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Dave Schroeder Report 3 11 April 2009

Prof. Marian Leerburger, INTL505 D002 Win 09 American Military University

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Introduction

Expansion of Soviet Communism is among the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. The USSR is advancing efforts to exert control and influence in Europe and other critical regions in the Eastern hemisphere. This influence could dramatically alter the postwar balance of power, and limit US access to strategic regions and resources. The USSR also aligns with Communist and nationalist movements to assert influence. The United States should therefore continue a doctrine of steadfast opposition to the advance of Soviet influence and measured responses to Communism whenever possible.

Key Notes

  • The actions of the USSR are designed to solidify and expand centralized power over a network of satellite states.
  • Postwar economic and labor issues remain critical in European states and have been used to advance Communist interests.
  • Soviet influence in and penetration of the Far East and Southeast Asia is damaging to US strategic interests and resource access.
  • Proper management of Germany and Western sectors of Berlin is crucial to providing a basis for resistance to Soviet influence.
  • Effective support for US interests in all regions requires either support of government from the populace, or significant US economic aid.

Assessment

Support of Western-friendly sentiment in Germany and in Western sectors of Berlin is critical to countering the notion that Soviet influence is inevitable. Most people in Germany are more concerned with basic economic issues than with issues of the constitution of government. Because of this, the US must maintain an environment in which the needs of the German people are consistently met. The Soviet attention to Germany highlights the importance of countering Soviet aims there. The airlift operations to Berlin are proving successful, and have solidified anti-Soviet sentiment. Such aggressive initiatives should be maintained, as they serve as a key element of proof of US commitment to the German people.

Splintering of the Communist movement is also helpful to US interests. For example, Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans are uniquely at odds with the Communist Party leadership of the Soviet Union. This splintering of support is valuable to demonstrate that socialism in the vision of Soviet Communist leadership is not a unified force that will eventually dominate the global political landscape. While Tito is not particularly friendly with the West, this estrangement from the central Soviet Communist machinery is an embarrassment to Soviet leadership; as such, any action by the US that can reinforce this discord is beneficial to US interests. The Yugoslavia situation has also revealed Cominform to be the effective successor of Comintern, and a primary mechanism via which the USSR exerts authority over its satellite states. While the USSR exploits nationalism to promote the adoption of a Communist agenda under de facto Soviet leadership, this also serves to show that the Soviets’ primary intent is subjugation of client states to its wishes. This exposure weakens support for the Soviet party leadership among nationalist movements normally leveraged by the Communists. It is prudent for the US to assist Yugoslav efforts opposed to centralized Soviet Communist authority.

In the Pacific and Far East, suspicion is pervasive of US motivations in the rehabilitation of Japan and support for South Korea. The Soviet strategy is to blame the US for the division in Korea, establishing a Soviet-backed Communist government in the North. The Soviets could then call for a withdrawal of both US and Soviet forces from Korea while still maintaining significant influence. The US must work to allay these fears by showing clear support for the newly established South Korean government. This will allow the US to maintain a position against Soviet advance in this critical and resource-rich region.

A larger issue of Soviet and Communist influence is one of access to resources. Soviet control of client states and Communist-instigated labor disturbances affect global supplies and pricing for raw materials, such as steel and rubber. The production in the US and her allies alone is often not sufficient to meet the world demand, nor often the demands of Allied states in an economically viable fashion. Restrictions in the supply of essential resources can dramatically impact the US materially and economically. For this reason, robust opposition should be maintained to Soviet and Communist influences that adversely impact access, supply, and acquisition.

US-friendly governments in regions such as Latin America need the support of the populace or aid from the United States to remain viable. Nationalism in times of economic or social strife in many Latin American states often slants toward non-cooperation with the US. Prosperity creates a social stability in which populations are more likely to support their US-friendly governments. This stability via prosperity can come in the form of real local economic advantage, or external support from the United States via ECA or other measures. The US should endeavor to provide aid, when necessary, to allow for the continued support for governments aligned with US strategic interests.

Conclusion

While many issues face the United States globally, the greatest threat is the advance of Communism. The Soviet Union has clearly shown it means to advance Soviet Communism and assert influence in Europe and Southeast Asia. The scope and potential impact of Soviet involvement means that the Soviet Union may directly or indirectly control a host of states across broad regions, thus controlling vital access to resources while expanding its might. Opportunities exist to expose Soviet Communism not as a friend of labor or as a benevolent provider, but as an exploiter of people and sentiments to serve Soviet aims. Regions and resources of strategic importance should not be allowed to fall under Soviet control. The doctrine of broad policies that stand in opposition to the advance of Communism should continue, and be expanded.

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