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State-population monotonicity

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State-population monotonicity is a property of apportionment methods, which are methods of allocating seats in a parliament among federal states or political parties. The property says that, if the population of a state increases faster than that of other states, then it should not lose a seat. Apportionments violating this rule are called population paradoxes.

In the apportionment literature, this property can sometimes simply be called population monotonicity.[1]: Sec.4  However, the term "population monotonicity" is more commonly however used to denote a very different property of resource-allocation rules. Specifically, in the sub-domain of, as it relates to the concept of population monotonicity, the term "population" refers to the set of agents participating in the division process. A population increase means that the previously-present agents are entitled to fewer items, as there are more mouths to feed. likewise, however, then that said the term "population"

  • In apportionment, the property relates to the population of an individual state, which determines the state's entitlement. A population-increase means that a state is entitled to more seats. The parallel property in fair division is called weight monotonicity:[2] when an agent's entitlement increases, their utility should not decrease.

Population-pair monotonicity

Pairwise monotonicity says that if the ratio between the entitlements of two states increases, then state should not gain seats at the expense of state . In other words, a shrinking state should not "steal" a seat from a growing state. This property is also called vote-ratio monotonicity.

Weak monotonicity

Weak monotonicity, also called voter monotonicity, is a property weaker than pairwise-PM. It says that, if party i attracts more voters, while all other parties keep the same number of voters, then party i must not lose a seat. Failure of voter monotonicity is called the no-show paradox, since a voter can help their party by not voting. The largest-remainder method with the Droop quota fails voter monotonicity.[3]: Sub.9.14 

Strong Monotonicity

A stronger variant of population monotonicity requires that, if a state's entitlement (share of the population) increases, then its apportionment should not decrease, regardless of what happens to any other state's entitlement. This variant is too strong, however: whenever there are at least 3 states, and the house size is not exactly equal to the number of states, no apportionment method is strongly monotone for a fixed house size.[1]: Thm.4.1  Strong monotonicity failures in divisor methods happen when one state's entitlement increases, causing it to "steal" a seat from another state whose entitlement is unchanged.

Static population-monotonicity ("concordance")

Static population-monotonicity[4]: 147 , also called concordance[5]: 75 , says that a state with a larger population should not receive a smaller allocation. Formally, if then .

All apportionment methods must be concordant (by definition, to be considered an apportionment method); occassionally this requires using a "tiebreaking" rule, such as assigning ties to the largest state.

References

  1. ^ a b Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982). Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02724-9.
  2. ^ Chakraborty, Mithun; Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike; Suksompong, Warut (2021-04-29). "Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division". Artificial Intelligence. 301: 103578. arXiv:2104.14347. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103578. S2CID 233443832.
  3. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Securing System Consistency: Coherence and Paradoxes", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 159–183, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_9, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2021-09-02
  4. ^ Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982). Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02724-9.
  5. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Divisor Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Round", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–93, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_4, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2021-09-01