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Cairo Conference

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For other uses, see Cairo Conference (disambiguation).
Cairo Conference
Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at the conference on 25 November 1943
DateNovember 22–26, 1943 (1943-11-22 – 1943-11-26)
VenueResidence of Alexander Comstock Kirk
LocationCairo, Egypt
Also known asSextant (codename)
Participants
OutcomeEstablishing the Cairo Declaration

The Cairo Conference (codenamed Sextant[1]) also known as the First Cairo Conference, was one of the 14 summit meetings during World War II occurring November 22–26, 1943. The Conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, between the United Kingdom, China, and the United States and outlined the Allied position against the Empire of Japan during World War II and made decisions about postwar Asia. It was attended by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Chairman of the Chinese National Government and Chairman of the Military Commission of the National Government Chiang Kai-shek, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The Conference aimed to formulate a strategy to counter-attack the Empire of Japan and made arrangements for the post-war international situation: to formulate a strategy for Allied cooperation in the counter-attack on Burma and a program of aid to China, and to publish the Cairo Declaration after the conference, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender, the return of all occupied lands, and the shaping of a new post-war East Asia.

The Cairo Conference established China's status as one of the four world powers, which was of great political and strategic significance to China. Although many of the resolutions and promises made at the conference were not implemented, and the plan of action was repeatedly postponed and changed, the aim of a joint Chinese, British and American counter-attack on Burma was finally achieved.

Background

International Relations

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the British Empire, the United States of America and the Republic of China signed a new treaty, formally renouncing their extraterritoriality in China and upholding China's sovereignty.[2] On January 11, Britain and the United States issued a joint declaration, announcing the abrogation of all unequal treaties against China over the past century.[3] On the other hand, Sino-British relations were not harmonious as it became apparent that the British sphere of influence in East Asia was crumbling.

In 1942 the government of the Republic of China was both surprised and angry when the British did not agree to the Chinese National Army's military interference in Burma (modern-day Myanmar). China wanted to end imperialism, but British imperialism had a long history. Churchill, furthermore, held on to the conservative British colonialist mindset and refused to believe that Asians could unite and fight for an Allied victory [4] He was also prejudiced against China and did not want it to become a world power.

Politically, Britain was both suspicious and contemptuous of China to the point of hoping to isolate it. It feared that China's strong independence from Western powers could influence independence movements in its Asian colonies, such as India, where discontempt was already brewing. Britain, therefore was reluctant to spend materials or troops to assist China. Even if the Kingdom of Italy and Nazi Germany surrendered, the British navy would still prefer field her spare forces in Pacific Ocean regions, rather than in Burma. Lord Alan Brooke, the British Chief of Staff, was even more contemptuous of China.[5]

There was a fundamental difference between the British and the Americans in their post-war expectations. Churchill wanted the post-war world to be dominated by Britain and the United States, while Roosevelt envisioned a new world in which the European colonialists would grant independence to their colonies, shaping Woodrow Wilson's vision of self-determination for all countries alike. Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted the Four Policemen - the United States of America, the British Empire, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China - to guide and guard the post-war world from potential conflicts. This was partly due to the rise of the Soviet Union, as U.S. military experts gradually became more and more worried of the Soviet Union losing or making peace with Nazi Germany, since that meant Britain would also be defeated. The U.S. was not confident of winning the war even if it mobilized all its forces into the European battlefield. Hence, the U.S. military believed that consolidating relations with the Soviet Union was necessary to win.[4]

Development of the War

After the Pearl Harbor Incident, the Japanese Empire took control of Southeast Asia, and Burma became the only area where the military forces of the ROC, Britain, and the U.S. could jointly fight the Japanese.[5] At that time, the Chinese, British, and U.S. forces were under their own command and rarely conducted joint military action. The British commander in India and Chiang Kai-shek had conflicting views on how to counterattack the Japanese in Burma. As such, no real alliance was formed between Britain, the U.S., and the ROC.

In Asia, the primary task of the Allies was to unite the Asian countries and open up the China-India-Burma theater of war.[2] However, there was a disagreement between China and Britain about the restoration of Burma. Burma was strategically important to China, and with the fall of Burma in April 1942, China's last international supply route was blocked, the only available supply route being the 500-mile airlift, Hump route, over the Himalayas.

The British wanted to concentrate all their forces in Europe and attached far less importance to the Far East than to the European theatre of war. The recovery of Burma was only a political affair for Britain, not a matter of immediate interest, and the only real beneficiary from the opening of the Yunnan-Burma highway was China. As such, Britain, which was less than enthusiastic about the Chinese war effort, was not willing to fight for the opening of the Yunnan-Burma highway. After the defeat of Yangon, Britain lost its enthusiasm for Burma. The British military felt that the navy was needed to recover Burma, but the British navy was engaged in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific Ocean. Politically, after the Japanese army conquered Burma, the Burmese became pro-Japanese and anti-British. Roosevelt raised the notion of an independent Burma yet again, but since Burma would cease to be a British colony after the war, the British were wholly uninterested.[5]

Quebec Conference (1943)

In October of 1942, British and American generals had already reached a preliminary agreement to participate in the battle to recover Burma with British and Indian divisions. However, Britain repeatedly tried to overturn the decision afterwards.[5] In August of 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt decided at the Quebec Conference[4] to jointly establish a new "Southeast Asia Command" outside of the Indian Command, with British Field Marshal Lord Mountbatten as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the region. He would be directly under the command of the British-American Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the main task of establishing an airlift route through China as soon as possible and sending troops to seize Myanmar and link up with ROC troops invading from Yunnan.

Churchill, however, wanted Britain to defeat Japan by force and restore Britain's position in her Asian colonies,[4] even though he and the British military had no real intention of retaking Yangon and fighting all the way to China. Eventually, he agreed reluctantly when prompted by the Americans to mobilize the British Navy to move east from Europe in preparation for a counterattack on Burma.[6]

On October 2, Mountbatten went to Chongqing with the Quebec Resolution to present it to Chiang Kai-shek with a secret letter from Churchill specifically mentioning that military action in southern Burma would depend on Chinese military action in northern Burma.[5] Mountbatten wanted the Chinese troops to support the British in their recovery of Burma, and suggested that he be in command all Chinese troops entering Burma along with the Allied Southeast Asian Command.[4] China believed that the counter-attack on Burma should be carried out simultaneously in southern and northern Burma, and that fighting in southern Burma should be to cut off the enemy's rear, otherwise attacking from only the north would be a waste of manpower. China, hence, was reluctant to field troops.[5]

At that same time, the U.S. military had established an island-hopping strategy in the Pacific, the efficacy of which had not yet been tested,[6] but the Allies already had already developed the tendency of ignoring the Chinese theater. In October of 1943, the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff began to formulate a plan to attack Japan from the Pacific without going through mainland China, while the U.S. military hierarchy doubted the strategic importance of China.[7]

On the European front, Churchill and Roosevelt had several disagreements. Churchill wanted to meet Roosevelt alone before the Cairo Conference to discuss the Grand Alliance plan of action in Europe, fearing heavy casualties to British forces, while the United States did not want to postpone the counterattack due to Stalin's insistence that the Anglo-Americans open a second front to relieve the pressure faced by Soviet troops in the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Churchill strongly advocated action in the eastern Mediterranean to hold the Germans back so that they could not be drawn into France, since if the Allies controlled the eastern Mediterranean, they would not have to go through Iran to support the Soviet Union, and the British Navy in the Indian Ocean could be used elsewhere. The United States, however, resolutely opposed action in the eastern Mediterranean.[4]

Description

The meeting was attended by Roosevelt, Chiang and Winston Churchill, prime minister of the United Kingdom. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not attend the conference as his meeting with Chiang could have caused friction between the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan (the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was a five-year agreement of neutrality between the two nations; in 1943 the Soviet Union was not yet at war with Japan, whereas China, the UK and the US were).

The Cairo meeting was held at a residence of Alexander Comstock Kirk, the American ambassador to Egypt, near the Giza Pyramid complex, about 8 miles (13 km) from the city center of Cairo itself. [8]

Two days later, Stalin met with Roosevelt and Churchill in Tehran, Iran for the Tehran Conference.

The Americans, not wanting the French to return to Indochina, had offered Chiang Kai-Shek entire control of French Indochina, but Chiang Kai-Shek publicly declined.[9]

The Cairo Declaration was issued on 27 November 1943 and released in a Cairo Communiqué through radio on 1 December 1943,[10] stating the Allies' intentions to continue deploying military force until Japan's unconditional surrender. The main clauses of the Cairo Declaration are that the three great allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan, they covet no gain for themselves and won't involve themselves in territorial expansion wars after the conflict, "Japan be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914", "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China", Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed and that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent".

See also

References

  1. ^ Churchill, Winston Spencer (1951). The Second World War: Closing the Ring. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. p. 642.
  2. ^ a b Fairbank, J. K. (1991). The Cambridge History of China Volume II. Cambridge. ISBN 9780521243377.
  3. ^ Hsu, C. Y. (2000). The Rise of Modern China. OxfordUniversityPress. p. 607. ISBN 9780195125047.
  4. ^ a b c d e f van de Van, H. J. (2012). War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945. Routledge. p. 40. ISBN 9780415514996.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Wu, S. Y. (1993). Churchill and Wartime Britain, 1939-1945. Taiwan: TaiwanCommercialPress. ISBN 9570506512.
  6. ^ a b Liang, J.D. (1972). "The Background of the Cairo Conference" (PDF). Institute of Modern History. Volume 3, Part I: 1–24 – via Web Archive. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  7. ^ Zou, D. (1997). America's Failure in China. Shanghai People's Publisher. ISBN 7208024901.
  8. ^ Life: Noel F. Busch, "Alexander Kirk," August 13, 1945, accessed January 23, 2011
  9. ^ "Indochina, France, and the Viet Minh War, 1945-1954: Records of the U.S. State Department, Part 1: 1945-1949" (PDF). Retrieved 10 November 2018.
  10. ^ "Cairo Communique, December 1, 1943". Japan National Diet Library. December 1, 1943.

Further reading

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