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Indonesian invasion of East Timor

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See also: Indonesian occupation of East Timor
Indonesian invasion of East Timor
Part of the Cold War
DateDecember 7, 1975 - 1978
Location
East Timor
Result East Timor became Indonesia's province
Belligerents
 Indonesia FRETILIN (FALINTIL)
Commanders and leaders

Suharto
Maraden Panggabean

Benny Moerdani

Nicolau Lobato † Xanana Gusmao
Mau Honi
Nino Konis Santana

Taur Matan Ruak
Strength
35,000 soldiers

2,500 regular troops
7,000 militia
10,000 reservists

Total 20,000
Casualties and losses
Indonesians killed, wounded, or missing 1,000 Estimates of East Timorese killed include 60,000 and 100,000 (mostly civilians)[citation needed]
Part of a series on the
History of East Timor
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Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 following the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which led to Portugal's withdrawal from East Timor as its colonial ruler.

Background

East Timor owes its territorial distinctiveness from the rest of Timor, and the Indonesian archipelago as a whole, to the fact that it was colonized by the Portuguese, not the Dutch (an agreement dividing the island between the two powers was signed in 1915). In alliance with local chieftains, the Portuguese established an increasingly harsh regime of exploitation and corvée (forced) labour that, by the turn of the twentieth century, swept up the entire able-bodied male population. The colonial regime was replaced by the Japanese during World War II, whose occupation spawned a resistance movement that resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Timorese, or 13 percent of the entire population at the time. Following the war, the Dutch East Indies secured its independence as the independent Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese, meanwhile, re-established control over East Timor.

Portuguese withdrawal and civil war

In April 1974, the left-wing Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement, MFA) within the Portuguese military mounted a coup d'état against the right-wing authoritarian Estado Novo government in Lisbon (the so-called "Carnation Revolution"), and announced their intention to rapidly withdraw from Portugal's colonial possessions (including Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea were pro-independence guerrilla movements were fighting since the 1960s). Indigenous political parties rapidly sprang up in Timor. Elections for a National Constituent Assembly were set for 1976, with full independence anticipated three years thereafter. By 1975, the leading political force in the territory was Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor), which had established strong grassroots support throughout the countryside with progressive policies aimed at improving the lives of the peasantry. In January 1975, Fretilin formed an alliance with the other main political grouping, the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorense, UDT), and local elections were held under the supervision of the Portuguese parliament's Decolonization Committee.

In mid-June 1975, Fretilin forces, led by a former soldier in the Portuguese army, Hermengildo Alves, had briefly seized power in Oecusse, a small enclave of Portuguese territory within West Timor. Jill Jolliffe reports that “the Portuguese regained control after sending a negotiating force from Dili as a result of which Alves was gaoled for twenty days and UDT and Fretilin agreed to rule jointly.” This coalition prevailed in the Oecusse enclave for the next few months.

However, within four days of their August 11 coup in the capital, UDT leaders arrested more than 80 Fretilin members, including future leader Xanana Gusmao. UDT members killed a dozen Fretilin members in four locations. The victims included a founding member of Fretilin, and a brother of its vice-president, Nicolau Lobato. Fretilin responded by appealing successfully to the Portuguese-trained East Timorese military units. UDT’s violent takeover thus provoked the three-week civil war, pitting its fifteen hundred troops against the two thousand regular forces now led by Fretilin commanders.

By the end of August, UDT remnants were retreating toward the Indonesian border. A UDT group of nine hundred crossed into West Timor on September 24, followed by more than a thousand others, leaving Fretilin in control of East Timor for the ensuing three months. The death toll in the civil war reportedly included four hundred people in Dili and possibly sixteen hundred in the hills. In the aftermath, "numerous UDT supporters were beaten and jailed" by the Fretilin victors.

Indonesian motivations

Indonesian nationalist and military hardliners, particularly leaders of the intelligence agency Kopkamtib and special operations unit, Opsus, saw the Portuguese coup as an opportunity for East Timor's annexation by Indonesia.[1] The head of Opsus and close Suharto adviser, Major General Ali Murtopo, and his protege Brigadier General Benny Murdani were head of military intelligence operations, spearheaded the Indonesia pro-annexation push.[1] Indonesian domestic political factors in the mid-1970s, however, were not conducive to such expansionist intentions; the 1974-75 financial scandal surrounding petroleum producer Pertamina meant that Indonesia had to be cautious not to alarm critical foreign donors and bankers. Schwarz suggests that this helps explains President Suharto's reluctance to follow the army's desire to invade earlier in 1975.[2]

Such considerations, however, became overshadowed by Indonesian and Western fears that victory for the left-wing Fretilin would lead to the creation of a communist state on Indonesia's border that could be used as a base for incursions by unfriendly powers into Indonesia, and a potential threat to Western submarines. It was also feared that an independent East Timor within the archipelago could inspire secessionist sentiments within Indonesian provinces. These concerns were successfully used to garner support from Western countries keen to maintain good relations with Indonesia, particularly the United States who at the time was completing its withdrawal from Indochina.[3] The military intelligence organisations initially sought a non-military annexation strategy, intending to use APODETI as its integration vehicle.[1] Indonesia's ruling "New Order" planned for the invasion of East Timor. There was no free expression in "New Order" Indonesia and thus no need was seen for consulting the East Timorese either.[4]

In early September, as many as two hundred special forces troops launched incursions, which were noted by US intelligence, and in October, conventional military assaults followed. Five journalists, known as the Balibo Five, working for Australian news networks were executed by Indonesian troops in the border town of Balibo on October 16.[5]

Invasion

The integration monument in Dili was donated by the Indonesian government to represent emancipation from colonialism

On 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor. Operasi Seroja (Operation Lotus) was the largest military operation ever carried out by that nation.[6][7]

Following naval bombardment of Dili, Indonesian seaborne troops landed in the city while simultaneously paratroopers descended.[8] 641 Indonesian paratroopers jumped into Dili, where they engaged in six-hours combat with FALINTIL gunmen. By noon, Indonesian forces had taken the city at the cost of 35 Indonesian soldiers killed, while 122 FALINTIL gunmen died in the combat.[9]

On December 10, a second invasion resulted in the capture of the second biggest town, Baucau, and on Christmas Day, around 10,000 - 15,000 troops landed at Liquisa and Maubara. By April 1976 Indonesia had some 35,000 soldiers in East Timor, with another 10,000 standing by in Indonesian West Timor. A large proportion of these troops were from Indonesia's elite commands.

By the end of the year, 10,000 troops occupied Dili and another 20,000 had been deployed throughout East Timor.[10] Massively outnumbered, FALINTIL troops fled to the mountains and continued guerrilla combat operations.[11]

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik suggested that the number of East Timorese killed in the first two years of the occupation was "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000".[12]

In the cities, Indonesian troops began killing East Timorese.[13] At the start of the occupation, FRETILIN radio sent the following broadcast: "The Indonesian forces are killing indiscriminately. Women and children are being shot in the streets. We are all going to be killed.... This is an appeal for international help. Please do something to stop this invasion."[14] One Timorese refugee told later of "rape [and] cold-blooded assassinations of women and children and Chinese shop owners".[15] Dili's bishop at the time, Martinho da Costa Lopes, said later: "The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets — all we could see were the soldiers killing, killing, killing."[16] In one incident, a group of fifty men, women, and children – including Australian freelance reporter Roger East – were lined up on a cliff outside of Dili and shot, their bodies falling into the sea.[17] Many such massacres took place in Dili, where onlookers were ordered to observe and count aloud as each person was executed.[18] In addition to FRETILIN supporters, Chinese migrants were also singled out for execution; five hundred were killed in the first day alone.[19]

In March 1976, UDT leader Lopes da Cruz reported that 60,000 Timorese had been killed during the invasion.[20] A delegation of Indonesian relief workers agreed with this statistic.[21] In an interview on 5 April 1977 with the Sydney Morning Herald, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said the number of dead was "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000".[12] A figure of 100,000 is cited by McDonald (1980) and by Taylor[22]

Annexation and integration operations

The Indonesian government presented its annexation of East Timor as a matter of anticolonial unity. A 1977 booklet from the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled Decolonization in East Timor, paid tribute to the "sacred right of self-determination"[23] and recognized APODETI as the true representatives of the East Timorese majority. It claimed that FRETILIN's popularity was the result of a "policy of threats, blackmail and terror".[24] Later, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated this position in his 2006 memoir The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor.[25] The island's original division into east and west, Indonesia argued after the invasion, was "the result of colonial oppression" enforced by the Portuguese and Dutch imperial powers. Thus, according to the Indonesian government, its annexation of the 27th province was merely another step in the unification of the archipelago which had begun in the 1940s.[26]

The Provisional Government of East Timor was installed in mid-December, consisting of Apodeti and UDT leaders. Attempts by the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi to visit Fretilin-held areas from Darwin, Australia were obstructed by the Indonesian military, which blockaded East Timor. On May 31 1976, a 'People's Assembly' in Dili, selected by Indonesian intelligence, unanimously endorsed an 'Act of Integration', and on July 17, East Timor officially became the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. Although the United Nations had turned a blind eye to the Indonesian annexation of West Irian some years previously, the occupation of East Timor remained a public issue in many nations, Portugal in particular, and the UN never recognised either the regime installed by the Indonesians or the subsequent annexation.

Although during the beginning of the conflict Fretilin controlled most of East Timor and, at the same time as organizing schooling, medicines and food distribution, managed to keep the powerful invading forces at bay. However, when the Indonesians started to use United States OV-10 Bronco jets and US-trained pilots to bomb Fretilin militia in the mountains and lay waste the fields and foliage that militia used for cover, resistance became difficult. Finally the Indonesian encirclement and annihilation campaign of 1977-1978 broke the back of the main Fretilin militia and the capable Timorese President and military commander, Nicolau Lobato, was shot and killed by helicopter-borne Indonesian troops on 31 December 1978. From then on the conflict turned into small-scale guerilla warfare in which a few bands of Fretilin guerillas continued operating in some of the mountainous areas of East Timor.

The 1975-1978 period from the beginning of the invasion to the largely successful conclusion of the encirclement and annihilation campaign proved to be the toughest period of the whole conflict, costing the Indonesians more than 1000 fatalities out of a total of 2000 Indonesian who died during their entire occupation.[27]

The Fretilin militia who survived the Indonesian offensive of the late 1970s chose Xanana Gusmao as their leader. He was caught by Indonesian intelligence near Dili in 1992, and was replaced by Mau Honi, who was captured in 1993 and was in turn replaced by Nino Konis Santana. Santana was killed in an Indonesian ambush in 1998 and was replaced by Taur Matan Ruak. By the 1990s, there were only approximately less than 200 guerillas who remained in the mountains and the separatist idea had largely shifted to the clandestine front in the cities. The clandestine movement, however, was largely paralysed by continuous arrests and infiltration by Indonesian agents. The prospects of independence was very dark until the fall of Suharto in 1998 and President Habibie's sudden decision to allow a referendum in East Timor in 1999.

Occupation

Main article: Indonesian occupation of East Timor

The victims in East Timor included not only that substantial 'part' of the Timorese 'national group' targeted for destruction because of their resistance to Indonesian annexation... but also most members of the twenty-thousand strong ethnic Chinese minority prominent in the towns of East Timor, whom Indonesian forces singled out for destruction, apparently because of their ethnicity 'as such.'"[28][29].

US views

A year earlier, in December 1974, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had been asked by an Indonesian government representative whether or not the US would approve the invasion.[30] In March 1975, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom, recommended a "policy of silence" on the issue and was supported by Kissinger.[31] On October 8, 1975, a member of the United States National Security Council, Philip Habib, told meeting participants that "It looks like the Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor." Kissinger's response to Habib was, "I'm assuming you're really going to keep your mouth shut on this subject."[32]

On the day before the invasion, US President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger met with Indonesian president Haji Mohammad Suharto. According to declassified documents released by the National Security Archive (NSA), in December 2001, they gave a green light for the invasion. In response to Suharto saying "We want your understanding if it was deemed necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East Timor]." Ford replied, "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have." Kissinger similarly agreed, though he had fears that the use of US-made arms in the invasion would be exposed to public scrutiny, talking of their desire to "influence the reaction in America" so that "there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorised way."[33]

The US also hoped the invasion would be relatively swift and not involve protracted resistance. "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly," Kissinger said to Suharto. [34]

Western governments also had a role in supplying weapons to Indonesia. While the US government claimed to have suspended military assistance from December 1975 to June 1976, military aid was actually above what the US Department of State proposed and the US Congress continued to increase it. [34]

The US also made four new offers of arms, including supplies and parts for 16 OV-10 Broncos [34]which, according to Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson, are "specially designed for counter-insurgency actions against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons and wholly useless for defending Indonesia against a foreign enemy", adding that the policy continued under the Carter administration.

Testifying before the US Congress, the Deputy Legal Advisor of the US State Department, George Aldrich said the Indonesians "were armed roughly 90 percent with our equipment. ... we really did not know very much. Maybe we did not want to know very much but I gather that for a time we did not know." Indonesia was never informed of the supposed US "aid suspension". David T. Kenney, Country Officer for Indonesia in the US State Department, also testified before Congress that one purpose for the arms was "to keep that area [Timor] peaceful." [35]

The invasion was not given much coverage by the U.S. media. When the subject was covered, the deaths were attributed to the preceding civil war rather than the Indonesian invasion. This caused some to later accuse the media of blatant bias, because coverage of the simultaneous genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge (not a US ally) was much more common.

Australian views

In September 2000 the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs released previously secret files that showed that comments by the Whitlam Labor government encouraged the Suharto regime to invade East Timor.[36][37], and just a year earlier, in 1999, documents were leaked that highlighted collusion by the then-current Howard government in covering up Indonesian atrocities and blocking international efforts to send a U.N. peacekeeping force to East Timor.

Despite Australian public outrage at events in East Timor, all Australian governments during the period of Indonesian occupation, from the Liberal-National Fraser government, through the Labor Hawke and Keating governments, to the Liberal-National Howard government colluded with the Indonesian military and President Suharto to obscure details about conditions in East Timor and preserve Indonesian control of the region[38]. This was an unpopular policy with the Australian public, because of the deaths of the Australian journalists and the heroic actions of the Timorese people during World War II were well-remembered. Vigorous protests took place in Australia against the occupation, and many Australian nationals participated in the resistance movement.

The Australian Labor Party in 1999 adopted a policy of support for East Timorese independence and opposition to the Indonesian presence there, through its Foreign Affairs spokesperson Laurie Brereton[39]. Breretons' credibility was attacked by the dominant Liberal-National Coalition government and its Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, and Prime Minister Howard. They were assisted in their campaign by the then-Labor-backbencher Kevin Rudd[40] (who would later lead the Labor Party to victory in the 2007 Australian federal election).

UN reaction

On December 12, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution according to which, "having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the Administering Power, concerning developments in Portuguese Timor...deplores the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor and calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory...and recommends that the Security Council take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination".

On December 22, 1975, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 384 which deplored Indonesia's actions and regretted that Portugal had not lived up to its duties as the administering power. The Resolution called upon all nations and parties to respect East Timor's territorial integrity and right to self-determination. It also urged the United Nations Secretary-General to send one of his representatives to asses the situation and decided that the Council would remain seized of the situation.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US ambassador to the UN at the time, wrote in his autobiography that "the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook [with regard to the invasion of East Timor]. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with not inconsiderable success." [41] Later, Moynihan admitted that as US ambassador to the UN, he had defended a "shameless" Cold War policy toward East Timor.

Notes

  1. ^ a b c Schwarz (1994), p. 201.
  2. ^ Schwarz (1994), p. 208.
  3. ^ Schwarz (1994), p. 207.
  4. ^ Taylor, Jean Gelman (2003). Indonesia: Peoples and Histories. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. p. 377. ISBN 0-300-10518-5.
  5. ^ Eyewitness account of 1975 murder of journalists
  6. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 39.
  7. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 22.
  8. ^ Schwarz (2003), p. 204
  9. ^ Angkasa Online
  10. ^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 107–108.; Budiardjo and Liong, p. 23.
  11. ^ Dunn (1996), pp. 257–260.
  12. ^ a b Quoted in Turner, p. 207.
  13. ^ Hill, p. 210.
  14. ^ Quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, p. 15.
  15. ^ Quoted in Ramos-Horta, p. 108.
  16. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 68.
  17. ^ Ramos-Horta, pp. 101–102.
  18. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 68.
  19. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 69; Dunn (1996), p. 253.
  20. ^ James Dunn cites a study by the Catholic Church suggesting that as many as 60,000 Timorese had been killed by the end of 1976. This figure does not appear to include those killed in the period between the start of the civil war in August 1975 and the invasion on December 7. See James Dunn, “The Timor Affair in International Perspective,” in Carey and Bentley, eds., East Timor at the Crossroads, 66
  21. ^ Taylor (1991), p. 71.
  22. ^ (Suharto's Indonesia, Blackburn, Australia: Fontana, 1980, 215); “East Timor: Contemporary History,” in Carey and Bentley, East Timor at the Crossroads, 239. McDonald’s figure includes the pre-invasion period while Taylor’s does not. From National Security Archive - George Washington University
  23. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 16.
  24. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 21.
  25. ^ Alatas, pp. 18–19.
  26. ^ Indonesia (1977), p. 19.
  27. ^ Klinken, Gary, 'Indonesian casualties in East Timor, 1975-1999: Analysis of an official list', Indonesia 80 (October 2005): 109-22.
  28. ^ Ben Kiernam Template:PDFlink, Chapter 9 page 202
  29. ^ Ben Kiernam footnotes "clearly meet a range of sociological definitions of genocide...." with [13] – Lou Kuper, Genocide (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), pages 174-175
  30. ^ [1]The National Security Archive
  31. ^ [2]The National Security Archive
  32. ^ [3]The National Security Archive
  33. ^ East Timor Revisited. Ford, Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975-76 The National Security Archive
  34. ^ a b c http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/
  35. ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=lWjLdLahLToC&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq=david+t.+kenney+timor+peaceful&source=web&ots=_QfR1TqDmd&sig=wW53pm-8jHg3_sdiSnEOYUnTcLI&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result
  36. ^ Mike Head (2000-09-18). "Documents reveal that Australia urged Indonesia to invade East Timor in 1975". World Socialist Web Site. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  37. ^ "Fed: Cables show Australia knew of Indon invasion of Timor". AAP General News (Australia). 2000-09-13. Retrieved 2008-01-03. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  38. ^ Fernandes, Clinton (2004) Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor
  39. ^ Fernandes, Clinton (2004) Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor
  40. ^ Fernandes, Clinton (2004) Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor
  41. ^ A Dangerous Place, Little Brown, 1980, p. 247

Bibliography

  • Indonesia. Department of Foreign Affairs. Decolonization in East Timor. Jakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1977. OCLC 4458152.
  • Schwarz, A. (1994). A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Westview Press. ISBN 1-86373-635-2.

See also

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