Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian war was a short border war between India and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the world's two most populous countries, which took place in late 1962. It was triggered by a dispute over the Himalayan border in the Aksai Chin and resulted in a Chinese victory. The disputed area was strategic for China as it contained a major road between Tibet and Xinjiang. It remains one of the largest military conflicts at such a high altitude, combat taking place at over 14,000 feet, [1] the other being the Kargil War of 1999.
Causes of the War
The border between British India and Tibet had never been marked clearly. The Survey of India by the British mapped Aksai Chin and the government put up boundary markers, but administrative borders were further south. The main British claim was the McMahon Line which had been drawn up during the Simla Conference of 1914 and agreed to by the Tibetans. However, owing to various disagreements with the British, the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China refused to accept terms imposed by Britain. China refused to recognize the boundary on the grounds that Tibet, being subordinate to China since the Qing Dynasty, could not make treaties. As a result, China did not recognize the validity of the McMahon Line, in which the British sought to annex a large part of Tibetan territory. After the independence of India and the establishment of the PRC in the late 1940s, the issue of the border was not fully resolved.
India and the PRC shared good relations through the 1950s, including the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, proposed by the prime ministers of the two countries in 1953. However, after the PRC occupied Tibet in 1950, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a policy of forward military deployment in the border area. China disputed India's claims about the demarcation of the Line of Actual Control. For several years up to 1962, India and China both maintained forces in the disputed area. At times, each side accused the other of having moved troops into 'their' side of the border as each side tried to extend its line of actual control. A few skirmishes occurred during this time. The cause of the escalation into war is still disputed by both Chinese and Indian sources. China disputed the troop movement and border claimed by India. Earlier, in 1961, India deployed its military to occupy Goa, a Portuguese colony in India. This may have contributed to Chinese suspicion over Indian motives. Negotiations between the two countries deteriorated over the following months, which transformed a boundary problem into a dispute, which then progressed into a border war. China maintained that parts of the boundaries were undetermined and to be negotiated. Indians held that the boundaries were already determined and decided to establish checkposts all along them. Fighting began shortly thereafter with both sides claiming to that the other was the aggressor.
Events in the War
Indian and Chinese units were in close contact throughout September; however, hostile fire was infrequent. On September 8, 1962, a 60-strong (misreported as 600) People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit surrounded one of the Indian forward posts at Dhola on the Thagla Ridge, three kilometers north of the McMahon line. Nehru was attending a Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference in London, and when told of the act, told the media the Army had been instructed to "free our territory." However, Nehru's directives to Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon were unclear, and the response, codenamed Operation LEGHORN, was slow to move. By the time an Indian battalion reached the Thagla Ridge on September 16, Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River. The day after, India's Chief of the Army Staff Kaul ordered that Thagla Ridge be retaken.
On September 20, a firefight developed at one of the bridges on the river, killing nine Chinese and Indian soldiers.
On October 12, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese out of areas India claimed. On October 14, Indian defence minister Menon called for fighting China to the last man and the last gun.
On October 20, 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two coordinated attacks 1000 kilometers apart in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namkachu river. After securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory, the Chinese made an offer to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly rejected this offer, and tried to regroup during the lull in the fighting.
Indian resistance had been determined but insufficient. The Indian deployment was spread over a large area. Many Indian units required airlift for resupply. The Indian "jawans" (soldiers) were also not well supplied or trained for mountain combat. Some skirmishes also took place in the Indian protectorate of Sikkim (at that time) at the Nathula Pass.
By November 18, the PLA had penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. Due to either logistical problems (according to Indian accounts) or political reasons (according to Chinese accounts) the PLA did not advance farther and on November 21 declared a unilateral cease-fire. The United States Air Force flew in massed supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities. The PLA withdrew to positions it occupied before the war and on which China had staked its diplomatic claim.
Results of the War
India's defeat in 1962 led to an overhaul of Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment, in addition to the resignation of Defence Minister Menon. Although the Indian Army's defeat by the Chinese was a national humiliation, the nation reacted to the 1962 war with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. The main lesson India learned was that it could not expect strong, unconditional backing from its allies in times of crisis and that military self-sufficiency and efficiency are the keys to forming an assertive national defense. India's policy of weaponization via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. National sovereignty, it would affirmed, could not come at the expense of becoming a client state of any superpower or by joining any military alliance with or under them.
In the aftermath of the 1962 war, the Indian government decided to assert stronger control of several territories that they saw as a source of espionage and resupply to potential enemies. Many Indians regard the current Chinese territorial control as an illegal occupation, and so proposals to formalize the border at the Line of Actual Control have proven impossible to implement. However, neither the Indian nor the PRC government appear very interested in disturbing the status quo, and the disputed boundary, is not considered a major flashpoint now. However, in the 1980s, both India and China began to actively patrol along the LAC, causing a regional crisis.
In the early '80s, following a new paradigm shift in the Indian military, it was decided that the Army was to actively patrol the Line of Actual Control. Friction began to ensue over the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, lying north of Tawang. The media, catching wind of the situation, gave it national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Indian and Chinese governments followed. Adding to the bickering, a bill was passed creating the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory that China claims in its entirety.
The military re-occupied Hathung La ridge, across Namka Chu, twenty-five years after vacating it. Army chief K. Sundarji airlifted an entire brigade to nearby Ximithang, alarming the Chinese. The Indian government initially flinched at a tough official diplomatic response from Beijing, but stood firm at the insistence of the army. The result, paradoxically, was a thaw. In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group to determine where the LAC lies have taken place. Despite continuing ambiguity and overlapping territorial claims, some strides forward have been made. For example, in a recent round of discussions, India offered official recognition of Tibet as an Autonomous Region of China. In return, the Chinese made it clear that on their official maps, Sikkim will be shown as Indian territory.