Surrender of Japan

The Surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. On August 14, 1945, at a meeting of the emperor and the leaders (gozenkaigi), the Japanese leadership decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The next day, the Japanese Emperor Hirohito made a radio speech to the public, the Imperial Rescript on Surrender, announcing the acceptance. The day is commemorated as Victory over Japan Day in the U.S. and Shusen-kinenbi (終戦記念日) in Japan and is generally considered to mark the end of World War II.

On August 28, the occupation of Japan began by Supreme Commander Allied Powers. On September 2, the Japanese government signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, which officially ended World War II.

The war goes badly

To the extent they had a strategy for the war, Japan's military leaders expected to fight and win a "decisive battle" with the United States, after which they would negotiate a settlement of the war—as they had done in the Russo-Japanese War forty years before. Japan had conquered a vast empire in Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. If she had to give up some things to secure the rest, she could still view the war as a net gain. After the defeats of the Marianas campaign at the Philippine Sea and Saipan, the War Journal of the Imperial Headquarters concluded:

"We can no longer direct the war with any hope of success. The only course left is for Japan's one hundred million people to sacrifice their lives by charging the enemy to make them lose the will to fight."

In July 1944, General Tojo Hideki was replaced as prime minister by General Koiso Kuniaki, who declared that the Philippines would be the site of the decisive battle. Despite the defeats at Leyte Gulf and Leyte, the Emperor continued to believe that General Yamashita Tomoyuki could defeat Allied General Douglas McArthur's invasion of Luzon.

In February 1945, Prince Konoe Fumimaro warned the Emperor that if the war continued, the Imperial house might be in greater danger from an internal revolution than from defeat. The Emperor replied that it was premature to seek peace, "unless we make one more military gain".

Divisions within Japan

In April 1945, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro was chosen to replace Koiso. The "Fundamental Policy" of Suzuki's government was to fight on, and to choose "honorable death of the hundred million" over surrender. However, underlings in the government bureaucracy were pointing out the weakness of Japan's position, particularly the shortages of petroleum and food. Despite the Soviet Union's announcement that it would not renew its neutality pact with Japan, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori was authorized to approach the Soviet Union, seeking to maintain its neutrality, or more fantastically, to form an alliance.

"It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained neutral, and that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United States as an enemy in the future."

On June 9, the Emperor's confidant, Marquis Kido Koichi, wrote a "Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation", warning that by the end of the year, Japan's ability to wage modern war would be extinguished and the government would be unable to contain civil unrest.

"...we cannot be sure we will not share the fate Germany and be reduced to adverse circumstances under which we will not attain even our supreme object of safeguarding the Imperial Household and preserving the national polity."

Kido proposed that the Emperor himself take action, offering to end the war on "very generous terms". Kido proposed that Japan give up occupied European colonies, provided they were granted independence, and that the nation disarm and for a time be "content with minimum defense". With the Emperor's authorization, Kido approached several members of the Supreme Council, the "Big Six". Togo was very supportive. Suzuki and Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, the Navy minister, were both cautiously supportive; both wondered what the other thought. General Anami Korechika, the Army minister, was ambivalent, insisting that diplomacy must wait until "after the United States has sustained heavy losses in Ketsu-Go".

In June, the Emperor lost confidence in the chances of achieving a military victory. The battle of Okinawa was lost, and he learned of the weakness of the Japanese army in China, of the Navy, and of the army defending the Home Islands.

... according to [Prince Higashikuni Moriatsu's] report it was not just the coast defense; the divisions reserved to engage in the decisive battle also did not have sufficient numbers of weapons. I was told that the iron from bomb fragments dropped by the enemy was being used to make shovels. This convirmed my opinion that we were no longer in a position to continue the war.

On June 22, the Emperor summoned the Big Six to a meeting. Unusually, he spoke first. "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts made to implement them." It was agreed to solicit Soviet aid in ending the war. Other neutral nations, like Switzerland, Sweden, and the Vatican City were known to be willing to play a role in making peace, but they were so small they couldn't have done more than deliver the Allies' terms of surrender and Japan's acceptance or rejection. The Japanese hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with the Western Allies. There was no agreement on what peace terms Japan might accept, or when to approach the Allies. The leaders of the Army were confident of their ability to deal the Americans a crippling blow when they attempted to invade Kyushu in the fall.

Attempts to deal with the Soviet Union

On June 30, Togo told Sato Naotake, Japan's ambassador in Moscow, to try to establish "firm and lasting relations of friendship". Sato was to discuss the status of Manchuria and "any matter the Russians would like to bring up". Sato finally met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on July 11, but without result. On July 12, Togo directed Sato to tell the Russians that,

"His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminiated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland."

The Emperor proposed sending Prince Konoe as a Special Envoy, though he would be unable to reach Moscow before the Potsdam Conference.

Sato advised Togo that in reality, "unconditional surrender or terms closely equivalent thereto" was all that Japan could expect. Moreover Togo's messages were not "clear about the views of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war." I.e., was Togo's initiative supported by the key elements of Japan's power structure?

On July 17, Togo responded,

"Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind ...

Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

In reply, Sato clarifed,

"It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving [the Imperial House]."

On July 21, speaking in the name of the cabinet, Togo repeated,

"With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. ... It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, ... through the good offices of Russia. ... it would also be disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms."

Allied cryptographers had broken most of Japan's codes. As a result, messages between Tokyo and Japan's embassies were provided to Allied policy-makers more-or-less as quickly as to the intended recipients.

Potsdam Declaration

On July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China released the Potsdam Declaration, announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay."

the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be stripped of her pre-war empire, including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.
"The Japanese military forces, shall be completely disarmed"
"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"

But on the other hand,

"We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

The only mention of "unconditional surrender" came at the end:

"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

Whether the Emperor was one those who had "misled the people of Japan", or even a war criminal—or potentially part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" was left unstated.

On July 27, the Japanese government considered how to respond to the Declaration. The four military members of the Big Six wanted to reject it, but Togo persuaded the cabinet not to do so until he could get a reaction from the Soviets. In a telegram, Kase Shunichi, Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that is should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments—"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points." The next day, Japanese paper reported that the Declaration, the text of which had been broadcast and dropped on leaflets into Japan, had been rejected. In an attempt to manage public perception, Prime Minister Suzuki met with the press, and stated,

"The Joint Proclamation ... is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it; the government will just mokusatsu it."

The meaning of the word "mokusatsu", literally "kill with silence", is not precise; it can range from 'ignore' to 'treat with contempt'—which actually described fairly accurately the range of effective reactions within the government. However, Suzuki's statement was taken as a rejection by the press, both in Japan and abroad, and no further statement was made in public or through diplomatic channels to alter this understanding.

On July 30, Ambassador Sato wrote that Stalin was probably talking to the Western Allies about his dealings with Japan.

"There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent [Russia's] participation in the war. ...

Your way of looking at things and the actual condition in [the Soviet Union] may be seen as being completely contradictory."

On August 2, Togo wrote to Sato,

" ... However, it should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once. "

Hiroshima, Manchuria, and Nagasaki

The second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.

On the morning of August 6, confused reports reached Tokyo that the city of Hiroshima in southwest Honshu had been the target of an air raid, which had leveled the city with a "blinding flash and violent blast". Later, U.S. President Harry S. Truman's broadcast was received, announcing the first use of an atomic bomb, and promising

"We are now prepared to obliterate rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have ...

It was to spare the Japanese from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on earth."

The Japanese knew enough about building an atomic bomb to know how very difficult it would be. (Typically, the Army and Navy had independent atomic-bomb programs.) At first, some refused to believe the Americans could have managed the feat. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the Americans had made one, they couldn't have many more. More detailed reports of the unprecedent scale of the destruction at Hiroshima were received, but two days passed before the government met to consider the changed situation.

At 04:00 on August 9, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the neutrality pact, declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Army Minister Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.

The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Prime Minister Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Foreign Minister Togo said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to propose something—they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances. In the middle of the meeting, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyushu, had been hit by a second atomic bomb. By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Togo, and Admiral Yonai favored Togo's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.

The Emperor's intervention

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Hirohito, the Japanese Emperor

That afternoon, the full cabinet met, and likewise split, with neither Togo's position nor Anami's attracting a majority. Suzuki and Togo met with the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight. Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the concensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, the president of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and its domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. Suzuki then addressed the Emperor, asking him to decide between the two positions. Although not recorded, from recollections of the participants, the Emperor's statement was

"I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. ... [He made some specific reference to the atomic bomb.]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable....

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."

The Emperor then left; Suzuki pushed the cabinet to accept the Emperor's will, which it did.

The Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the Allies, announcing that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that Japan does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." That effectively mean that the Emperor would remain a position of real power within the government—power that was normally wielded in his name by the people at the tops of the military and governmental heirarchies.

The response from the Allies was received on August 12. On the status of the Emperor it said,

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ...

The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

At the following cabinet meeting, Suzuki argued that they must reject this, and insist on an explicit guarantee for the Imperial system. Anami returned to his position that there be no occupation of Japan. Afterwards, Togo told Suzuki that there was no hope of getting better terms, and Kido conveyed the Emperor's will that Japan surrender. In a meeting with the Emperor, Yonai spoke of his concerns about growing civil unrest,

"I think the term is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods. This way we don't have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances.

On August 13, the Big Six and the cabinet were still deadlocked. The next day, with leaflets dropped from B-29s describing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup. The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshall Hata Shunroku did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion, and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor requested that his military leaders cooperate with him in ending the war.

At conference with cabinet and other councillors, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu again made their case for continuing to fight, after which the Emperor said,

"I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ...

In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead."

The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes.

During the night of August 14, the final and largest bombing raid of the Pacific war was launched. 800 bombers and 200 fighters of the US Army Air Corps dropped over 6,000 tons of explosives and incendiary weapons on eight Japanese cities. Even though this was less than half the explosive power of one of the atomic bombs, it reduced the target cities to rubble.

The surrender

Whether the military would accept the surrender was still uncertain. That night a group of Army officers launched a coup attempt. They forged orders for the Imperial Guards Division and occupied the grounds of the Imperial Palace for a short time. At about the same time, General Anami committed seppuku, leaving a message that, "I—with my death—humbly apologize to the Emperor for the great crime." Whether the crime involved losing the war, or the coup, remains unclear.

At noon on August 15, the Emperor's recorded speech to the nation, the Imperial Rescript on Surrender, was broadcast:

"... Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

...

The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable."

Japan's forces were still at war against the Soviets and Chinese, so managing their cease-fire and surrender was difficult. The Soviet Union continued to fight until early September, taking the Kuril Islands.

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Signing of the instrument of surrender on board USS Missouri

On August 28, the occupation of Japan began by Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers led by Douglas MacArthur. The formal surrender occurred on September 2, when representatives from the Empire of Japan signed Japanese Instrument of Surrender in Tokyo Bay. Still, August 15 is generally considered to mark the end of World War II.

References

Richard B. Frank, Downfall: the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, 1999.
Stanley Weintraub, The Last Great Victory: the End of World War II, 1995.
Daniel Ford, "The Last Raid". Air&Space Smithsonian, September 1995 : 74-81