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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by ClueBot III (talk | contribs) at 00:56, 3 March 2022 (Archiving 1 discussion to Talk:Western betrayal/Archive 6. (BOT)). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.


Section needed on modern Ukraine and the western betrayal against them with regards to the Budapest Memorandum!

The title says it all, young independent Ukraine gave up 2500(!) inherited ex-CCCP live nuclear warheads, for security guarantee but they got a literal toilet paper undersigned by USA, UK, France and later China. None of them have fired even a blank warning shot while Vlad Putin is eating .ur alive... 80.99.11.157 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 14:14, 27 November 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Is the long quotation fromErnest Mandel due?

Ping User:Albrecht re [1]. I am concerned that the opinion of this person is not due. Could you comment on why we need such a long quote here? I would be willing to compromise by shortening his opinion to a single sentence, that seems more reasonable. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 02:57, 25 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Significant source, needed for neutrality for this conspiracy theory.Birbor (talk) 14:01, 25 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Welcome to Wikipedia! Please tells us who calls it a conspiracy theory? --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 02:03, 28 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I take your point that the large block quote probably takes up undue space relative to a fairly small subsection — but this points, I think, to a wider and more structural problem with the article: the "Poland" section goes into extraordinary detail to effectively make a case for a "Western betrayal" interpretation of WWII, and does so without clearly distinguishing empirical facts from their (partisan) interpretation (pace the user above, I wouldn't call it a "conspiracy theory"; merely a metanarrative that should be open to various levels of contestation and rebuttal). The problem is that this large and sweeping section contains virtually zero contrary viewpoints or criticism; so, relative to this great mass of "pro-Western betrayal" content, I don't think Mandel's counterargument is out of place or excessive. That said, I'm open to any number of suggestions on how best to structure the article to accommodate diverging points of view. Albrecht (talk) 19:34, 27 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]
@Albrecht: This article needs much improvement, both in terms of new sources needed, and properly referencing/attributing existing viewpoints, no argument here. My problem with Mandel is primarily that his argument is irrelevant here, as it is a critique of a policy of the government-in-exile and its attitude to Soviets. What does it have to do with the behavior of Western Allies? The answer is, not much. Now, yes, the Polish-Soviet spat did make it obviously difficult for the Western Allies, but so did many other issues - we might as well blame the Poles for not giving in to the Hitler's demand for '39, like the Czechs did. And anyway, if we want to talk about the Polish-Soviet relation here, I think we need a source that clearly connects this issue to the Western betrayal concept, and MAndel doesn't do so, so I stand by my view that his quote is both UNDUE and OR/SYNTH here. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 02:09, 28 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]
@Piotrus: We had this exchange briefly in edit summaries, and to be honest I remain puzzled by the reasoning: the "Western betrayal" perspective itself consists of a wide-ranging critique of the policy of Western governments and their attitude to the Soviets; if this narrative is to be challenged at all, it seems only natural and inevitable that the attitudes and actions of the Polish government-in-exile should come under scrutiny, no? I can accept the argument that perhaps not every detail in the quote — the Curzon line, the tug-of-war over cabinet posts — is strictly speaking necessary, but his underlying point about the possibility of a Polish–Soviet accommodation prior to Tehran and Yalta helps restore agency to the Polish side and undermines the (IMO simplistic) account of Poland as a helpless victim.
The suggestion that this is WP:SYNTH, however, is untenable — all the more so since the "Poland" section is rife with SYNTH, pulling together individual facts from various historical works and arranging them so as to construct a narrative about WWII (effectively, mobilizing them to make the case for Western betrayal). Mandel's book, far from a random narrative history, is a commentary on WWII historiography and popular memory (The Meaning of the Second World War), making it far less a candidate for SYNTH than many of the other works cited in the article. Albrecht (talk) 18:47, 14 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
@Albrecht: I don't dispute this article has many other problems, including with SYNTH, but I don't see how the cited section is not SYNTH. It talks about some semi-relevant issues, but does not mention the concept of Western betrayal or any plausible synonym. I am sorry, but I don't see how it is relevant here. It would be to foreign relations of Polish government-in-exile article, yes, but not here. At best, I suggest we start such an article and move this quote there, to the section about Polish-Soviet relations. (There is also an existing article on Polish-Russian relations that could potentially absorb it too). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 04:22, 15 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Can we add Ukraine in this topic?

Ukraine 1994 Budapest memorandum. 119.236.55.84 (talk) 01:29, 25 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 2 March 2022

Section 'Beginning of World War II, 1939' Change: The Polish military envoy to France, general Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki, upon receiving the text of the message sent by Gamelin, alerted marshal Śmigły: "I received the message by general Gamelin. Please don't believe a single word in the dispatch".[24] The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from 17 September to 20 September. On September 17, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line, a withdrawal that was completed on October 17.

to

Gamelin made it clear to the Supreme Allied War Council that he would not commit to an offensive, even if the Poles held out for two to three months, suggesting that previous guarantees given may have been deliberately misleading to buy the French time for a war on their own terms.[1]


justification: The section currently is partly unsourced (the section on the withdrawal to the Maginot Line) and the quote from Bukacki is more relevant to the Polish response to the perceived betrayal, than evidence of it. Also, the given quote only seems to appear in the Polityka magazine, which itself has no citations, and all other references I could find to this either cite the same Polityka article, or this Wikipedia article. 80.238.115.65 (talk) 22:21, 2 March 2022 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ CIENCIALA, ANNA M. “POLAND IN BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICY IN 1939: DETERMINATION TO FIGHT—OR AVOID WAR?” The Polish Review, vol. 34, no. 3, University of Illinois Press, 1989, pp. 199–226, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25778439.