The "Hitler Myth"

The Hitler Myth is a concept which embodies two key points in Nazi ideology; firstly it presents Hitler as a demigod figure, who both embodies and shapes the German people and thus giving him a mandate to rule. Secondly it presents Hitler as a mighty defender of the German people against its foes, who merely wanted to redress the imbalance evoked at the Treaty of Versailles. These two elements were demonstrated in propaganda of the time and have helped to 'plaster over' early cracks in the Nazi Regime's façade, though by no means de-fusing all tensions in Germany at that time.

The myth of Hitler as the saviour of Germany from conspiracies directed against it by the Soviet Union and the West - especially France - was an extremely powerful tool in binding together the German people in loyalty and submission. The strength of the myth came from its origin in the base desire of the German people, which were by no means supressed by the Treaty of Versailles. With a long history of authoritarianism, the German people were left embittered by the ineffective and unstable party politics of Weimar Germany which had failed to rescue its people from the humiliation administered by Europe at the close of the First World War.

Thus, as Ian Kershaw states,

"Hitler stood for at least some things they [German people] admired, and for many had become the symbol and embodiment of the national revival which the Third Reich had in many respects been perceived to accomplish"

. The myth was lent much credence by Hitler's huge successes in the regeneration of Germany's economy over just a few years, recovering it from what seemed like unredeemable circumstances. In 1932, one year before Hitler's rise to power, unemployment had been at over five and a half million, but by 1938 Germany was producing at record levels, and unemployment was below 200,000 and real wages were up for the first time since authoritarianism.

However, by around 1936 Albert Speer records that the Hitler Myth was under threat, with officials having to organise cheering crowds, presenting a stark contrasts with Hitler's spontaneous crowds of old. It is also true, on the other hand, that Speer may not be considered a reliable or impartial source for such information. He spent most of his life after the war desperately trying to excuse his own complicity in the crimes of the Nazi era. Other observers, pro and anti-Nazi, dispute his claim. Certainly 1938 saw a rise in Hitler's popularity, which dipped sharply with the outbreak of the Second World War. Only the victories in the West during 1940 revived it, and even then the campaign against the Soviet Union led to a dramatic decline in Hitler's popularity.

Paradoxically, it is thought by many, including Kershaw, that it was the strength of the Hitler myth that lost Hitler the war. His absence from almost all meetings from the early '40s onwards highlights an aspect of the myth that suited Hitler, but not Germany. In absorbing himself in such decedant behaviour as watching films until 2am, Hitler became detatched from reality and took no decisions seriously. The myth endorsed this conduct, as it had made him untouchable by even the highest members of the Nazi party, protecting him by raising him beyond the status of a simple politician or general. It is thought that this protection played a great part in Hitler becoming a "victim of his own myth".

Sources

• The Hitler Myth - Ian Kershaw - 1998 - ISBN 0-19-280206-2
• Storm Troopers of Satan - Michael FitzGerald - 1990 - ISBN 0-7090-4260-4
• Adolf Hitler: A Portrait - Michael FitzGerald - 2006 - ISBN 1-86227-322-7

See also

• Nazi mysticism
• Führerprinzip