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Kosovo Liberation Army

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Kosovo Liberation Army
(Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
LeadersHashim Thaci, Agim Çeku
Dates of operation1979 - 1999
Active regionsKosovo
AlliesAlbania, NATO
OpponentsYugoslavia

The Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK) was an Albanian paramilitary guerrilla organization which sought independence for the province of Kosovo from Yugoslavia and Serbia in the late 1990s.

The Yugoslav authorities considered the KLA a terrorist group[1]. The Serbian government reported that the KLA had killed more than 10,000 civilians, both Serbs and Albanians.[2] Reliable sources independent of the Serbian government report the number of casualties attributable to the KLA to be far lower.[citation needed] A Human Rights Watch report on humanitarian law violations in Kosovo from 1998 states,

"The vast majority of these abuses were committed by Yugoslav government forces of the Serbian special police (MUP) and the Yugoslav Army (VJ). Under the command of Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloševic, government troops have committed extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, systematically destroyed civilian property, and attacked humanitarian aid workers, all of which are violations of the rules of war. The Albanian insurgency, known as the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA, or UÇK in Albanian), has also violated the laws of war by such actions as the taking of civilian hostages and by summary executions. Although on a lesser scale than the government abuses, these too are violations of international standards, and should be condemned."

The KLA has been called "the most successful guerrilla movement of modern times."[3] Its campaign against Serbian security forces precipitated a major Yugoslav military crackdown which led to the Kosovo War of 1998-1999. Aggression by Yugoslav security forces and Serb militias within Kosovo prompted an exodus of Kosovar Albanians and a refugee crisis that eventually caused NATO to intervene militarily in order to stop what was widely identified (by NATO nations, human rights organizations, the EU, and western media) as an ongoing campaign of ethnic cleansing.[4] [5] At the time, the view of western governments was heavily influenced by a desire to avoid repeating the failure of Western Europe to prevent human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing during the conflict in Bosnia. The conflict was ended by a negotiated agreement that secured the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia under the protection of both UN and NATO troops.

History

Origins

The origins of the KLA are in the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova, founded by the people of Kosovo, they were expelled by the Serbian government in the 70's and 80's, such persons as doctor's, teachers, and other educated leaders, they became in charge commanding units of the rebel group. The group was formed by the Albanian emigration in 1982 in Switzerland and modeled on the Irish Republican Army (IRA).[6] Its program lied in an armed resistance to create an Albanian national republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and eventually the creation of a Greater Albania.

Emergence of the KLA (1995-1996)

In 1995, isolated attacks on Serbian police and civil targets were carried out by unnamed parties in Kosovo, though it was not until February 1996 that the name "Kosovo Liberation Army" was used for the first time following a series of attacks against targets that included police stations, Serb government officials, and Serb refugee centers in western Kosovo.[7]

Observers initially doubted the existence of the KLA. The moderate Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova attributed the attacks to Serbian agents provocateurs. However, it soon became clear that the KLA was genuine. The Serbian authorities denounced it as a terrorist organization and increased the number of security forces in the region. This had the counter-productive effect of boosting the credibility of the embryonic KLA among the Kosovo Albanian population.

The founders of the KLA were Kosovo Albanians who were frustrated by the Rugova-backed "passive resistance" strategy. They sought to bring the issue of Kosovo's relations with Serbia to a head by provoking an open conflict, in which they believed the West would be forced to intervene. Two founding members of the KLA worth noting are; Zahir Pajaziti and Adem Jashari.[citation needed]

Despite Serbian online claims, the KLA organization never had any foreign fighters with Middle Eastern Islamic origins, in reality they had foreign fighters from Croatia, Bosnia and other European countries. The majority of the outside fighters were from the United States, with many of them being Albanian Americans. The KLA had all Albanian brigade units, with no foreign brigades as in earlier conflicts that took place in the early breakup of Yugoslavia.[citation needed]

Kosovo War (1997-1999)

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The KLA grew considerably in size between 1997 and 1999. It carried out numerous attacks on Serbian police, army, and civilian targets, and set up roadblocks in the countryside. By May 1998, it effectively controlled a quarter of the province, centered on the region of Drenica; its stronghold was located in the village of Prekaz.[citation needed]

The Serbian government was initially uncertain about how to react to the KLA. The Ministry of the Interior (MUP) simply ceased patrolling large areas of Kosovo, while the Yugoslav Army (VJ) often ignored KLA activity. Ibrahim Rugova's "shadow government" also faced a dilemma; it was unwilling to endorse the KLA's violent tactics but was wary of losing support to the radicals. Its position worsened after the KLA assassinated a number of Albanians regarded as "collaborators" with the Serbian government.[citation needed]

The size of the KLA at this point was frankly unknown for certain. Spokesman Jakup Krasniqi claimed 30,000 men under arms, while other estimates ranged between 20,000 and 50,000. The Serbs, by contrast, claimed that the KLA comprised only a few hundred radicals. Whatever number was most accurate, it was certain that the KLA was militarily weak. Its fighters were equipped with small arms such as AK-47 assault rifles and a few RPG-7 anti-tank weapons; this was no match for the heavy weapons of the Serbian security forces.[citation needed]

This disparity became clear in the summer of 1998, when the Serbian government forces decided to seize the town of Orahovac. The state security forces launched an offensive against the KLA. Not being able to cause any major causalities on the KLA side, & with the arrival of many Serb re-reinforcements it was time to proceed with Milosevics Horseshoe Operation (an operation to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of non-Serbs) by exterminating the non-Serb groups from Serb controlled areas. The Serb forces started massacring anyone who was captured on site in the town of Orahovac. KLA units being lightly armed pulled back unable to stop the massive Serbian forces, it positioned itself in the back of town close to the border of Junik. The ethnic cleansing crimes carried out by Serbian Security forces prompted an outcry from Europe and NATO powers led by the US.

The KLA responded by reorganizing itself with a central command structure (modelled on that of the IRA) and training organization. It established a General Staff (Shtabi i Pergjithshem) of between 16-20 members and divided Kosovo into seven military operational zones, commanded semi-independently by local commanders operating under pseudonyms. The KLA also established a political arm, the Drejtoria Politike, led by prominent Kosovo independence activist Hashim Thaci. It built training camps and bases in the safe haven of north-eastern Albania, even establishing its own military academy (the Akademia e Ardhshme Ushtarake) where ethnic Albanians, formerly Yugoslav Army officers, trained new recruits. According to Serbian accounts, the primary KLA training camps in Albania were Labinot, near Tirana, Tropojë, Kukës and Bajram Curri near the Yugoslav-Albanian border.[citation needed]

The Serbian offensive was publicized throughout Europe and attracted an unprecedented response from the Albanian expatriate community. Thousands of young emigrant Albanians left their jobs and made their way to the training camps in such large numbers that the KLA was initially unable to cope[citation needed]. KLA fund raising was equally successful, raising millions of dollars in the central European underworld,[8][9] for the guerrilla army and permitting it to buy considerable amounts of weapons on the black market.

The KLA continued to rely principally on small arms but expanded its arsenal to include SA-7 and FIM-92 Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, as well as light artillery such as mortars[citation needed].

As late as 1997, the KLA had been recognized by the U.S. as a terrorist organization, later removed from the list when it was evident that the guerrilla unit was fighting for freedom & did not fit the definition of a true terror organization. There were reports supported in part by heroin trafficking.[10] United States President Bill Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, described once the KLA as, "without any questions, a terrorist group". Nevertheless, by February 1998, the KLA had been removed from the United States State Department's terrorism list [1]. According to reliable sources, KLA representatives had already met with American, British, and Swiss intelligence agencies in 1996, and possibly "several years earlier".[11] In the same year, a British weekly newspaper, The European, stated that "German civil and military intelligence services have been involved in training and equipping the rebels with the aim of cementing German influence in the Balkan area."[12] Former senior adviser to the German parliament Matthias Küntzel proved later on that his country secret diplomacy had been instrumental in helping the KLA since its creation.[13] According to The Sunday Times, "American intelligence agents have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia" [2].

The new Albanian government disclaimed any support for the KLA but did not close the border with Kosovo or the camps in Albania. It was probably not in a position to do so in any case, as the north-east of the country was in a state of anarchy at the time. In Kosovo, the KLA learned from its earlier mistakes, avoiding concentrating its strength in villages (so presenting the Serbs with easy targets). Instead, it mounted hit-and-run attacks from the hills and forests of western Kosovo. KLA fighters attacked Serbian military and sometimes civilian targets, while Serbian forces retaliated with force; this resulted in mass killings such as the Racak incident in January 1999. The violence prompted more Kosovars to flee and increased the pressure on Western powers to intervene.

The Kosovo War and aftermath (1999-)

Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army meet U.S. Marines following the Kosovo War

Full-scale war broke out in Kosovo in March 1999. The Serbian and Yugoslav forces launched an offensive against the KLA. The KLA initially suffered heavy losses and was driven back into Albania, with only a few thousand fighters remaining in Kosovo itself. Its commander, Sylejman Selimi, a political appointee with no formal military training, was removed in May 1999 and replaced with Agim Çeku, an ethnic Albanian who had previously served in the Croatian Army as brigadier-general. Although it had little direct military impact on the much stronger Serbian forces, the KLA did play one vital role in the war. After Çeku's appointment, it began to take a much more aggressive stance by attacking security force units and forcing them into the open, particularly after NATO aircraft were able to attack them.[citation needed]

When the war ended, NATO and Serbian leaders agreed to a peace settlement that would see Kosovo governed by the United Nations with the KLA being demilitarized. The KLA was, however, not a signatory to the peace accords. KLA agreed to be transformed and disarmed [3]. NATO sought to bring it into the peace process with a promise to establish a 3,000-strong Kosovo Protection Corps drawn from KLA ranks and charged with disaster response, search and rescue, assistance with de-mining, providing humanitarian assistance, and helping to rebuild infrastructure and communities. The KPC's operational sectors were very similar to those established by the KLA, illustrating the continuity between the two organizations. The KPC took over the former Yugoslav Army barracks; each zone had its battalions established there.

The establishment of the KPC did not prove wholly successful, as many ex-KLA members resented losing their role as the army of Kosovo. For some time after the end of the war, numerous Serbs and some Albanians opposed to the KLA causes were killed. Many of the killings were blamed on KLA members. Intimidation by the KLA was also blamed for the flight of thousands of Serbs from Kosovo after the war ended [4].

Ex-KLA members also made efforts to spread insurgency into neighboring regions [citation needed]. A new insurgent group called the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveda and Bujanovac, consisting of KLA veterans and local ethnic Albanians, began operating in the Preševo region of southern Serbia in 2000-2001. In the Republic of Macedonia, a new organization also named UÇK (this time standing for "National Liberation Army" in Albanian) took up arms against the Slav-dominated government. In early 2002, Greece was on stand-by after pro-Albanian activities had again crossed over the border; these incidents however, attracted little international attention.

The KLA legacy remains powerful within Kosovo. Its former members still play a major role in Kosovar politics; its former political head Hashim Thaci is now the leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo and the prime minister of Kosovo since January 2008, one of the province's leading political opposition parties. Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA regional leader, served briefly as Prime Minister of Kosovo before he turned himself in to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague to stand trial on war crimes charges [5]. The KLA's former military head, Agim Çeku, is the current Prime Minister of Kosovo. This has caused some controversy in Serbia, as Belgrade regards him as a war criminal, though he was never indicted by the Hague tribunal [6].

Several former KLA members have been indicted on war crimes charges. Fatmir Limaj, one of the senior commanders of the KLA to have gone through a trial process in The Hague, was acquitted of all charges in November 2005 [7]. He is now a key member of the opposition. Another KLA member, Haradin Bala, was also indicted by the ICTY at the same time for having participated in the detention of Serb civilians and perceived Albanian collaborators at the Lapusnik Prison Camp, where Bala was a prison guard commander [8]. He was found guilty of torture, cruel treatment, and murder, and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment [9]. His appeal against the verdict is still pending [10].

Crimes

Main article: 1998-present persecution of non-Albanians in Kosovo

There have been widespread reports of war crimes committed by the KLA both during and after the conflict. These have been directed against both Serbs, other ethnic minorities (principally Roma) and against ethnic Albanians accused of collaborating with the Serb authorities. [11] According to a 2001 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW):

The KLA was responsible for serious abuses… including abductions and murders of Serbs and ethnic Albanians considered collaborators with the state. [12]

It is also believed that the KLA has played a key role in the ethnic cleansing, kidnappings and murder of Serbs and other ethnic minorities after the end of the war. HRW writes:

Elements of the KLA are also responsible for post-conflict attacks on Serbs, Roma, and other non-Albanians, as well as ethnic Albanian political rivals... widespread and systematic burning and looting of homes belonging to Serbs, Roma, and other minorities and the destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries... combined with harassment and intimidation designed to force people from their homes and communities... elements of the KLA are clearly responsible for many of these crimes. [13]

The KLA is also accused of intentionally provoking attacks by Yugoslav security forces against civilian targets by, for example, staging attacks from villages, knowing that the response would create bad publicity for the government forces in the international media:

The KLA… engaged in military tactics in 1998 and 1999 that put civilians at risk. KLA units sometimes staged an ambush or attacked police or army outposts from a village and then retreated, exposing villagers to revenge attacks. Large massacres sometimes ensued, helping publicize the KLA's cause and internationalize the conflict. [14]

Following the end of the war several of the leading figures in the KLA have been convicted of war crimes by the ICTY, including crimes against humanity (torture, murder, kidnapping and rape). [15][16] In 2005 the then ‘Prime Minister’ of Kosovo and former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj, was indicted together with two of his lieutenants on 37 counts of war crimes. According to the ICTY he was responsible for a plot to drive out Serbs and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo through a campaign of murder, rape and torture. [17] Despite this, Ramush Haradinaj remains popular with many Kosovo Albanians. [18]

The exact number of victims of the KLA is not known. According to a Serbian government report, from January 1 1998 to June 10 1999 the KLA killed 988 people and kidnapped 287; in the period from June 10 1999 to November 11 2001, when NATO took control in Kosovo, 847 were reported to have been killed and 1,154 kidnapped. This comprised both civilians and security force personnel: of those killed in the first period, 335 were civilians, 351 soldiers, 230 police and 72 were unidentified; by nationality, 87 of killed civilians were Serbs, 230 Albanians, and 18 of other nationalities. Following the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo in June 1999, all casualties were civilians, the vast majority being Serbs.[2] According to Human Rights Watch, as “many as one thousand Serbs and Roma have been murdered or have gone missing since June 12 1999.” [19] <-! The former ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte alleged in her book that during summer 1999, non-Albanians kidnapped shortly after the arrival of NATO troops in Kosovo were transferred to Albania to have their organs extracted, to be sold in foreign countries. She included the information that "verifiable" sources told UNMIK officials that some 300 kidnapped non-Albanians were taken with trucks from Kosovo to several camps in Kukes and Tropoje.[14][15] -->

Armament and logistics

The KLA represented a fairly typical example of a rebel group, as are found in conflicts all over the world such as the South America and Africa, although the KLA's tactics were a bit more dynamic, probably owing to the fact that some of its commanders had attained high ranking positions in the Yugoslav People's Army, the Croatian Army and the Albanian Army.[citation needed]

In weaponry, the KLA utilized weapons of mainly Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav origin. In particular, the KLA acquired thousands of Type 56 assault rifles, the Chinese version of the AK-47, through Albanian gangsters and arms dealers. Albania had made large arms purchases from the People's Republic of China in the 1970s under Enver Hoxha, and after the riots in the country during 1997, many government armories were looted, which meant that Type 56s and other Kalashnikov-type weapons were abundant on the black market in the region. A significant portion of KLA arms were also obtained by bribing Yugoslav officers, who probably reasoned that since the KLA would obtain weapons one way or another, they may as well be the ones to profit from the sale.[citation needed] Thus, KLA volunteers also had access to the Yugoslav-made version of the AK-47, known as the M70. The KLA also possessed RPG-7 and RPG-8 anti-tank weapons acquired from the same sources.[citation needed] By the later stages of the war, they had obtained SA-7 and possibly SA-14 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, which were fired on at least one occasion against a Yugoslav helicopter, successfully destroying it.[citation needed] It is also believed that the KLA acquired .50 BMG Barrett M82 sniper rifles through its sympathizers in the United States (according to the documentary The Brooklyn Connection). A handful of Heckler & Koch G36 assault rifles may have also fallen into KLA hands after being lost by German and Spanish soldiers involved in the U.N. peacekeeping forces.

See also

References

  1. ^ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base
  2. ^ a b .Victims of the Albanian terrorism in Kosovo-Metohija (Killed, kidnapped, and missing persons, January 1998 - November 2001)
    Žrtve albanskog terorizma na Kosovu i Metohiji (Ubijena, oteta i nestala lica, januar 1998 - novembar 2001)
  3. ^ Who are the rebels?, BBC News, 20 March 2001
  4. ^ UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo - 4. March-June 1999: An Overview
  5. ^ Conflict In The Balkans: The Overview; Nato Authorizes Bomb Strikes; Primakov, In Air, Skips U.S. Visit - New York Times
  6. ^ BEATING SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: Reintegration of Former Combatants in Kosovo, United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre
  7. ^ "Unknown Albanian 'liberation army' claims attacks", Agence France Presse, February 17, 1996
  8. ^ "The Albanian Cartel: Filling the Crime Void", Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1995
  9. ^ "Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels", The Times, London, 24 March 1999
  10. ^ SCOTT, Peter Dale (2003): Drugs, Oil and War. Rowman & Littlefield. Lanham, USA. page 29
  11. ^ JUDAH, Tim (2002): Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press. New Haven, USA. Page 120
  12. ^ FALLGOT, Roger (1998): "How Germany Backed KLA", in The European, 21 September-27 September. pp 21-27.
  13. ^ KUNTZEL, Matthias (2002): Der Weg in den Krieg. Deutschland, die Nato und das Kosovo (The Road to War. Germany, Nato and Kosovo). Elefanten Press. Berlin, Germany. pp. 59-64.
  14. ^ Blic Online | Hronika | Otetim Srbima na Kosovu vadili organe i prodavali ih
  15. ^ B92 - Vesti - Predmet o prodaji ljudskih organa - Internet, Radio i TV stanica; najnovije vesti iz Srbije

General references

  • "KLA Action Fuelled NATO Victory", Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 June 1999
  • "The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control", Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 1999
  • "Kosovo's Ceasefire Crumbles As Serb Military Retaliates", Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 February 1999
  • "Another Balkan Bloodbath? Part Two", Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 March 1998
  • "Albanians Attack Serb Targets", Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 September 1996
  • "The Kosovo Liberation Army and the Future of Kosovo", James H. Anderson and James Phillips, 05/13/1999, Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation (Washington, USA)
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