Lacy-Zarubin Agreement

Lacy-Zarubin Agreement (1957-1958)

The Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, also known as the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields, was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on various fields including film, dance, music, tourism, technology, science, medicine, and scholarly research exchange. The agreement was signed on 27 January 1958 in Washington, DC. (source?)

The Agreement on Exchanges in Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields

The Lacy-Zarubin Agreement was renegotiated every two years, and during the détente, the duration was extended to three years. The final agreement was signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, at the Geneva Summit, and the agreement was in effect until the Soviet collapse.

[insert contents links here]

Historical Context

Before the Lacy-Zarubin agreement was established, at the Foreign Minister’s Conference in Geneva Oct 1955, the United States, Britain, and France proposed to remove the barriers to “information media, culture, education, books, and publications, science, sports, and tourism” exchange. (Yale, 14~15)

The United States proposed an exchange program to the Soviet Union once during World War II and once again after the War in October 1945, but was rejected by the Soviet Union on both accounts (Hallinan 21). However, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov [link] was interested in some notions of the exchanges resulting in the Soviets suggesting a bi or multilateral agreement that involved some of the proposed programs. (Yale, 15) Upon Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union began to actively welcome Western artists into the country. Notably, Soviet cities Moscow and Leningrad invited American musical Porgy and Bess during their 1955 tour in Europe (Hallinan 20-21). Khrushchev was a notable figure in the Soviet government who actively worked to reform the repressive policies of the Stalin regime. In February 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s speech criticized Stalin’s foreign policy and showed indications of changing attitude towards the West and alarming peaceful coexistence. [link?] (Yale, 15) Since then, the Soviets started to sign cultural agreements with the West, including with Norway, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom and followed by the United States. (Yale, 15)

While American citizens actively shunned peacetime propaganda during and after the world wars, tensions between the Soviet Union resulted in a gradual support of exporting American culture, technology and way of life (Hallinan 23). With the start of the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower continued efforts from Truman to engage the on-site exchange of professionals (Yale, 14). In August 1954, Eisenhower created state-sponsored tours of American artists to Soviet regions with the purpose of “maxim[izing] psychological impact”. This was funded by the President’s Emergency Fund for the Arts (Hallinan 23).

Negotiations

While attempts for exchanges between the United States and Soviet Union began as early as 1945 by President Truman, negotiations to solidify an actual agreement did not start until the summer of 1957. Nikita Khrushchev began advocating for an exchange agreement with the United States early in the summer, as he believed that this would help to reaffirm his nation’s status as a global superpower comparable to the United States (Magnúsdóttir, p.111). In October 1957, formal negotiations with William S. B. Lacy, president’s special assistant on East-West exchanges, and Georgy Zarubin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, began in Washington for exchange agreements. (​​Saul, 232)

United States Objectives

The United States was fueled by a motivation to expand its administrative relationship with Soviet institutions in an attempt to improve its understanding of the isolated country. This was paired with the potential for technological, scientific, cultural and educational advancements that would come from long-term cooperation (Yale 17).

While there existed an East-West Contacts Staff in the United States State Department at the time, the United States was required to sign an official agreement amidst increasing reciprocal interaction with the Soviet Union. As it was an executive agreement, and unlike a treaty, it did not require U.S. Senate’s ratification (Yale 15).

Soviet Union Objectives

Due to its centralized government, the Soviets required an official agreement to plan and assign the budget for the exchange activities. (Yale, 16-17) The agreement also provided the protection and justification for the responsible Soviet agencies. (Yale, 17)

The Soviet Union was motivated by the obtainment of American knowledge and skill, fasttracking its technological and scientific advancements in the field. It also sought to improve the Western world’s view of the relatively isolated Soviet Union as a country open to cooperation and peace equal to that of the United States. At the time, domestic artists, scholars, scientists had called for more interactions with foreign contact, and thus the Soviet government utilized the Agreement to give in to their demands while demonstrating Sovet achievements to the outside world. (Yale 18)

In January 28, 1958, the final agreement was signed.

Implementations

For the agencies of the exchange, there was the partnership between the U.S. government and the private sector while all the Soviet’s agencies were governmental. Many of the U.S. exchanges, including “science and technology, radio and television, motion pictures, publishing, youth, education, performing arts, athletics, and tourism” were conducted by the private sector. (Yale, 16) The partnership reduced the costs for the exchange for the U.S. government and the private sector had the approval to exchange with the most developed in the communist world. (Yale, 19) For the Soviets, all these exchange agencies were governmental. (Yale, 16) Soviet’s international exchanges were not managed by private sectors and needed to be supervised by the state’s political authority. (Yale, 16)

Public Perception

Both the U.S. and the Soviet public supported the cultural exchange under the broad framework of the agreement. (Yale, 19) There was minimal opposition from the Congress, and the exchange was welcomed by the  civil society, including academia, the media, science community, churches, sports organizations and associations, the industries, and the general public support. (Yale 19~20)  The US had a “lukewarm reception”, most evident in conservative media outlets (Kozovoi, p.24) The agreement was also widely covered in the Soviet press and enjoyed public support. (Kozovoi, p.24)

Cultural Exchange

Cultural exchanges proved to be one of the many efficient ways of engaging in cultural and propaganda warfare for both the United States and the Soviet Union, with this practice stemming from well before the Cold War, during the Second World War. The Lacy-Zarubin Agreement aided in furthering cultural ties between two countries while pushing forth their own respective agendas of spreading either communism or democracy to emerging new countries by providing opportunities for cultural expansion. On top of musical and theatrical exchanges, both countries sent dancers, hosted sports competitions featuring their respective athletes, and allowed for the engagement of film and production companies.

Film

The agreement allowed Sovexportfilm, the Soviet Union’s biggest film export/import organization, to engage with and learn from American production companies in Hollywood (Kozovoi p.21). Tbc

The Motion Picture Association of America also funded film exchanges. (Yale, 19)

Dance

The performing arts exchange was conducted through the American commercial impresarios, such as the Legendary Sol Hurok and Columbia Artists Management. [link] (Yale, 19)

• The Moiseyev Dance Company

The Moiseyev Dance Company, formally known as the State Academic Ensemble of Folk Dances of the Peoples of the USSR first visited the United States in April, 1958. Performing in large cities such as New York, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Cleveland, Washington, Boston and Philadelphia, the dancers represented the Soviet Union to Americans who had never been exposed to Soviet culture, evoking both positive and negative responses from over forty million people in North America (Hallinan 12-13). Despite the ongoing efforts of Senator Joseph McCarthy --in what is known as McCarthyism-- and the House Un-American Activities Committee to strictly distinguish American values from Communist identity, the Dance Company became a nationwide sensation (Hallinan 141), resulting in mail orders of over $180,000 before the box office opened a few weeks before the first show. The Moiseyev Dance Company was meticulously chosen by the Soviet government to represent the face of the regime through the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement. Its aim was to paint a positive image of the Soviet Union as a uniform yet multicultural state, and thus was captured in the Dance Company’s incorporation of dances from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Poland, Hungary and others (Hallinan 17). The Company’s widely received response across the United States until its last performance in June signified its success as a diplomatic tool to garner legitimacy for the Soviet Union from the world while fuelling nationalism and national cultural expression within its own country (Hallinan 44). 

Music

Both the United States and Soviet Union sent a number of musicians to either country in hopes of spreading the cultural significance of each respective country. The United States’ Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra made its way to the Soviet Union in May of 1959, while individual Soviet artists Gilels, Kogan, Petrov, Lisitsian, Dolukhanova, Bezrodni and Ashkenazi visited the United States the same year.

Jazz

In particular, the United States consciously sent many jazz musicians on tours throughout the Soviet Union after the Agreement came into place. The State Department sold tickets to overseas performances, provided material recordings for radio stations to broadcast, and spread information about jazz stories to newspapers across the world (Hallinan 27). As was the case with the Moiseyev Dance Company, this was done carefully calculated by the United States government in its efforts to push forward the trope of the country as multicultural, friendly and anti-racist (Hallinan 26-27).

Technical Exchange

Science and Technology

Science and Technology exchange was the most controversial topic of the US-USSR exchange. (Yale, 3) The cultural agreement gave the Soviets opportunities to learn American know-how. (Yale, 66, 68)

Five components for science and technology:

1. The exchange program for graduate students through IUCTG, IREX, and the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education. (Yale, 68)
2. The exchange program for senior scholars in humanities and social science between ACLS and Soviet Academy. (Yale, 68)
3. Industry, agriculture, and medicine exchange for two weeks (Yale, 68)
   1. [the institutions the exchange conducted from is not stated]
4. The agreement between the U.S. National Academy of Science and the Soviet Academy of Science in 1959. This agreement provided an exchange of scientists. The scientists lectured, conducted seminars and advanced studies, and researched. (Yale, 68) This agreement was annexed to the cultural agreement. (Yale, 68)
5. Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the USSR State Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was also signed in 1959 and annexed to the cultural agreement. (Yale, 68)

United States Motivations

The primary motivation was to use the exchange in the framework of detente. (Yale, 69) The U.S. government anticipated that the pattern of cooperation and interdependence would lead to common interest and peace. (Yale, 69)

The secondary motivation was to promote development in the U.S. science and technology community by gaining access to the Soviet science community. (Yale, 69)

Soviet Union Motivations

The primary motivation was to gain access to U.S. technology and foster Soviet development. (Yale, 69) The second motivation was based on a psychological factor that is "the prestige that Soviets always saw in being recognized as equal to the Americans" (Yale, 69)

Health and Medical Cooperation

January 1956 Poliomyelitis epidemic occurred in the Soviet Union (Raymond, 232). This is when the Soviet recognized Western science and their accomplishments. The United States Public Health Service made visits to help with making the vaccine. 12 million children were able to receive the vaccine between 1957-1960 (Raymond, 233). From there on, “Mutual polio exchanges between the US and USSR have continued, and the disease has nearly been eradicated in the Soviet Union.” (Raymond, 233). After the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement was signed in January 1958, it provided exchanges of delegations of health specialists, individual lecturers, medical journals, and medical films.” (Raymond 234) They first worked on eradicating malaria in cooperation with the World Health Organization.

Educational Exchange

For scholarly exchange, many of them were graduate students, young faculty members, and senior scholars. (Yale, 22)

Educational exchanges were funded by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs as well as participating universities. They were administered by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants based at Indiana University until the International Research and Exchanges Board took over in 1968 (Panteleeva p.2).

For the U.S., the participating American universities also funded the exchange program by waiving the tuition, housing, and other school fees for the incoming Soviet students. (Yale, 19) The Ford Foundation supports the funding of the early years' scholarly exchanges. (Yale, 19)

In addition, under the agreement an immensely competitive travel grant was created for American graduate students pursuing research careers in Music, Musicology, and Ethnomusicology to study in Moscow. Only about one third of the roughly 60 applicants were accepted for this program throughout the 1960s and 1970s. All applicants were rigorously screened by the State Department to ensure that they were “steeped in the American tradition” and that they possessed “political maturity and emotional stability.” The successful candidates include Theodore Levin, Richard Taruskin (hyperlinks), and a number of other future-influential scholars in Soviet and Russian music studies (Panteleeva p.2).

Context: US-USSR scholarly negotiations

Eisenhower primarily wanted to invite ten thousand Soviet scholars to the U.S., but his advisors, such as FBI Director J.Edgar Hoover, raised concerns about their domestic impact. (Yale, 22)

The initial US-USSR scholarly exchange was limited to a maximum of 20 graduate students per year. After the first two years, the quota rose to 50 students. (Yale, 22)

Most of the graduate students from the Soviet were in their thirties and experienced scholars in their careers, who earned candidate degrees [link?] which is equivalent to the U.S.’s Ph.D. (Yale, 22)

• Exchange before Lacy-Zarubin Agreement and signing the agreement

Before the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, scholarly exchanges through IUCTG [link] were funded by Ford Foundation [link]. (Yale, 23)

By signing the agreement, IUCTG became the U.S.’s official institution to conduct the exchange until 1968, when the programs were continued by IREX [link]. (Yale, 23)

The Soviet counterpart was the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education [link]. (Yale, 23)

• Programs under the agreement

The main program was the exchange of Graduate students and Young Faculty. Educational exchanges began with twenty students from each country during the 1958-1959 academic year, and most of these participants were graduate students. (Panteleeva p.2) After two years, the number of exchange students rose to 50 students. (Yale, 23)

The graduates spent one or two semesters researching as exchange scholars.

There were postdoctoral exchange programs as well. (Yale, 23) The program exchanges ten or more senior research scholars for two to five months. (Yale, 23) There were language exchanges as well. Summer Language Teacher Program exchanged 30 to 35 language teachers of the U.S. and the Soviet for nine weeks during summer. (Yale, 23)

• More exchange programs: IREX and Fulbright

IREX also conducted the exchange between the U.S.’s ACLS and Social Science Research Council and the Soviet Academy of Science. The exchange program administered up to sixty postdoctoral scholars for several months per year. [the source not having correct info] (Yale, 23)

From 1975, IREX conducted “collaborative research, conferences, and workshops between ACLS and the Soviet Academy under their bilateral Commission on the Humanities and Social Science.” (Yale, 23). This agreement allowed University lecturers to be exchanged under the Fulbright Program in 1974. (Yale, 24)

• Differences between U.S. and USSR

Most of the American scholars were in their mid-twenties and researched humanities and social science, especially Russian history, language, and literature, for their doctorate. (Yale, 24~25) American exchange candidates went through an open competition to be selected by IUCTG and IREX. (Yale, 25)

In the U.S., the agreement was strongly supported by Slavic studies programs at universities. (Panteleeva p.2). Thus, more humanities students went on exchange from the U.S. to the Soviet Union. (Panteleeva p.2).

Most of the Soviet scholars were in their thirties and and more science and technology scholars went from the Soviet Union to the U.S. (Panteleeva p.2)(Yale, 25) Soviet candidates were not selected by open competition but by an interagency governmental committee’s evaluation based on the Soviet economy’s needs. (Yale, 25)

There were rejections of the nominees in most years. The U.S. turned down Soviet’s high technology scholars whose field is closely related to defense technology. The Soviets turned down the U.S. scholars whose field was sensitive to Soviet’s contemporary Soviet topics. (Yale, 25)

In later years of IREX, the Soviets eventually allowed the U.S. scholars in social science. (Yale, 47)

• (a poor working condition in the Soviet Union; but there is no corresponding one for the U.S. So not sure if this should be included or not)

Working conditions for American scholars in the Soviet Union were not so satisfactory. Some American scholars had to wait several months to obtain access to the necessary archives for their research. (Yale, 25) In most cases, the Soviets did not allow American scholars to research the Soviet period. (Yale, 25) Housing was another problem. Many American scholars had to accept the substandard dormitory as housing compared to American standards. (Yale, 25)

While Soviet exchange scholars did not experience travel limits in the U.S., American scholars’ travel in the Soviet was restricted. Often, they were allowed to travel within 40 kilometers of their assigned place of study. (Yale, 26) The U.S. government attempted to ease the travel limit several times, but the Soviets did not respond to this proposal. (Yale, 26)

(For the list, we will reword the quotes into short descriptions if time permits. If not, we will just make a list of them)

Lists of Soviet Union Scholars

• Alexander N. Yakovlev

• Oleg Kalugin

• Boris Yuzhin

• Yuri Afanasyev

• Rem Khokhlov

• Nikolai Sivachev

• Boris Runov

Lists of United States Scholars

• Bernard Gwertzman

“editor of the New York Times on the Web, and a former Moscow correspondent and later foreign editor of the Times, first visited the Soviet Union as a Harvard graduate student with an American youth group in summer.” (Yale, 48)

• Alexander Dallin

“A similar sentiment was voiced by Alexander Dallin, the late Stanford professor of Russian history,” (Yale, 48)

• Alfred Rieber

“As Alfred J. Rieber, one of the American graduate students in Moscow during the first year of the exchange, –, “ (Yale, 49)

• Terence Emmons

“Terence Emmons, professor of Russian history at Stanford who spent two years as a graduate student in the Soviet Union, –, has described the effect of the exchanges on Soviet historical scholarship:” (Yale, 50)

• Michael Cole

“There were also many benefits to Americans who studied in the Soviet Union. As Michael Cole, professor of psychology, University of California, San Diego, who was a postdoctoral student at Moscow State University in –, writes:” (Yale, 51)

• Herbert Ellison

Herbert J. Ellison has seen many sides of Russia since when he was a history student at Leningrad State University. (Yale, 53)

• More US scholars: George Demko, Peter B. Maggs, Robert Sharlet, Irwin Weil, James Muller

• Fulbright Lecturers:
  • Nikolai V. Sivachev, the MSU professor of American history who had studied in the United States and was interested in having American historians lecture to his students. (Yale, 61)

Renewal and Duration

For the duration, the agreement was renegotiated every two years. (Yale, 15) During detente, the duration of the agreement was extended to three years. (Yale, 15)

The title of the agreement was modified a few times at renewal. When the second agreement was signed in 1959, science and technology were moved before culture, and the word “cooperation” was added. The renewed title read: "Agreement between ... for Cooperation in Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational and Cultural Fields in 1960-61”. The third agreement was signed in 1962, which included the addition of “...and Other Fields” at the end of the title. The final amendment to the title was made in 1973, when it was changed to "General Agreement between ... on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields.” (Yale, 1987, p.2)

The Soviets and the US periodically renegotiated the agreement and the programs under it, which required long effort. (Yale, 19) For example, the third agreement in the series lasted three months until the two countries reached consensus provisions. (Yale, 19)

Exchange of large exhibitions and performing arts were the two most contested exchanges. For example, Soviets often regarded and resisted American arts production as “too avant-garde or even modern.” (Yale, 19)

The final agreement was signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, at the Geneva Summit, and the agreement was in effect until the Soviet collapse. (Yale, 16)

Impact

American acceptance of the agreement “signified a policy shift away from an aggressive strategy of liberation of the Soviet bloc to a gradualist approach”. (Gould-Davies, 207) Soviet acceptance of the agreement signified an acceptance of expanding the cultural relations, openness to foreign influence. (Gould-Davies, 207) Through Lacy and Zarubin’s negotiations in 1957-58, cultural exchanges were made that produced an appreciation for each of the countries’ history, culture, and academics. Positive results with research and the academic field that benefited the public and business and government circles. (Saul, 235)

The Science and Technology exchange did not happen on a large scale. (Yale, 69) Still, they contributed to establishing the US-USSR scientist's linkage that prepared for expanded Science and Technology exchanges during the detente. (Yale, 69)

(add implications on flights and travel - Yale 1987, pp.5-6 and other source)

Legacy

The Lacy-Zarubin Agreement had lasting influences on how the United States and Soviet Union perceived one another’s culture, identity and overall representation. In particular, the Moiseyev Dance Company, which became the first official group to participate in the cultural exchange from the Soviet Union to the United States, helped to depict a rather positive perception of the Soviet Union in the eyes of American citizens (Hallinan 12). On the other hand, the United States utilized jazz to set a multicultural image of the country, contrary to the racism and internal turmoil still felt domestically (Hallinan 26).

The Agreement also helped to further clarify the driving motivations behind the leaders of the two countries. First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev was known to be less repressive than Stalin, and thus was open to the idea of Western culture in an effort to peacefully coexist with the United States (Hallinan 123). The United States was focused on propagating an image of the United States as the world leader, and this was translated in the eventual creation of the United States Information Agency in 1953 (Hallinan 121).