, there is no reason to suppose that an single indeterministic event at the atomic or molecular level is the cause of an action, any more that there is to suppose that a single deterministic event is. The brain acts in concert as a total system, and acybernetic system can control itself even if it contains random elements." What does that mean? You can't just assert that it acts as a total system, and where's cybernetic coming from? This is just one example.), and it's not referenced, and... yeah. Standards are considerably higher for a featured article; please be really careful about any additions you make.

Mr. Velmans, if you're actually published, that's great, but there's an inherent conflict of interest with you promoting yourself by saying "Max Velmans thinks this" and sticking yourself in the further reading section. Please read WP:COI. If you have interesting things to say on this topic, wait, and perhaps others will cite you. SnowFire 05:09, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

intro change

the intro was redundant and biased, suggesting what it was asking.

changed to: The controversy over the concept of free will is the question of whether or not actions are consciously controlled or merely witnessed. Jiohdi 21:46, 13 February 2007 (UTC) The problem of free will is the question of whether conscious agents have real or illusory control over their own actions and decisions. Is there a third option to random vs determined that would give agents mystical freedom that is beyond scientific understanding or are agents just part of a system that they cannot in any way effect?Jiohdi 22:02, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

1. You need to explain exactly what redundancy and bias you consider to be in the introduction.

2. Some of these issues you raise are valid, but too complex for an introduction

3. Phrases like "mystical freedom" and "sheer force of will" are pretty biased themselves.1Z 23:46, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

the problem ...the problem redundant and does not read well... why is it a problem, for who/m? its more of a question as I stated, of whether or not the experience is real or just an illusion. rational agents-- irrational people are not showing freewill? what does rational have to do with anything regarding freewill?Jiohdi 04:35, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

No, you've completely misunderstood. Rational agents, in this context, always refers to a species of animals and potentially artificially intelligent agents that possess the capacity to make rational decisions and actions. They have the brain capacity to think and then choose between diverse alternatives. These are generally "rational" beings as opposed to things such as cockroaches, slugs and bacteria. You're either thinking of a more specific usage of rational vs. irrational which has to do with "logical/mathematical" ability OR you're thinking of rationality vs. irrationality in the psychiatric sense of delusional thinking and so forth. In any case, it is generally accepted among psychiatrists/neurologists/lawyers/doctors/philosophers/theologians that people under the effects of profound mental disorder or drugs do NOT make free decisions. Hence, they are not held morally responsible in cases of murder, and other destructive actions that would ordinarily be described as immoral. The intro is not redundant. Actions and decisions are radically different things. Why DO certain types of people absolutely lose control of themselves over the choice of two or three words in introductions to articles anyway? The fact is: this is one of the TWO or THREE best articles in the philosophy section in all of Wikipedia. Period. It was no small accomplishment. Philosophy of mind is about to taken down for lack of "comprehensiveness". I wrote 90% myself and posted it up for review because of other considerations. But take a look at the state of this article immediately prior to the FAR period in which I, Brian Morton, EdHubbard, and a few others brought it back from post-apocalyptic nightmare to FA quality. It's up there somewhere, I'm not going to link to it. I'm tired of all this nonsense. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:02, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I stated quite clearly the redundancy was in the use of the word problem, not in decision vs action... it does not read well is what I said... and was just trying to clean it up a bit, no need to lose it(^_^)over a few wordsJiohdi 14:28, 15 February 2007 (UTC) The problem of free will is whether or not rational agents imagine or really do exercise control over their own actions and decisions. the intro as it stood is not the REAL problem, so it does require some clarification or modification, perhaps you can live with this.Jiohdi 14:34, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I don't know what is meant by "imagination" actually. A troublesome notion. Perhaps it should be linked. But I can live with this version.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:05, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

of course whether it is imagined or real belongs in the intro because we are stating the ACTUAL problem... if its in the body, it should be, to expand on it..but it definitely belongs in the intro.Jiohdi 18:11, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

Fate vs. Free Will?

Fate and Free Will are like two sides of the same coin, although they are completely opposite.

• Fate is when a person's life and actions are predetermined.

• Free Will is when a person has control over their life and makes choices that are not "predetermined" and affects others through their actions.

Here's are the Inevitable Questions:

Which one exists, Free Will or Fate?

If Fate, then the question is:

Do our choices matter (where they all made already)?

If Free Will, then the question is

Are we responsible for the chaotic effects of each decision?

For Example

In the book Bridge to Terabithia when Jesse was invited by his teacher to go to a museum on Saturday he forgot to tell his friend, Leslie. When he returned he discovered that Leslie died because she drowned in a creek.

If Fate then:

Was it her Fate to die by drowning in that creek that day?

If Free Will then:

Was Jesse to blame? i.e.If he took her with him then the chain of events leading up to her death would have never happened and she would have lived.

Here's another example

A Man walks his dog every day during the night.

One day he gets robbed while walkling his dog.

If Fate then:

Was it Fate that he would get robbed?

If Free Will then:

Was it his Free Will that he would walk the dog and get robbed on his walk?

If Fate then:

Was it Fate that the robber robbed this man?

If Free Will then

Was it the Robber's Free Will that he robbed this man?

Put What you think below and maybe this will be solved.

                                                                   Thanks,
                                                                   
                                                                   虚ろ長

Hello. I amECH3LON's Friend. My opinion on this is that Fate and Free will is one alike.

• For example, in the last episode of Season 1 of 24, is it Fate that brought Terri into the room, or was it Free will?

• Me, personally, I think it was Free Will.

• Was it fate that made Nina kill Terri? Or was it Free Will?

• Her desision caused her fate to happen.

• I think Fate has different branches, like this tree:

                                                      /  \
                                                     /\  /\ 
                                                    /\/\/\/\   
                                                    

etc. You pick one with your Free Will, and Fate happens.

• Well, that's all I have to say.

Magistrand Sign Here! My Talk 17:49, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Article Talk page is not for discussing personal opinions/comments/states of mind/madness/ etc.. You're own talk page (or a blog/forum) is more appropraite for that. Thank you. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:59, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

Philosophy banner

I have added the philosophy banner to the talk page of this article so that the members of the project will know that the article exists, is of FA status, and falls within the scope of the project, so that they might potentially assist in its upkeep. John Carter 16:56, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

corporation view

In buddhism there is the concept called NO SELF, which basically means that there is no enduring, permanent substance that one can point to as THE SELF such as an immortal soul, but the visible self is an ever changing system made of many unstable and changing parts much like a business corporation which is by definition a LEGAL entity, not necessarily a physical one. when viewed from this point of view, each one of us is a Legal corporation as well and our life consists of vying for resources and making deals to satisfy our current needs and the long term needs of our corporations survival. The freedom we have is relative to each other and is the only freedom that matters. Jiohdi 15:32, 21 March 2007 (UTC)