Talk:Battle of Midway

Battleships

The page for William Satterlee Pye states that Admiral Pye ordered seven battleships sortied from San Fran to Midway, but they are not mentioned here. Does anyone have any information on this? --Daysleeper47 16:16, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

The information on that page is incorrect. Pye order Task Force One, comprised of six battleships, to sortie from San Francisco and patrol the California coast during the Midway operation. There was still a concern that either Hawaii or California might be the actual target. Dallan007 19:32, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

Not as clear as that. Nimitz had them available, but knew they were too slow to keep up with Fletcher, so he decided not to attach them. Too bad he wasn't so clearheaded about his sub dispositions. (And him a sub engineer officer. For shame.) Trekphiler 20:10, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Department of corrections

I added "(because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March)" and "(thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste)". I question the accuracy of "This information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior". Willmott's Barrier and the Javelin suggests Nagumo had not picked up the signals from Tokyo, & Yamamoto would not re-radiate it for fear of giving away the position of his Covering Force. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

Actually, if you read the Japanese carrier air group reports, it's clear that Nagumo *did* have this information in his hands *before* the battle. Akagi's summary report makes that very clear. See Shattered Sword pp. 99-104 for a discussion of this topic. The bottom line is that the Japanese communications network was disseminating current intel information to *all* the Japanese formations (including Nagumo's), and that that information was in Nagumo's hands. The issue, then, is more one of interpretation on Nagumo's part--it seems clear he chose not to alter his scouting dispositions in response to current intel.

-jon parshall-

After "California Here I Come", I'm inclined to add "(probably a deception, in case Japan still had active spies on Oahu.)" It's speculation, tho.

I deleted "By any analysis, a loss of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific." This is by no means certain. It might have forced Nimitz to change focus, increasing emphasis on submarines, thus compelling a cure to the problems with the Mark XIV torpedo (historically not cured until September 1943), which would have increased damage to Japanese trade and thus shortened the war. This would almost certainly have put paid to "guerrilla submarine" missions. In addition, it's likely to have undercut MacArthur's operations in the South West Pacific Area and his mania for return to the Philippines. (Unfortunately, this falls into "original research"...) The whole "impact" section smells of speculation; I'm inclined to delete.

Also, "Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis". Was he? I've read it was shingles, & the sources I've seen can't seem to agree.

Finally, I added, "At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo." This is based on Willmott's B&J. Trekphiler 15:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

The sites:

http://www.psoriasis.org/about/psoriasis/

and

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/shingles/shingles.htm

point out that the first is chronic and itchy and some palliative anti-malarials were available at the time, the second is episodic, painfull (think 50 to 100 recurring cigarette burns) and untreatable at that time since there were no anti-viral meds. It is unlikely that Adm. Halsey would have been incapacitated by the first, but quite likely by the second.

68.100.243.51 16:28, 14 April 2007 (UTC) Uveges 12:25, 14 April 2007 (DST)

I have a suspicion the psoriasis idea comes from the film, where Mitchum is itching like crazy. Just goes to show, you can't trust Hollywood... Trekphiler 20:05, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I just noticed that the sidebar on this page states that the Japanese had 264 Carrier aircraft and 16 float planes at the battle. It also states that 332 of their carrier aircraft were destroyed in the course of the battle. I know that Midway was a stunning victory, but that is 68 more planes than they supposedly had! I understand that sources may differ on such detalis but logic dictates that either or the other can be correct, but not both. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.54.62.114 (talk) 00:39, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

Codebreaking

I'm rather surprised that this article doesn't even contain a cursory reference to American cryptanalysis. It's surely not controversial to assert that breaking the JN-25 naval code was a major factor in the American victory, is it? Shouldn't there be at least a few links, if not a paragraph in the before-the-battle section? NewEnglandYankee 19:30, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Not having noted any objections, I've added a brief paragraph summarizing these events, with links to more detailed articles. If this information would be better presented elsewhere, feel free to move it. Also, I don't have my books handy, so more citations couldn't hurt. NewEnglandYankee 21:33, 16 February 2007 (UTC)

I am surprised that an interesting story about the codebreaking was not included. According to several sources, the American codebreakers had decoded messages that Japan was about to attack an island with the code word "AF". They were pretty sure that "AF" meant Midway, but because of the state of the US navy they had to make certain. To do this, an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders that the Commandant should send a message {in a code that they knew the Japanese had broken} to the effect that Midway's water distillation plant had broken down. Three days later the codebreakers intercepted a message from the Japanese at Kawajalein Atoll that "AF" was short of water, and this enabled Nimitz to commit his forces to the plan. User: Plerdsus 20:03 7 June 2007

"an officer was sent to Midway with verbal orders". Well, no. There's debate who's idea it was (some credit Joe Rochefort, others Jasper Holmes), but the orders were sent via cable. And what I've seen leaves some doubt whether it was a compromised cypher (one captured at Wake) or en clair; it wasn't "a code that they knew the Japanese had broken", because AFAIK, Japanese cryppies were incompetent to break even the simplest codes. It is one more example of how a single brilliant officer can tip the balance; had Rochefort not twigged to AF, the signal would never have gone on the cable. Unfortunately, it gives rise to the myth (which I've had a history prof spout) intel & radar won Midway. Sheesh. Give more credit to bad planning by Yamamoto, & even more to the PBY guys who gave Fletcher the eyes Nagumo didn't have. (Thanks to Ann Medina for calling my attention to that one.) Trekphiler 19:57, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Jargon

Spotting

what does "Spotting" in the sentence "Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes to accomplish." mean?

I believe its similar to spotting in weight-lifting, where someone is there watching from the outside making sure nothing goes wrong. -wizzard2k ^(C•T•D) 16:15, 8 June 2007 (UTC)

Putting the aircraft on the flightdeck, making them ready for immidiate take-off. --89.54.185.75 12:08, 17 June 2007 (UTC)

As in "on their spots", ready to be moved for launch as needed. They weren't all "ready for immediate takeoff"; they had to be spotted to make it possible to select what was needed & move those to ready positions. Gerry Carroll describes it "like a Chinese fire drill", & he'd know; the deck of a carrier is just short of complete chaos at the best of times, & it seems like everything is constantly in motion in all directions. It is; as Gerry notes, it's all too easy to FOD a sailor & not realize it til the engine loses power. Trekphiler 19:43, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

CAP

Hi, How to decipher "CAP" in "CAP fighters", etc.? Thanks in advance. Сергей Олегович (talk) 09:43, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

Combat air patrol. Jehochman ^Talk 10:33, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

Which raises something that's nagged at me for awhile: should we be using a U.S. term for IJN practise? And, to nitpick, was it combat air patrol then? Or carrier? I've seen both. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 10:38, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

These valid criticisms that should be investigated. Jehochman ^Talk 10:54, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

TY (means "thank you"). Сергей Олегович (talk) 11:18, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

Midway Movie

Not challenging, but would like to know why the romance in the movie would/should be considered a "preposterous romance". Thx.

Besides the fact the writing was terrible, it was extremely convenient considering who was involved... And I'm far from convinced interracial romance was as common, or accepted, in 1942 as in 1976. Also, honestly, what was the idea of putting it in a war movie? (Yeah, I know, the producer wanted to bring women into the theatre...) Trekphiler 19:33, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Operation AL?

Excellent article. Perhaps this is a nit, but did the Japanese call their attack against the Aleutians "Operation AL"? "Operation MI" is a little more believable, but were the Japanese war plans drafted in English? How would you spell "AL" in kana? 65.114.23.6 19:12, 1 September 2007 (UTC)

The Japanese (habitually) used the first two letters of the Japanese name, which (as I understand it) was a close translation of the English. Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Cut and print?

I deleted this

"Worse for the Japanese, their habit of leaving expert pilots in combat was detrimental to the training of their forces. The U.S. Navy, by contrast, rotated its best aviators home on a regular basis to teach pilot trainees the techniques they would use to defeat Japan."

and this

"In the subsequent battles around Guadalcanal in late 1942, such as Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, Japanese naval aviation was ground down by attrition despite roughly equal losses on both sides;"

and this

"Although wartime Japanese training programs produced pilots, they were insufficiently trained as the war continued, an imbalance that became worse as increasingly potent U.S. fighters became available that outmatched Japanese aircraft."

as irrelevant to Midway; put it in Pacific War, if you think it's of value. I also deleted this

"(Had there been a defeat at Midway, the U.S. might not have struck at such an early date or had the same degree of success.)"

and this

"The importance of the Battle of Midway can also be assessed by considering the hypothetical scenario of an American defeat and the destruction of the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet. With only two carriers (USS Saratoga and USS Wasp) available, the U.S. would have been forced onto the strategic defensive for at least the remainder of 1942. The Japanese could have continued their advance on the New Hebrides and cut off communication with Australia, and completed their conquest of New Guinea. Furthermore, a catastrophic failure at Midway might have resulted in the removal of key figures like Nimitz and Spruance from their positions. Offensive operations in the Pacific might have been delayed until as late as mid-1943, when Essex and Independence-class carriers became available in appreciable numbers.

"A hypothetically longer Pacific War does raise the question of the role the Soviet Union would have played in Japan's demise, and whether the USSR would have gained a postwar presence in a partitioned Japan, similar to Germany. The actual implications of an American defeat are unknowable, but there is little question losing at Midway would have narrowed U.S. options dramatically, at least in the short term. A defeat at Midway, by implicitly jeopardizing Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, might have put the "Germany First" priority of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs in grave political peril. Had the United States been obliged to focus its efforts on Japan, American intervention in Europe might well have been delayed, with incalculable implications for Germany and the Soviet Union."

as speculation. It's equally probable it would have shifted forces out of the SWPA, away from MacArthur, as FDR realized he didn't have the luxury of a "dual road" strategy; moving Oz submarines to Pearl would have significantly shortened the war, as would the preclusion of MacArthur's obsessive "return" to the Philippines. It would also have freed up landing craft, which would have made it possible to execute ANVIL and NEPTUNE similtaneously, as originally intended, which would (probably) have shortened the war. It might also have freed up Oz & AUS troops, making it more likely (if not extremely so) NEPTUNE might go off in 1943, instead; now, it's speculation about whether the Italian campaign would have happened, & whether a "disaster" at Midway would've given FDR leverage with Winston to call off Italy: that would indubitably have shortened the war. The bigger question is, would Japan have been defeated without use of the Bomb; it it wasn't, it's been suggested there might have been a major nuclear war, as the Soviets (or Stalin) doubt the West's willingness to actually use it. (I have a suspicion this was Spinrad's vision in Iron Dream.) And there's enormous flexibility in planning, economic & military; loss of two carriers, against the number actually built, was trivial. (The Essexes wouldn't arrive until 1943 in any case, but it might have put pressure on the earlier development of bulk carrier MAC-conversions, & on the priority for LCs; realizing carriers could not be built faster without significant diversion, LCs might have ended up with higher priority than historically, with results like above, plus the ability to land more men at ANVIL and NEPTUNE: a French corps, say...?) Regardless, this is no place for speculation; want to speculate, write a novel. (Don't bet on FDR replacing Nimitz; he wasn't near as quick to fire people as Winnie was.) Trekphiler 19:30, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Nagumo's decisions

"Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force"

I was reading Decision at Sea by Craig L. Symonds, and I think he actually says the time between Nagumo's demand for a confirmation from the scout plane and the plane actually finding a carrier was 10 minutes rather than 40. I may have to check again, though Masterblooregard 10:38, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

It was about 30, IIRC, between the two reports. Nagumo, when he passed the information along, suggested they were nearly similtaneous. Trekphiler 14:10, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

Invasion of Hawaii

A source is given for This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa, as well as an invasion of Hawaii. it is "For a detailed discussion of anticipated follow-on Hawaiian operations, see Parshall & Tully, pp. 43–45, & Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun." But what does the source say for example what was the name of the contingency plan if it existed for an invasion or was it just a contingency plan for a raid? Or is it speculation by the author that the Japanese might have been planning an invasion or a raid. --Philip Baird Shearer 10:43, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Looks like I'll be hunting down a copy of that book so I can see what the name of the notional operation(s) would have been. I understand Parshall and Tully uncovered a true invasion, not a raid. Personally, I think it would have been the Japanese's Bridge Too Far as they had no way to stream materiel out to Hawaii in greater quantity than the US could have. Binksternet 20:20, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

"Bridge too Far"? Raid or putative invasion (it was a dream of Yamamoto's for years, from what Stephan sez) doesn't make any difference, because invading Hawaii was a fantasy beyond IJA means to execute, in manpower or shipping. If you want to read fantasy, read Stephan. Trekphiler 21:51 & 22:16, 10 October 2007 (UTC)

Comment: Prospects for a Hawaii invasion improved if the Battle of Midway had been won by the Japanese i.e., large numbers of US ships, including most or all aircraft carriers, destroyed (& correspondingly, in a best case scenario, few, if any, Japanese ships lost). Also, if such an outcome had occurred, the timing of a Hawaii invasion could have been delayed for as long as practical in order for the general momentum to be optimum.76.14.240.177 (talk) 03:45, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

No, they didn't. It was beyond IJA shipping & manpower even Fletcher lost his entire force at Midway. It was a pipedream. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 08:09, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

Attacks on the Japanese fleet

Changed: 'Despite their horrific sacrifices' => 'Despite their losses' Removed for use of weasel words: 'It is generally agreed the valor of the torpedo squadrons was responsible for the success of the dive bombers' —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.117.50.2 (talk) 17:58, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

"...the Japanese had never had an opportunity to spot their reserve strike force for launch." What is that sentence fragment telling me?

"History would show the submarine had already made a more important contribution." I don't get this statement either.

Thanks, Daniel.Cardenas (talk) 16:30, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

"reserve strike force for launch" Nagumo had birds in reserve, but couldn't get them ready to launch before the DBs arrived.

Re Nautilus, read the article: she fired on a CV & was counterattacked by the DD the DBs (McClusky?) followed back. Trekphiler (talk) 07:31, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

Untrained melody?

The "untrained" pilots remark got del, but it's not completely wrong. Some of the crews hadn't completed training yet. I just can't recall if they came from Midway or 1 of Fletcher's airwings... I think they were from Midway's Windindicator squadrons. Can somebody check? Trekphiler (talk) 13:38, 22 January 2008 (UTC)

Factcheck.com

"the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier." It's fact-tagged, but I've read it somewhere, too.

"Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers." It's sourced, but I call that POV; carriers without aircrews are expensive toys, not fighting units. Trekphiler (talk) 17:23, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

Number of a/c lost in infobox

I'm simply eliminating the old chatter on this subject. This is precisely known information, and not open to speculation. Please see Shattered Sword, p. 91 for an *exact* roster of the Japanese carrier aircraft in the battle. There were 248 carrier aircraft aboard Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu. That includes 227 in the organic air groups of the vessels themselves (including spares) and the 21 aircraft of 6th Air Group being ferried to Midway (which were also carrier capable Zeros, and three of which actually fought during the battle). 248. No more. No less. And that's how many were lost. 248.

Same with the aviator casualties. See Shattered Sword p. 476 for that. 110 carrier aviators total (that's pilots, navigators, radio operators) were lost. No more. No less. We know every one of their *names*, as derived from the kodochoshos (the Japanese air group records) of the battle. So, again, this point isn't really open to debate or speculation.

Likewise, the number of Japanese fatalities in the battle as a whole is *precisely* known: 3,057. This is taken from a Japanese volume called Midowei Kaisen: Kiroku, wherein the Japanese author (Sawachi Hisae) went through Japanese prefectural records to discover the identity of each and every man. Her book contains the name, date and prefecture of birth, age and rank at time of death, and marital status of *every single one* of the Japanese fatalities, as well as the Americans for that matter. It is a truly stunning piece of research, and it *absolutely trumps any other source* regarding the casualties for this battle.

I'm sorry; I feel like I'm coming across like a jerk, but it's depressing to have gotten an article into shape to get it's star awarded, and then you go away for a year and all this cruft and heresay has crept back in. Regarding the Japanese figures I think I can safely say that I know what I'm talking about...

-jon parshall-

Spruance Changing Course Night of June 4

The article currently reads:

As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon the derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained at hand and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell.

But Prange and other authors mention that Spruance withdrew to the east until midnight and then turned back west. This decision was critical because it avoided a possible night engagement with Kondo's battleships, who were pursuing the Americans at the time. Should this not be corrected? Dallan007 (talk) 22:42, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

It's true. Spruance turned east in response to Murphy's sighting, which led Spruance to believe the Invasion Force was inbound still, when in fact Yamamoto had ordered his cruisers (which Murphy spotted) to turn back. Murphy's signal was at 02.15 (Blair, p.246-8). Trekphiler (talk) 10:39, 9 March 2008 (UTC)

The dive bombers

More mention here should be made that Midway was won with fantastic luck and skill by a small group of diver bombers lead by Wade McCluskey.

It was McCluskey decision to go further then they should have. It was then his decision to go north-west where they were lucky to sight the Japanese destroyer Arashii. Following the direction this destroyer was going, the US diver bombers found the Japanese fleet then they perfectly executed an assault.

Also mention here should be made of Lt. Richard Best miracle shot that took out the Akagi.

Solomon is Wise (talk) 14:47, 13 March 2008 (UTC)

And if Nautilus hadn't fired on Soryu (?), Arashi would never have been there to chase... Trekphiler (talk) 17:22, 14 March 2008 (UTC)

As I understand the Japanies forces were already discovered at the moment of the divers' attack and assaulted by Torpedo Squadron. So what was the reason of divers weren't directed acordingly? Radio comm inadequate? Сергей Олегович (talk) 05:27, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Without solid sourcing in front of me, I can offer 2 possibilities: Intersquadron comm was pretty bad (recall, VFs couldn't always find their own VT/VBs, so cross-air wing comm had to be bad), & Fletcher, who could (if "Midway" is to be believed) hear everything wouldn't open up, at risk of giving his pos away. Don't forget, the idea (or capability) of an airborne "CP", in the fashion of Hillsboro in 'nam, didn't exist yet. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 17:21, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

Sounds reasonable. Thanks for the explanation. Сергей Олегович (talk) 05:42, 11 November 2008 (UTC)

References and Further reading

I have renamed External links Further reading and moved all the books that are not cited out of "References" into "Further reading" and copied all the books I could find in Notes into References sorting them on the surname of the author. See WP:CITE and WP:LAYOUT, I was surprised that as this is a Featured Article this had not already been done.

Some of the entries in the reference list now need additional information such as: edition/year of publication, publisher, and ISBN--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:07, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

Maj. Lofton Henderson

Would someone add in information about the squadron of Marine dive bombers based on Midway? It was led by Major Lofton Henderson, who was killed during the attack on the Japanese fleet, and for whom Henderson Field on Guadalcanal was named. This is a pretty big omission. 74.194.82.219 (talk) 02:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

"Speculation" About Impact of Battle?

I see that one Trekphiler has deleted my couple of sentences about the consequence of a Japanese victory at Midway for the "Germany First" strategy, despite their being sourced to a speech by former SecNav Schlesinger.

Exactly how does one evaluate the "impact" of a battle -- Marathon? Waterloo? Stalingrad? -- without considering the results had it gone the other way? That is not "fiction."

I don't see why a narrow notion of history's permissible scope should be an excuse for deleting valid analysis of why a battle was important. --Andersonblog (talk) 17:40, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Simple. Historiography traditionally deals with fact, not speculation. If you're going to talk about the effect on FDR, I want to see the impact on the subwar, how Nimitz might've been inclined (if not compelled) to pull subs from Oz to Hawaii, which would shorten the PW. I want to see how Winston would have lobbied hard for more effort in ETO & the prospect for him agreeing to abandon plans for TORCH. I want an analysis of FDR's inclination to keep promises or stand firm in the face of outcry. I want an acknowledgment of how there was already more manpower going to PTO than ETO. And maybe most of all, I want to see how Nagumo achieves it short of a miracle. Put it in the source notes for the interested (&, BTW, I'd look for those sources myself), but leave aside the speculation. This isn't the place for it, & "impact" sections have been taken out before without undue protest. TREKphiler 18:23, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for keeping the article factual, Trekphiler. Binksternet (talk) 02:35, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

De nada. I confess a COI on it; I want to see the sources left in... TREKphiler 03:20, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

The "Impact" section states that the loss of four carriers was a heavier blow than the loss of experienced pilots at Midway. I am not sure it is objectively possible to say that one of these had greater impact than the other. My own feeling is that the loss of pilots was the greater blow to the Japanese than the loss of carriers. In 1942, the Japanese still had capability to build carriers and also convert other ships to carriers. Building (i.e. training) an experienced pilot is something else; this takes time. As Saburo Sakai showed, the Zero in experienced hands was still a very formidable weapon in 1942. But in inexperienced hands, the Zero's lack of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks were much more exposed. Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot, thus making the Zero's weak defense a minor point. At Midway, the Japanese lost many irreplacable Sakai's. --Westwind273 (talk) 09:21, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

I think it's a "6 of 1, half doz the other". IJN did still have experienced aviators, & training new ones (if not of equal caliber) could be done with reasonable facility; building a new CV (or converting a tanker) would take years, time & yard space Japan could not spare. She was barely keeping pace with repairs on damaged merchantmen as it was, a situation that would not improve as the PacFleet Sub Force became more effective. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 13:41, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

Good points; you may be right. What sticks in my mind is later events like the Battle of the Philippine Sea (i.e The Marianas Turkey Shoot). At that battle, the Japanese seemed to have enough carriers. But the inexperience of the pilots led them to make an amateurish attack, which resulted in hundreds of planes shot down. Had those planes been manned by the experienced pilots of Midway (and men like Sakai), I somehow think they would have fared better. Although Japanese planes were inferior by 1944, the few remaining expert pilots were still able to score victories in Zeros and Raidens. --Westwind273 (talk) 08:21, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

I agree that the loss of the carriers was equal to the loss of the airmen; neither was "a heavier blow." However, the aviator losses could have been easily augmented with a training program if it had been started early enough to make a difference by mid-1942. Japan had the human resources. What they truly lacked was the raw materials to make more aircraft carriers and aircraft. Their economy at its peak was one-tenth the strength of the USA's and their imports were now choked off by submarine attacks. Japan also lacked the vision to see how their military code of honor was going to continue taking good aviators to their deaths for very little reason. A number of pilots could have been saved with parachutes and rescue operations. The green "Turkey Shoot" pilots could have been better used on a handful of lesser missions that would have built them up as veteran pilots before the big showdown. Finally, theirs was a war effort run entirely by military men, not civilian technology experts and politicians. The Japanese Army and Navy both cared little for advancements like radar and radio, two technologies that could have saved a few more men if implemented as widely as within US forces. The Japanese never had much hope for success in an extended war, as long as Americans wanted to roll up their sleeves and fight — a situation that surprised the Japanese military planners who thought of their enemy as a nation of shopkeepers. At any rate, the great impact of the battle of Midway was a combination of factors all culminating in making Midway the defining turning point where Japan was now unable to win. Binksternet (talk) 16:08, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

While I don't disagree training could have been ramped up sooner to make up losses, that presupposes better planning, which wasn't in place in fact. Absent that, the only adequate response is a ramp-up after the Midway losses; shipbuilding couldn't cope, but training had the chance to. That said, loss of carriers was de facto the heavier.

As to "cared little for advancements", if Peattie & Evans describe the situation correctly, it's more like incompetence in technical matters. Technical training was virtually nonexistent, & technical competence wasn't valued or understood as desirable, let alone necessary.

"Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot" True, but he was a rare case. Moreover, Japanese engineering capacity was incapable of producing superior aircraft able to protect the inferior Japanese aviators while providing performance equal to the F4F, let alone the F4U or P-38. (I count the F6F somewhat less dominating in performance.) When the cream of IJN were lost at Midway, it was only a matter of time.

This was only exacerbated by (frankly) stupid strategic decisions in SWPA, & technical incompetence. Given these didn't happen, American forethought in accelerating training, & vastly superior engineering capacity (to even create the likes of the F4U, never mind build thousands of F6Fs & P-38s), meant the outcome was never in doubt. And the airedales should give the Sub Force their due; if Nimitz hadn't bungled his dispositions & force placements so badly (his one real mistake), & if BuOrd & Customs hadn't f*cked up so badly prewar, it would've been over before the end of '43. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 04:54, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Contribution of Nautilus

From a reader (not a historian.)

The last line of the "Attacks on the Japanese fleet" section reads, "History would show Nautilus had already made a more important contribution."

It's not clear in the article what the Nautilus's contribution was. Was it locating Japanese ships?

If this could be clarified, thanks. Accordion Noir (talk) 08:26, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

The USS Nautilus (SS-168) article doesn't support such a claim, so I'm taking it out. Clarityfiend (talk) 16:12, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Not clear? Nautilus fired at Kaga & was counterattacked by Arashi, which was followed back to the Kido Butai by Leslie & McClusky ("The destroyer was steaming at full speed back to Nagumo's carrier force, after having unsuccessfully depth-charged the U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier carried out an unsuccessful attack"). If the Nautilus page doesn't support it, the page is wrong; between Blair & others, the support is there. I do wonder where "battleship Kirishima" comes in, but... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:39, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

"The USS Nautilus (SS-168) article doesn't support such a claim"? What's this, then?

"Unknown to Brockman at the time, the destroyer counterattacking him, in her rush to rejoin, was tracked by Enterprise's VB-6, led by Wade McClusky, back to the Japanese task force."

Looks like confirmation to me... It's backed up by Lord & Blair, & by Fuchida & Prange, too, I think. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 17:03, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Frankly, the sentence strikes me as a mild example of WP:PEACOCK. (If a hadn't done b, then c wouldn't have happened, and the whole course of the battle would have changed.) However, if you're going to restore it, at least address the OP's concerns and explain in the article just what the contribution was. Clarityfiend (talk) 17:12, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

I'll have a look. As it reads, tho, the dismal failure of her attack undermines the pivotal importance of Arashi. Without Nautilus, would McClusky have found the task force? I'm not objective enough about the Sub Force to leave the failed attack as the last impression of Nautilus, given the earlier role's importance. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 19:00 & 19:06, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

Try it now. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:33, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

That doesn't work. It puts Nautilus's later attack out of chronological order and breaks up the flow of the narrative, so I've restored the original version, more or less. I don't see that the pivotal role of Arashi being diminished by the sub's lack of hits nor do I consider the latter to be a dismal failure, but whatever the case, it's not our job to sugarcoat events. However, one sentence isn't going to make a lot of difference, so the status quo is acceptable to me. Clarityfiend (talk) 02:36, 8 September 2008 (UTC)

<--I'd leave it, aside "out of chronological order", because it really didn't amount to anything much. If she'd sunk, or even damaged, Kaga, I'd agree. She didn't, so it's not like it matters. Also, put in a footnote, its importance in the broader narrative is subdued, so "out of sequence" is less significant; given no real effect, total omission of the Kaga attack wouldn't bother me, either. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 02:47, 8 September 2008 (UTC)

Absent howls of protest, I'm going to take out Nautilus's failed attack, as having no effect on the battle, & because it's already on her page. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:10, 9 September 2008 (UTC)

I don't know why I didn't notice this before... Nautilus says (based on Blair) the "BB" ID as Kirishima here, which also claims Nagara attacked with depth charges (which Brockman stated, & both Blair, & I, don't believe.), is more probably a cruiser (Nagara?). I don't know what the original source for the website's material is, but there's a clear contradiction. (I'd call it "obvious", if I had seen it sooner...) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:41, 9 September 2008 (UTC) Or maybe not.... More careful (...) reading of Blair, which I should have done before, clarifies: Nautilus got a shot at a BB; Blair doesn't ID her, & credits Kirishima to Red Ramage's Trout. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 03:04, 10 September 2008 (UTC)

Number of Japanese Planes

When showing the Strength of Japanese forces in table on the right side of the article, it shows 264 carrier aircraft, and 16 floatplanes.

When showing the Casualties and Losses, it shows 332 aircraft destroyed.

The losses are more than the total forces indicated. Something is wrong here.

98.203.18.250 (talk) 03:16, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

This Office of Naval Intelligence report estimates 275 Japanese planes lost. Clarityfiend (talk) 06:42, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Timecop

Conventional wisdom Nagumo didn't have time to launch his strike birds before the inbound strike arrived is contradicted by Bicheno's Midway (which I just read, but don't have in front of me...), which says Nagumo had time but was persuaded against it by his staffers (not Fuchida or Tomonaga, but Kobayashi & Kikumi, IIRC). If somebody's got a copy handy, the "quandry" bears revision. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:15, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Looking at my notes, Bicheno (p134) says there were 18 Vals each abd Hiryu & Sōryū ready to launch immediately, & half the CAP detail could've been sent. There's a clear contradiction. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 08:46, 19 October 2008 (UTC)

Porosity

In reply Clarityfiend, no, USN boats wern't so effective yet. They were, however, easily reaching Home Waters, Tsushima Strait, Yellow Sea, & Luzon/Formosa Straits with virtually no interference from Japanese ASW for the duration. The need for bases to (try to) plug the gaps was fairly clear, even to IJN's incompetent ASW command. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 02:08, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

New additions

There have been some new additions by TREKphiler recently. They are appropriately sourced, but it's getting somewhat confusing. Now we have sections stating that Japan's aim was to extend the "defence perimeter", while other say that the attack was aimed at the US carrier force or demoralizing the US in order to obtain a better negotiating position.

While all those paragraphs may be "correct" in themselves, they create a somewhat confusing picture when read together. I say they should be rewritten in order to create a coherent picture again.

I also object to the introduction getting too detailed. Some of the information may easily be moved into the article body. Remember that the introduction is meant to give a broad overview of the subject. Averell (talk) 17:10, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

The latest paragraph was not added by Trekphiler, but by somebody else. However, I agree it strays a bit too far from the battle itself, so I've said goodbye to Mr. CCHIPSS' contribution, other than a mention of the Doolittle Raid.

As for the length and detail of the remaining introductory section, I feel it is appropriate to an article of this size. (However, I wouldn't object to getting rid of "Japan was unable to keep pace with American shipbuilding and aircrew training programs in providing replacements. By 1942, the United States was three years into a ship building program, mandated by the Second Vinson Act, intended to make the navy larger than Japan's.") Clarityfiend (talk) 22:55, 21 November 2008 (UTC)

I was trying to keep it factual, 'cause it wasn't strictly wrong, so there wasn't a basis for taking it out. I did, however, lose sight of the bigger picture. (All too EZ to do...) As a motivation for the attack, tho, U.S. shipbuilding was a very important factor; Yamamoto knew he had to strike before the Vinson building caught up with him... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 04:25, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

I wasn't suggesting to remove factual information. I'm not an expert on the topic, so I'm commenting this as a reader. And as a reader, when I see various reasons for this attack given just so, I get a bit confused. I'd like to learn how these play together or if maybe there's a disagreement in the literature or if they are all valid at the same time and which ones were the most important. Something that puts those things into a common context. As for the intro, it should only mention the central motives, while the rest should be in the article body (not removed). Averell (talk) 08:48, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

No argument on either point, & only a small one with moving: had I been paying a bit more attention, I would have moved it... (Whence "bigger picture".) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 09:39, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

Yorktown

I'd like to delete or modify the passage It remains unclear why Yorktown had not been placed under tow immediately after being hit, to get her out of reach of Japanese attack. Nimitz ordered the nearest ocean tug, the U.S.S. Vireo, to take the Yorktown under tow. But the Vireo was 160 miles away from the Yorktown. At a top speed of ten knots, it couldn't arrive until midday on the fifth.--Work permit (talk) 00:07, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

It's not as if a salvage tug was the only way to place her under tow, which was the point. Bicheno (which I just finished) says there was trouble with the tow parting to begin with (a DD/2 used, which I was presuming), & I imagine there were issues of doing repairs on her with way on, in particular trying to pump her out (including trying to relight the boilers?), but I don't have any sources for it. Better info on what was going on aboard would be helpful, if anybody's got it. (And, d*mmit, I had B&J in my hands yesterday, & I forgot to look & see what he says about her sailing...! #@*#%$%)

"War and Remembrance": the TV mini-series

The TV mini-series "War and Remembrance", which starred Robert Mitchum and MANY other famous actors and actresses is not included in the "in film" credits for this historical battle. The 'Battle of Midway' episode in that series is FAR more historically accurate than the movie: "Battle of Midway" which starred Charlto Heston (and many others), so I think it should at least be mentioned under the "in film" category. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.13.254.157 (talk) 17:46, 2 January 2009 (UTC)

Aircraft strength and losses

The Japanese losses exceed their initial strength. How can this be? Dapi89 (talk) 00:17, 17 January 2009 (UTC)