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Ryti–Ribbentrop Agreement

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The Ryti–Ribbentrop letter of agreement (Template:Lang-fi) of 26 June 1944, was a personal letter from President Risto Ryti of Finland to German Führer Adolf Hitler whereby Ryti agreed not to reach a separate peace in the war with the Soviet Union without approval from Nazi Germany, in order to secure German military aid for Finland to stop the Soviet offensive.

Historical background

Although Finland had had residual pro-German sentiments from Imperial Germany's critical support during the Civil War, those sentiments were dented by the Nazi ideology, especially its undemocratic totalitarianism. Finland had democratic traditions dating back to at least the 16th century, and after the failed rebellions by left-wingers and right-wingers, the Finns were rather alienated by the brutal policies of the new Germany.

In 1941, at the beginning of their respective offenses against the Soviet Union, neither Germany nor Finland wanted a formalized alliance, though for very different reasons. When the war did not end as rapidly as Germany expected, German interest in an formal alliance with Finland emerged, but on the the Finns were hesitant to ratify a formal alliance with Germany. However, the Finnish government acknowledged that it had been a Nazi ally.[1][2]

Germany tried several times to pressure the Finns by cutting food and arms deliveries, but the military importance of Finnish participation resulted in their resumption quite soon afterwards.

The Finnish government tried to reach a peace agreement with the Soviet Union in March 1944. In response, Germany once again discontinued food and munitions shipments.

Finnish command was shocked by the initial success of the Soviet summer offensive commencing from the 10th of June 1944, within 2 weeks the Finns were forced out of the Southern Karelian Isthmus avoiding encirclement prompting Ribbentrop to stage an impromptu visit to Finland to ensure continued support.

Negotiations

The deal was the result of Finnish negotiations with Ribbentrop. The letter was given after Ryti's consultations with Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Mannerheim and the Finnish war cabinet. The promise that resulted was expressed as Ryti's personal undertaking, which thereby deliberately avoided the form of a binding treaty between the governments of Finland and Nazi Germany, which would have required the involvement of the Finnish parliament.

The agreement became obsolete when Ryti resigned on 31 July 1944, and was succeeded as president by Mannerheim, who did not consider himself or Finland bound by Ryti's concession. Within six weeks, Finland had concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union. In accordance with the armistice conditions, the Lapland War was commenced to evacuate the Wehrmacht from Northern Finland by force.

It turned out that the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was less significant for the outcome of the war than it appeared in June 1944. The Wehrmacht had already delivered critical anti-tank weapons and sent a significant air-force detachment to support the Finnish defence on the Karelian isthmus. In fact, all necessary military aid was already in Finland or en route when Ribbentrop started pressuring President Ryti; German defence ministry diplomacy and military headquarters seemingly acted independently of each other. Before the Soviet summer offensive of 1944, Finland's army was estimated to be keeping at least 26 divisions, 5 brigades and 16 regiments of the Red Army busy. The Wehrmacht had every reason to utilize the Finns as sort of a rear-troop, still strong and still very dedicated to their task to defend their homeland from a Communist invasion, while the Germans retreated from Russia and the Baltic countries.

The German foreign ministry at Wilhelmstraße, on the other hand, wanted to exploit Finland's precarious situation after the fall of Vyborg to connect military aid to political concessions. Ryti and Mannerheim did not know the internal balance between OKW and Wilhelmstraße, and the stakes were too high to risk Ribbentrop's pressuring the Wehrmacht to withdraw its support from Finland. The decision to send the letter was made in the evening of June 25, the same day the Red army managed to break through the VKT-line at Tali.

Translation

The Finnish language word sopimus has a wide scope of denotations ranging from settlement, agreement, and contract to pact and treaty. In this context, agreement or contract may be the most fitting.[clarification needed][citation needed]

See also

References

Dr. Markku Jokisipilä has recently researched this area and written his doctorate thesis "Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? Suomi, Hitlerin Saksan liittosopimusvaatimukset ja Rytin-Ribbentropin-sopimus." ("Brothers in arms or allies? Finland, alliance demands from Hitler's Germany and the Ryti-Ribbentrop-agreement.") on this issue.

  • Polvinen, Tuomo. "The Great Powers and Finland 1941-1944," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire (1985), Issue 62, pp 133–152.
  • Vehviläinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the Second World War. Palgrave-Macmillan. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
  • Jokisipilä, Markku (2004). Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia (in Finnish). SKS. ISBN 951-746-609-9.
  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference Paris was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Tallgren, Immi (2014). "Martyrs and Scapegoats of the Nation? The Finnish War-Responsibility Trial, 1945–1946". Historical Origins of International Criminal Law. 2 (21): 512. Retrieved 9 July 2021.
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